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Abstract 
 
This thesis is focused on the intersections of ontology and politics in the work of Michel 
Foucault and Jacques Derrida. In particular it concerns the ways in which these two thinkers 
offer accounts of (ethical, social, political) relations which exceed a traditional dichotomy 
between transcendentalism and empiricism. Both Derrida and Foucault show universal 
foundations to originate in an anterior play of differences 'between' the transcendental and 
empirical. However, as this thesis shows, each thinks this anterior 'medium' of relations in 
radically incommensurable ways: as differance or aporia in Derrida and as power and 
problematization in Foucault.  As such, each necessarily views the other as failing to account 
for the ‘true medium’ of relationality and so of its violent effacement and disavowal.  This 
incommensurability, it is argued, results in a polemic between them which is explicit in their 
competing accounts of Descartes’ Meditations and implicit throughout all of their work. This 
thesis traces the polemic between Derrida and Foucault across their accounts of subjectivity, 
ethics and politics.  It is argued that in their engagements with each of these fields they 
employ parallel politicizing strategies which are nevertheless wholly exclusive of one another. 
 The incommensurability between Derrida and Foucault reflects a broader problematic 
which any political thought affirming its own finitude cannot explicitly recognize.  Post-
foundational accounts of relationality, it is claimed, violently exclude competing 
philosophical strategies without the capacity of accounting for this exclusion.  
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Introduction 
  
 
For a Post-Foundational Political Thought  
 If there is a fundamental claim which might be said to delineate what has variously 
been called post-structural, ‘post-foundational,’ post-essential or post-metaphysical political 
thought today it is that there is an inherent and irreducible contingency to all forms of social 
order.  That is, the common response to the crisis of essentialist universalism which defines 
the vague and contested outline of a post-foundational paradigm lies in the affirmation of 
the contingent and plural nature of any ground or foundation of the political.  In turn, there 
is a corresponding shift of theoretical focus to the mode or means by which particular 
foundations are constituted.  Thus, to affix the qualifier ‘post’ to foundationalism or 
essentialism signals the recognition that an account of the political can be reduced neither to 
foundationalism nor to anti-foundationalism.1  The former is refused since, in the wake of 
Nietzsche and Heidegger in particular, it is affirmed that a principle grounding or ordering 
social relations which is transcendent to those relations themselves cannot be derived.  
Thought has no access to an Archimedean position beyond the (relational) terrain of its 
articulation.  Moreover, the possibility of a totally anti-foundational political theory is 
discounted since, as Jacques Derrida has perhaps shown most of all, to claim to have totally 
exceeded the foundational is itself a foundational or essentialist move.  Anti-foundationalism 
implies the capacity to totally circumscribe, master and exceed a foundational ‘inside’ and 
thus in turn repeats the transcendent move it is meant to escape.  Post-foundationalism in 
short, does not usher in a nihilistic celebration of a total absence of order or normative 
principles but rather affirms that any ordering principle or ground is contingent, partial and 
never immutable. 
 
 The assertion of the contingency of any order of social relations marks in turn the 
need for a re-articulation of philosophy’s relation to politics.  Therefore, Jacques Rancière’s 
critique of what he calls ‘archipolitics’ is indicative of a broader post-foundational zeitgeist 
which seeks to question the constitutive principles that have governed political thought.  The 
                                               
1 On this point see Hugh Silverman, “Introduction.” Gianno Vattimo, “The Truth of Hermeneutics.” and  
    Basil O’Neill, “Truth as Fundamental and Foundational.” Collected in Hugh Silverman (Ed.) Questioning  
    Foundations: Truth/Subjectivity/Culture. London: Routledge, 1993.  See also Oliver Marchart, Post- 
    Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau. Edinburgh:     
    Edinburgh UP, 2007. Pp.11-15. 
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demand – which Rancière argues originates with The Republic – that the polis should reflect 
the order of ideas represents the denial of the contingent nature of the political inherent to 
the tradition of political philosophy.2   Rancière seeks to undermine the subsumption of 
politics to competing principles of order from which sovereign authority is derived, which 
Hannah Arendt refers to as the displacement of the political by an “external force which 
transcends the political realm.”3  For Arendt, philosophy’s positing of principles that might 
govern the political reflects the former’s desire to master and escape the unpredictability and 
contingency of human action.4  Implicitly building on Arendt’s claim, Rancière argues that 
the tradition has related to the political as a ‘paradox’ to be resolved by the philosopher 
whose role is to determine the “harmonious essence of a just or good society.”5  Philosophy 
engages in politics, Rancière argues, only in terms of its desire to “achieve politics by 
eliminating politics,” by governing its contingency through a transcendent ground.6  Despite 
their broad differences from Rancière, Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe too are 
exemplary of the critique of archipolitics which, in their terms forms a ‘retreat of the 
political.’  A withdrawal or retreat of the political qua political, they argue, has been effected 
by the metaphysical tradition’s positing of an “essential […] co-belonging of the philosophical 
and the political.”7  The philosophical and the political have until now functioned, Nancy 
and Lacoue-Labarthe claim, as mutual limits insofar as the latter is related to as the object of 
philosophy, a relation defined by philosophy’s “total domination of the political” constituted 
in its desire to empirically realize itself.8  The political withdraws or retreats insofar as it is 
never thought in itself, but always displaced, effaced and dominated by philosophy’s desire to 
order and master it.  
 
 Consonant with the critique of ‘archipolitics’ is a critical assessment by post-
foundational political thinkers of the aspiration to transform political philosophy into a 
political science.  Grounded in various economic or behaviorist principles and competing 
                                               
2  Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. (Trans., Julie Rose). Minneapolis: U of Minnesota    
    Press, 1999. 
3  Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority?” Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought.  
    London: Penguin, 1993.  P.97, 115. 
4  Ibid. Pp.109-114. 
5  Jacques Rancière, Disagreement. P.64.  See also Slavoj Zizek’s discussion of Rancière’s account of  
    archipolitics in The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London: Verso, 1990. P.190 
6  Ibid. 
7  Jean-Luc Nancy & Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Opening Address to the Centre for Philosophical  
    Research on the Political.” Retreating the Political. (Ed. & Trans., Simon Sparks). Pp.107-121.  See p.109 
8  Jean-Luc Nancy & Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “The ‘Retreat’ of the Political.” Retreating the Political.   
    Pp.122-134.  P.123 
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methods for pursuing its task, politics becomes conceived as the competition over the 
distribution and management of power, interests and resources.  The sum of these practices 
is in turn named ‘political system’ and becomes the object of a science of politics.  This 
desire for objectivity is extended to the beliefs, ideals and values which animate political 
activities usually through idealized and abstract accounts of political agents. 9  Consequently, 
the political is confined by an epistemological discipline to an institutional ensemble and 
what Arditi and Valentine call its “day-to-day administrative rivalries.”10  Political science, 
driven by what Claude Lefort says is a “desire to objectivity,” sees politics as existing only if it 
can be measured as behavior, procedure, the distribution of resources or people.11  
Accordingly, Lefort claims, political science fails to account for the fact that the scientist and 
his/her objects are constituted within a socio-political and historical context which invests 
the object with meaning, or in other words, that his/her practice is itself political, 
inseparable from the socio-political horizon in which it is constituted.  
 
 If the broad claim articulated by the thinkers discussed here and shared by many 
others is that political philosophy and political science displace or disavow the political by 
defining it by the terms of another field, be it metaphysics, science or economics, then the 
common aim of post-foundational political thought, I would suggest, is to seek to think the 
political in itself and not to ground or order it through the principles of a field which 
exceeds it.  The sheer fact of our being-with-others anterior to its determination by some 
ground or principles, the patent plurality of an indeterminate and contingent relationality 
becomes the object of thought.  The aim in other words, is to think the social ‘bond’ without 
ground, to relate determinate social relations to the indeterminate, the contingency of an 
‘unbond’ from which they emerge.  Once the gesture of grounding or determining a social 
order is displaced by the foundational question of how a given order is grounded relations 
appear as radically contingent.  Once any ground or order is affirmed as contingent, the 
question of relation, of the binding-unbinding of pure singularities or differences themselves 
rather than the search for the terms by which they can be organized and ordered, emerges as 
a central one for political thought.     
 
 The refusal of the archipolitical and scientific desire to displace the political therefore 
                                               
9  Benjamin Arditi, Politics on the Edges of Liberalism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2007.  P.12 
10  Benjamin Arditi and Jeremy Valentine, Polemicization The Contingency of the Commonplace. Edinburgh:    
 Edinburgh UP, 1999. P.13 
11  Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory. (David Macey, Trans.) Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988.  P.11 
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alters the aims of political thought and the terrain it seeks to elucidate.  The locus of thought 
shifts to the event of the determination of social relations themselves.    The unities and 
identities which were previously central to political analysis begin to lose their privileged 
place.  Particular conceptions of the good society, the subject, man or consciousness 
functioning as the grounds of inter-subjectivity are supplanted by a primacy of the ‘inter’ 
itself.  That is, of the contingent status of the ‘bond’ or community anterior to its 
determination, reduction or restriction through the constitution of particular hierarchies, 
obligations and orders.   
 
 
Rethinking the Question of Relation 
It is from out of this broad characterization of post-foundational political thought 
that the fundamental paradox which this thesis engages issues.  While for all of their 
differences, Nancy, Antonio Negri, Gilles Deleuze, Ernesto Laclau, Judith Butler, William 
Connolly, Slavoj Zizek, Giorgio Agamben and especially our protagonists Jacques Derrida 
and Michel Foucault (to name but a few), have brought political thought to question its 
foundations, they have also put in question the possibility of severing philosophy from the 
political conditions within which it arises.  While politics can no longer lay claim to secure 
grounds, the gesture of rethinking political ontology cannot be separated or abstracted from 
the social relations from which it is articulated.  If an account of the nature of the political in 
terms of the contingency of the relations that make it up is to be coherent, it must I argue, 
entail the affirmation of the situatedness or particularity of any such account.  No 
Archimedean position exists beyond the relational from which the latter can be described.  
An irreducible opacity haunts every post-foundational political thought; every account has an 
uncircumventable partial and finite status such that a paradox emerges: how are we to think the 
differences and divergences between political ontologies which provide an account of the nature of the 
relational while simultaneously affirming the finite and political status of that very account?  On what 
grounds might we think the fundamental differences between thinkers insofar as post-
foundational political ontologies recoil back upon the authority and totalizing nature of their 
claims in asserting their own finitude? 
 
Engagements with these considerations have thus far only been incomplete.  Stephen 
K. White, whose work represents one of the more well known attempts to define a post-
 11 
foundational political paradigm, is instructive of the limits of such attempts hitherto.  White 
has proposed, in defense of accusations of the thoroughgoing relativism of post-
foundationalism, that contemporary continental political theory should be conceived in 
terms of what he calls, echoing a concept coined by Gianno Vattimo, “weak ontology.”12  
White argues that to describe ontology as ‘weak’ denotes two indispensable elements which 
post-foundational accounts of the political share.  First, in the absence of transcendental 
grounds there is, as William Connolly has also argued, an ‘essential contestability’ to 
political concepts and theorems.  White maintains this does not mean we should or could 
jettison conceptual apparatuses and frameworks altogether and I would add that to do so, as 
we will see, would be to return to the errors of empiricism and positivism.13  Secondly, ‘weak 
ontologies’ are consequently not ‘anti-foundationalist’ as their less rigorous critics and 
supporters alike often affirm, yet nor do they qualify their own theories or accounts as 
“incontestable” as a traditional foundational account would.14  In other words, weak 
ontologies do not amount to what Jean-Francois Lyotard has infamously called ‘meta-
narratives,’ totalizing accounts of the world.15  But given their inescapably theoretical status 
they necessarily form “generalizations” insofar as they stand for different political ontologies.  
As White puts it, “[w]hat sort of engagement there will be between one small narrative and 
another only takes shape within the conception, however implicit, of a ‘grand’ or at least 
grander narrative.”16  Thus, White’s imposition of the qualifier ‘weak’ to post-foundational 
political ontologies denotes both the now commonplace affirmation of the absence of any 
final normative ground for political theory while at the same time affirming that there is 
nevertheless implicit in all theory a ‘grounding’ and thus, at least a partially totalizing move.   
 
Accordingly, White’s argument resonates with my own articulation of post-
foundational political thought.  Yet my claim is that the implications of this formulation 
must be pressed further, in the direction of an essential paradox: post-foundational political 
ontologies affirm their own contingency and particularity yet simultaneously, necessarily efface that 
particularity insofar as they are couched in the productions of ‘grander’ narratives.  As we will see, 
                                               
12  Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory.  Princeton:  
      Princeton UP, 2000.  See also Gianno Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post- 
      Modern Culture. (Trans., John R. Snyder).  Cambridge: Polity, 1988. 
13  Ibid., p.8. See also William Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse. 3rd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell,    
      1993. 
14  Ibid. p.11 
15  Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. (Geoff Bennington & Brian  
      Massumi, Trans.) Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1984.   
16  Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation. P.12 
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Derrida may affirm the contingency of any particular deconstruction and Foucault may 
affirm his genealogies as particular exercises of power.  But insofar as these accounts of the 
contingency and finitude of their own philosophies still rely upon a presumption of what ‘is’ 
they are irreducible to the grounding move of articulating a ‘grander’ narrative. 
 
 Therefore, if recent political thought has sought to think the contingency of all 
foundations or universal grounds, what has generally gone under-theorized is what I suggest 
is the way in which political thought is itself politicized once post-foundational premises are 
accepted.  If, as White argues, principles and concepts are both irreducible and yet the result 
of particular conditions of existence, then I argue that ‘weak’ ontological accounts are more 
finite than they affirm and can be politicized in ways exceeding the limits of their own 
grander narratives.  In short, what Connolly conceives as the “essential contestability” of 
political concepts which results from the impossibility of deriving a neutral language or 
metalangue to describe political phenomena, can be extended the essential contestability of 
political ontologies themselves and in turn, orients enquiry towards the constituent points of 
divergence between them.17 
 
Engaging with Derrida and Foucault 
 It is with these hypotheses of the contingent and contestable status of political 
ontology in mind that I situate my comparative analysis of the work of Jacques Derrida and 
Michel Foucault.  Typically either corralled together as harbingers of post-modernism, 
prophets of nihilism, privileged pillars of la pensée soixante huit, as young conservatives, or 
conversely, differentiated only through the partisan demand to take sides which leads to the 
condemnation of one through theoretical strategies indebted to the other, rarely is the 
possibility of an extensive and productive dialogue between them undertaken.  This thesis 
seeks to do just that, to trace the exchange of theoretical positions which takes place between 
these two thinkers; an exchange which is explicit in the polemic which emerges out of 
Derrida’s reading of Foucault’s first book, Madness and Civilization and, with the exception of 
an essay of Derrida’s and occasional veiled references on the part of both, is largely implicit 
and at the background of all of their work.  In tracing the moments where their works 
converge but also, perhaps more significantly, where they deviate – the moments where the 
possibility of dialogue between them ultimately breaks down – we attain not only a more 
                                               
17   William Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse.  
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nuanced view of their respective oeuvres but can also begin to draw out implications which 
extend beyond their work to engage with the ways in which philosophy’s relation to the 
political is theorized.  The interstices between Derrida and Foucault provide an opportunity 
to begin to re-articulate the terms in which the political, broadly conceived, can be 
understood today. 
 
 The polemic between Derrida and Foucault concerns on the one hand, the question 
of how to think the locus of the event by which relations are determined and on the other 
hand, each account’s success in affirming its own relational status.  If relation denotes the 
processes that operate between terms to condition or effect their individuality then no 
identity can be abstracted from the (social, economic, sexual, linguistic, cultural, etc.) 
relations from out of which they emerge.18  Thus, every relation implies a particular 
authority, hierarchy, order and violence since it determines and arrests in some way what are 
ultimately irreducible differences.  The debate between Derrida and Foucault lies not only 
over what this relational process ‘is,’ how it operates and how its contingent nature can be 
revealed, because the medium of thought must also be relational and thus (partially) 
conditioned.  In other words, when engaged in polemics against one another I argue that 
fundamentally, each accuses the other of failing to think the ‘true’ medium wherein relations 
are determined and accordingly, of failing to fully assume the partial and finite nature of 
their own account insofar as its point of departure lies in a determinate relational field.  
While both think a relational medium anterior to any identity, subject or ground, each 
thinks this medium differently and as such, their philosophies are at their core 
incommensurable.  If each affirms the essential situatedness of his thought, insofar as it is 
inscribed within a grander narrative which the interlocutor rejects, each thus views the other 
as having failed to situate it adequately.  In this light, the debate or polemic thus suggests 
that a conception of incommensurability should supplement recent articulations of 
contingency in political theory. 
 
 
 
                                               
18  I appropriate this definition of relation from Peter Hallward, Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of 
Creation. London: Verso, 2006.   Rudolphe Gasche offers a similar definition in Of Minimal Things: Essays on 
the Notion of Relation. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000. Pp.2-10.  For a history of the status of the concept of 
relation see Julius R. Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation and Induction. Madison: U of Wisconsin, 1965. Pp.68-
78. 
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Outline of Chapters 
 It is around the insight that the polemic between Derrida and Foucault takes the 
form of two ‘grander’ yet finite narratives that the central questions which animate thesis are 
organized.  Chapter 1 introduces the terms through which the polemic takes place by 
locating the origins of our questions in the work of both Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin 
Heidegger.  Nietzsche and Heidegger are important thinkers for an engagement with post-
foundational political thought since both, perhaps more than any other philosopher, 
introduced a thinking which proceeds from the primacy and contingency of relations.  
Nietzsche posits that the subject, identity and truth are preceded by anterior fields of 
relations between forces.  Similarly, for Heidegger the subject’s relation to an object or to 
others emerges from out of a primordial Being-in-the-world.  Anterior to the determinate is 
the unconcealing of Being; the disclosure of a world is antecedent to any particular way of 
inhabiting that world.   
 
 Moreover, in insisting upon the irreducibility of contingency both posit the 
irreducibility of the violence of all relations.  If there is no natural order or ground of the 
political which thought can recover then every order cannot but be unnatural and violent.  
Nietzsche situates the origin of every truth in a field of struggle while in Heidegger’s lectures 
of the mid-1930s in particular every ordering is said to be effected in an originary polemos.  
Positing violence as originary presents a fundamental aporia for thought: the means by which 
ethico-political orientations have traditionally been derived are withdrawn.  That is, both 
Nietzsche and Heidegger affirm the absence of normative grounds yet their responses to this 
absence nevertheless prove inadequate.  Nietzsche’s ‘grand politics’ and Heidegger’s 
attempted recovery of the pre-Socratic origin of metaphysics ultimately repeat the grounding 
move and its consequent denial of originary violence.  Yet they provoke what might be said 
to be the fundamental question governing the polemic between Derrida and Foucault: once 
one invokes the irreducibility of violence – of all relations and of one’s own philosophy – on 
what basis is a philosophical ethics and politics to be derived? 
 
 The polemic between Derrida and Foucault over the status of Descartes’ Meditations, 
the focus of chapter 2, might be said to revolve around this very question.  Each thinker 
accuses the other of obscuring both the true locus wherein Descartes’ rational subject is 
differentiated from an absolutely mad alterity and of veiling and renouncing the violence of 
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his own account of that event and concordant appropriation of madness.  Ultimately, each 
thinker is accused by the other of failing to think the ‘true’ medium or terrain where 
relations are determined.  That at stake in this dispute are two irreducible ‘grander’ 
narratives is unmistakable once we demonstrate in the second part of this chapter that the 
critique of Derrida’s transcendentalism or Foucault’s empiricism cannot ultimately be 
maintained.  How then are we to think and articulate the discrepancy between these two 
oeuvres? 
 
 In chapter 3 I suggest that it is ultimately a matter of the pursuit of two differing 
strategies of accounting for the relational which marks the divergence between Derrida and 
Foucault.  Their ontological differences are tied to methodological ones.  Like Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, both seek to perform a sort of meta-questioning which shifts the site of 
philosophical interrogation from the desire to order and organize to an analysis of the 
conditions which make particular orders or hierarchies possible.  The Derridean formulation 
of aporia and the Foucaultian formulation of problematization are two competing modes 
through which these conditions are located and interrogated.  Yet if we affirm that Derrida 
and Foucault posit two modes of questioning which move between the affirmation of a finite 
locus and a grander narrative which accounts for the conditions of possibility of order can an 
ethics be said to orient their own questions?  That is to say, once we assert the impossibility 
of appropriating a pre-ordinal ground and thought appears limited to avowing the 
contingency of its conditions (as aporetic or problematic) then Derrida and Foucault appear 
to be left without any foundation by which relational existence can be negotiated.   
 
 These questions form the focus of chapters 4 and 5.  Chapter 4 takes up Derrida’s 
and Foucault’s explicitly ethical works in order to examine the divergent ethico-political 
orientations they construct.  By thinking a violence more pervasive than the empirical and 
which cannot be transcended both thinkers risk being incapable of identifying violence at all.  
The escape from this dilemma in both cases is grounded in an articulation of an economy of 
violence governed by two opposite poles of a better and a worse violence.  This in turn 
provides a means by which the refusal of a non-violent standard or ground nevertheless 
provides an ethical orientation.   
 
 Chapter 5 engages with a series of questions related to the nature of politics which 
follow from what I suggest are two competing economies of violence which emerge from 
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Derrida's and Foucault's ethico-political orientations.  Following the discussion of their 
divergent methodologies in chapter 3 and their distinct ethical orientations in chapter 4, this 
chapter explicitly takes up the central question posed at the outset; that of philosophy's 
relation to politics.  This chapter examines the displacements of archipolitics each thinker 
develops in order to examine both how their correlative yet distinct ethical orientations 
constitute the political terrain upon which dominant logics or systems are to be resisted and 
how we are to think the disparity in the political strategies which their works evoke?  Here, 
their incommensurability, elaborated throughout the thesis, is claimed to hold political 
import in itself.  To the extent that Derrida’s and Foucault's accounts are self-affirmingly 
finite and situated there is no position beyond the relational which they both seek to express 
from which the polemic between them can be decided.  Their incommensurability points to 
a broader polemical/political space which cannot be described as such since it only emerges 
between Derrida and Foucault, confirmed only in the equality of their incommensurability, a 
polemical space that can only be inferred.  The political must be seen as essentially polemical 
yet it must also be admitted that no single discourse can fully depict this polemical space 
since to do so is to restrict these polemics.  Considering the political as polemical in these 
terms serves to introduce a notion of radical democracy.  For if no single onto-perspectival 
theory can be said to depict the political as such, this also means that ‘radical’ democracy 
cannot be reduced to any such account.  Accordingly, ontological incommensurability allows 
us to posit a notion of the democratic which is simply defined as being in excess of any of its 
particular descriptions.  Any account of the democratic and by extension, of the relational 
will be exceeded by a democratic field in which it is enunciated.  Philosophy is politicized, 
but also democratized. 
 
 Finally, chapter 6 asks if the schema of philosophy's relation to politics derived from 
the question of relation in Derrida and Foucault can be extended beyond the specificity of 
their 'onto-political' accounts?  Is there a limit or paradox internal to Derrida and Foucault 
which allows us to construct a 'perspectival' schematic but marks these two thinkers as 
insufficient?  Might a politics of indetermining or un-bonding the relational exhaust the 
political possibilities of a thought affirming its own relational status?  Positing an 
engagement with recent political ontologies centered upon a notion of universalism, and 
Alain Badiou's work in particular, allows us to begin to outline the ways in which 
universalizing onto-political strategies might be amenable to the notions of polemics and 
 17 
incommensurability developed through the work of Derrida and Foucault.  Badiou's work 
certainly poses a challenge to the account of political thought developed in this thesis and it 
is through his work and that of others who share some of his fundamental critiques of post-
foundationalism that the possibilities for broadening my concept of incommensurability 
might appear. 
 
 Such a project however, would have to proceed from out of the fundamental claims 
developed in this thesis.  That is to say, through an analysis of the contingency of the 
relational that any account of determinate social relations itself proceeds from out of its 
situatedness within the determinate.  By tracing a polemic between Derrida and Foucault in 
terms of their accounts of (de)politicization, the polemic between them is shown to result 
from their pursuit of two parallel yet radically incommensurable philosophico-strategic 
accounts of repoliticization.  It is the question of relation which produces an analysis of their 
philosophical accounts of the political without effacing the fact that philosophy is in itself 
political, that is, inextricably tied to determinate relations.  It is thus by tracing the polemic 
between Derrida and Foucault as two ways of thinking the event of the political that we can 
demonstrate that there exists a politicized or polemical space that exceeds their accounts and 
which appears only negatively – inferred at the points of their incommensurability.  And it is 
this incommensurability itself which points to a broader account of the relational.  In other 
words, if there is broad agreement among post-foundational thinkers of the polemical nature 
of all political concepts, then the object of debate should be transformed from the 
traditional question of the grounds of legitimacy to competing (and possibly 
incommensurable) accounts of the polemical; of the violence and determination of 
relationality itself.   
 
Some Preliminary Qualifications 
 With the exception of the first and last chapters, the scope of this thesis is defined by 
the construction of a continuous dialogue between Derrida and Foucault on a series of 
questions revolving around a focus on the political as the relational.  This is not a stylistic 
decision but a methodological one insofar as it serves two fundamental conditions if my 
central claims are to be successful.  First, the pursuit of a dialogue between them shows they 
construct similar and analogous philosophical and political orientations.  Second, it 
demonstrates both the coherence and the equality of their work.  As such, their mutual 
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critiques or what I will call circumscriptions of one another can be maintained only from 
within their particular ‘grander’ narratives.  The polemic between them is irreducible insofar 
as each pursues a different and incommensurable ‘grander’ narrative which necessarily 
constitutes the other as having failed to affirm his position within this terrain.  It is thus the 
moments where the dialogue between Derrida and Foucault breaks off, in the silence and 
incommensurability between them that a relational locus which exceeds both accounts and 
points to a perspectivism more radical than either thinker is able to affirm.  It is a terrain 
visible only in the breakdown of dialogue. 
 
 If my hypothesis is correct and their works should be situated in a broader series of 
questions around relationality and political ontology why then privilege Derrida and 
Foucault as exemplars?  Something more of the situatedness of my own project should be 
affirmed here.  At the outset, this thesis began as an investigation of the status of the 
relational in Foucault’s work.  Motivated by dissatisfaction with recent critiques of Foucault’s 
ethics often animated by Derridean concerns, a turn to the work of the latter was inevitable.  
Yet once I had turned to the question of the difference between Derrida and Foucault it 
became clear that their apparent incommensurability posed a problem and paradox which 
each chapter of this thesis can be understood as an attempt to grasp.   
 
 In a sense Derrida and Foucault are, it is my hypothesis, nevertheless only exemplars of 
a broader problematic of the finitude of relational ontologies.  Yet, in a very Derridean sense, 
given the irreducibility of finitude which must accompany all accounts of relation, there can 
be no ‘essence’ of the relational which exceeds the status of the exemplary; any account of 
the relational as I describe it can only be partial.  Thus, there is ultimately no philosophically 
legitimate reason why Derrida and Foucault should be chosen as exemplars.  That being said, 
the primacy accorded to these two thinkers in this thesis issues from the explicit dialogue 
and polemic between them.  The dialogue itself, obviously most pronounced in the cogito 
debate, is what first points us to the notion that the divergence between Derrida and 
Foucault suggests the possibility of beginning to think a concept of relation whose definition 
is initially limited to an affirmation of being in excess of both thinkers.  It is in tracing the 
terms upon which they themselves see the interlocutor's work as inadequate which indicates 
the relational as it appears in the interstices between them.  But then, where shall we begin?  
With the question of beginnings and origins and the authors of its most radical articulations 
in the late 19th and early 20th century: Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger.
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Chapter 1:  
Nietzsche, Heidegger and the Question of Relation 
 
The aim is lacking.  'Why?' finds no answer.' 
Friedrich Nietzsche1 
 
'Man is like the rose.  Without 'why?' 
Friedrich Holderlin2 
 
 
Introduction 
 If we begin with Nietzsche and Heidegger it is because they are both crucial to any 
attempt to think the question of relation.  While their influence on Derrida and Foucault 
is immense my aim will not be to take its measure; I will not be trading in intellectual 
histories nor tracking influences.  Rather, my concern here will be to begin to suggest 
what it might mean to think the relational and the paradoxes and challenges with which 
such a thought must engage.  An encounter with Nietzsche and Heidegger is fundamental 
to such a task since both, perhaps more than any other thinkers, think the primacy of 
relations, that is, as prior to their terms.  Nietzsche posits that the subject, identity and 
truth are preceded by an anterior field of relations between forces.  Similarly, for 
Heidegger the subject's relation to the object or to others emerges from out of a 
primordial being-in-the-world.  Anterior to the determinate is the unconcealing of Being; 
existence within a disclosed world is antecedent to any determinate relations within that 
world.   
 
 Moreover, both think relation as irreducibly violent.  Nietzsche sets the origins of 
transcendent truths in a field of struggle while in Heidegger's lectures of the mid-1930s in 
particular, every ordering or determination is the result of an originary polemos.  
Crucially, both distinguish the violence of origins from what Nietzsche calls the will to 
truth, the desire for stability and security in first principles.  Finally, both affirm the 
irreducible situatedness of thought.  Both Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectivism and 
Heidegger's existential category of thrownness or facticity form attempts to think relation 
from within particular and determinate relations.   
 
                                               
1  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power. (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale, trans.) New York:  
     Vintage, 1968. [Hereafter referred to as 'WP.']  WP, p.9. 
2  Quoted in Reiner Schurmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy. (Christine-Marie 
Gros, Trans.) Bloomington, Indiana, UP, 1987.  P.58 
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 My aim in this chapter will be three-fold.  First, I will begin to suggest, through 
readings of Nietzsche and Heidegger, the terms by which an account of the political 
pursued through the question of relation proceeds and the types of questions and 
paradoxes which emerge from such a trajectory.  Second, the Heideggerean encounter or 
auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche is suggestive for my overall argument since it forms the 
model for Derrida's and Foucault's critiques of one another.  Elucidating the form of what 
I will call Heidegger's 'circumscription' of Nietzsche within the limits of metaphysics is 
instructive since Derrida and Foucault effect similar moves on one another.  Finally, 
Derrida's and Foucault's Nietzschean critiques of Heidegger and their evocations of a 
genealogical method point to the fundamental moment of convergence between them.  It 
is in terms of their appropriations of Nietzschean genealogical themes that it is possible to 
show that these two thinkers share an ethico-political orientation which ultimately, makes 
a dialogue between them possible.  We turn first to an account of Nietzschean genealogy. 
 
 
Nietzsche's Genealogy and Relationality 
 
 The Genealogy of Morals revolves around Nietzsche’s distinction between two 
expressions of will to power which amount to two moral systems of differentiation; two 
systems of denoting actions and individuals deemed 'good' – admirable and praiseworthy 
– and their consonant opposites.3  The moral system of the 'strong' masters with which 
The Genealogy opens is characterized by a naked will to power – a pre-reflective expulsion 
and experience of power.  These 'noble' masters' will to power never met any impediments 
to its expression; they asserted their own goodness as an expression of strength prior to 
any measure by external criteria.4  Moral differentiation was consequent to strength; those 
weak slaves, unable to assert their goals and desires directly, were only consequently 
labeled as 'bad.'  Noble morality was a self-sufficient and affirmative one such that the 
nobles' self-differentiation was not constituted upon a relation of dependence to the 
weak.  Each of the three essays of The Genealogy of Morals recounts the event, and 
continued implications of, the 'slave revolt' in morals whereby this noble and aristocratic 
distinction between good and bad is overturned through the emergence of a new system 
of differentiation: slave morality.  
                                               
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality. (Douglas Smith, Trans.) Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996.  
[Hereafter referred to as 'GM.']   
4 GM,I: 7 
 21 
 Nietzsche derives the origins of morality and metaphysics in the slaves’ ressentiment 
against life and their vengeance against the nobles from what is a crucial supposition: 
metaphysical values are derived from a field of struggle.  Morality is, as he puts it, "the 
doctrine of the relations of supremacy."5  The erection of a system of moral values 
premised upon the principles of Judeo-Christian monotheism not only provided the 
instruments for a self-affirmation as a chosen people but also the construction of a 
metaphysical world that would allow the destruction of master morality.  The slaves, 
Nietzsche argues, constructed a vision of the world that licensed and celebrated their own 
position and character while simultaneously branding the strong as evil.6   
 
 By assuming the irreducibility of struggle and violence, Nietzsche's questioning of 
the "value of values" returns metaphysics to the violent exclusions and dominations which 
he shows are concordant with the elevation of any system of values.7  There is no single 
meaning of the good since any system of moral differentiation originates with social and 
political struggles.  To claim that "[t]his world is the will to power – and nothing besides!" as 
Nietzsche does, implies that struggle and domination are inherent to every claim to 
truth.8  Underlying Nietzsche's claim is a vision of the world as ephemeral, transitory and 
always in motion; a world composed of events and as nothing more than a "determination 
of degrees of relations of force."9  The crime and error of Christian slave morality and 
metaphysics is thus to have sought to fix, determine and transcend this cosmological 
drama and so, to have "robbed of its innocence the whole purely chance character of 
events."10  Slave morality functions as a 'herd' morality; it posits an 'other' "imaginary" 
world against which actions are measured and standards are developed to which all must 
conform.11  Accordingly, in opposition to the will to truth which characterizes slave 
morality, genealogy asserts the perspectival and partial nature of universalizing moral 
claims in order to cultivate a sense of their dubiousness and place their hegemony in 
question.12   
                                               
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. (Walter Kaufman, trans.) 
New York: Vintage, 1996.  [Hereafter referred to as 'BGE'].  BGE:19. 
6 GM,I:7 
7 GM, P:6  
8 WP, p.550 
9 WP, p.552,  
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality. (Walter Kaufmann, Trans.) 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.  13 
11 cf. Daybreak:10 
12 David Owen, Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality. London: Acumen, 2007. P.46.  Owen argues that the 
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 Nietzsche interprets man in terms of nature; the subject, identity or agent are but 
effects of a surface of relations between forces.  The will to power, Nietzsche argues, is 
continuous with, and defines life itself so that the function of a custom or institution are 
only markers of a will to power that has become master of something less powerful.  All 
living creatures including humans are governed by a desire to express or discharge 
power.13  Yet because humans are self-conscious creatures our will to power is never 
expressed directly but always mediated by particular perspectives through which we 
interpret and understand our power.  Interpretation becomes central to the way we 
experience our own will to power.  Accordingly, will to power can function as an 
evaluative standard, particular perspectives on the world can be evaluated in terms of the 
degree of enhanced potential of will to power which they allow us to experience and not 
the extent to which they correspond to reality.  From this perspective herd or slave 
morality is made to appear destructive since its cardinal belief that the pain and suffering 
of existence is a punishment for sin and guilt represses will to power.14   
 
Will to Truth 
 The result of slave morality's victory over nobility is the dominance of a new mode 
of determining social relations.  Nietzsche claims that the universalisation of values, 
necessary to maintain communal identity, was imposed through a form of relation 
between individual and community regulated and internalized through punishment.  The 
imposition of stability and uniformity in the political sphere in turn formed the basis for 
a mode of relating to self and others mediated and determined by external measure or 
standard of universal law.15  Social relations are stabilized and governed through a 
principle of self-denial constituted in the imposition of meaning upon existence in Judeo-
Christian tradition.16  As such, the value and meaning of life is posited as transcending 
and independent of it.  The desire to overcome suffering and domination is realized in 
the negation of existence which is seen as the source of misery.  A will to power emerges 
which can only assert itself by denying and repressing itself.  At the core of metaphysical 
                                                                                                                                          
burden of Nietzsche's claim does not lie with disproving metaphysics, the cultivation of doubt and 
skepticism is sufficient to begin to eliminate the need for metaphysical justifications.  
13 BGE:13.  See Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought. MIT: London, 1988.  Chapter 4.  See also 
Paul Patton “Power in Hobbes and Nietzsche.” Nietzsche, Feminism, Political Theory. (Paul Patton, Ed.) 
London: Routledge, 1993. Pp.144-161. 
14 BGE:202, 203.   
15 GM, II:8 
16 GM, II:7 
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life lies a 'will to truth': truth fulfills the demand for stability and security, it supplants the 
absence of any meaning of suffering by devaluing sensual life.  Metaphysical ideals, 
Nietzsche argues, are "ideals which are all hostile to life, ideals that defame the world."17  
In short, for Nietzsche, man is enslaved to a myth of truth, a form of life that posits a 
realm external to it which then acts as its ground, a will to power which seeks to situate 
itself beyond all contradiction.18 
 
 If Nietzsche affirms that there is a will to power behind all values then by tracing 
their descent and their origins his genealogy seeks to undermine their universal and 
humanist pretensions.19  The metaphysical move of positing local valuations as universal 
is de-stabilized if not displaced altogether.  The meta-question of the value of values which 
animates genealogy is indeed a moral one; the ethical ideal of truth emerging from herd 
morality is the source of every ideal.20  This ideal, which Nietzsche calls will to truth, is 
what Michel Haar refers to as the "moral prejudice of all knowledge."21  There is a 
fundamental conviction "that truth is more important than anything else, than every 
other intention."22  In short, this ethical ideal is defined by the desire for unity and identity 
over difference, dynamism and the play of forces and which in turn attempts to justify and 
explain the suffering of existence; a will which effaces the force, dynamism and difference 
at the origin of every metaphysical ideal. 
 
Ontology, Epistemology and Ethics 
 Does Nietzsche's genealogy exceed or transgress the will to truth?  Is it too subject 
to the same desire for truth?  Any response to this question must begin by asserting that 
there is a perfect continuity between Nietzsche's account of the will to power and of 
perspectivism.  If life is will to power "and nothing besides!" as Nietzsche asserts, then the 
values of identity, stability and universality both repress the inherent force or power of 
knowledge and the necessarily perspectival nature of that account.  No concept is total or 
free of perspective since every concept originates from out of the play of differences 
                                               
17 GM, II:24 
18 Michel Haar, “Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language.” The New Nietzsche. (David B. Allison, Ed.). Pp.5-
36. P.18 
19 Keith Ansell-Pearson, Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1994.  Pp.125-6 
20 GM, P:6; Michel Haar, “Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language.” P.18 
21  Ibid. 
22 GS: 344. 
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between forces.  "Perspectival seeing", Nietzsche says, "is the only kind of knowing."23  The 
will to power as play of appearances is a dynamism that eludes identification by stable 
concepts or the essence of Being.24   
 
 An immediate continuity relates the ontological assertion of life as will to power 
to the epistemological assertion that all knowledge is perspectival.  Any recognition of life 
as a phenomenon includes a recognition of the violent and arbitrary character of life and 
the partial, violent character of all knowledge.  Since there is an indefinite play of forces it 
follows that there is an indefinite number of interpretations.25   It is in this perspectival 
account that Nietzsche asserts, if not introduces a central insight to the question of 
relation: that the affirmation of relationality provokes and is inseparable from a reflection 
on thought's point of departure.   
   
 In this way the relation between Nietzsche's account of will to power and his 
affirmation of perspectivism points to a 'paradox' which exceeds the confines of 
Nietzsche’s work to affect in some sense all post-foundational thought: if all knowledge is 
affirmed as perspectival, as originating from out of determinate relations and thus partial, 
then it seems to follow that there can be no privileged position from which the 'grander' 
account of will to power can be derived.  To put it bluntly, if everything is affirmed as an 
interpretation, then it appears that the account of life as will to power too must be 
affirmed as such – as violent and partial event.  Accordingly, there is, as Jean Granier 
notes, an apparent oscillation between Nietzsche’s affirmation of perspectivism and the 
identity of some definite knowledge.26  However, from this apparent circularity we should 
not derive Habermas' conclusion that Nietzsche, like the supposed 'young conservatives' 
who follow him, is guilty of self-referentiality insofar as the account of perspectivism 
seems to exclude the possibility of providing an account of will to power as such.27  The 
claim that will to power and perspectivism are contradictory formulations only makes 
sense if one excludes the possibility that Nietzsche can inhabit a position between a 
particular perspective and a 'grander' 'ontological' narrative about life itself as preservation 
                                               
23 GM, III:12  
24 Jean Granier, “Perspectivism and Interpretation.” The New Nietzsche. Pp.190-200.  P.191. 
25 GS: 374 
26 Jean Granier. “Perspectivism and Interpretation.” P.197 
27 Jurgen Habermas.  The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.  (Frederick Lawrence, Trans.) Cambridge: 
Polity, 1990.  p.74 
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and overcoming.  The claim of vicious circularity between perspectivism and will to power 
first countenanced by both Walter Kaufmann and Arthur Danto and seized upon by 
Habermas relies upon the false assumption that Nietzsche's position would have to be 
extra-perspectival in seeking to account for the conditions of all perspectives themselves.28   
 
 For any thought which reflects upon its point of departure, upon its being-
historical and being-relational such an oscillation between particular and 'grander' 
narrative is not only not vicious, it is absolutely irreducible.  As Clive Cazeaux suggests, 
the critical appraisal of circularity or contradiction in Nietzsche relies on a particular 
understanding of 'ontology,' one which Nietzsche himself denies.29  Kaufmann, Danto 
and Habermas all appear to imply that will to power refers to a fundamental realm of 
beings or things in themselves beyond appearances and independent of context.30  Yet 
Nietzsche does not assert that knowledge must be of the object in itself or independent of 
context, he is totally consistent in claiming that knowledge is always relational and as 
such, never total or necessary.  Will to power is, as Tracy Strong argues, a form-giving 
force: knowledge is a mode of will to power and thus, immanent to what it describes.31  
Or, as Diana Coole puts it, "will to power is not an origin but interpretation and 
becoming."32  There is no in-itself of will to power, there are only violent and partial 
interpretations of it each of which is but its expression.  
 
 Understanding will to power in these terms may not free Nietzsche from the 
paradox of circularity but my claim is that there need not be a burden on it to do so.  This 
argument is confirmed by a number of Nietzsche's interpreters who argue that genealogy 
need not refer its account to an ultimate ground but rather, that comparisons and 
evaluations can be made between perspectives on the basis of criteria which they share.33  
Points of reference can be asserted as neutral insofar as they are internal to two or more 
perspectives.  For Maudemarie Clark these 'neutral' criteria are located in relevant beliefs 
                                               
28 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1950.  P.176, 
Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher.  New York: Columbia UP, 2005.  P.62  This common claim 
uniting these thinkers is pointed to by Clive Cazeaux in his Metaphor and Continental Philosophy: From 
Kant to Derrida. London: Routledge, 2007.  
29 Clive Cazeaux, Metaphor and Continental Philosophy. P.109 
30 Ibid. 
31 Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration.  London: U of California Press, 1976. 
P.233-4 
32  Dianna Coole, Negativity and Politics: Dionysus and Dialectics from Kant to Postructuralism. London:  
Routledge, 2000.  P.102 
33  I owe this point to Clive Cazeaux, Metaphor and Continental Philosophy. P.109 
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which differing perspectives share.34  For David Owen, will to power, which he conceives 
as an expression of agency, is both internal to but also exceeds metaphysics since it 
succeeds in coherently supplying the conditions for metaphysical assertions and beliefs.35  
In a similar vein John Richardson argues that the preservation of ambiguity between wills 
acts as a measure of the will to power which can cross different perspectives; in fact, it is 
the aptitude for crossing and multiplying perspectives which signals health.36  Thus, as 
Nietzsche puts it,  
 
"the more feelings about a matter which we allow to come to expression, the more eyes, 
different eyes through which we are able to view this same matter, the more complete our 
'conception' of it, our 'objectivity', will be."37   
 
For all of the above thinkers will to power is ultimately just a 'better' perspective because it 
is successful in explaining and evaluating given cultural practices thus circumscribing 
them in its terms and in affirming its own perspectival character.   
 
 Ultimately, the circularity between ontology and epistemology, between Nietzsche's 
perspective(s) and the grander narrative of will to power can be neither arrested nor 
circumvented.    Yet the claim being pursued here is that this circle should be seen neither 
as vicious and contradictory nor as marking the ultimate incoherence of genealogy.  
Rather, its circularity forms the necessarily ethical affirmation of genealogy – Nietzsche’s, 
but also, as we will see in chapter 4, Derrida’s and Foucault’s – insofar as it affirms its 
own relational status.  Genealogy affirms its origins in relations of force and struggle and 
so relinquishes the claim to a totalizing knowledge.  This affirmation of situatedness 
forms what Charles Scott calls the ethical 'recoil' of the genealogical discourse insofar as 
its apparent circularity allows it to resist "authoritatively reestablish[ing] itself."38  In their 
circularity the authority of Nietzsche's narratives always recoils back onto them so that 
their authority is undermined.39  Like any perspective genealogy is a determinate 
expression of force yet in affirming itself as such it is, to paraphrase Derrida, a 'weak 
force.'40  Genealogy's capacity to exceed the will to truth is thus not limited to its 
                                               
34 Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy.  Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990. P.141 
35 David Owen, Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality. P.33, 46. 
36 John P. Richardson, Nietzsche’s System. New York: Oxford UP, 1996.  P.279-280 
37 GM III:12 
38 Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger.  Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
1990. P.15 
39 Ibid. p.16 
40 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays On Reason.(Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, Trans.). Stanford: 
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production of a narrative which relegates the latter to an anterior field of forces since in 
confirming its own particularity it refuses to ground the legitimacy and authority of its 
assertions.  Knowledge, in other words, is not divorced from power.  Yet there is also a 
moment in Nietzsche's work where this incessant self-undermining is disavowed.  In his 
call for a 'grand' politics Nietzsche succumbs to the philosophical desire to legislate the 
political.   
 
'Grand Politics' and the Failure to Recoil 
 Nietzsche premises the potential for an overcoming of herd morality in the 
formation of a ‘sovereign individual’ with the capacity to posit his own values: an 
individual with the power to appeal to himself rather than universal values as ultimate 
authority.  It is in this sense that he calls upon humanity to “become those we are – human 
beings who are unique, incomparable.”41  Such an individual would mark a new ‘health,’ 
a being who would require no metaphysical grounds or security to justify the meaning of 
existence, an individual who would not require certainty as a condition of the good and 
of happiness, who would take pleasure in the instability and flux of existence.  We would 
become those who “who give themselves laws, and create themselves.”42  
 
 Just as a hierarchical slave society produced a peculiar herd morality, Nietzsche 
thinks a new ‘morality’ of sovereignty will arise out of a new organization of society – of a 
new pathos of distance.  In this sense, Nietzsche's great error is to have tied the possibility 
of self-overcoming to the institution of a hierarchical and aristocratically structured 
society.  Nietzsche is generally unequivocal: the potential for the production of a sovereign 
individual rests upon the insular function of an unbridgeable chasm between the 
perpetually weak that require metaphysical comforts to support life and the few strong 
individuals who can affirm life as it is.  The legitimacy of an order of rank is derived from 
the restrictions herd morality places upon individual difference; a universalizing morality, 
Nietzsche argues, is “detrimental for the higher men.”43   He seeks a new form of society 
wherein the strong would act as “commanders and legislators,” as creators of value for 
those lacking the power to do so.44  Great individuals would both exceed herd morality 
                                                                                                                                          
Stanford UP, 2005.  [Hereafter referred to as ‘RO’]. 
41 GS, 335 
42 GS, 335, 347 
43 BGE 228 
44 BGE 211  
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and form its values.45  The possibility of sovereignty is balanced upon the dream of 
constituting a new order of rank in the form of the philosopher’s (the ‘free spirit’s’) 
legislation of political conditions that would guarantee the permanent enhancement of 
humanity.46  The formation of a hierarchical society grounded in the pathos of distance is 
a necessary ‘hygienic’ principle, a chasm between healthy and sick for the overcoming of 
the herd.47  Nietzsche's 'grand politics' is thus premised on a vision of what Keith Ansell-
Pearson describes as a culture of artist-tyrants for whom man is the material to be 
sculpted.48  Nietzsche’s politics thus rests on a paradox: society is delivered from the 
corrosion of the will to truth only by those individuals who can effect a break from it.49  
Nietzsche both champions but undermines his own ideal.  The creator of values 
encourages others to become sovereign yet in commanding obedience forms blind 
followers.50  Nietzsche's 'grand politics' posit the conditions for a non-metaphysical life yet 
the legislation of these conditions is itself metaphysical.   
 
 The problem of Nietzsche's grand politics points to the broader question which 
post-foundational political thought must face: the attempt to think a politics in excess of 
the will to truth or will to foundation always risks repeating the foundational move 
insofar as it fails to recoil upon its own authority.  While Nietzsche's thought certainly 
opens the question of relation in positing the absence of permanent grounds, it 
frequently finds itself caught in the binary typology of weak and strong which he finds at 
the origins of morality.  The question of the empirical conditions which originally form 
the moral differentiation between strong and weak is never fully exceeded.  Debates 
around so-called 'post-structuralist' politics have often centered upon the problem of 
recoil – how can a politics be constructed around an affirmation of finitude?  Moreover, 
the question becomes even more urgent when we posit it in terms of the divergence that 
occurs when, as we will see in the case of Derrida and Foucault, finitude and recoil is 
expressed in seemingly incommensurable terms.  The competing notions of ethical recoil 
and the fields in which they are inscribed are both constitutive of Derrida’s and 
Foucault's 'grander' narratives but also form the conditions of their polemic and their 
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incommensurability.  Yet it is Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, his circumscription of the 
latter within the horizon of metaphysics, which forms the model for their reciprocal 
critiques and it is to this reading to which we now turn. 
 
 
Heidegger and the Determination of Relation 
 If I am correct in arguing that relation emerges and is affirmed as a central 
question in Nietzsche's genealogy and that there is a consequent disavowal of this 
question in his 'grand politics' then Heidegger can be seen to extend this disavowal to 
Nietzsche's work as a whole.  The disavowal and determination of relation is not limited 
for Heidegger to the philosophical desire for a society of rank but infects all of Nietzsche's 
thought.51  For Heidegger, Nietzsche's overcoming of metaphysics remains grounded in 
the subject's legislation of the world which prevails in modernity.  Despite extending 
across almost thirty years and amounting to over one thousand pages of essays and lecture 
transcripts, there is a unique question at the core of the wide scope of Heidegger’s 
readings of Nietzsche, revolving around the status of Being in Nietzsche’s attempt to 
overcome metaphysics.  Heidegger claims Nietzsche's overcoming of metaphysics 
ultimately fails, for while the 'revaluation of all values' may have opened metaphysics to 
the nihilism which lies at its essence, it nonetheless marks the exhaustion of the 
metaphysical desire for ground.  It is the 'medium' of differentiation, the locus through 
which relations are determined which Heidegger argues Nietzsche fails to think – that is, 
the unconcealing or disclosedness of Being.  It is an explication of Heidegger's 
understanding of Being that we will now pursue before a closer analysis of his relation to 
Nietzsche. 
 
Heidegger, Being and the Determination of Relation 
 In Being and Time Heidegger describes truth in the following terms: "the 
uncoveredness of entities within-the-world is grounded in the world's disclosedness.  But 
disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to which it is its 'there.'"52  For 
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Heidegger, anterior to any determinate relation between a subject and an object or any 
theoretical abstraction is our primordial Being-in-the-world.  As such, objects and others 
emerge primordially in a web of functional relations or what in Being and Time Heidegger 
calls a "totality of involvements" which together reveal the 'worldhood' of the world.53  
Accordingly, the positing of an objective and determinate relation to objects or others to 
be judged or evaluated by a subject always already presupposes a prior 'disclosure' of the 
world through Dasein's specific actions and involvements.  Anterior to any position or 
perspective upon the world, the world is 'existed', not as a separate object over a subject, 
but as a totality of involvements.  Dasein, in short, discloses Being in its being-in-the-
world, in its everyday involvements in the 'Da' ('there') in which it dwells.54 
 
 In this sense Heidegger is, I suggest, a thinker of relation – our very existence 
within a disclosed world is anterior to any particular relations within that world.  Crucial 
to his understanding of relation is Heidegger's notion of 'thrownness.'  Dasein, he argues 
in Being and Time, is 'thrown' into or "delivered over" to its possibilities and thus, to its 
Being.55  As such, existence always already finds itself in the world in a particular way.  To 
be always already in-the-world is to already have an implicit understanding of Being as a 
mode of existence and to already interpret experience according to the "mood" into which 
one is thrown.56  Dasein is always already in Being and so Being is always already in 
question.57  Insofar as this question cannot be abstracted from a particular relational 
existence to be grounded in a substantive foundation (man, consciousness, subject, etc.), 
Heidegger thus seeks to delineate the locus of thought – Being and Time outlines the 
'existential categories' through which Being is thought as Being, that is, of the essential 
structures of the primordial 'there' of existence anterior to its particular determinations.   
  
The basic structure of human existence is not conceived in terms of concepts or 
rules but the way in which Dasein exists and the way the world is disclosed through its 
existence.  This locus is defined as the temporal 'stretch' between the horizon of Dasein's 
being-thrown into a particular Being-in-the-world and its 'projection' of itself upon the 
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things of its everyday concern.  Dasein, in other words, is always projecting from a past to 
a future.58  Thus, any determination or truth proposed about the world, any account of 
subjectivity and any particular positing of a perspective are for Heidegger derivative of the 
primordial disclosedness of the world to temporal and finite Dasein.  While in 
Heidegger's work after Being and Time, the absolute centrality of Dasein is partially 
displaced by an account of the history of the different modes of the world's disclosure or 
'unconcealment' this notion of the temporality and finitude of existence would remain 
central.  Moreover, it is through this later historical and epochal understanding of 
unconcealment that Heidegger circumscribes Nietzsche within the limits of metaphysics 
and it is a closer analysis of its terms that we will now seek to elucidate.   
 
 For Heidegger, metaphysics is the history of the 'forgetting' of Being enacted in the 
determination and grounding of existence in first principles or arkhe.59  That is, 
metaphysics encompasses all modes of inquiry that have attempted to account for and 
produce a determining rule for all entities in the world.60  Any metaphysical 'grounding' of 
Being (in Idea, first cause, subject, etc.) is accomplished by forgetting the question of 
Being, in forgetting the mode in which the world is disclosed anterior to any derivative 
account of what 'is.'  Anterior to any metaphysical experience of the world is the 
unconcealment of Being itself.  Metaphysics occurs as a series of historical modes of the 
reduction of Being – of what 'is' – to its determination as the most general quality of 
beings or entities (a move which Heidegger in the Nietzsche lectures and elsewhere calls 
'beingness').  In conceiving Being in terms of what is present or as presence, the presencing 
of Being is forgotten.  The formation of general rules about the realm of the unconcealed 
fails to think unconcealment as such – the sheer fact that things are and the mode in 
which they come to be.  As Heidegger puts it, "inasmuch as Being is put in question with 
a view to the arche, Being is itself already determined."61  In other words, metaphysics 
reifies the structures of logos as presence and thus, forgets the always located existence or 
'Da' from which any notion of logic, judgment or perspective emerges.   
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Rather than take the structures of system, logic or categories as present and 
determined in advance, Heidegger returns 'logos' to the temporal event and spatial 'there' 
of its determination.  Anterior to any determinate relational system is the event of 
determination itself.  It is this account of event which is instructive for post-foundational 
thought insofar as it calls for, explicitly in much of Heidegger's work of the 1930s, a re-
articulation of the political itself.  Heidegger contrasts the event of determination to any 
determinate rationality or politics and thus, inaugurates the distinction, operative in 
much of contemporary political theory between the 'political' as paradigmatic event and 
'politics' as determinate everyday practices which occur within its horizons.62  Like 
Nietzsche though in very different terms, Heidegger's understanding of the political will 
affirm the inescapability of violence and struggle in the origin.  It is with these themes in 
mind that we now move to discuss Heidegger's account of originary violence in 'The 
Origin of the Work of Art' and Introduction to Metaphysics. 
 
 
Heidegger's Polis 
 In attempting to renew the question of Being which he argues has been occluded 
and disavowed by the whole philosophical tradition since Plato, Heidegger turns to the 
pre-Socratics with whom he claims the metaphysical question originates.  As Heidegger 
puts it in a later essay, "the essence of all history [Geschichte] is determined from the Greek 
'destining'" and so our experience is still derived from this originary one.63  The pre-
Socractics experienced the originary event of the determination of Being and thus, the 
"basic traits" of the Greek world, "though distorted and repressed, displaced and covered 
up, still sustain our world."64  In other words, the pre-Socratics inaugurate what in The 
Contributions Heidegger calls the 'first inception' of metaphysics insofar as they held an 
originary experience of Being in relation to which we stand in a long decline.65   
 
 The 1935 essay 'The Origin of the Work of Art' exemplifies Heidegger's 
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understanding of the generative and productive inception of Being in its account of the 
artwork as constituted in the 'strife' between concealment or 'earth' and unconcealment 
or 'world.'  Much as it does in Being and Time, for the later Heidegger world refers to the 
horizon or clearing in which and as which Being takes place.  Yet, insofar as world is 
always temporally and spatially situated it is never totally transparent, the openness of 
Dasein's finite Being-in-the-world emerges from an 'earth' which cannot be grounded 
because it’s 'giving' is the ground of intelligibility and thus appears only as 
"undisclosable."66  Thus, as Heidegger puts it in 'The Origin of the Work of Art,' "[t]ruth is 
un-truth insofar as there belongs to it the reservoir of the not-yet-uncovered, the 
uncovered, in the sense of concealment."67  The artwork's significance for Heidegger lies 
in what he views as its power to disclose the world; to 'gather' and hold together, it sets up 
a world against the contrast of the earth from which it is torn, it is a being through which 
Being is disclosed or held open.68  At the centre of the event of the inception of the world 
is polemos or ‘originary struggle’ between world and earth.  “Struggle,” Heidegger says, 
“first projects and develops the un-heard, the hitherto un-said and un-thought."69   
 
Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics, delivered the same year as 'The Origin of 
the Work of Art,' broadens and extends the analysis of originary polemos or strife 
developed in the latter text.  In Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger sets out to think the 
originary violence of the opening of world against earth through the question of the polis 
conceived as the event of determination anterior to any determinate politics.  Rather than 
displace the claims of the ‘artwork’ essay, he extends them.  That is to say, the polis is not 
reduced to its traditional conception as made up of political institutions and citizens but 
includes "the gods, the temples, the priests, the festivals, the games, the poets, the 
thinkers, the ruler, the council of elders, the assembly of the people, the army and the 
fleet."70  Every ordering, every emergence of a world is inherently violent insofar as it is 
the product of 'originary struggle' and it is this originary violence which Heidegger 
conceives as the 'essence' of the political anterior to both its metaphysical determination 
by political philosophy or any determinate politics. 
                                               
66 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art." Poetry, Language, Thought.  London: Harper, 1975. 
P.47 
67 Ibid. P.60 
68 Ibid. P.46-7. 
69 IM, p.65 
70 IM, p.163 
 34 
 In Introduction to Metaphysics, in attempting to think originary polemos Heidegger 
turns to Sophocles' Antigone (lines 332-75).  Man is described as 'uncanny' (deinon) in the 
Antigone chorus, Heidegger argues, because in revealing or gathering the world his techne 
or knowledge involves "looking out beyond what, in each case, is directly present-at-hand 
[given as determinate]."71  Man's uncanniness results from techne's violent seizing and 
"setting" of Being from the overwhelming power of nature or physis.72  Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the Greek notion of dike is central to understanding what he means 
here.  Dike, Heidegger claims, did not signify justice for the Greeks as is usually thought 
but rather what he refers to as "joint and structure."73  Dike is the revealing of common 
ordering or primordial structuring of the world, the interpretative whole into which 
Dasein is thrown and from which it uncovers its being-in-the-world.  Man's techne 
searches out or attacks beyond the power of the given, yet he nevertheless always finds 
himself thrown into a polemos between the ordering power of dike and the violence of his 
techne.  It is in this polemos between the power of ordering and man's transgression of any 
given order that Heidegger views the uncanniness of man in terms of his "overstep[ing] 
the limits of the homely" to bring the uncanny itself into the open.74  Man is thrown into 
an overpowering dike from out of and against which he enters into a polemos with Being, 
between the violence of his knowledge and work and the overpowering order of the world 
there occurs a "violent taming of the violent."75   
 
 With this understanding of dike and techne in mind, Heidegger interprets the pre-
Socractic understanding of Being as physis which he translates as "emerging-abiding 
sway."76  Being was understood as an "overpowering power" anterior to any determination, 
which is to say, "not yet mastered in thought."77  As uncanny, man 'gathers' and brings 
Being into the open yet in turn is exposed to the power of Being as physis.  The pre-
Socratics understood that man does not and cannot "subdue" or master Being in opening 
the world; his finitude precludes the possibility of mastering the earth.78  As such, at the 
point at which man posits himself in the midst of Being his stand against the power of 
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nature simultaneously reveals the unmasterability of nature.  Man's finitude, his 
'unhomeliness' is revealed in his polemos with Being since it confirms the absence of any 
absolute or necessary ordering.79   
 
 If Heidegger's account of the polis as the site of this originary polemos appears 
abstract and far from political-philosophical questions, it is because it marks a 
revolutionary re-articulation of the political itself, one with which all post-foundational 
political thought must contend.  Heidegger thinks the essence of the polis as an event of 
violent ordering anterior to any particular determinate order.80  Thus, the Greek polis is 
not to be understood as a city-state but as the historical site of the ordering of the world 
in originary violence.81  The significance of the polis in Heidegger's interpretation is its 
status as the site or 'pole' of this violent originary differentiation.  According to 
Heidegger, Greek 'political' experience was grounded in the abyssal and violent 'truth' of 
Being; the Greeks experienced the originary and irreducible polemos at the core of every 
founding or ordering gesture.82  It is polemos, Heidegger says, which "allows what 
essentially unfolds to step apart into opposition, first allows position and status and 
rank... In con-frontation, world comes to be."83  Crucial to Heidegger's understanding of 
the political is the distinction between inaugural and empirical violence, for while 
empirical violence may or may not occur, it is inaugural violence which opens the 
possibility of the empirical.84 
 
Nietzsche, Metaphysics and Nihilism 
 While the status of the pre-Socratic origin lies in its opening or disclosing of the 
world, metaphysics is for Heidegger the history of 'forgetting' or "turning away" from this 
originary truth of Dasein's relation to Being.85  Thought disavows originary polemos by 
determining existence via principles or arche and thus fails to think the unconcealment or 
event which gives order itself.86  Moreover, it is the shift in modernity to a determination 
of the meaning of Being through 'man' or subject through which Heidegger reads 
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Nietzsche.  In modernity man assumes centrality as the being from out of whose 
representation things find their meaning, Being is nothing more than an object of 
representation for a subject.87  Man appears as the being who gives measure and who 
regulates all that is; he secures, organizes and articulates the world.88  While Heidegger 
argues this subjectivist metaphysics originates with Descartes, it is Nietzsche whom he 
situates not at the overcoming, but as the culmination of this process of determining and 
abandoning Being – Nietzsche’s thought is the final expression of metaphysics. 
 
 Heidegger’s circumscription of Nietzsche within the end of metaphysics occurs 
through two distinct moves.  First, he adopts Nietzsche’s formulation of the inherent 
nihilism of metaphysics: “that the uppermost values devalue themselves, that all goals are 
annihilated, and that all estimates of value collide against one another.”89  Each decline of 
a suprasensory authority only effects the rise of another which itself is destined to fall.90  It 
is only with Nietzsche’s death of God that this process is arrested and metaphysics reaches 
a point where “nothing more remains to which man can cling and by which he can orient 
himself.”91  Each authority or centre is grounded on an abyss; the truth of metaphysics is 
nihilism, yet the death of God marks the collapse of the possibility of all arche and thus, 
opens metaphysics onto its own implicit logic.  Second, Heidegger confines Nietzsche's 
notion of overcoming within the margins of the history of the metaphysical.  If Heidegger 
will admit the Nietzschean conception of nihilism, he nevertheless thinks Nietzsche’s 
death of God to be the consummate moment in the history of the forgetting of Being.  
The killing of God, Heidegger argues, is the 'destined' disempowering of the suprasensory 
world which is fully internal to the metaphysical logic of the forgetting Being.  Nietzsche 
might articulate nihilism yet he never thinks its essence.  Heidegger characterizes 
Nietzsche’s attempt to form a new principle of valuation in the will to power as still 
metaphysical and Nietzsche as "the last metaphysician of the West."92  In a sense then, 
Heidegger places Nietzsche within the very limits of metaphysics which the former had 
himself drawn. 
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The Will to Power as Metaphysics 
 In Heidegger's interpretation, Nietzsche’s notion of life as a will to power which 
always strives to its preservation and enhancement forms the ground of the latter's 
overcoming of metaphysics.93  Insofar as it is the preservation and enhancement of life 
whereby limits are placed upon the essential chaos of life only to be exceeded, will to 
power forms a new principle of valuation wherein “values are the conditions of itself 
posited by the will to power.”94  The essence of will to power is value itself insofar as the 
will to power is both what posits values and it is the principle of the revaluation of all 
values, yet because it exists only to overcome itself, beings have value only insofar as they 
are a condition of the expansion of the will to power.95  The will to power, Heidegger says, 
becomes in Nietzsche the fundamental trait of all existence as a “will to will” more of 
itself.96  Will to power's indefinite desire for expansion acts as the ground of all existence.  
Beings are evaluated and determined insofar as they form the conditions for the 
preservation and overcoming of the will. 
 
 Will to power can only act as the ground of forming values, Heidegger says, if the 
question of Being is abandoned and forgotten.97  Will to power is thus nihilistic; it thinks 
the truth of the totality of beings (of beingness) and not Being itself.  It forms the final 
expression of a metaphysical humanism in the form of an ontological doctrine of 
becoming and overcoming which evaluates and organizes the world in terms of its own 
desire for expansion.98  Will to power is a humanist doctrine insofar as it represents a 
subject's desire to impose beingness upon Being.99  In this sense, Nietzsche will always 
place the totality of what is within the confines of a single principle; the subject's self-
preservation and enhancement.  This totalizing condition inherent to all subjectivity is 
taken by Heidegger to lie in what he calls 'justice.' 
 
Heidegger’s Circumscription of Nietzsche 
 Heidegger locates in Nietzsche the Cartesian theme of the search for something 
unconditional and fixed upon which to ground Being insofar as the intelligibility of all 
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beings is defined as that which can be presented to a representing subject.  While 
Nietzsche rejects the notion of a unitary, self-appropriating subject, Heidegger maintains 
that Nietzsche's account of subjectivity as the desire for certainty is still caught within the 
ambit of this question.  That is, in Nietzsche the determination of the totality of beings 
may no longer be sought in the “cognitive subject” but through the self as body, drives 
and forces, yet he still determines the totality of beings purely in terms of whatever the 
subject as a collection of drives can re-present to itself as the condition for its own willing 
and self-overcoming.100  Heidegger argues that the notion of 'justice' acts as the prior 
condition for knowledge in both the Cartesian search for certainty and Nietzsche’s will to 
power.101  In contrast to Heidegger's account of dike as the overpowering of ordering itself, 
metaphysics thinks justice or justification as judgment, certainty or assertion which 
determine in advance the structure of the world.  Justice, in contrast to dike, forgets the 
violent opening of world.   
 
The Nietzschean condition of justice as Heidegger understands it exceeds the 
modern desire for definitive and permanent security because in the doctrine of 
perspectivism it does not posit a single principle of security but rather the desire for 
security as such.  Consequently, will to power as justice defines, without exceeding, the 
principle of determining Being for a subject: “[j]ustice is a passage beyond previous 
perspectives, a passage that posits viewpoints.”102  Nietzsche's perspectivism exceeds and 
undoes previous metaphysical claims by showing them to be perspectives yet Heidegger 
argues it nevertheless functions as a derivative determination of Being since it is a 
principle which determines as preservation and enhancement the mode in which things 
appear for the subject.103  Truth is reduced to the demand for presence by a willing subject 
for whom the world becomes an object posited for its self-overcoming.  Nietzsche thus 
remains within the bounds of a metaphysics of subjectivity even if the sovereign 
individual exceeds the terms of a certitude grounded upon a mental substance.  Once 
Nietzsche determines truth as what serves the interests of the human will, subjectivitist 
logic is brought to its final nihilistic conclusion. 
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 Once the metaphysics of subjectivity culminate with Nietzsche, Heidegger argues 
the question of Being is forgotten and beings reach the status of ‘resources’ for the 
amplification of the will to power.  All beings, including human beings, come to exist for 
the modern will in terms of its capacity for mastery and control in the mode of what 
Heidegger in 'The Question Concerning Technology' calls “standing-reserve.”104  In other 
words, the world is ordered according to the infinite desire for the will to augment itself.  
In determining man as “the relational centre of that which is as such” Nietzsche always 
determines relation in advance.105  Dasein's relations to the world and to others are always 
determined by the will’s unlimited power to calculate, plan and mold all things, relations 
are not seen to exceed but rather, are dispensed from the subject.106  Thus, in Heidegger’s 
reading of Nietzsche the refusal of the question of relation traverses all of Nietzsche’s 
thought.  The self as self-willing absolute subject exists prior to and determines its 
relations to the world. 
 
 The strategy by which Heidegger's encounter with Nietzsche proceeds is what I call 
'circumscription' and it is one which I will claim Derrida and Foucault pursue against one 
another.  In shifting the articulation of what 'is' or what happens from a narrative of will 
to power to Being as unconcealing the definition of metaphysics and nihilism too is 
modified from man's enslavement to his own myths to the 'forgetting' of disclosedness.  
Metaphysics is not overcome by Nietzsche, Heidegger claims, since he only repeats the 
metaphysical gesture of determining Being as presence.  While Nietzsche recognized the 
nihilism inherent to metaphysics in terms of the impossibility for any value to ground 
existence permanently and the absence of any transcendent realm which would give life 
meaning, he did not himself exceed this nihilism.  As such, rather than enacting an 
opening to the question of the self’s relations to others, Nietzsche’s thought acts to 
determine relation in advance.  For Heidegger there is no breach effected onto the 
question but rather, the metaphysical gesture of determining the self’s relations to others 
culminates in Nietzsche’s thinking.  Accordingly, in shifting the limits of metaphysics 
exterior to will to power Heidegger views Nietzsche as caught within it, as having failed to 
think the point of departure and situatedness of his own thought. 
                                               
104  Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology.”  The Question Concerning Technology 
         and Other Essays.  p.17 
105  Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture.” P.128 
106  Ibid., p.135 
 40 
Heidegger's Politics 
 Both Derrida and Foucault, like many of their contemporaries, implicitly or 
explicitly appropriate the Heideggerean theme of determination.  They proceed from the 
basic premise that any order or field of determinate relations is effected by an anterior 
event(s).  Thus, like Heidegger, both think arche or grounds as effected by an anterior 
determination; thought 'takes place' in a 'medium' which exceeds it and which cannot be 
reduced to thought.107  Both follow Heidegger in shifting the ground of questioning from 
how an order is or can be grounded to the event of ordering itself.  For both, thought has 
an 'other' or 'outside' which is anterior to thought such that thrownness is irreducible.108  
Any questioning always begins from wherever it is thrown and can never totally exceed 
those relations.  Yet Derrida and Foucault both see Heidegger's search for a 'proper' or 
originary determination of Being, one that leads him back to what he thinks is the event 
of the inception of metaphysics among the pre-Socratics as illegitimately attempting to 
absolutely 'differentiate' Being or unconcealing from its relation to a particular being.  
Ultimately, they imply that Heidegger seeks to transcend thrownness.  The attempt to 
accede to an originary presencing and determination of Being is inescapably haunted and 
contaminated by the ontic or empirical determinations from which it proceeds.  It is this 
desire for the proper – not bound or contaminated by any ontical or empirical 
determinations – which marks the ultimately metaphysical refusal in Heidegger. 
  
 Being and Time is organized around an understanding of an inauthentic Dasein 
who's essential being-in-the-world into which it is thrown is a public and shared mode of 
existence which Heidegger calls das Man[the 'one' or 'they']; a loss of Dasein's singularity 
in the anonymity and even “dictatorship” and “domination” of everyday being-with 
others.109  This inauthentic 'fallenness' is contrasted to an authentic existence which 
corresponds to Dasein's primordial condition, that is, its existence as a 'stretch' between 
the horizon of its originary future as being-towards-death and its originary past as being-
already-in-a-world.  In authentic resoluteness, existence relates to itself on the basis of its 
finitude.  In the infamous paragraph 74 of Being and Time Heidegger attempts to 
overcome and to draw an accord between the apparent opposition of the singularity of 
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resolute Dasein and its essential being-with others in an authentic community.  Yet in the 
move from authentic resoluteness to the communal resoluteness of "das Volk" the 
singularity of Dasein is displaced by the logic of a totalizing community.110  Dasein's being-
in-the-world as being-with-others is totally determined by the limits of the horizons of a 
pre-determinate 'authentic' community defined by what Heidegger calls a 'common' 
sharing of the historical "destiny" of a volk.111  In other words, relationality is no longer in 
question and open but defined in advance by a single determinate 'pole' or fate.  The 
question of the relation between Heidegger’s Nazism and his philosophy notwithstanding, 
what is crucial for my own account is that the theorization of 'authentic community' as das 
Volk marks a disavowal of relationality. 
 
 It is this disavowal of the irreducibility of a determinate (relational) point of 
departure that has been at the centre of not only Derrida's engagement with Being and 
Time but also, among others, of Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben.  The central 
insight of all three thinkers in relation to Heidegger is the impossibility of transcending 
Dasein's being-thrown.  Authenticity cannot be, as Heidegger often seems to suggest, a 
flight from inauthentic existence but only an affirmation of Dasein's finitude and being-
improper.  Against the standard reading (which they nevertheless do not deny) through 
which Heidegger is said to maintain the primacy of the proper or authentic over and 
against everyday existence, all three thinkers show that one can take a different path.  
Nancy for instance claims that Heidegger's error is to fail to think through Dasein's being-
towards-death as "radically implicated in its being-with."112  To think death as the 
experience of Mitsein or being-with others and not only as a relation to oneself is to admit 
that it is precisely finitude's excess over experience which guarantees the undoing of any 
'communion' or totalizing community – a community of finite singularities is 'inoperative' 
and inappropriable.113  Similarly, Agamben insists on the co-originarity of the proper and 
improper.  Inauthenticity he argues is original and positive.  Being is not given in general 
but only partially unconcealed to finite existence and thus, there is no proper location for 
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thought.114  Existence is always thrown and improper, authentic questioning is thus only 
the affirmation of the possibility of the world such that the disclosedness of Being is co-
originary with its dis-propriation or concealment.  Likewise, in Aporias, to which I will 
return in chapter 3, Derrida argues that the very distinction between authentic and 
inauthentic Dasein in Being and Time operates only in the reduction of thrownness.  
Moreover, it is their dedication to the Heideggerean theme of thrownness which both 
unites Derrida and Foucault as relational thinkers yet also forms a condition of the 
irreducibility of the polemic between them.  Once one refuses to countenance the 
possibility of totally exceeding one's (relational) point of departure one is left without an 
Archimedean position from which judgment can be decided nor an ultimately proper or 
original stance for thought.  Indeed, one is returned to the Nietzschean problematic of 
circularity – every grander narrative recoils upon its finite beginning. 
 
 The later Heidegger encounters a similar problem in the inscription of a binary 
opposition between the proper and improper.  In his later work the binary is inscribed 
into Heidegger's account of metaphysics as the history of forgetting.  Heidegger's Abbau or 
destruktion is premised upon the recovery of an originary presencing, unity or gathering of 
Being, in short, an originary experience of truth.  Metaphysics as the forgetting of what 
makes it possible culminates in the nihilism of the will to power and Being's 
unconcealment as technology marks a culmination of forgetting, total oblivion of Being 
and a complete determination of the world as 'standing reserve.'  What Derrida and 
Foucault both refuse is the teleology of the coming to presence of Being as what John 
Caputo calls a "metanarrative of Being" which thinks an original or primordial beginning 
which is then corrupted absolutely in modernity.115  It is such a narrative which serves to 
announce and command a revolutionary possibility, one which we know Heidegger 
sought, at least until the mid-1930s, in National Socialism.  While it is crucial to note that 
Heidegger's support for the Nazis did not necessarily follow from his philosophy it was 
nevertheless enabled by his belief in the necessity for a 'total' renewal of the relation to 
Being and the idealization of Greek experience and in this sense was neither an 
“accident” nor a “mistake,” as Lacoue-Labarthe puts it.116  In positing an originary truth, 
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Heidegger is then free to find, at least temporarily, its authentic repetition in history.  
Thus, as Lacoue-Labarthe insists, Heidegger repeats the metaphysical move of the 
philosophical determination of the political.117  In positing the purity of the origin and 
the history of its loss, he licenses the potential for any means for its recovery.  The 
account of a total loss licenses and is complicit with the 'worst' ontic violence which is 
legitimated or grounded upon an ontological revolution. 
 
Reading Nietzsche and Heidegger through Derrida and Foucault 
 Derrida and Foucault will not – in the face of the Heideggerean failure or 
otherwise – join the likes of Habermas or Richard Wolin in seeking out the grounds for 
Heidegger's Nazism in the lack of an authoritative normative justification which would 
serve to ground legitimate political constraints. 118  Heidegger's failure lay not with the 
absence of normative grounds.  The ethico-political burden upon their work, as with all 
post-foundational thought, is to navigate a different path, neither of the 'grounding' of 
legitimacy nor of locating the sources for a philosophico-political revolution as both 
Nietzsche and Heidegger have done.  Heidegger's 'error' consisted neither in relativism 
nor decisionism which left him without critical resources to condemn Nazism; his error, I 
suggest, was that he was not perspectival enough.  Indeed, in contrast to Heidegger both 
Derrida and Foucault refuse to enunciate a discourse of loss or accordingly of revolution 
(the political implications of which are addressed in chapters 5 and 6).  Neither thinker 
will countenance a 'proper' dwelling for thought, an originary relation or determination 
from which thought proceeds and must appropriate if it is to be authentic.  Thus, in a 
broad array of texts Derrida has sought to undermine the Heideggerean attempt to think 
the presencing of Being itself free from any particular ontic determinations, that is, free 
from empirical inscription.  Being, Derrida argues in 'The Ends of Man', can only be 
articulated through ontic metaphors.119  Heidegger's question of Being, he claims, is tied 
to a "metaphysics of proximity," to a question of the proper relation between Dasein and 
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Being.120  One can trace a notion of proximity as authenticity throughout Heidegger's 
work: the question of Being is a question about the 'truth' of Being; the overcoming of the 
metaphysics of subjectivity is sought through the recovery of the question of Being in the 
attempt to fix or secure a new mode of "exemplary Being."121  Similarly, in his only 
extensive engagement with Heidegger, in The Order of Things Foucault considers the latter 
to be a modern (subjectivist) thinker insofar as Heidegger conceives a finite being 
(Dasein) who grasps the condition of possibility of his knowledge (time, history or the 
destining of Being) as the grounds for his 'becoming.'  Knowledge attempts to recover the 
ever-receding origin which makes it possible.122 
 
 With this critique of Heidegger in mind, both Derrida and Foucault should be 
understood to restore, in divergent ways, a form of 'perspectival' thought.  Thrownness for 
both thinkers goes all the way down without the promise of propriety and it is the name 
'Nietzsche' which for both often stands in for the refusal to countenance the possibility of 
purity or recovery of origin or ground.  Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy is a key reference 
point here.123  For Deleuze the will to power expresses the pure play of difference, it is an 
expression of the world as a network of ephemeral and contingent forces caught in 
indefinite struggle.  In other words, will to power forms the differential and genetic 
element of forces.  Thus, in a way analogous to Heidegger, Deleuze offers a systematic 
reading of Nietzsche, yet in opposition to Heidegger, this systematicity consists entirely in 
the consistent assertion of the world as a multiplicity of forces and of the Nietzschean 
affirmative joy in difference.  In the early programmatic essay 'La Différance' Derrida 
attaches the key insight from his own work to Deleuze's Nietzsche book.  "Différance," 
Derrida says in reference to Deleuze's Nietzsche, "is the name of differences of forces, that 
Nietzsche sets up against the entire system of metaphysical grammar, wherever this system 
governs culture, philosophy, and science."124  Similarly, Foucault has also praised Deleuze's 
analysis of difference in Nietzsche and links his reading of Nietzsche to this notion in the 
essay 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx' which we will discuss below.125  In accordance with 
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Deleuze's reading, both Derrida and Foucault shift the position of Nietzsche's thinking 
beyond the end of metaphysics within which Heidegger circumscribes it into the position 
of a rupture with the desire for ground and for the proper.   
 
 Before pursuing these two themes it is important to note a prior condition for 
Derrida's and Foucault's engagements with Nietzsche: freeing him from the Heideggerean 
reading.  Derrida’s and Foucault’s interpretations of Nietzsche escape the latter's 
circumscription within metaphysics through two distinct modes of reading him.  Both 
refuse the unifying force of the narrative which Heidegger imposes on Nietzsche's 
fragmentary work.  Derrida argues that it is precisely the Nietzschean text which cannot 
be subsumed to a single identity, its heterogeneity marks out the singularity of Nietzsche’s 
text so that “one must forbid oneself,” Derrida says, “with Nietzsche above all – to force 
his name into the straightjacket of an interpretation that is too strong to be able to 
account for him.”126  The fragments of Nietzsche’s text do not, Derrida argues, form 
elements of a single whole, the multiplicity and heterogeneity of Nietzsche’s text denotes 
the impossibility of the imposition of a unity.  Indeed it is Heidegger’s reading of 
Nietzsche which is metaphysical insofar as it presupposes the telos of a final truth in 
Nietzsche which can be deduced from an accurate and ‘proper’ interpretation.127   
  
While also suggesting that his reading is licensed by the differential and 
heterogeneous nature of the Nietzschean text, Foucault refuses to offer a complete or total 
interpretation and instead uses passages or sections from Nietzsche in terms of his own 
interests and “not with the purpose of showing that this was the Nietzschean 
conception.”128  Nietzsche’s text exerts no essential authority upon the interpreter, it 
invites the reader, Foucault says, “to use it, to deform it, to make it groan in protest.”129  
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Interpretation and application is sanctioned through the notion that the elements of the 
texts have no necessary relation to the whole and accordingly, they can be isolated 
without affecting the (non-existent) unity and identity of the argument.  There is no claim 
to a final truth on behalf of the text in either of these interpretations, and furthermore, 
they see the absence of such a claim at the heart of Nietzsche’s work.  Both of these 
modes of interpretation yield a Nietzsche in excess of Heidegger's reading yet the textual 
opening is elicited through two distinct strategies which will be our focus in later chapters.  
In Derrida’s case, it is the unity of the text which always breaks down in recoiling upon its 
own particularity in the attempt to seize its meaning while for Foucault it is the specificity 
of the elements of the text which have no necessary relation to the whole. 
 
Both Derrida and Foucault, I argue, set out with the same genealogico-strategic 
orientation: to return truth to its particular and violent origins.  Two central Nietzschean 
themes will be pursued in this regard.  First, both posit language (in the case of Derrida) 
or discourse (in the case of Foucault) in conformity with Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, as 
a field or network of differences, as a relational field governed by no privileged term, the 
position of each element is always determined in its relations to other elements.  
Moreover, both Derrida and Foucault repeat the Nietzschean affirmation of difference, 
both follow Nietzsche in affirming the absence of a transcendent ground of relation as 
marking the possibility of transgressing and appraising the humanism of twentieth 
century thought.  Nietzsche is thus privileged as the thinker who, rather than marking the 
completion of metaphysics, thinks and affirms a difference grounded only in itself.  
Second, Nietzschean genealogy is explicitly affirmed by both Derrida and Foucault as a 
mode of thinking which opens thought to the originary violence inseparable from the 
self’s relations to others.  In this sense, I will claim that both Derrida and Foucault are 
genealogical thinkers. 
 
Nietzsche, Interpretation, Affirmation 
 Once the sign is no longer thought as intermediary transmitting some prior 
substance and itself becomes the object of philosophical enquiry its position comes into 
crisis; the unity and identity of a transcendental signified is challenged and ultimately, the 
possibility of a permanent truth comes into question.  In several early works, namely Of 
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Grammatology and ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ in the case of Derrida and ‘Nietzsche, Freud, 
Marx’ and The Order of Things in the case of Foucault, Nietzsche assumes a singular 
position in the history of philosophy as a thinker who places the unity of signifier and 
signified in question.  Perhaps more significantly, they suggest that the impact of 
Nietzsche’s thought lies in the manner he relates to the consequences of the question of 
the sign and of truth: rather than mourn the impossibility of a final truth or a fully 
present knowledge, Derrida and Foucault read Nietzsche as a singular figure who affirms 
the impossibility of a permanent and final truth.  It is to these readings of Nietzsche that 
we will now turn. 
 
 The opening sections of Derrida's Of Grammatology approach the question of the 
sign through the linguistic structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure whose elision and 
denigration of the question of writing, repeats, Derrida says, a metaphysical gesture 
enacted by Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel, etc.  In the history of metaphysics, writing 
has always appeared as a “phenomenon of exterior representation.”130  Saussure had 
already shown that the relation of signifier to signified is arbitrary insofar as it arises from 
out of custom.  Signs are thus only defined by their negative differences from one 
another.  Yet Derrida claims Saussure preserves the security of the sign by ignoring the 
disturbing nature of writing.  It is Saussure’s own assertion of the differential nature of 
the sign which should not ignore the difference of writing because the appearance of 
speech itself only transpires within a system lacking any positive terms.  As such, language 
in fact resembles Saussure's own definition of writing as secondary and derivative to the 
spoken sign.  In short, Derrida radically broadens the supplementary logic which has 
defined writing to all signification; no sign is independent of the play of differences that 
compose language.131  Meaning occurs only as a possibility of what Derrida 'names' 
différance, as a movement of difference and deferral constituted in the absence of full 
presence.     
 
If thus far we have taken this detour through Derrida’s deconstruction of Saussure 
to discuss Nietzsche, it is precisely because Nietzsche is situated by Derrida as a thinker 
who, rather than mourn the impossibility of transcendence and seek to escape from 
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indefinite play, is able to affirm and celebrate it.  Derrida says that with Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and Freud a rupture occurs in metaphysics insofar as the centre, ground or 
transcendental signified of any structure or system is no longer able to act as a stable 
presence transcendent to structure since it becomes thought in terms of the structure 
itself.132  Consequently, in conceiving the absence of the possibility of a centre – the 
absence of the possibility of a permanent ground constituted by a transcendental signified 
– the domain of play becomes “indefinite.”133  No single element of any system can 
assume the desired totalizing position so that no structure is indefinitely and totally 
determined. 
 
While Saussure responds to the absence of centre with a thought of structure 
which nevertheless closes upon itself in a privileging of the phonic substance, Derrida 
argues that Claude Levi-Strauss’ response (to whom Nietzsche is contrasted in ‘Structure, 
Sign and Play’) to the problem is distinct.  Concepts are for Levi-Strauss not truths in 
themselves but rather, tools which are adopted from out of the tradition by the 
anthropologist.  He thus attempts to enact a separation between method and truth in 
retaining conceptual tools whose value he doubts, a method which, in calling it ‘bricolage’ 
he distinguishes from that of the ‘engineer.'  In contrast to the bricoleur, the engineer's 
discourse aspires to a totalizing knowledge and always already begins with a well-defined 
totality, language and lexicon and thus, theoretical work is always delimited and 
determined in advance.  It is this binary opposition which Levi-Strauss constructs and 
which Derrida seeks to undermine.  “The engineer is a myth,” Derrida argues.134  To 
conceive of a subject who creates a theoretical system from nothing is a teleological ideal.  
Moreover, not only is the engineer a myth, but it is the creation of the bricoleur.  There 
can be no thought beyond bricolage, it is thought's only possibility:  
 
“as soon as we admit that every finite discourse is bound by a certain bricolage and that 
the engineer and the scientist are also species of bricoleurs, then the very idea of 
bricolage is menaced and the difference in which it took on its meaning breaks down.”135   
 
By assuming that a ground cannot be posited because the empirical realm is 
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simply too vast as Levi-Strauss does is still to maintain the possibility of a ground; it is to 
relate to ground as unfulfilled desire.  In contrast to Levi-Strauss' empiricism, the 
archetypal Nietzschean gesture is for Derrida the “joyous affirmation of the play of the 
world and the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, 
without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation.”136  
Underlying Nietzsche's work is an affirmation that, in opposition to the Heideggerean 
nostalgia for a proximity to Being, “plays without security.”137  There is an absence of any 
nostalgia in Nietzsche's work, instead it “determines the noncentre as otherwise than as 
loss of the centre.”138  The affirmation of this play of the will to power constituted by the 
lack of a transcendental signified is what in “La Difference” Derrida will, in asserting the 
proximity of Nietzsche’s genealogy to his own deconstructive approach, refer to as “the 
‘active’ (in movement) discord of the different forces and of the differences between 
forces.”139   If Nietzsche thus exceeds Heidegger’s delimitation it is precisely through the 
question of interpretation and of the indefinite substitution of the signified.   
 
However, Derrida also maintains that there is no prospect of choosing between 
these two modes of interpretation, there is no simple mode for thought to abandon its 
heritage – there is no possibility of an absolute rupture with metaphysics for 
interpretation must always engage with an inherited discourse.  Nietzschean affirmation 
cannot absolutely break with its history, metaphysics is always active in the language that 
is used to oppose it.  We can only, Derrida says, think between these two modes of 
interpretation.140  And yet, almost inexplicably, despite his claim to the impossibility of 
absolutely choosing the Nietzschean break Derrida nevertheless seems to suggest 
simultaneously a utopian and terrifying possibility of an immediate relation to the pure 
play of differences in the concluding sentences of ‘Structure, Sign and Play’: “a birth in 
the offing, only under the species of nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and 
terrifying form of monstrosity.”141  Even if Derrida explicitly denies the privilege of the 
Nietzschean gesture of an absolutely affirmative relation to difference, he simultaneously 
avows the possibility of just this unnameable break.  Rather than being simply a 
culmination of metaphysics in the total domination of a boundless subject, Nietzsche is 
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for Derrida the thinker who marks “the systematic mistrust as concerns the entirety of 
metaphysics” and so points to the possibility of its excess.142 
 
 The Nietzschean themes of the absence of a transcendental signified and the 
consequent affirmation of this absence which emerge in these early texts of Derrida’s 
appear in a similar form in some of Foucault’s earlier work.  For instance, in ‘Nietzsche, 
Freud, Marx’ Foucault argues that with these three thinkers a mode of interpretation 
appears which reflects only itself; nothing supports or grounds interpretation; there is 
simply “nothing to interpretation.”143  It is in this sense that Nietzsche, Freud and Marx 
signal a caesura with what preceded them since for these ‘masters of suspicion’ the sign 
does not represent a depth of hidden meaning but is instead a surface phenomenon 
within an inexhaustible network of relations.  Nietzsche's account of philosophy's will to 
truth, capital in Marx and the relations between the conscious and unconscious in Freud 
all fold depth and interiority onto a surface of positivity.144  The critique and reversal of 
depth opens a new mode of interpretation and thus, a new space or field of thought 
which is nothing but the space of language, the “space of distribution in which signs can 
be signs.”145  Given this new landscape, interpretation becomes an infinite task, an 
infinity constituted not by human finitude as it is for Levi-Strauss but because there is 
nothing apart from interpretation such that its object is “inexhaustible,” it has neither 
origin nor end.146  Furthermore, much like Derrida, Foucault argues that with the 
effacement of depth, we can no longer conceive a universal relation between a signifier 
and signified.147  Interpretation is founded only upon suspicion and in this sense, assumes 
ascendancy once the teleological question of truth is undermined.148  Once language is no 
longer thought as a transparent representation of the world and assumes its own 
positivity, the dream of empiricism is extinguished. 
 
 In ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Marx’ Foucault identifies Nietzsche in particular as opening 
the question of language as a philosophical question.  Once the being of language appears 
as a question unto itself, a further Nietzschean question will assume increasing 
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importance for Foucault: ‘who speaks?’149  Foucault says once we admit Nietzsche’s notion 
that “words have always been an invention of the ruling classes” the question of ‘who 
speaks’ demands a genealogy into the force that language evinces.150  Once language is 
thought in its own positivity the question of language emerges as an interrogation of the 
force manifest in particular discourses and interpretations; an authority always speaks.  
The Nietzschean question of the ‘who’ thus acts to decentre and displace the subject 
which itself becomes the effect of an interpretation; the subject appears as an effect of a 
struggle revealed in a network of signs.   
 
 Moreover, for Foucault Nietzsche’s pronouncement of the death of God, in 
marking the end of transcendence, forms the conditions for the destruction of the 
identity and unity of man.151  Once knowledge is thought in terms of discontinuity, force 
and struggle, it is the sovereignty of the subject which is dissolved into relations which 
precede it.152  Nietzsche is an un-archaeologizable figure, always in excess of the modern 
episteme, marking out and opening the space and terms of its rupture.  A rupture that, 
rather than mourn, Nietzsche celebrates and affirms in the “laughter” and joy of man’s 
demise.153  Much as he appears in Derrida’s ‘Structure, Sign and Play,’ Nietzsche emerges 
in The Order of Things as the thinker whose rupture with the metaphysics of subjectivity is 
delimited by the feat of affirming the end of the possibility of positing positive grounds 
for knowledge.  Nietzsche celebrates the possibility of a new mode of existence in excess of 
the formal structure of transcendence. 
 
Derrida, Foucault and Genealogy 
 This ceaseless rending open which both Derrida and Foucault admire and 
appropriate from Nietzsche is, I argued above, the core element of Nietzsche’s genealogy.  
Genealogy proceeds from the historicization of truth; through an inscription of difference 
at every origin, interminably opening thought to the heterogeneous networks of forces 
which constitute truth and relation.  Both Derrida and Foucault, while rarely 
acknowledged in the case of the former, explicitly adopt genealogy as an approach to the 
                                               
149  I owe the theme of the question of ‘who speaks?’ to Alan D. Schrift in “Foucault and Derrida on 
Nietzsche and the End(s) of ‘Man.’” Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche- 
Interpretation. (David Farrell Krell & David Wood, Eds) London: Routledge, 1988.  p.140-2 
150  EWII, p.276 
151  OT, p.351 
152  OT, p.373, cf. EWIII, p.10 
153  OT, p.420 
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question of origins.  Both employ the genealogical gesture in their works in opposing the 
sanctity of the origin by disrupting and undermining the metaphysical claim to a universal 
truth distinct from power.  Like Nietzsche, their genealogies open thought to the violence 
and struggles which are inseparable from thought’s foundation.  Both in this sense are 
pursuing the same broad purposes insofar as they think the origin as a play of differences 
and conceive genealogy as the mode by which difference is thought.  These genealogical 
thematics mark the ultimate point of convergence between Derrida and Foucault.  As 
absurd as it may sound, deconstruction and genealogy are both genealogical and it is thus 
their conceptions of genealogy that we now pursue. 
 
 While Foucault’s works from the 1970s and early 80s are closely associated with 
Nietzsche’s genealogy, less is made of Derrida’s own assertion in Of Grammatology that, at 
least in this text, he too works within the scope of what he explicitly refers to as a 
“genealogy of morals.”154  Like Foucault, Derrida adopts genealogy as a means to 
undermine morality’s claim to have acceded to a permanent and transcendent truth and 
to confront and undermine the claim of a truth and knowledge independent from power.  
In undermining morality’s claim to universality deconstruction effects the Nietzschean 
gesture of opening the question of relation onto itself.  In revealing “the nonethical 
opening of ethics” Derrida poses the question of a modality of relation absent a will to 
truth which would determine, secure and ground it in advance.155  It is in ‘The Violence 
of The Letter,’ Derrida’s engagement and deconstruction of Levi-Strauss’ writings on the 
nature/culture binary divide, that the genealogical gesture emerges most explicitly in his 
work.156  Levi-Strauss is an exemplary figure for Derrida in his characterization of writing’s 
secondary, derivative and violent imposition upon the Nambikwara tribe of South 
America.   
 
 In Tristes Tropiques Levi-Strauss recounts his unintentional introduction of writing 
to what he perceives as a people who had, prior to his arrival, been wholly devoid of 
written language.  Derrida retraces Levi-Strauss’ account of the abrupt emergence of 
                                               
154  OG, p.140 
155  OG, p.140 
156  Gary Shapiro develops this argument in “Taming, Repeating, Naming: Foucault, Derrida and the  
Genealogy of Morals.” Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra.  (Clayton Koelb, Ed.)  
London: SUNY, 1990.  My own analysis is indebted to Shapiro’s insights on the genealogical  
character of OfGrammatology.     
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violence which appears among the Nambikwara when their leaders begin to pretend to 
have learned the anthropologist’s writing and employ this knowledge as a power to 
manipulate others.157  Levi-Strauss presents this account as the narrative of an 
anthropologist, guilty of having introduced writing, and thus threatens the originary 
simplicity and presence of origins of the tribe.  The introduction of writing is 
characterized as a fall from innocence, as the fall from an “authentic community […] fully 
self-present in its living speech” infested from without by the corruption of the written 
word.158  But Derrida argues that Levi-Strauss has already implicitly shown that, in 
symbols, property, kinship and myths, writing is already present in the community.  
Furthermore, the tribe is not without the elements of power relations, violence, hierarchy 
and rank that Levi-Strauss considers himself guilty of introducing.  Levi-Strauss does not 
distinguish these elements because he only views them as features of the West.  His 
thought is traversed Derrida argues, by a Rousseauist nostalgia for a natural state before 
writing which deconstruction disrupts.159 
 
 There is another element to the seemingly inescapable nature of the violence of 
writing that appears in Derrida’s deconstruction of Levi-Strauss.  The Nambikwara, Levi-
Strauss recounts, are forbidden from revealing their proper names.  But once, while 
playing a game, one child does divulge an opponent's name Levi-Strauss is eventually able 
to induce the children to disclose the names of all of the villagers.  In Levi-Strauss’ 
discourse the anthropologist’s inducement of the children to divulge their proper names 
is presented as the violation of “a virginal space” by the guilty anthropologist who 
desecrates the purity of the names of the tribe’s members.160  Yet Derrida argues that 
neither the concealment nor the disclosure of the proper name constitute a primordial 
violence.  It is the act of naming itself which already constitutes “originary violence.”161  
To name is already to enact a violence, it is to classify and to inscribe ‘within a system.’162  
While Levi-Strauss thinks the empirical violence of the prohibition he thus effaces 
originary violence for in both the introduction of writing and in the prohibition of the 
name, science effaces all necessary violence and posits an origin which is the object of its 
desire.   
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 The disavowal of originary violence acts to master and determine it.  Violence can 
be thought as exterior to language only in the constitution of the logocentric and 
metaphysical myth of self-present origins, that is, in what is a decisive echo of Foucault's 
work, a “presumed difference between knowledge and power.”163  Levi-Strauss' discourse 
only functions by effacing the impossibility of a present truth and of a society not 
constituted and maintained in violence; no relationality is free from the violence of 
inscription, “writing cannot be thought of outside the horizon of intersubjective 
violence.”164  Derrida’s “repetition” of the genealogy of morals opens thought to this 
violence in undermining a truth which would present itself as divorced from power.   
 
 Two essays in particular explicitly signal Foucault’s methodological debt to 
Nietzsche in terms of an approach which Foucault has unequivocally labeled genealogical.  
The first is the often cited paper delivered in 1971 titled ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy and 
History’ while the second is a less frequently read series of lectures delivered in 1973 
which form an initial articulation of the arguments of Discipline and Punish called 'Truth 
and Juridical Forms.'165  The second of Foucault’s 1973 lectures introduces what may be 
his earliest use of the concept of ‘power relations’ and which would go on to become the 
central methodological principle of his work until at least the end of that decade.  
Foucault introduces his understanding of power within the context of a discussion of 
Nietzsche’s genealogy and the development of a metaphysics of binary oppositions in 
antiquity.  Foucault says that a momentous rupture occurred in ancient Greece when 
Plato posed a disjunction between truth and power – an event that Foucault returned to 
in his final works on ethics and truth-speaking.166  “With Plato,” Foucault says, “there 
began a great Western myth: that there is an antinomy between knowledge and power.”167  
The great deed underlying the Platonic dialogues was the emergence of a will to truth 
which posits itself as distinct from, and in opposition to, power.  Prior to Plato truth and 
power, rather than being thought as opposites, were considered to be inseparable.  True 
discourse was determined as speech with the capacity to inspire, to contest and to 
command.168  With Plato the condition of truth would shift “from the enunciation of 
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168  See Nathan Widder, “Foucault and Power Revisited.” European Journal of Political Theory.   Vol.3,  
 55 
truth from a prophetic and prescriptive type of a discourse to a retrospective one that is 
no longer characterized by prophecy but rather by evidence.”169  Accordingly, the 
condition of Platonic truth would be the denial that it enacts and is conditioned by 
power.  Metaphysics originates in the denial by truth of its inseparability from power.   
 
 Foucault locates Nietzsche as the first thinker since Plato to think what he calls, 
echoing Derrida, the ‘logocentric’ ground of philosophy.170  Truth for both Nietzsche and 
Foucault is a product of the will.  Thus, to investigate the question of truth is always 
necessarily to ask the question of ‘who speaks?’  The question of knowledge is inseparable 
from a question of power, of authority and of will.  Genealogy, in tracing the origins of 
truth to the power relations that constitute it, opens thought to a will to truth which 
marks discourse as either true or false and imbues certain discourses with authority and 
power.  Genealogy opens ethico-political relationality as a question in undermining 
determinations of morality and the claims to authority of moral and political discourse. 
 
 Foucault also explicitly appropriates what he sees as a Nietzschean priority of the 
event as a means of undermining the unity and totality of concepts of structure, system 
and logic.  The notion of the event acts to displace the will to truth’s effacement of its 
own power and authority in asserting that truth emerges from power relations.  The event 
functions to undermine the sanctity of the origin in opening it to the violence which has 
constituted it.  Foucault argues that the event is not thought within the terms of 
continuity or discontinuity but rather, as multiplicity.  Events are always multiple and 
plural, never in excess of the multiplicity of power relations within which they are formed.  
Contra Heidegger, the event does not locate or subsume power relations to a single event 
or even a single category of event.  Rather, events are always heterogeneous, immanent to 
power relations and thus, dissolve the unity of the origin into the field of power.171  The 
origin as it appears in Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche, is not in excess of power, but 
rather, is an event of power. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
        No.4, 2004.  Pp.411-32.  Foucault would come to refine this account of pre-Socratic truth in his  
        final three lecture courses and in his accounts of parrhesia in particular.  See chapters 4 and 5. 
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   Genealogy, as it functions in Nietzsche, Derrida and Foucault disabuses thought 
of any claim to transcend the violence of the political.  Relations to others are inescapably 
established in knowledge and power.  Metaphysics has, since Plato, attempted to legislate 
the political through a knowledge which would eradicate its own authority and effects.  
Philosophy has always sought to determine and secure the political through a knowledge 
which would deny its own political power.  Nietzsche, in questioning the validity of this 
move, in forcing philosophy to face the verity of its own will, opens the possibility of a 
new way of thinking the political.  No longer will relations with others be sought in 
legislation by the philosophical but rather, engagement with the question of relation will 
confront its determination by metaphysics.  Derrida and Foucault do not lapse into a 
legislation of the political in the way that Nietzsche does because they never venture 
beyond the critical force of genealogy: genealogy is already a mode of engagement with the 
political and not simply a prior step to a new philosophical determination of the political.  
Genealogy provides a form of engagement with the question of relation that for both 
Derrida and Foucault is centered upon the question of the point of departure in 
particular which does not succumb to Heidegger's desire for the proper or proper origin.  
Instead, genealogy affirms “difference or distance in the origin,” as Deleuze puts it.172  It is 
in the pursuit of a genealogical strategy that both evade the disavowal of the relational 
that I claimed is commensurate with Heidegger's questioning of Being – thrownness for 
Derrida and Foucault is irreducible. 
 
Conclusion  
 The point here is not to reduce Derrida and Foucault to 'Nietzscheanism' nor to 
argue for the importance and influence of Nietzsche over any other single thinker, for 
instance an engagement with Heidegger and the unconcealment with Being is crucial to 
both (see chapter 3).  Yet both seek to maintain a Nietzschean affirmation of the 
irreducible play of differences and the resulting inescapability of finitude that for both, 
functions to displace the concept of origin.  Yet in so doing both are led back, we will see 
below, to a form of the Nietzschean paradox of circularity – of a thought affirming its 
particularity and finitude while simultaneously offering a 'grander' narrative of the field 
which exceeds it.  And while, as I suggested (and as we will see in chapter 4) this 
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circularity forms the condition for an ethical recoil and thus, the possibility of a non-
normative political ethics, it also forms the condition for the irreducible polemic between 
them.  There is no ultimate ground or position from which the divergent ways these two 
thinkers conceive originary difference can be resolved or judged.  
 In an interview revolving primarily around the question of Nietzsche, Richard 
Beardsworth suggests to Derrida and which the latter confirms, that there is an element 
in deconstruction which exceeds the Nietzschean thematic of the play of differences.173  
Unlike most 'contemporary French philosophy' (Beardsworth has in mind here Deleuze 
and Foucault in particular) at the core of Derrida's thought is the insight that the 
immanence of the difference of forces cannot be formulated without a 'passage' through 
or 'experience' of an impossible transcendental and 'messianic' promise of a future.174  As 
Derrida puts it, "[t]he logic of force reveals within its logic a law that is stronger than this 
very logic."175  In other words, as we will see, for Derrida the question of transcendentality 
is irreducible.  The play of differences cannot be conceived for Derrida, except insofar as 
it is thought in conjunction with a law which exceeds it.  The account of the play of 
differences is not in itself a play of difference.  The question of transcendental rules or 
laws cannot itself be transcended.  On the other hand, Foucault associates the question of 
the transcendental with the disjunction of knowledge from power which he traces to 
Plato and which he sees still taking place in Derrida's deconstruction.  A fundamental 
divergence between them seems to emerge here.  How should this departure over how to 
think the origin as difference be articulated?  What is at stake in this discrepancy between 
Derrida and Foucault?  It is to these questions we now turn. 
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Chapter Two: Derrida and Foucault  
Between the Empirical and the Transcendental 
 
Is there a single theoretical orientation which has not been accused by its 
 detractors of having not entirely rejected the Cartesian heritage? 
Slavoj Zizek1 
 
Introduction 
 
 In his reply to Derrida’s critique of Madness and Civilization Michel Foucault 
categorizes the question at the core of the debate between them in the following way:  
[c]ould there be anything anterior or exterior to philosophical discourse?  Can its 
condition reside in an exclusion, a refusal, a risk avoided, and why not, a fear?”2  In 
question for Foucault is philosophy’s persistent capacity to assert its sovereignty as a 
privileged mode and means of analysis of socio-political questions.  Yet this depiction of 
the debate can be only partial for two reasons; firstly, because the stakes of the debate are 
broader than Foucault allows and secondly, because the depiction of Derrida as advocate 
and champion of philosophical discourse can only be maintained by reducing the 
implications of Derrida’s reading of Descartes and deconstruction more broadly.  In fact, 
the stakes of the debate are even broader.  An accusation is made by each thinker against 
the other of repeating modern philosophy’s crime of the ‘Cartesian exclusion’ which 
would reproduce the conditions of the objectification and determination of the other 
from a privileged and self-authorizing position.  Without explicitly declaring so, Derrida 
and Foucault can be understood to accuse one another of actively participating in the will 
to truth, that is, of committing the metaphysical move which Nietzsche defined as 
implicitly or explicitly conceiving truth wholly in excess of relation.  In short, the stakes of 
the debate involve two incommensurable and competing modes of critically engaging the 
relational.  It is with these stakes in mind that this chapter is organized.   
 
 While the first part of this chapter will offer an account of the 'cogito debate' in 
terms of the question of relationality, the second part will build on the conclusions drawn 
from the debate in asking how both thinkers displace fixed and grounded orders of 
relations to an anterior field of a play of differences from which relations are produced.  I 
problematize these accusations by showing how both thinkers work to displace the 
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empirico-transcendental double in an effort to think the relational medium in which the 
'double' is produced.  Both thinkers will in this sense be seen to inherit yet radicalize 
Heidegger's thesis of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity as reductive of the 'clearing' of 
Being through which determinate relations are given.  The difference between them will 
thus not be a question of aims or goals of their works, but rather, of the way they proceed 
and the possibility of access to what each views as the anterior 'medium' in which 
relations are produced.  Since the empirico-transcendental difference appears as a crucial 
element in their polemic, the reasons for their irreconcilability will become clear. 
 
Reading the Cogito Debate: Text, World and History 
 That the debate between Derrida and Foucault over Madness and Civilization has 
drawn a vast amount of secondary literature should be of no surprise given that it was the 
only public dialogue into which two of the most influential and widely read thinkers of 
the twentieth century entered.  Furthermore, given the large amount of attention which 
this debate has proffered, it should be no less surprising that there exists a multitude of 
interpretations of precisely what the debate was over.  However, to my knowledge none of 
the secondary literature has fully recognized the full scope, implications and the stakes of 
the debate for the question of relation and the will to truth’s desire to indefinitely 
determine it.3   
 
Critiques of Derrida's 'Textualism' 
 Edward Said, in an extended analysis of the debate and its wider implications for 
defining the differences between Derrida and Foucault, has argued that the fundamental 
point of discord lies between two distinct modes of conceiving the text’s relation to the 
world.4  For Said, the approaches of Derrida and Foucault are distinguished at the 
fundamental point wherein the existence of the text is to be described through either a 
                                               
3   An overview of the dialogue between Derrida and Foucault is provided by Antonio Campillo in  
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the relation between reason and literature: Shoshana Felman, “Madness and Philosophy Or Literature’s 
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on this debate see Peter Flaherty, “(Con)textual Contest: Derrida and Foucault on Madness and the 
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deconstruction akin to “negative theology” which would demonstrate what is absent from 
the text (Derrida) or a discursive analysis which would place the text into its constitutive 
networks of language, power and knowledge (Foucault).5  The difference between them is 
thus, as Said puts it, a question of engaging in textual analysis as either a ‘mise en abyme;’6 
the identification of an inescapable element of negativity which prevents the text from 
ever indefinitely constituting itself, or a ‘mise en discours;’ which identifies the broader 
context in which the meaning of the text is constituted.7  Said is typical of those who 
favor Foucault over Derrida insofar as he argues that unlike Derridean deconstruction, 
Foucault questions the text’s “historical presentation” and thus, avoids what he sees as 
Derrida’s a-historicism.8  Roy Boyne’s extended analysis replicates the structure of Said’s 
analysis insofar as he views the debate in terms of a question over the privileging of “the 
social real” in Foucault and its “philosophical reflection” in Derrida.9  Finally, Michael 
Sprinker too follows Said’s contention that the polemic revolves around the question of 
history and method and thus he concludes that Derrida, unlike Foucault, is guilty of an a-
historicism which thrusts all texts into a single and self-referential opening to their 
“undecidability.”10  These three are typical of those analyses partisan to Foucault since, at 
their broadest point of agreement they cite the inability of Derridean deconstruction to 
historicize the text.  In question is not the force and effectiveness of deconstruction’s 
undermining of the metaphysics of the transcendental signified, but rather of the failure 
to make an engaged claim to disturb a broader political and cultural space.  As Said puts 
it,  
 
“if everything in a text is always open equally to suspicion and to affirmation, then the 
differences between one class interest and another, or between oppressor and oppressed, 
one discourse and another, one ideology and another are virtual in – but never crucial to 
making – the finally reconciling element of textuality.”11   
 
Unlike Foucaultian analysis, Said argues that Derrida is incapable of moving us beyond 
the text to the structures which surround it. 
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Critiques of Foucault's 'Historicism' 
 Those partisans of Derrida’s position in the debate have generally sought to rescue 
Derrida from the charge of a-historicism by viewing the terms of the dialogue as a debate 
over the question of historicity, that is, the conditions of possibility of a history and 
history itself.12  In conceiving the divergence between Derrida and Foucault in these terms 
Foucault’s history of reason and madness appears as a negation of historicity since it 
assumes that the meaning of an event can be determined in its relation to a finite 
historical structure.  Yet Derrida’s reading of Descartes makes visible that all such 
structures are undermined by an excess which they cannot master.  The error of 
Foucault’s enterprise results from an erasure of historicity insofar as it is grounded in the 
assumption of a determinate historical structure.  While the arguments raised by this 
approach I think unfairly and prematurely dismiss the position of Foucault’s 1972 reply,13 
they do begin to shift the terms of the debate to what I am arguing is the fundamental 
difference between the two thinkers; namely the way in which each thinks the production 
of difference and of relation anterior to relationality's determination.  Nevertheless, seeing 
the dissimilarity between Derrida and Foucault in these terms from the perspective of 
deconstruction generally precludes the possibility of seeing the way that Foucault, after 
Madness and Civilization, also sought to respond to these questions.  This general failure 
on the part of the theorists which have taken the side of Derrida points to a further 
question which arises when contrasting and evaluating these two enterprises, namely, the 
possibility of comparing them at all.   
 
Derrida and Foucault as (Ir)reconcilable? 
 A very brief article by Jean-Luc Nancy has suggested that none of these 
characterizations of the stakes could be correct.  The dialogue between Derrida and 
Foucault occurs, he argues, in a space between two wholly distinct planes of analysis 
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which cannot be reconciled; there is an “irreducible heterogeneity” between them.14  For 
while Foucault’s work questions the theoretical-practical schemas of reason, Derrida’s 
analysis is concerned with the means philosophy employs (and always fails) to maintain its 
schemas and representations.  Nancy’s portrayal comes closest to addressing (without ever 
explicitly affirming it) one of the key elements that the secondary literature has generally 
not recognized, that the Derridean and Foucaultian approaches necessarily view one 
another as erring insofar as each views the other from their respective theoretical 
positions; they may in fact be simply mutually exclusive modes of analysis interrogating 
opposed and distinct objects.  Something like the mirror opposite of Nancy’s 
interpretation of the debate is made by Alan D. Schrift who maintains the possibility of 
reconciliation between Derrida and Foucault.  While on the face of it, viewing their 
projects as reconciliatory may appear opposed to Nancy’s account, yet it is merely a more 
optimistic version of the same thesis since for Schrift the basis of their reconciliation lies 
with the fact that the difference between them is ultimately only one of “regional 
application.”15  Their difference, for Schrift, arises in the objects of their respective 
analyses and not from a fundamentally distinct theoretical outlook and thus, there is no 
fundamental obstruction to a rapprochement.  Yet the possibility of an immediate 
reconciliation can be affirmed by Schrift only in overlooking what I will claim is the way 
that each thinker’s discourse functions to enclose the other and consequently, make an 
accusation of methodological and ethical failure.  Only in by-passing the fundamental 
differences in these modes of thinking relation can the immediate possibility of 
complimentarity and reconciliation be thought. 
 
The Debate and the Question of Relation 
As we elaborate the critiques which Derrida and Foucault unveiled at one another 
over what I argue is the narrower question of the interpretation of Descartes’ Meditations 
and more broadly, over the question of relation, it should become apparent that there is a 
degree of accuracy to all of these interpretations.  However, the argument developed 
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below is grounded in the view (which the secondary literature generally does not address) 
that at the core of the debate, producing the distinctions between Foucault and Derrida, 
lie two very distinct ways of thinking the event or decision wherein determinate fields of 
relations are constituted and the implications for thinking the question of relationality.  
Such an account of the debate has been suggested by Leonard Lawlor and Claire 
Colebrook.  Both Colebrook and Lawlor affirm that Derrida and Foucault (both also add 
Deleuze to this list) are united in seeking to think a medium or locus of pure difference or 
singularity anterior to its repetition, generalization or determination.16  While the work of 
Lawlor and Colebrook has proved highly instructive for the present analysis, it is my claim 
that the dialogue between Derrida and Foucault can also be productively pushed in a 
direction anathema to their insights in the direction of the question of the divergence 
between them.   
 
This claim proceeds from the insight that each of Derrida's and Foucault's 
accounts of the medium of differentiation implicitly claims to accede to the terrain 
wherein the differentiation and violence of relation occurs.  Given the different ways 
through which each thinker views this 'medium,' each necessarily perceives the other of 
having failed to think it, and thus, Derrida and Foucault accuse one another of 
constituting a denial of the situatedness of their own discourse.  Each circumscribes the 
other within a competing grander narrative and accordingly, accuses the other of denying 
the medium which each articulates.  Moreover, such a denial is defined for both thinkers 
as the metaphysical gesture of forming a position which transcends all determinate 
relations.  Since they do not view the cogito debate in these terms, the majority of its 
interpreters obfuscate what I claim are the central questions which it provokes: what is it 
to think the originary violence of relation? How might one proceed ethically, that is 
without determining given fields of relations in advance?17  How are we to think the 
relation between the divergent responses by Derrida and Foucault to these questions?   
Our analysis of the cogito debate will not propose to answer any of these questions with 
anything resembling conclusiveness; this will be the aim of the following chapters.  
                                               
16 These themes are discussed at length in the present and the following chapters.  See Claire Colebrook, 
The Ethics of Representation: From Kant to Poststructuralism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1999. Leonard 
Lawlor, The Being of the Question: Thinking Through French Philosophy.  Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2003 
and The Implications of Immanence:  Towards a New Concept of Life. New York: Fordham UP, 2006. 
17 Marion Hobson's Opening Lines is partially exempt from this accusation, though in her text, the 
consideration of the 'medium of differentiation' is limited to Derrida and does not address this theme in 
Foucault.  
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However, it is in the ‘cogito debate’ between Foucault and Derrida where these 
fundamental differences appear most clearly, for it is only here that they are formulated in 
relation to one another.   
 
 
Derrida on Madness and Civilization: Determining the Other 
 Derrida’s “Cogito and the History of Madness” targets the core of the 
archaeological project in Madness and Civilization: its attempt to let madness itself speak.  
Such an attempt cannot but betray its ambition, an archaeology of the silence of madness 
cannot but reproduce the conditions which always already objectify madness because, as 
Derrida asks, echoing Foucault’s own definition of madness as the ‘absence of a work:’ 
“[i]s not an archaeology, even of silence, a logic, that is, an organized language, an order, a 
sentence, a syntax, a work?”18  The ‘madness’ of Foucault’s enterprise, Derrida argues, lies 
in its attempt to transcend the language of Western reason.  Such an attempt is 
structurally correlative to Levi-Strauss’ notion of the absolute singularity of the name; like 
the name, madness cannot be said without being re-introduced into reason in general.19  
An archaeology of the silence of madness is, Derrida argues, impossible: “[a] history, that 
is, an archaeology against reason doubtless cannot be written, for, despite all appearance 
to the contrary, the concept of history has always been a rational one.”20   
 
Derrida's Critique of Foucault's Denial of Originary Violence 
 It is the perceived denial of the violence of all discourse by Foucault which sets in 
motion Derrida’s critique.  Foucault’s project can proceed, Derrida argues, only insofar as 
he has violently determined madness from the outset:  
 
“everything transpires as if Foucault knew what ‘madness’ means.  Everything transpires 
as if, in a continuous and underlying way, an assumed and rigorous pre-comprehension 
of the concept of madness, or at least its nominal definition, were possible and 
acquired.”21   
 
If madness is indeed always in excess of philosophy and Western reason, then it cannot be 
said and Foucault must remain silent, to speak the silence of madness is inescapably to 
already determine it.  For Derrida, Foucault can only justify his project by imagining an 
                                               
18 Jacques Derrida, 'Cogito and the History of Madness, Writing and Difference. Pp.36-76, p.41 
19 Marion Hobson, Opening Lines, p.35 
20 WD, p.42-3  
21 WD, p.49 
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originary presence of madness within history which would efface the metaphysics of his 
own determination of madness.   
 
 This moment of originary presence is sought, Derrida says, in the preface of 
Madness and Civilization wherein a contrast is drawn between the objectification of 
madness in modernity and the Greeks who, Foucault claims, had no conception of an 
other to logos but rather, only a distinction between sophrosyne and hybris, between 
moderation and excess.22  In the classical age madness is made silent, it is forced to 
conceal that reason cannot constitute itself except by excluding unreason.  Only by 
conceiving, Derrida argues, an originary presence of madness which existed for the 
Greeks; that is, a non-violent prior unity and abundance of madness and reason, can 
Foucault perceive his own discourse as a non-violent and non-determining return to this 
undifferentiated “original presence.”23   
 
 In addition to positing the presence of madness, Derrida argues that Foucault is 
caught dating the event of division between reason and madness across two irreconcilable 
points.  Foucault famously draws a structural correlation between the ‘great confinement’ 
carried out in European societies in the seventeenth century and Descartes’ Meditations.  
Derrida argues that Foucault’s argument is grounded in a contradiction: that the 
exclusion of madness occurs in the seventeenth century and simultaneously, that reason 
had no other for the ancient Greeks.  If, Derrida argues, the event of decision occurred 
with Socrates’ insertion of reason within his reassuring logos, in which case the decision 
is essential to the history of philosophy.  Consequently, the specificity of the classical age 
cannot be maintained together with Foucault's simultaneous privileging of the Greeks. 
Conversely, if hubris was not in fact contained by reason in the way Foucault describes in 
the preface to Madness and Civilization, then the Socratic dialectic cannot have the 
reassurance of rationality that Foucault describes.  Thus, the split between reason and its 
other in the seventeenth century would lose its mark of specificity.   
 
For Derrida, these confusions arise because Foucault has not recognized the a 
                                               
22 Madness and Civilization, p.xii-xiii 
23 WD, p.48.  Foucault would come to criticize precisely the move of placing the grounds of thought as 
withdrawal in The Order of Things, see “The Retreat and Return to Origin.” Pp.358-365.  Derrida and 
Foucault both associate this move (and the turn to the pre-Socratics) with Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
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priori grounds of the opposition between reason and its other, he has failed to think the 
“common root of meaning and nonmeaning” and thus, the point wherein “the original 
logos in which a language and a silence are divided from one another.”24  From Derrida’s 
perspective the crucial difference between he and Foucault is that the latter does not 
adequately question these grounds insofar as he finds the opposition grounded within 
history and as a consequence, his thought does not accede to the point of division or 
difference which is anterior to a determined history.  Foucault’s thought collapses the 
economy of historicity into the historical, the de jure into the de facto, and the transcendent 
into the empirical.25  To accede to a point completely beyond reason would be to position 
oneself beyond language itself.  Accordingly, the archaeologist inhabits an impossible 
transcendental and Archimedean position.  The archaeology of silence fails because it 
does not accede to the locus where the conditions of possibility of reason, history, 
language etc., structure the limits within which Foucault’s analysis functions.  As Derrida 
puts it, “[i]t is the meaning of ‘history’ or archia that should have been questioned first, 
perhaps.  A writing that exceeds, by questioning them, the values ‘origin,’ ‘reason,’ and 
‘history’ could not be contained within the metaphysical closure of an archaeology”26  It is 
an analysis of this originary point which would be the focus of Derrida’s re-interpretation 
of Descartes in distinction to Foucault’s. 
 
Undermining Foucault's Reading of Descartes 
 At the beginning of the second chapter of Madness and Civilization dedicated to the 
‘Great Confinement’ which occurs across Europe during the seventeenth century, 
Foucault uses Descartes to establish a distinction between attitudes towards madness that 
existed during the Renaissance and Classical periods.  This epochal shift, marked by an 
institutionalization of the mad that had commenced in Paris and traversed across Europe, 
is conditioned by the formation of a ‘rigid division’ between reason and madness 
exemplified in Descartes' Meditations.27  For Descartes, Foucault argues, errors of the 
senses, illusions, and dreams all form obstacles to the overcoming of doubt, yet madness is 
categorically different:  
 
                                               
24 WD, p.51.  Quoted in Marion Hobson, Opening Lines, p.33 
25 WD, p.50 
26 WD, p.42-3 
27 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy. (Trans. & Ed. By John Cottingham), Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1996. 
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“[i]n the economy of doubt, there is a fundamental disequilibrium between madness on 
the one hand, and dream and error on the other.  Their position is different in relation 
to truth and to he who seeks it; dreams or illusions are overcome from within the 
structure of truth itself; but madness is excluded by the subject who doubts.”28   
 
Madness falls outside the categories of truth and error and is disqualified from the activity 
of doubting a priori.  Foucault ties this gesture to an immense epistemological shift which 
relocates the question of the possibility of knowledge from the quality of the object to be 
known to the mind of the thinking subject.  Consequently, once madness is constituted 
as the absence of thought it is excluded from the thinking subject; “I who think, cannot 
be mad,” as Foucault puts it.29   
 
 This reading of Descartes attracts the focus of Derrida’s critique of Foucault 
because in it he finds all of the elements of a metaphysical determination and exclusion 
of the relation to the other of which he accuses Foucault.  Indeed, all of the questions of 
thinking relationality between these two thinkers can be seen here in their embryonic 
form.  Derrida claims that, through his reading of Descartes, Foucault formulates a 
violent exclusion of madness in an extra-historical objectification of the other and in a 
historical determination of the foundation of the exclusion.   
 
 The question of the mutual exclusion between reason and madness, Derrida 
argues, is not a historical one but is rather economical in the sense that it is essential to 
the “economy” of language as such.30   Language and reason always already mark a break 
with madness, language is always already differed and deferred from madness and 
therefore, Foucault’s attempted history of reason and its exclusion of madness is one form 
of madness and does not represent the historicity of reason in general.31  The Cartesian 
exclusion is not a particular event; it is the constitutive foundation of the possibility of 
language, reason and history as such.  In denying what Derrida views as the essential 
nature of the determination of the other in the constitution of meaning and history, 
Foucault is accused of positing his enterprise as transcendent to this violence by 
pretending to accede to a position from which he can appropriate the originary presence 
of the unity of reason and madness.  Thus, he is guilty of a “structuralist totalitarianism” 
insofar as he invokes, what Derrida calls, an “evasive transcendence;” a transcendence 
                                               
28 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la Folie a l’Age Classique. Paris: Gallimard, 1972. (My translation.) p.57 
29 Ibid. 
30 WD, p.51, 68 
31 WD, p.50-1 
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which, in effacing the violence of its own discourse, succumbs to the error of all 
metaphysics.32   
 
Madness as Unmasterable Excess 
While Foucault claims madness is excluded and constituted as the other of the 
cogito, and consequently thought as an illness to be repressed, Derrida argues that 
Descartes never excludes madness at this point in the meditation (where Foucault says he 
does), since here it is a case of only a minor impediment to the act of doubting and not a 
totalizing termination of doubt.  Madness, Derrida says, is a less radical form of doubt 
than the examples of the dream and especially the evil genius.  On the one hand, the 
dream functions to question all sense perception and is thus more radical than madness 
as a form of doubt and on the other, madness is not an act of doubt but only a rhetorical 
device composed for Descartes’ non-philosophical interlocutor.  Doubt is only radically 
considered in the instance of imagining an evil genius wherein we are forced to question 
ideas, not only of sensible origin as in dreams, but also of intelligible origin.33  The evil 
genius represents the possibility of total error and delusion wherein, unlike the example 
of the dream, even deductions such as mathematical truths may be false.   
 
It is at the moment of absolute delusion provoked by the evil genius that the 
cogito is nevertheless affirmed by Descartes.  As Derrida puts it, for Descartes, “[the 
cogito] is valid, even if I am mad.”34  The presence of reason is only constituted when 
reason itself is ‘mad,’ when the opposition between reason and madness is undecidable, a 
space radically anterior to any necessary relation between reason and madness, time and 
thought, temporality and truth.35  The cogito is the “zero point” “which no longer belongs 
to a determined reason or a determined unreason,” it is the “common origin” of meaning 
and nonmeaning whereby “all the determined forms of the exchanges between reason and 
madness are embedded.”36  Rather than exclude madness as Foucault believes, Derrida 
argues that Descartes fully appropriates it in the cogito.  At the moment of the hyperbolic 
doubt of the evil genius, Descartes accedes to the ‘essential’ point beyond the totality of 
reason which is historically determined, and accordingly, the cogito cannot be reduced or 
                                               
32  WD, p.69-70 
33  Antonio Campillo, “The History of a Debate on History.”  
34  WD, p.67 
35  WD, p.393-4. (n.27) 
36  WD, p.68 
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confined to a historical structure or totality.  Descartes thus seeks a point, Derrida argues, 
prior to all meaning, a point which acts as the possibility of meaning, reason, history as 
such.   
 
Derrida's critique of Foucault works by undermining the possibility of thinking 
the decision for reason over madness as a determinate historical event.37  Foucault is said 
to collapse the transcendental condition of the ‘decision’ or differentiation between 
reason and madness to either/or the exclusions constituted in Socrates and Descartes.  
Yet any claim to temporalize the cogito, to determine it within the horizon of a history 
would be, Derrida says, “violence itself.”38  Any claim for a madness exterior to logos would 
amount to a decision which would claim to transcend the determining violence of 
relation.  The ‘common origin’ of reason and madness, Derrida argues, is the point of 
radical hyperbole wherein thought can only think determinate forms by transcending the 
totality through the guarantee and grounding of thought in God.39  Only when Descartes 
posits God as the source of a totalizing closure does the decision and differentiation 
occur.  Only through the absolutely divine is the cogito saved from the silence of total 
hyperbole: “Descartes knew that, without God, finite thought never had the right to 
exclude madness, etc.  Which amounts to saying that madness is never excluded, except in 
fact, violently, in history.”40  Madness is the condition of possibility of Descartes’ project 
since it constitutes absolute doubt, but also marks its impossibility since the exit from 
madness is only made in a thinking of totality.  Madness is in principle or de jure always 
inseparable from reason, yet it is de facto exceeded in determinate historical events.  The 
point of differentiation is located at the cogito's reinsertion into determinate history with 
the absolute support of God.  The cogito becomes non-madness once it speaks, once it 
becomes temporal and discursive.  Any claim to speak madness is always already 
necessarily grounded in its exclusion since language must both open to, yet determine, the 
otherness of madness which is its condition of possibility.   
 
Just as Foucault can constitute his archaeological enterprise as soon as he departs 
from his initial definition of madness as pure silence in order to implicitly determine it in 
some way, Descartes makes the same move through the guarantee of certainty in God.  
                                               
37  Marion Hobson, Opening Lines, p.35 
38   WD, p.70 
39   WD, p.68,  
40   WD, p.395 (n.28) 
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Both Descartes and Foucault think the forms of reason and madness as historically 
determinate because they violently determine the infinite hyperbole of madness as a 
closed totality either through the transcendence of totality by the divine (Descartes) or by 
the Archimedean position of the archaeologist (Foucault).  Foucault endows hyperbole 
with a historical location and thus, denies the ‘essential’ excess in any relation to an other.  
In principle, the violence of this relation is never overcome for it conditions the 
possibility of meaning, history and reason.  The violence of exclusion and of constituting 
determinate relations is irreducible. 
 
The Cogito and the Determination of Relation 
 Derrida has thus shifted the place of what he elsewhere calls the “prior medium in 
which differentiation in general is produced” away from where it is located by Foucault.41  
Something akin to Heidegger's circumscription of Nietzsche occurs here.  Derrida's 
account seeks to circumscribe Foucault within the limits of metaphysics which the latter 
seeks to exceed.  Contra Foucault, the medium of the constitution of a determinate 
relation of reason and madness cannot be thought as a singular historical event for two 
reasons.  Firstly, because the separation of reason and madness is a condition of 
historicity and language itself and therefore, a historical account of this separation always 
already presupposes it as soon as it speaks.  Secondly, (and this follows from the first 
reason) there is no reason which is not already traversed by madness, nor a madness 
which is not traversed by reason and thus, neither can be questioned from the perspective 
of the other.   
 
 In short, Foucault is accused of repeating the Cartesian exclusion.  That is, 
archaeology betrays madness as soon as it begins to speak, much as the Cartesian 
guarantee of certainty cannot but violently determine the irreducible indefinite excess of 
hyperbolic doubt.  By providing the cogito with a divine guarantor Descartes neutralizes 
its excess so that it may begin to think axiomatically while Foucault is only able to speak 
of an event of decision in presupposing an originary (non-violent) and harmonious logos 
prior to the dispersion which he aims to reverse.  The originary violence of all relation 
and language is denied in its being reduced to a localized historical event. 
 
                                               
41  Jacques Derrida, Dissemination. (trans. Barbara Johnson) London: Routledge, 1981, p.129.  Quoted in 
Marion Hobson, Opening Lines. P.64 
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Foucault and the Discursive Field of Differentiation in Descartes 
 Foucault produced his response to Derrida as an appendix to the second edition 
of Madness and Civilization nearly ten years after Derrida’s essay had first appeared.  By the 
time the response appeared the nature of Foucault’s enterprise had shifted significantly.  
For all intents and purposes, the response to Derrida came from a different Foucault than 
the one who had written Madness and Civilization.  By 1972, when “My Body, This Paper, 
This Fire” had appeared, The Order of Things, The Archaeology of Knowledge had already 
been published and Foucault had already announced his later genealogical project with 
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.”  This later Foucault would no longer claim to accede to 
the possibility of an experience of pure exteriority in madness; Foucault had, by the early 
1970s at the latest, revoked the attempt to think a non-violent relation to the absolutely 
other.42  Without ever acknowledging Derrida’s critique of his attempt to think an 
originary experience of ‘madness itself’ as present to thought, he had nevertheless 
explicitly revised the aim of his enterprise and had done so, at least in part, through a 
critique of this aim in Madness and Civilization.  For instance, in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge Foucault admits that the earlier book “had accorded too great a place, and a 
very enigmatic one too, to what [he] called an ‘experience,’ thus showing to what extent 
one was still close admitting an anonymous and general subject of history.”43  In effect, 
Foucault implicitly admits that to the extent that he had aspired to uncover an experience 
of madness totally in excess of metaphysics Derrida's critique is accurate.44   
 
 However, if Foucault can be said to admit this element of Derrida’s critique, he is 
nevertheless adamant that it is Derrida, and not he, who has repeated the ‘Cartesian 
exclusion.’  Foucault’s reply thus immediately addresses what I claim is the question at the 
core of the debate: the location and status of the ‘essential’ point wherein the exclusion is 
constituted, the status of the point or medium of differentiation.  For while Derrida 
argues that the cogito, as constituted in the excess of hyperbolic doubt, cannot be fully 
enclosed within a historical structure, Foucault argues that in this interpretation the 
cogito only exceeds a finite determined totality in terms of the status assigned to it by 
                                               
42   cf. Antonio Campillo, “Derrida and Foucault: A History of a Debate on History.”  P.118 
43   Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, [Hereafter referred to as AK], p.16 
44  I am not prepared to go so far and assume, as Roy Boyne does, that it was as a direct reaction to 
Derrida’s critique that Foucault had revised the aim of his oeuvre. Cf. Derrida and Foucault: The Other 
Side of Reason. 
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philosophical discourse.45  Derrida is said to efface the multiplicity of discursive elements 
co-existing in Descartes text because he only reads it from the position of a sovereign 
philosophical discourse which disavows any other (juridical, medical) discursive elements.  
Foucault’s reply therefore suggests that it is Derrida who is guilty of what Nietzsche calls a 
will to truth since he violently excludes the singular elements of Cartesian discourse in 
order to locate within it ‘transcendental’ philosophical problems.  Foucault thus once 
again shifts the point where the exclusion – the determination of relation – is to be 
located, both in Descartes’ text and in Derrida’s, to the denial of the inescapable power 
and violence of a material discourse.  It is Derrida whose reading of Descartes is 
circumscribed within the limits of metaphysics, whose account fails to think the terrain 
where the metaphysical may be exceeded.   
 
Derrida's Cartesian Gesture 
 In this, his second and more extensive interpretation of the Meditations Foucault 
argues that Derrida is wrong to assume that the dream hypothesis is a more radical 
exercise of doubt than the example of madness because the dream affects only the matter 
of meditation.  That is to say, it only affects the object of the meditating subject’s 
knowledge and so only puts in question the truth of the most immediate sensory 
impressions.  Madness, on the other hand, Foucault argues, affects the epistemological 
and medical characterization of the social and juridical qualification of the meditating 
subject itself.  In organizing his interpretation of Descartes in terms of the question of 
hyperbole from Foucault's perspective Derrida ignores the broader ethical features of the 
discourse.  He effaces the askesis or ascetic transformation that the meditating subject 
undergoes in order to prove capable of performing the philosophical act of doubting prior 
to the performance of the act itself.  Before the examples of the dream and of the evil genius 
upon which Derrida focuses, there is a prior demand for the formation and 
determination of a specific type of subject which is qualified to doubt.46   
 
 As such, Derrida’s ‘philosophical’ reading of Descartes is said to overlook that the 
                                               
45  See Wendy Cealy Harrison “Madness and Historicity: Foucault and Derrida, Artaud and Descartes.” 
History of the Human Sciences. Vol.20, No.27, 2007. Pp.79-105, 
46  Foucault would return to this theme of the askesis or self-transformation of the subject in his final works 
on ancient ethical and political practices.  In these later works the event of decision in Descartes 
remains for Foucault the archetypal instance of a modern subject who is always determined prior to 
philosophical exercise.  These themes will be explored in chapter 4. 
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text forms, not only a philosophical system of propositions wherein the subject remains 
fixed and unaffected by the demonstration, but also a subjective exercise which, in acting 
as a discursive event, calls for a transformation of the doubting subject.  The Cartesian 
discourse is defined by Foucault, employing the perspective developed in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge, as a “discursive meditation” which functions as: 
 
“a set of discursive events which constitute at once groups of utterances linked one to 
another by formal rules of deduction, and series of modifications of the enunciating 
subject which follow continuously one from another” and thus, “the utterances which 
are formally linked, modify the subject as they develop.”47    
 
These two complimentary elements of the text are disregarded from the outset of 
Derrida’s analysis insofar as he does not proceed in analyzing the text as a discourse, that 
is, as “a set of utterances which are produced each in its place and time.”48  Indeed, 
insofar as it is a discursive event, Foucault maintains that the analysis of Descartes’ text 
must endeavor to determine the meaning of its utterances and the relation between the 
status of the utterance and the position of the speaking subject.   
 
 Only through an analysis of the Meditations as discursive ensemble is the position 
of the subject in relation to the discourse and in relation to itself established so that the 
Cartesian meditation marks both the constitution of the form of a subject who is 
authorized to speak the truth (to form axiomatic statements) and the exclusion of a 
subject who may not (the subject qualified as mad).  The meditation is thus what Foucault 
would later call an ethical technique for the production of a particular mode of 
subjectivity, or, in other words, the meditation functions as a modification of the subject 
capable of the enunciation of philosophical truths.  It is a ‘spiritual exercise’ which, in 
altering the subject, produces either a subject deemed capable of speaking the truth or 
one who is disqualified from truth-speaking.49 
 
The 'Meditations’ as Subjective Exercise 
 Descartes begins his meditation with a single proposition: every truth received by 
the senses must be doubted and consequently, for the meditation to continue, its subject 
must form itself into a subject capable of doubting absolutely.  However, a subject capable 
                                               
47  Michel Foucault, "My Body, This Paper, This Fire." EWII, Pp.393-418, p.406 
48  EWII, p.405 
49  The distinction of discourse as spiritual exercise between Descartes and the ancient Greeks would again   
 become the focus of Foucault’s very last works.  See chapter 4. 
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of absolute doubt would be mad and accordingly, would be disqualified from 
participating in a rational discourse.  Thus, Foucault argues that the necessary first step is 
to perform an askesis to confirm the subject as rational and so it is in this sense that 
Descartes proposes the example of the dream as superior to the example of madness; the 
subject of madness, unlike the example of the dream, can neither be the doubting nor the 
meditating subject.  As Foucault puts it, “madness is posited as disqualificatory in any 
search for truth….” and thus, Descartes constitutes the event of decision whereby he 
“parts company with all those for whom madness can be in one way or another the 
bringer or revealer of truth.”50  Madness is excluded because the exercise of the madman’s 
doubt does not qualify as that of a rational subject; the madman cannot speak the truth.  
Descartes disqualifies the madman by identifying him through seventeenth century 
juridical and medical discourse as demens, and it is through this juridical category that he 
is always already determined as incapable of truth-speaking.  The point of exclusion 
occurs in the intersection of several discourses, none of which is absolutely privileged, 
which in turn determine in advance, that is, form the limits of, the subject of philosophy. 
 
 Derrida, Foucault argues, is only able to view the example of the dream as a more 
radical questioning of sense perception because he discounts the discursive difference 
between the subject of madness and the subject of dreaming which he is able to do only 
by revoking philosophical status from the exclusion of the mad subject.  Furthermore, 
Derrida claims that the example of the madman is excluded from the process of doubt 
insofar as it is removed by Descartes for pedagogic reasons, that is, the dream unlike the 
example of madman, does not frighten what he imagines to be Descartes’ naïve, common-
sense, non-philosophical interlocutor.  In considering the dream in relation to madness in 
this way, Foucault argues that it is Derrida who has in fact performed the ‘Cartesian 
exclusion’ of the other since he excludes madness insofar as it is not accorded 
‘philosophical status.’  Foucault’s claim is, in short, that Derrida’s interpretation has the 
effect of “erasing” differences within the text in the name of the priority of a 
philosophical discourse which, in order to preserve its sovereignty over the text, must 
ignore its own historical determination.51  The Derridean reading does not traverse the 
chiasm in the text, remaining only at the point of question of the possibility of the 
Cartesian ‘system’ and not of its status as a subjective exercise.   
                                               
50  EWII, p.409 
51  EWII, p.412 
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Madness and the Sovereignty of Philosophy 
Accordingly, while Derrida posits the example of the evil genius as the most 
radical example of doubt in the meditation, Foucault argues this example only emerges at 
a point in the meditation where madness has already been mastered and excluded by 
philosophy: “[i]f the evil genius takes on powers of madness, this is only after the exercise 
meditation has excluded the risk of being mad.”52  The event of determination, the closure 
of the inside from the outside, occurs elsewhere Foucault argues, because the example of 
the evil genius is a mastered and voluntary exercise that allows the meditation to continue 
insofar as it allows a so-called madness to appear to philosophical discourse only once it 
has been objectified and excluded.  For Derrida, much like for Descartes, madness is 
evoked as a fiction to be overcome and mastered by the subject of philosophy.  Derrida 
has abstracted and protected philosophical subjectivity from the power of discourse 
through an act which asserts the sovereignty of philosophy, that is, which “avoid[s] placing 
discursive practices in the field of transformation where they are carried out.”53   
 
For Foucault, Derrida’s interpretation of the text is constituted through an a-
historical idealism and it is thus Derrida (and not Foucault) who makes the metaphysical 
move of occupying a position totally transcending history itself insofar as all texts are 
subsumed to a single philosophical discourse: “the philosopher,” Foucault says in 
reference to Derrida, “goes directly to the calling into question of the ‘totality of 
beingness.’”54  Accordingly, the argument goes, Derrida sees all discourses through the 
horizon of philosophical discourse and is thus blind to the singularity of madness in the 
Cartesian meditation.  In effect, it is Derrida and not Foucault, who must claim to occupy 
a position prior to, but wholly outside of, history.  Derrida’s analysis thus appears as a-
historical from Foucault’s perspective because it fails to accede to a thought of the point 
of exclusion.  Exclusion is not constituted for Foucault in the necessary denial of the 
absence of the other (in the act of making the other present) but in the forces of 
dispersion of discourse which form and determine the other as a certain type of subject 
(one who cannot doubt rationally) and thus, as a certain type of object of knowledge 
(insane, mentally ill, etc.).   
 
                                               
52  EWII, p.415 
53  EWII, p.416  (emphasis added). 
54  EWII, p.412 
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The Cogito and the Determination of Relation (Again) 
Foucault’s critique of Derrida is premised upon shifting the accusation of a 
violent determination of the relation to the other from himself onto Derrida insofar as he 
accuses Derrida of committing a secondary violence upon the originary violence of 
discourse.  Derrida is said to deny the singular elements of the discourse in order to locate 
within it transcendental philosophical problems.  In thinking the relation of logos-
madness as a necessarily and irreducibly undecidable question of the conditions of 
possibility of all meaning, historicity, language, Derrida denies the material differences of 
discourse(s) producing the context or conditions from which Descartes discourse emerges.  
And while Derrida would claim that his analysis accedes to a point anterior to the 
transcendental insofar as he questions the production of a metaphysico-transcendental 
position – which he claims Foucault inhabits without problematizing – Foucault reverses 
the claim to argue that it is Derrida’s analysis which fails to question its own 
transcendental status and as such, establishes a position for deconstruction which would 
always violently determine the object of analysis in advance.   
 
 In short, Foucault can be understood to claim in “My Body, This Paper, This Fire” 
that it is in fact Derrida’s analysis which constitutes itself in determining relationality in 
advance and accordingly, it is Derrida who is guilty of repressing the violence and 
objectification which occurs in his analysis.  It is a question then, once again, though this 
time on Foucault’s part, of making the claim to have acceded to a point anterior to the 
exclusion of the other which occurs in the Meditations; a point which for Foucault cannot 
lie in the ‘quasi’-transcendental nature of the excess of the evil genius because madness, is 
already excluded by Descartes before the act of doubting can take place.   
 
 
The (Im)possibility of Choosing Between Derrida and Foucault 
 In essence, the ‘cogito debate consists in two accusations of denial; two 
accusations of constituting a secondary violence, of denying the exclusion of the other in 
order to govern it and identify it within a domain that the accused has mastered in 
advance.  Consequently, Derrida and Foucault accuse one another of the ethical failure to 
think the violence of relationality insofar as each is charged with suppressing this violence 
in the name of a method which accedes to the essential point of exclusion, of 
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determination and objectification of the self’s relation to the other and others.  The 
difference between them is therefore a question of two modes of thinking the medium or 
point where the differentiation, and thus violence, occurs and the ethico-political 
implications of failing to view this point correctly.  In effect, this failure amounts to, in 
the view of both thinkers, what we have called using the formulation outlined by 
Nietzsche and appropriated by both Derrida and Foucault, the will to truth.  That is, 
failure to think the medium of differentiation correctly amounts to the denial and 
repression of the conditions of possibility of one’s own analysis and thus, to a secondary 
violence which effaces the ‘true’ point of determination and exclusion of the other.  In 
other words, from the respective positions of deconstruction’s analysis of the quasi-
transcendental nature of the exclusion and of archaeology’s analysis of what we might call 
the quasi-empirical nature of the multiplicity of discourse, the other thinker’s analysis 
always appears as having failed to affirm the irreducibility of its being-thrown into 
determinate relations.   
 
 The claim being pursued here is that from each of these positions, the opposing 
one appears incapable of thinking the medium of differentiation wherein relations are 
determined and thus, of an ethical and political failure insofar as the question of relation 
is the irreducible primary element of the political.  These two thinkers seem to be 
mutually incompatible, and yet, are only shown to 'err' or commit the metaphysical move 
of determining relation from within the horizon of one or the other's text.  Nevertheless, 
it should be evident that the questions of historicity, text and world, and region of 
application, are all determined by this anterior point of the medium of differentiation.  
Any characterization of the difference between Derrida and Foucault in these terms will 
only succeed in identifying partial or secondary differences between them, but not the 
source of their incommensurability; two distinct ‘media of differentiation’ through which 
all of their analyses pass.  
 
 If at the core of the 'cogito debate' we find the question of the locus or medium 
where determinate relations are formed, then we should see this question as opening a 
host of themes that cut across both Derrida's and Foucault's work.  Epistemic questions 
about the possibility of a knowledge which can think this region while simultaneously 
avowing its own situatedness, ontological questions about the being of thought and its 
relation to its other, and consequent ethical and political questions relating to the 
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appropriate response of what a thought asserting its relatedness and thus violence over 
things should be.  The stakes of the debate are, it seems, high.  Moreover, it is my that 
claim the polemic is irresolvable.  Relationality is either said to no longer appear in the 
open horizon of a question, but in a transcendentally governed field of philosophical 
questions or an empirically determined history through which alterity is violently made to 
appear.  The transcendentally or empirically determined field where differentiation occurs 
functions for the interlocutor as the disavowed alibi for the inescapable violence of 
relation.   
 
The incongruity if not irony of these two-way accusations of transcendentalism 
and empiricism is that it is in working to displace the empirico-transcendental binary 
through which Derrida and Foucault have defined much of their theoretical enterprises.  
Accordingly, if it is to their mutual engagements with the question of the subject to which 
we now turn it is because it is here that in modernity the transcendental and the 
empirical have been brought into contact with one another; where a determinate 
transcendental form of subjectivity has functioned to govern the empirical content of 
knowledge, but also of ethical and political relations.  If the claim that the polemic 
between them is irresolvable is to be upheld, then one way of doing so is to demonstrate 
that both thinkers have sought to think beyond an empirico-transcendental double to 
think the conditions or 'medium' by which the subject can emerge.  Ultimately, despite 
their claims to the contrary, the terms of the debate are grounded neither in 
transcendentalism nor empiricism but rather, in the 'grander' narratives through which 
each accounts for the double's emergence. 
 
 
Between Immanence and Transcendence  
 The question of the subject is perhaps the most basic and essential question of 
modern philosophy.  Its importance lies in the fact that in modernity the subject has 
functioned as the ground of knowledge, but also of the political since it has served as 
ground ordering relations between the self and the world, truth and others.  In 
modernity, the individual considered as a 'subject' has acted as the Archimedean point 
from which the world is given meaning and significance.  The Latin term subjectum as is 
well known, is a translation of the Greek hupokeimenon, a term referring to a fundamental 
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substratum which has no more originary ground and upon which all other elements are 
predicated.55  It functions as the ultimate substance underlying Being as such.  Once 'man' 
as self, ego, consciousness, etc. becomes subjectum in modernity, the determining principle 
or ground is made to coincide with the thinking 'I.'  Descartes' Meditations  inaugurate the 
positing of an abstract, transcendental subjectivity and a concrete empirical reality in 
which the thinking subject can be located.  Yet it was Kant who radicalized this 
formulation of the thinking subject by grounding subjectivity on the relation and 
difference between subject and object.  The object comes to depend on the subject's 
constitution of objectivity; reason becomes grounded on universal laws which form the 
transcendental conditions of knowledge.  Thus, as Gerard Granel argues, Descartes' 'I 
think' becomes with Kant, "I represent to myself that I think."56  For Kant, experience is 
representational; the world and its objects are received by reason according to 
transcendental conditions, that is, through the way objects which are sensibly present are 
represented to thought.  
 
 Grounded in Kant's 'Copernican revolution' of the conditions of subjective 
knowledge, the rise of modern philosophies of subjectivity would bring with them a new 
vision of the political.  Particular philosophies of subjectivity, by establishing a 
transcendental human identity, would provide a new ground upon which political 
philosophies and policy could be based.  Particular political strategies, from Hobbes to 
Marx and beyond, work to ground themselves through various assertions of human 
nature or knowledge and the consequent desire for a harmony between a given human 
essence or identity and political institutions.  The metaphysics of subjectivity would thus 
serve not only to determine the self's relation to the world and its possible knowledge of it 
but crucially, the self's relations to others.  It is in this sense that Heidegger's critique of 
modern anthropologism's determination of man as a being who gives measure and 
regulates all that is, is not only radically epistemological or ontological, but inherently 
political.57  As we have seen, for Heidegger, to conceive man as both an entity, being, or 
object and as the ground of all objects is to neglect the primordial status of our being-in-
the-world which precedes the subject-object or empirico-transcendental dualism.  
                                               
55  cf. Simon Critchley "Prologema to Any Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity." Deconstructive Subjectivities, 
(Simon Critchley & Peter Dews, Eds.) Pp.13-46, see p.13 
56  Gerard Granel, "Who Comes After the Subject?" Who Comes After the Subject? (Eduardo Cadava, Peter 
Connor, Jean-Luc Nancy, Eds.) London: Routledge, 1991. P.159 
57   See for instance “The Age of the World Picture.”P.134 
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Heidegger replaces the epistemic question of 'how can the subject have knowledge?' to the 
ontological question of Being.  That is, the transcendental question is displaced by the 
question of the givenness or disclosure of Being which precedes particular relations 
between truth and the world.  In other words, Heidegger seeks to think what is 'between' 
and anterior to determinate relations between subject and object or subject and subject.  
As he puts in 'The Letter on Humanism': "[e]very determination of the essence of man [...] 
always presupposes an interpretation of beings without asking about the truth of Being."58  
His articulation of Dasein as Being-in-the-world displaces articulations of subjectivity or 
intersubjectivity as particular ways of relating to the world, or what he calls modes 
through which the world is disclosed.   Heidegger thinks Being as the medium through 
which determinate relations to the self, the world and others are given or produced and 
thus, the subject as relation between the empirical and transcendental is circumscribed by 
a more originary relation to Being. 
 
 Like Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault disrupt and displace the constitution of the 
empirico-transcendental double by thinking an 'outside' which is both anterior to and 
gives or discloses the subject.  They share the post-Heideggerean impetus of thinking the 
subject as situated and made to appear through a logic or 'medium' which exceeds it.  
After Heidegger, the question of the subject is no longer a question of a substance which 
governs thought's relation to the world and to others, but rather, a question of its 
appearance or becoming.  The being of the subject, as Nancy says, "takes place, that is to 
say it comes into presence."59  Derrida and Foucault both share the view articulated by Nancy 
of the subject not as a determinate transcendental substance, but as effected and allowed 
to appear within networks of determinate historical, material and linguistic relations.  
Both think the appearance of the subject through what has been called the 'paradox of 
subjectivity:' "the ineluctable aspect of thought attempting to think its own (absent) 
ground."60  Both Derrida and Foucault attend to the space generated by the paradox of a 
thinking 'I' which is both ground and object of thought; attempting to appropriate itself to 
itself.  It is to the ways in which Derrida and Foucault respectively think the appearance of 
the subject as a determinate relation between the inside and its constitutive outside to 
                                               
58   Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings. P.225-6 
59   Jean-Luc Nancy, "Introduction," Who Comes After the Subject? p.7 
60  Caroline Williams, Contemporary French Philosophy: Modernity and the Persistence of the Subject. London: 
Continuum, 2001. p.8 
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which we will now turn.  This will serve two purposes.  First, it will substantiate the 
different and ultimately incommensurable ways they conceive the relation between the 
empirical and transcendental which we saw was central to their debate over the 
Meditations.  Secondly and consequently, it will point to the ways in which each proceeds 
to question and moreover, thinks the possibility of thinking, the anterior medium 
through which relations are determined.  As such, it will serve to substantiate my claim 
that the terms of the debate between them lie not with a question of text or world but 
with the correlative yet incommensurable grander narratives which each proffers. 
 
   In an essay originally published in 1996 titled 'Absolute Immanence' Giorgio 
Agamben famously draws a distinction between on the one hand, Deleuze and Foucault 
and Derrida and Levinas on the other hand, as marking two distinct Heideggerean 
trajectories in twentieth century philosophy.61  Deleuze and Foucault are said, in a lineage 
passing through Spinoza and Nietzsche, to be thinkers of pure immanence, while Derrida 
and Levinas, in their affinity to Kant and Husserl, are called by Agamben thinkers of 
transcendence.62  In drawing the distinction in these terms, Agamben's essay suggests a 
productive way of thinking the difference between Derrida and Foucault.  But while 
Agamben does devote several paragraphs to the immanent structure of Foucault's 
formulation of 'life' (to which we will return), the name of Derrida only appears in a 
highly schematic diagram in the end of the essay.  Agamben's text is given to thinking the 
concepts of immanence and life in Deleuze and we are left guessing what the precise 
terms and stakes of drawing such a distinction might be.  In developing Agamben's 
suggestive schema in terms of the differences between Derrida and Deleuze, Daniel W. 
Smith provides some insights which are productive for our own analysis.63   In tracing the 
paths of Derrida's thought of transcendence and Deleuze's thought of immanence 
through the questions of subjectivity, ontology and epistemology Smith provides the 
parameters for an analysis of the divergence between Derrida and Foucault.  Foucault, like 
Deleuze, thinks both experience and Being in the terms of immanence, that is, that there 
is nothing beyond Being and that there is an immanence between Being and beings.  On 
                                               
61  Giorgio Agamben, "Absolute Immanence." Potentialities. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Ed. & trans.).  Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1999.  pp.220-239. 
62  Ibid. p.239 
63  Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent 
French Thought." Between Deleuze and Derrida.  Paul Patton & John Protevi (Eds.), London: Continuum, 
2003.  pp.46-66. 
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the other hand, Smith argues, that while Derrida is not simply a transcendental 
philosopher, he nevertheless insists upon what he calls a "formal structure of 
transcendence."64   
 
 While Smith's account is helpful in thinking the implications of Agamben's 
diagram, he nonetheless passes too quickly over the nuances of Derrida's work.  As we will 
see below, to insist on a purely transcendent structure to deconstruction is to efface the 
Derridean claim that all transcendence is irrevocably tied to and contaminated by the 
empirical realm from which it attempts to delimit itself.  I suggest that insofar as it is 
engaged in undermining or disrupting transcendental grounds Derrida's thought is close 
to Foucault's.  They converge upon the pursuit of what is anterior to and 'outside' the 
duality of the empirico-transcendental.  Furthermore, as we will see below, both I would 
claim, attempt to think the primacy of difference anterior to its subordination to some 
ground or repetition.65  This is reflected by the genealogical thematic which I claimed in 
chapter 1 emerges with both thinkers; they both undermine efforts to completely exceed 
the originary violence of relation by taking up an archipolitical position which transcends 
and governs relationality.  Yet both simultaneously turn against this possibility in 
affirming the impossibility of an Archimedean position beyond determinate relations 
which would afford access to pure difference in itself. 
 
 Nevertheless, if there are similar theoretical effects and consequences from 
Derrida and Foucault's distinct ways of undermining the empirico-transcendental double, 
such a displacement is nevertheless accomplished through two distinct efforts which we 
might think, as Agamben suggests, in terms of immanence and (quasi)transcendence.  
While Derrida's conception of the 'double-bind' or of conditions of possibility as 
impossible maintains the necessity of working through transcendental ideas as regulative 
of thought, Foucault attempts to displace the transcendental altogether.  In other words, 
Derrida attempts to submit the conditions of the possibility of experience to their 
simultaneous impossibility and thus works in the terms of an essential interruption or 
contamination of universal and transcendental conditions of experience.  In a very 
different theoretical decision, Foucault displaces the question of transcendental 
                                               
64  Ibid. p.48, 54 
65  In several texts, Leonard Lawlor suggests that, while they may engage in different theoretical work,    
 Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault should all be considered as thinkers of immanence. cf. Leonard  
 Lawlor, The Implications of Immanence and Thinking Through French Philosophy. 
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conditions altogether by what he calls in The Archaeology of Knowledge, their 'conditions of 
emergence.'  That is, transcendentals are submitted to the discursive events through 
which they are produced.  In short, if what unites both thinkers is their desire to no 
longer submit and govern thought by transcendental grounds, it is in the way in which 
Derrida and Foucault attempt to displace or undermine the necessity for transcendental 
principles which their differences appear.  It is to these two distinct movements of 
displacement of the empirico-transcendental double to which the rest of this chapter is 
addressed. 
 
 
Derrida, Foucault and the Critique of the ‘Double’ 
 The 'cogito debate' has pointed us towards the question of the empirico-
transcendental since each accuses the other of a thought which inheres in the double.  In 
the following sections, we will begin by showing that Derrida disrupts the double by 
submitting the constitution of the transcendental to an indefinite passage to self-presence 
which, since it can never completely transcend the empirical, is never fully constituted.  
We will then go on to examine Foucault's argument that the double is formed through a 
teleology or eschatology which aims to form a unity of identity and difference or Same 
and Other and thus, is doomed to fail since it covers over the immediacy of the discursive 
field through which it is formed.  Both Derrida and Foucault thus think a differential 
network between and anterior to the double which prevents its ultimate presence to self, a 
relational surface or medium anterior to any determinate order of inter-subjectivity.  It is 
the different ways in which this field is thought which will prove instructive for our 
analysis. 
 
Derrida and the Double: Exceeding Presence and Absence 
 Derrida conceives his negotiations with the empirico-transcendental double as 
moving 'undecidably' between these two positions.  The 'quasi-transcendental' structure of 
différance marks an irreducibility between empirico-historical events and their formal 
transcendental elements.  The distinction between right and fact is both maintained and 
simultaneously displaced in the movement, exemplified in the reading of the cogito, 
between complete excess and its determination; between metaphysical closure and its 
outside.  To neglect the essential and unmasterable excess of all relationality is to be 
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committed to historicism; to view history as a series of facts as Levi-Strauss and Foucault 
are accused is to commit violence in the denial of originary violence.  On the other hand, 
to reject history as a determination of the originary presence of the other as other is to 
attempt to accede to a transcendent position uncontaminated by the de facto originary 
violence of relation and thus, a denial of the relational situatedness of thought.66  Derrida 
attempts to avoid either option by demonstrating that the opposition between totality and 
excess or empirical and transcendental are preceded by a logic which he describes with the 
French word "pas," which  can mean both 'step' and 'not'.67  The passage to the presence of 
the transcendental signified only appears in its impossibility or withdrawal. 
 
 In his work Derrida has consistently sought to trace a constitutive failure of re-
presentation in dispersing it to an originary division and difference.  While I have been 
referring to this 'non-originary' difference as an originary "medium," the term must be 
qualified for it refers to a locus anterior to any medium, a differential movement that 
cannot be conceived or conceptualized.68  Différance does not exist within time and space, 
since it is the differential movement that gives them and thus, is opposed to the logic of 
an originary presence that is re-presented.  Deconstruction opens to an experience of 
'nonpassage' or of the "pas (step/not)" which gives and disrupts all unity, origin, ground, 
etc.69  Consequently, presence is shown to be the effect of a difference and deferral that is 
"between" the empirical and transcendental since it names both fusion and separation, 
producing its conditions of possibility while making unity impossible.70  The 'between' 
thus forms the 'medium' or 'milieu' which allows and prevents the constitution of the 
double, it marks "the spots of what can never be mediated, mastered, sublated, or 
dialecticized through any Erinnerung or Aufhebung."71   Presence is always the effect of a 
dispersion or dissemination which thought can neither master nor appropriate.  As we 
will see below, the displacement of presence is central to Derrida's deconstruction of the 
empirico-transcendental double. 
                                               
66  This argument is made by Marion Hobson in Opening Lines, p.40 
67  cf. Jacques Derrida, Aporias: Dying-Awaiting (One Another At) The 'Limits of Truth,' (Trans. by Thomas 
Dutoit), Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993, p.6, [Hereafter referred to as ‘AP’]. "Ja, or the Faux Bond." Points: 
Interviews, 1974-1994. (Elisabeth Weber Ed.) Trans. by Peggy Kamuf et al. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995. 
P.52,  
68  This point is made by Claire Colebrook in The Ethics of Representation. 
69  AP, p.6 
70  Derrida discusses the structure of his quasi-transcendentals as a 'between' in Dissemination, p.230.  See 
also Marion Hobson, Opening Lines. 
71  Ibid. 
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The Voice and Writing 
 The ideal of presence, Derrida claims, is grounded in a conception of the voice as 
a medium which transcends the breach between thought and its other.  It allows thought 
to posit an enclosed space in which it can bring the presence of the signified to itself in a 
direct and unmediated relation.  Metaphysics is thus said to proceed by way of an 
eschatology whereby the overcoming of the distance of re-presentation results complete 
presence to self.  Insofar as logos is defined as pure presence, metaphysics attempts to 
found thought in the appropriation of an origin that would function as its ground: 
"[p]hilosophy has always insisted upon this: thinking its other.  Its other which limits it, 
and from which it derives its essence, its definition, its production."72  Metaphysics is 
defined by the desire to ground itself in what exceeds it by mastering it, that is to say, to 
provide a foundation for thought in an element which transcends thought but which 
both determines or makes thought possible and which thought can appropriate.  In a 
number of early texts, including Voice and Phenomena, Of Grammatology and 'The Ends of 
Man,' Derrida's argument shows self-presence to be grounded  upon the constitution of a 
proximity of presence to the subject.  As Derrida puts it in Of Grammatology:  
 
"the nonexterior, nonmundane, therefore nonempirical or noncontingent signifier – has 
necessarily dominated the history of the world during an entire epoch, and has even 
produced the idea of the world, the idea of world origin, that arises from the difference 
between the worldly and non-wordly, the outside and the inside, ideality and nonideality, 
universal and nonuniversal, transcendental and empirical."73 
 
 It is the voice which, posited as a necessary mode of what Derrida calls 'auto-affection,' 
functions as a medium that can preserve self-presence.74  The metaphysics of subjectivity is 
grounded in a notion of the subject who is affected by a phoneme which does not pass 
through any exteriority, the world, the nonproper, or an other and thus, a transcendental 
signified divorced from its empirical inscription.  Auto-affection, as the constitution of 
self-presence, occurs through the metaphysical notion of a time wherein space is 
completely reduced.75  In order to posit the structure of an originary presence not 
contaminated by empiricity, a relation to presence must be conceived which is completely 
non-spatial.  That is to say, for the metaphysics of self-presence to function, beyond 
                                               
72  Jacques Derrida, "Tympan." Margins of Philosophy. Pp.IX-XXIX, quoted on p.X 
73  OG, p.7 
74  cf. Leonard Lawlor, The Implications of Immanence. P.18 
75 Jacques Derrida, Positions. (Trans. by Alan Bass), London: Continuum, 2004.  p.21.  Leonard Lawlor  
explores this point particularly vociferously in both The Implications of Immanence and Thinking Through  
French Philosophy.  My analysis is indebted to his formulation of the deconstruction of self-presence.   
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different signifiers there must be an original and transcendental meaning or content 
which can be sustained and re-presented through time.76   
  
Derrida effects a displacement of the notion of self-presence, of the unity or fusion 
of the empirical and transcendental by recourse to a formulation of the irreducibility of 
time and space.  There cannot be, he argues, any difference between thought and its 
other, between thought and its originary ground, without an originary division and 
deferral.  Self-presence, insofar as it is always a re-presentation, passes through an 
inescapable spacing or outside which consequently, always traverses and contaminates the 
inside of self-presence.  Time, as Derrida argues, is inseparable from space such that the 
immediacy of presence is always contaminated in a mediation; the singularity of self-
presence is only constituted insofar as it is repeated and universalized.  For a concept to 
mean, it must function as a meaning-content through and across time-space which means 
that it must function beyond particular instances such that meaning is re-presented across 
time.77  While meaning is grounded in conceiving a presence beyond the sign, Derrida 
argues that the constitution of transcendentals is always contaminated and traced by 
failure since content (empirical positivity) and form (transcendental foundation) are 
inextricably bound and compounded together in self-presence at the same time – spacing is 
inescapably bound to thinking.  There is consequently an essential ambiguity to the 
presence of an ideal content related to thought in self-presence in the (non)time of 
'hearing(understanding)oneself-speak.'  In speaking, even to oneself, thought is always 
exteriorized and thus, there is rather an irreducibility to the transcendental's 
contamination by the empirical in its passage through time-space.  There is thus always 
already what we might call, echoing Foucault, a 'double' between hearing and speaking 
and between thought and its other.78  Any transcendental ground, any relation of thought 
to its origin presupposes an originary difference and deferral which divides presence to 
the self.  The excess of an outside always traverses the inside in a movement whereby the 
inside of non-space (time) appears to itself and constitutes self-presence.79   
 
 
                                               
76  Derrida makes this argument in relation to Aristotle's determination of Being as substance in "Ousia  
and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time." Margins of Philosophy, Pp. 29-68. See pp.50-2 
77  "Ousia and Gramme." p.51 
78  Leonard Lawlor suggests this analogy in Thinking Through French Philosophy. (See especially pp.11-23). 
79  Leonard Lawlor, The Implications of Immanence, p.51-2 
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The Aporia Between the Empirical and the Transcendental 
 The relation between the empirical and the transcendental is thus what Derrida 
calls 'undecidable' or an 'aporia'.  Contra Smith's (and others') insistence on the primacy 
of the transcendental in Derrida's work, his negotiation with the question of the double 
disrupts the transcendental by forcing it to pass (and accordingly demonstrating its 
impossibility) through a 'detour' of the aporia of the 'between' and which consequently 
prevents the formation of what Marion Hobson calls "a homogeneous space for 
thought."80  Like he does in his account of the constitution of the cogito, Derrida 
undermines a given transcendental by exhibiting the experience of the aporia between the 
conditions that make a given relation both possibility and impossible.  This 'medium' is 
the place or milieu where differences themselves are formed: "the place where this 
division begins to function, a place that is not empirical or historico-chronological."81  
Origin can no longer be conceived as ground but as an aporetic movement of difference 
and deferral.  To think ground or origin as aporia is not, however, to draw an irresolvable 
contradiction or problem to be solved, a logical deficiency, nor to show it to be the result 
of a rhetorical move.82  Rather, the relation to origin, ground or determination of a field 
of relations is always already threatened and contaminated.83  If the signifier functions as 
a passage for presence, then the aporia is the experience of a 'nonpassage.'  In re-inscribing  
the notion of the sign from a passage for presence of ideal content to the withdrawal of 
presence which he calls 'arche-trace,' Derrida shows the double to be grounded in an 
attempt to efface the 'play' of difference (and consequently originary violence) in favor of a 
principle or arche which would serve to ground thought in advance. 
  
 Presence can only be thought as a movement which unceasingly differentiates the 
elements within a signifying series.84  Each time it reiterates itself, the element is not 
identical to its previous saying and thus, a delay of the original signified.85  The origin 
never comes to be present and the two movements of différance, the spatial and the 
temporal, function as a giving and simultaneous withdrawal of presence insofar as they 
constitute a relation between the same and the entirely other.  It is in this sense that 
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Derrida says that "différance is not."86  Différance is thus the 'between;' neither absent nor 
present, neither transcendental nor empirical, it posits the necessity and failure of a 
passage through presence since it is the striving after presence which inaugurates the 
possibility of meaning in general yet it is the failure to constitute presence which traces its 
undermining.87 
 
Foucault and The Double: Between the Same and the Other 
 Like Derrida, in The Order of Things Foucault famously displaces the 'double' by 
showing it to be the effect of what he elsewhere calls non-originary "spaces of 
dispersion."88  The empirico-transcendental double is related to the specificity of the 
organizing principle of modern knowledge which Foucault calls episteme or 'historical a 
priori' and it refers to the "conditions of possibility" or later "conditions of emergence" for 
the empirical sciences at a given time and place:89 
 
"[t]his apriori is what, in a given period, delimits in the totality of experience a 
field of knowledge, defines the mode of being of the objects that appear in that 
field, provide man's everyday perception with theoretical powers, and defines the 
conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about things that is recognized to 
be true."90   
 
The episteme is identified by regularities in scientific discourses and thus, these conditions 
are not transcendental but rather, form a network or space in which scientific discourses 
may appear.91  Foucault's analyses of discourse, which he calls 'archaeology,' rather than 
deny the existence of the subject, account for the conditions in which particular subjects 
are produced.92  The subject, he says, is "a position that be filled in certain conditions by 
various individuals."93  It is delimited by its place in a particular discourse since, as an 
autonomous field of regularities and transformations, discourse is not dependent on 
individual speakers for forming meaning.  The historical a priori is made up of the 
historically dynamic rules of what is given to thought in what is said.94  Foucault thus 
shows discourse and later also power, to be anterior to the empirico-transcendental 
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double, since they form the conditions in which subjectivity attempts to ascertain its 
grounds and origins. 
 
Modernity and Man as Empirico-Transcendental Double 
 Man, the subject of representation, emerges as a question once "words ceased to 
intersect with representations and to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge of 
things."95  Once the media of knowledge become objects of knowledge in themselves a 
new epistemological question arises: to represent things, man must negotiate a historical 
context that precedes him since man is thought as appropriator of language and thus, as 
representing being.  Representation as a problem unto itself is linked to an anterior field 
that precedes and exceeds representation and is thus, granted status as the foundation of 
knowledge.96  Modern knowledge proceeds in the search for a more fundamental ground 
in the finitude of man. 
 
 Modern thought, Foucault argues, occurs as a series of attempts to overcome the 
problem of 'man' in the search for,  
 
"a discourse whose tension would keep separate the empirical and the transcendental while 
being directed at both; a discourse that would make it possible to analyze man as a subject, 
that is, as a locus of knowledge which has been empirically acquired but referred back as 
closely as possible to what makes it possible, and as a pure form immediately present to those 
contents."97 
 
Man's capacity for representation is grounded in the causal forces of life, labor and 
language that precede and form him, yet man is not only an object produced in the world 
but also a subject that constitutes the world.98  Beginning with Kant, man is thought as an 
object; as finite being limited by conditions which are prior to him and a subject who 
constitutes the world of objects in which he is included.99  Modern knowledge is 
grounded in an 'analytic' of man who reflects upon his finitude in the search for it to 
provide its own foundation: "a fundamental finitude which rests on nothing but its own 
existence as fact, and opens the positivity of all concrete limitation."100  Man, as ground of 
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knowledge, is a relation of identity (of unity) and of difference (since nothing can precede 
itself).101  Thus, the task of modern thought is to provide a foundation for the knowledge 
of objects which confirm to man that he is finite.102  Consequently, Foucault argues that 
modern knowledge is grounded in an aporetic structure since man as an object of 
knowledge is not a being, but the product of a contingent discursive formation.  Modern 
philosophy is constituted in a series of attempts to overcome the distance between man as 
subject and object of knowledge; to overcome the empirico-transcendental double and 
resolve man to himself; to make all difference correspond to the Same.  The failure of 
every system or logic to ultimately determine the epistemic relation between words and 
things is not a question of human finitude, but a condition of the logic or system itself.  
That is, of the regularities which govern particular discourses without being independent 
of discursive practices. 
 
Thinking 'Between' the Double 
 In what is a marked correspondence to the early Derrida's writings on différance 
discussed above, in The Order of Things Foucault argues that there is a "middle region" 
between and anterior to the doubles which in turn allows the dispersal of Same and Other 
and forms the terrain upon which they are gathered back.103  The differential movement 
'between' Same and Other traced by Foucault is the locus which allows modern thought 
to think time as succession, promise, completion, origin, etc, in the teleological 
movement of resolving man to his ground or origin.  Analogous to the productive failure 
of self-presence through différance in Derrida, the 'middle region' between the doubles 
prevents, Foucault argues, their perfect coincidence.  For Foucault, no single set of 
elements can ground or transcendentally determine another set and so the empirico-
transcendental double is consequently dispersed into its anterior medium of 
differentiation.  Yet, rather than searching for a transcendental ground of experience in 
something in excess of experience, Foucault locates the 'between' as immanent to 
structure yet irreducible to the experience it generates as the medium which produces and 
disperses the doubles.  The 'between' which forms the locus for the constitution of the 
empirico-transcendental double is a space of difference and struggle (even if under-
theorized in his archaeological works).  It functions as the medium of differentiation or 
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what Foucault calls the "heterotopian" space where orders of determinate relations are 
delimited and where the historical a priori of experience is constituted.104  While in his 
archaeological phase, Foucault already characterizes this medium as a space of struggle 
which "allows or prevents the realization of a desire, serves or resists various interests, 
participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a theme of appropriation or rivalry;" 
not until his later more affirmatively genealogical works, would the power relations 
composing this space be fully elaborated.105   
 
 
Immanence, Transcendence and the 'Between' 
 Like Derrida, Foucault's attention to this middle region or outside is not an 
attempt to appropriate man to his unthought other or origin, but rather, exhibits 
knowledge's partial determination by a field which it cannot master.  Knowledge is re-
inscribed into spaces of positivity that make it possible irreducible to scientific knowledge.  
Foucault relates thought to its outside which, never transcends, but is always immanent to 
the inside insofar as he displaces the subjection of thought to transcendental grounds to 
what, in this early text he calls "the pure experience of order and its modes of being" 
which exceed and produce the conditions for the double.106  Foucault's early works, like 
those of Derrida, attempt to think the 'between' anterior to determinate relations between 
knowledge and its other, which in turn forms a space for the desire for ground or origin.  
Thus, for Foucault and Derrida, as for Heidegger, thought has an outside which gives 
thought or makes it possible.107  However, unlike Heidegger's question of Being, neither 
thinker posits a more originary or authentic ground of questioning the outside.  Rather, 
both think an originary difference and violence which disrupts the possibility of positing 
an originary disclosure.  Both attempt to maintain a Nietzschean affirmation of the 
irresolvable play of differences and the resulting inescapability of perspectivism that for 
both, functions to displace the concept of origin and the possibility of any totalizing or 
authoritative position over any field of differences.  Nevertheless, from this conclusion, 
both proceed in radically different directions. 
 
 If we might cautiously admit, as Smith does, that a "formal structure of 
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transcendence" underlies Derrida's work it would result from the latter's insistence on the 
irreducibility of a 'passage' or detour through the constitution of the presence of the 
transcendental signified in order to begin to open a space to its excess.  Thinking the 
displacement of the empirico-transcendental double in terms of the simultaneity of 
conditions of possibility and conditions of impossibility, as Derrida does, means that his 
thought, while undermining grounds or first principles, nevertheless ascribes the necessity 
of a 'passage' or 'detour' through the question of transcendentality.  As a passage or 
detour, transcendentality is experienced as inescapably contaminated and thus, failed.  
However, for Derrida the experience of this 'passage' or 'step' is necessary since it is only 
in passing through the aporetic conditions of possibility as conditions of impossibility 
that we recognize the violence of all attempts to transcend or totalize the empirical.  
Furthermore, as we will see below, it is in thinking through the contamination of 
absolutes or transcendentals that an excess to the closure of metaphysics appears.  It is in 
the failure of transcendentality that we see that no field can delimit itself totally and thus, 
can think the outside anterior to determinate relations to self, other and truth.  This 
question of the necessity of thinking a 'passage' to presence marks a profound point of 
divergence between Derrida and Foucault. 
 
 If Derrida presents the inescapability of the question of the transcendental, I 
would claim that Foucault on the other hand, attempts to displace the positing of 
absolutes or grounds altogether in thinking the positivity of discursive statements which 
produce the conditions of subjective experience.  The historical a priori is not a realm 
independent of experience and thus, Foucault refers to it as a 'positive unconscious.'108  
The positivity of discourse, Foucault argues, is always-already present to thought.  The 
role of the archaeologist is the formalization and analysis of this field.  "He must," 
Foucault says,  
 
"reconstitute the general system of thought, whose network, in its positivity, renders an 
interplay of simultaneous and apparently contradictory opinions possible.  It is this 
network that defines the conditions that make a controversy or a problem possible, and 
that bears the historicity of knowledge."109   
 
Unlike Derrida, Foucault does not think the unconditional as impossible absolute which 
opens the possible.  Instead, for Foucault, it is the result of a multiplicity of forces 
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constituting subjects, objects and the discourses which form them by coagulating around 
a given 'problem.'  Rather than posit the necessity of thinking transcendentally, Foucault's 
analyses appeal to a field of immanence insofar as he never portrays one set of elements 
determining another but rather, in terms of diverse fields of multiplicities in reciprocal 
feedback relations.  It is a total dislocation of the perceived necessity of submitting 
thought to government by transcendental grounds which Foucault attempts by conceiving 
thought as difference, force, and event; as singularities governed by no prior ground. 
  
The 'Between' and the Displacement of the Question of Being 
 Foucault's texts, like Derrida's, undermine the attempt to ground thought in 
subjectivity.  The question of positing a ground in a subject present to itself, the question 
of the transcendental, is displaced by a non-autonomous logic of difference anterior to it.  
Archaeology and deconstruction thus both develop methodologies which attempt to 
think the outside which is delimited or closed in order to form the time and space of the 
question of grounds, justifications or origins.  As Agamben's schema described earlier 
suggests, like Heidegger, both conceive transcendental grounds – the attempt to 
determine relations between subject and object and subject and subjective – as given by 
an anterior event.  However, both radicalize and undermine Heidegger's question of 
Being.  For Heidegger, any ground or arche is effected by an anterior relation to Being 
which is subsequently determined by metaphysical thought and thus, concealed or 
forgotten.  Heidegger asks the radical question, evident for example in 'The Age of the 
World Picture' of how man is grounded or determined as representing being, and 
consequently thinks time as the ecstasis that effects a subject who comes to know the 
world.  Thus, for Heidegger, man as ontic (empirical) being is possible in man as 
ontological (and arguably transcendental) Being or temporal ecstasis.  The origin of 
difference is always already located in the existence of Dasein or the disclosure of Being.   
 
 In The Order of Things Foucault argues that Heidegger's attempt to recover the 
origin of man in the experience of the self-concealing withdrawal of Being is an 
impossible task since the doubling of man is always already begun and consequently, cut-
off from an originary experience.  Heidegger, Foucault implicitly suggests, accords a 
primordial status to the experience of origin as moment when the transcendental (the 
cultural practices which give history) and the empirical (the actual movement of history) 
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are identical and thus, man's unity is established.110  As such, Heidegger is caught in an 
infinite regress since he thinks man as both source and product of history.111  In contrast 
to Heidegger, Foucault posits no privileged medium of difference, since the a priori itself 
changes with history; the "a priori of posivitivities," he argues, "is not only the system of a 
temporal dispersion – it is itself a transformable group."112  Like his later genealogies of 
power apparatuses and ethical problems, the episteme or a priori has no unified structure 
except insofar as regularities between differences are formed in processes of 
sedimentation.   
 
 Similarly but more explicitly, Derrida will problematize and radicalize the 
Heideggerean displacement of the metaphysical determination of the relation to Being 
and others through 'man.'  Heidegger's attempt to retrieve an originary relation to Being 
from the metaphysics of subjectivity is inevitably contaminated by metaphysical gestures.   
In the essay 'Envois"' for instance, Derrida argues that Heidegger's attempt to overcome 
the representational relation between subject and object to think an originary sending or 
givenness of Being cannot itself completely overcome the representational relation.113  In 
'The Age of the World Picture' Heidegger thinks history as a series of epochs unified by 
the destiny of Being as 'sending.'  The Greek, medieval and modern epochs form three 
distinct modes of the relation to Being.  These three modes are counterposed by 
Heidegger to the pre-Socratics who, he argues, posited no separation between subject and 
object but thought only in terms of logos as an originary gathering of Being exposed to 
chaos.114  Derrida argues that Heidegger's notion of representation as forgetting of this 
originary relation which it in turn represents is mirrored by the very way Heidegger thinks 
Being.  Heidegger cannot overcome representational thought because, Derrida argues, 
there can be no total access to the outside of determinate order.  Sending, the history of 
Being, is always already threatened since there is no single unity or medium of Being, 
there is no primordial unity since the origin is inescapably dispersed.115 
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In short, Derrida and Foucault inherit Heidegger's radical attempt to think an 
outside anterior to thought and particular determinate relations against which 
relationality is determined.  Yet, neither posits an originary medium of Being totally 
anterior to determinate relations, but rather, for both, the origin is always already 
dispersed in a multiplicity of media; there is no single set of conditions which give a 
ground for thought to question its relation to the world or to others.  However, while 
both effect a similar theoretical move, the divergence between them over how the event of 
determination can be thought, the locus of its occurrence and the ethico-political 
possibilities which it occasions mirrors the points of contention of the 'cogito debate.'  
Foucault attempts to disengage from the question of the limits of man to think a radical 
positivity; the possibility of a thought not subordinated to presence, ground or arche.  
That is, Foucault seeks to think a level of reality which cannot be attributed to a subject 
who participates in a discourse.  The Derridean response, in turn, would be the one, it 
seems, that Derrida has made against Heidegger, and also Foucault.  That thought cannot 
escape the question of the transcendental.  Any reference to a 'beyond' representational 
thinking would itself be caught within and rely upon metaphysical gestures such as 
representation.  Since there is no possibility of a complete exit from the metaphysical 
determination of relations, except through the employment of metaphysical tropes of 
transcendence itself. 
 
The Transcendental and Archaeology 
 It is in Foucault's attempt to move beyond the question of transcendentality 
altogether that his thought, his archaeology in particular, has encountered both critiques 
and misunderstandings.  Several thinkers have argued that there is an ambiguity between 
the transcendental and empirical in the status of the rules governing discourse.  Beatrice 
Han and Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow have argued that there is an ambiguity in The 
Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge between the prescriptive and descriptive 
nature of the rules of discourse.  It is unclear, they argue, whether the rules which 
Foucault ascertains govern, or whether they describe truth, that is, whether they have a 
transcendental or empirical status.  Similar claims have been made in a more 
deconstructionist vein by Arthur Bradley and David Carrol.116  Both Bradley and Carrol 
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argue that Foucault's conception of the historical a priori displaces the founding subject 
only to have it function as a foundation for his analyses.  Extending the argument which 
Derrida makes in 'Cogito and the History of Madness' against Foucault's 'transcendental 
contraband,' they argue that history functions as a transcendental ground concealed as 
empirical events.  However, the claim for such an inherent ambiguity to these texts can be 
made only if one thinks the rules governing discourse within the horizon of the empirico-
transcendental double; the rules governing discourse would be transcendental if they 
maintained a constant status in relation to the episteme or archive.117   
 
 Foucault's attempt to do away with the question of the transcendental altogether 
both undermines this sort of critique and also marks a point of divergence from Derrida's 
claim that thought cannot escape a passage via the question of the transcendental.  There 
is a relation of immanence between rules and statements which, as we will see, Foucault 
later expands to the relations between particular and general or global power relations 
and apparatuses.  Archaeology works, Foucault says, by "suspending the indefinitely 
extended privilege of the cause, in order to render apparent the polymorphous cluster of 
correlations."118  His method does not collapse or confuse the transcendental into an 
empirical condition or event, or as Derrida puts it in 'Cogito and the History of 
Madness,' the de jure is not collapsed into the de facto.  Rather, in his archaeological works, 
Foucault attempts to think discourse as a medium anterior to the production of the 
double wherein fact and right cannot be categorically distinguished since they are 
produced in an immanent and reciprocal field of relations.  Between rules and the field 
they govern conditions of emergence are constituted by the sedimentation of regularities 
in the discursive field which are in turn, reinforced or modified by new appearances.119  
Unities appear in the interplay of different rules which are not grounded by one of their 
elements nor by any exteriority.  The a priori is itself a dimension which changes with 
history since there is no single determining level or plane from which relationality is 
determined.  Discourse does not refer to a prior ground or other plane but only to itself.  
There is no necessity to think the passage to the presence of the concept for Foucault 
since his is not a question of the meaning but of the use of the concept in different fields.   
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 Nevertheless, I am not certain that this appeal to the immanence of conditions 
and conditioned in his archaeological works releases Foucault from these criticisms.  
While archaeology displaces the constitution of transcendentality by thinking the archive 
or episteme as a set of determining variables in continuous modification, Foucault's 
analysis nevertheless falters in its theorization of the 'positive unconscious' of order.'  
While archaeology is historically situated and does not lay claim to a totalizing knowledge 
of our own episteme from some Archimedean point, it nevertheless makes the pretense of 
producing a "pure" experience of order.120  As Dreyfus and Rabinow have famously 
argued, what archaeology fails to do is account for the position of the archaeologist since 
any such situated position would undermine the possibility of the 'purity' of this 
experience.  This experience, if it is to be 'pure,' would have to avoid being subject to any 
interpretive act whatsoever, that is, not be engaged in a search for meaning or depth but 
only the rules of its production.  Such a "pure description" would only be possible, 
Dreyfus and Rabinow argue, if archaeological analysis were not itself produced from 
within a given discursive formation.121  Foucault would have to assume an Archimedean 
position for archaeology prior to the production of a history or historicity itself.  Since the 
archaeologist is always situated within a given discourse not only can he not transcend the 
rules governing his own discourse as Foucault readily admits, but the difference in which 
it appears from the present can only be partial, oblique and an event of discourse itself.122  
Archaeology, in short, cannot account for its own status which seems to exceed any 
particular archive and is thus, open to the Derridean critique launched in 'Cogito and the 
History of Madness.'   
 
While by the time of The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault 
is no longer engaged in a project of re-appropriating an originary experience untouched 
by reason or violence as he is in Madness and Civilization, he nevertheless thinks the 
possibility of recuperating the purity of an experience of the medium of differentiation 
prior to any determination.  As Dreyfus and Rabinow put it, "being both within and 
outside of the discourses he studies, sharing their meaningful truth claims while 
suspending them, is the archeologist's ineluctable condition."123  In order to be totally 
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successful Foucault must both share and deny the 'meaning' of a discourse.  While 
Foucault is aware in The Archaeology of Knowledge that we cannot describe our own archive 
he must nevertheless posit an impossible position for the archaeologist himself from 
which he can determine the limits of his discursive formation.124  He is caught in what we 
will see Derrida calls a 'border' insofar as there is an implicit determination of a prior 
limit which cannot be maintained yet makes his analysis possible.   
 
 Foucault would come to address this problem of the situatedness of his own 
discourse in his genealogical work and in the process, more clearly distinguish his 
position from Derrida's.  Foucault's archaeological method attempts to displace 
transcendental questioning by thinking the link between conditions of possibility or 
emergence and the elements which they condition as immanent since any categorical 
distinction between rules or principles and their elements is only subsequently derived 
from sedimentations among multiplicities of discourses.  Yet, there is nevertheless a 
problematic in Foucault's method, as we saw, which belies its own residual transcendental 
structure insofar as he thinks the possibility of knowledge of a given order or discursive 
formation which is simultaneously not determined by that order.  Foucault's genealogy, as 
Dreyfus and Rabinow have most notoriously suggested, would come to undermine the 
potential for such an Archimedean position for his own discourse by refusing to grant any 
special status to his own analysis, that is, as outside any order.  Rather than advance 
within the terms of the impossibility of any unconditional experience as Derrida's work 
does, the impossibility of transcendence marks the point from which Foucault's genealogy 
sets off. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 If Derrida and Foucault can both be said to attempt to attempt to think 
genealogically, that is, by refusing a position for their own thought which would exceed its 
contingency, its determination in particular fields of relations or order and also to 
undermine all metaphysical attempts for thought to ground itself by postulating a non-
contingent, non-relational transcendental which would thus violently determine and 
govern relationality.  Then the difference between them, and the fact that each accuses 
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the other of such a metaphysical move, arises from the different ways each thinks the 
empirico-transcendental difference and the way in which it can be displaced by thinking 
the medium anterior to every determinate relationality and the different ways both think 
the movement of the determination of relation: either in terms of immanence or quasi-
transcendence.  This suggests that what is at stake between them is therefore the 
possibility of a mode of questioning which could affirm its own violence and so, 
according to both of their logics, be a lesser violence and secondly, to do so by relating 
thought to the limit of order; the limit between inside and what is outside every 
determinate order.  It is to these questions we will now turn. 
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Chapter 3: The Question of the Outside 
 
 
 
"To give priority to the question is to submit the response to an endless interrogation;  
it is to overthrow the power, to preserve the opening." 
Edmond Jabès1 
 
"What is the answer to the question?  The problem.   
How is the problem resolved?  By displacing the question." 
Michel Foucault2 
 
"There, in sum, in this place of aporia, there is no longer any problem." 
Jacques Derrida3 
 
 
Introduction 
 What is it to think relations first?  That is to say, as prior to and constitutive of 
their terms and anterior to any single 'medium' of thought?  And thus, think relationality 
neither in terms of a transcendental which would exceed and govern relations in advance, 
nor in terms of an empiricism which would assume pre-given terms and then systematizes 
their relations?4  What is it to think the 'between,' anterior to the empirico-transcendental 
double, at the limit of the inside and the outside in which this double is produced?  In 
the previous chapter I began to suggest that for both Derrida and Foucault, thinking from 
relations means thinking 'between' the determinate, limited or finite and the outside, 
infinite or unbounded.  In doing so, both thinkers affirm the contingency inherent to all 
attempts to form determinate fields of relations.  Any attempt to delimit and determine 
an inside, they both show, will necessarily fail since there is an outside or excess which 
cannot be indefinitely and totally mastered.  Consequently, genealogy and deconstruction 
both enact an opening to and of relationality by questioning and disrupting the 
determination of relations by attending to this liminal movement and the play of 
differences which it longs to fix.  Accordingly, this chapter pursues two related claims.  
That the refusal of the primacy of either the transcendental or the empirical outlined in 
chapter 2 leads both thinkers to seek to think an 'outside' anterior to both.  That is, a play 
of differences which is both conditional to yet ultimately undermines any determinate 
                                               
1  Edmond Jabès, "Interview with Maurice Patouche." Le Monde. August 2, 1981, p.ix. Quoted from 
     Irene Harvey, Derrida and the Economy Différance. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988. p.94 
2  Michel Foucault. "Theatricum Philosophicum." Essential Works, Vol.2, Pp.343-368, quoted on p.359 
3  AP, p.12 
4  Brian Massumi gives this definition of empiricism in Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. 
London: Duke University Press, 2002.  p.70 
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relational structure or hierarchy.  Yet, both pursue competing methodological strategies in 
order to affirm the contingency of the relational in order to do so.  So the second part of 
the chapter will take up these two strategies in order to demonstrate that not only is the 
divergence and incommensurability between Derrida and Foucault fundamental, but that 
it extends beyond the cogito debate to touch their oeuvres as a whole.  
 
 
The Finitude of Knowledge 
 In attempting to think the outside both Derrida and Foucault affirm the need to 
proceed, not from some determinate ground, but strategically.  Their thought inhabits the 
'between' of determinate inside and indeterminate outside, while it affirms the excess of 
contingency which is anterior to any determinate relations, it must also conversely affirm 
its own status as originating from within determinate relations.  While it may resound as a 
tiresome cliché, both thinkers affirm the impossibility of a complete or totalizing 
understanding of any specificity.  My claim is that this is the case not only because both 
affirm the outside which exceeds any order, but because their own thought is inescapably 
particular and situated.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in Derrida's often 
(mis)quoted aphorism that "[t]here is nothing outside the text" and which Foucault, almost as 
notoriously, echoes: "there is no point where you are free from power relations."5  Not only 
are all references to the 'real' inseparable from a differential movement but one cannot 
transgress this movement to an external transcendental signified.6  The impossibility of 
absolute knowledge is affirmed by both not only in epistemological terms as the result of 
human finitude, since as Derrida argues in "Structure, Sign and Play" such a conception 
of interpretation preserves the teleology of the possibility of total knowledge.  Rather, the 
insurmountability of perspectivism is the result, for both thinkers, of the ontological 
condition of the absence of depth and consequent indefinite movement of difference.7   
                                               
5  OG, p.158 and Michel Foucault, "Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity." EWI, pp.163-174, quoted on 
p.167 
6  Morag Patrick interprets Derrida's claim in these terms but as I have shown, this characterization of the 
status of knowledge applies equally to Foucault.  See Morag Patrick, Derrida, Responsibility and Politics. 
London: Ashgate, 1997. p.19.  For Foucault's displacement of the transcendental signified and 
subsequent characterization of the free play of the signifier see "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx." EWII, pp.269-
78. 
7  cf. "Structure, Sign and Play" where Derrida argues that "nontotalization can be determined in another 
way: no longer from the standpoint of a concept of finitude as relegation to the empirical, but from the 
standpoint of the concept of play." WD, p.365, while in "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx" Foucault argues that 
"depth was only a game and a surface to fold... everything which elicited man's depth was only child's 
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Perspectivism and the Question of Being 
 Both Derrida and Foucault I would claim, inherit from Nietzsche a notion of 
perspectivism that leads them to affirm that thought always begins from within 
determinate relations – from within fixed moments in the play of differences.  As such, 
thought can only proceed strategically and provisionally.  Accordingly, Derrida proceeds 
by showing that every attempt to overcome either empiricism or the transcendental is 
always already inscribed by its position in the metaphysical heritage and its empirical 
situatedness.  One can only, he argues, "operate according to the vocabulary of the very 
thing one delimits."8  Thought cannot exceed either its finitude nor the play of difference 
and thus, "[w]e must begin wherever we are," he says, and consequently, it is "impossible to 
justify a point of departure absolutely."9  Echoing Derrida, Foucault will affirm that "we 
are in a strategic situation" and moreover, [w]e are always in this kind of situation."10  In 
short, thrownness is irreducible. 
 
 The refusal to posit either a ground or privileged position for their work has 
produced the common and well known critiques of post-modern excess, nihilism or 
conservatism, political impasse and quietism which have been leveled against both, often 
at the same time.  Rudi Visker, in an essay on Heidegger and Foucault, provides the terms 
for a nuanced and rigorous approach to the debate over the normative deficit in Derrida 
and Foucault.11  Visker argues that, unlike Heidegger's question of Being and the 
destruktion of metaphysics, Foucault's ontology leaves him caught between two 
unsatisfactory normative conclusions which can arguably be extended to Derrida as well.  
Given his thoroughgoing perspectivism Foucault is limited to either thinking that a given 
order could have been otherwise or to succumbing to a dream of a "primordial 
spontaneity" which would be the absence of all order whatsoever; a pure play of 
differences.12  As Visker puts it, Foucault is caught between either "turning every order 
into authentic order by accepting exclusion as being constitutive" or "condemning every 
                                                                                                                                          
play." EWII, p.273 and later, in his genealogical phase Foucault would argue that "The perspectival 
character of knowledge derives... from the polemical and strategic character of knowledge." "Truth and 
Juridical Forms." EWIII, Pp. 1- 89, quoted on p.14 
8 "La Différance." MP, p.18, quoted from Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Translator's Preface." OG, p.xvii 
9  OG, p.162, emphasis in original. 
10  Michel Foucault, "Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity." EWI, p.167 
11  Rudi Visker, "From Foucault to Heidegger: A One-Way Ticket?" Foucault and Heidegger: Critical   
 Encounters.Alan Milchman & Alan Rosenberg (Eds.) Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2003. Pp.295-
323. 
12  Ibid., p.301, 302 
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order to inauthenticity by appealing to a pre-ordinal self-sufficiency."13  Once one thinks 
the inevitability and inescapability of the violence of determinate relations it seems, one is 
trapped between either rejecting or accepting all determination. 
 
 I argue here that Derrida and Foucault refuse both of these poles.  Both affirm the 
exclusionary and determining nature of all ordering.  Yet both defy the normative 
paralysis that this might generate by affirming the inescapability of determination as such 
while simultaneously refusing to accept and seeking to undermine any particular 
determination.  Conversely, the possibility of thinking what Visker calls the "pre-ordinal" 
and what I have referred to as the 'outside' is always tempered by the fact that thought 
always begins from the inside.  To think is to commence from a determinate time and 
place while at the same time refusing the possibility of totally exceeding relationality to a 
'pure' experience of the dis-order of the play of a pure and ungrounded difference.  
Difference cannot be thought in itself, since it is always a difference of or from some 
ground, origin or apparatus.14  It is in the terms of this logic that Derrida and Foucault 
both affirm their commitment to a relational thought.  As we will continue to see in the 
following chapters, this commitment is not only epistemological nor ontological, but 
thoroughly ethico-political.  To proceed ethically and to think the political is not, for both 
thinkers, to dream of transcending all relations, but rather to negotiate with the least 
possible violence the determinate fields within which we find ourselves – which also 
means, interrogating and undermining the denial of violence which lies at the core of all 
ordering.  But it is the way in which each of them conceives the means by which thought 
can question its own determination and determination itself which marks the point of 
divergence between Derrida and Foucault.  It is their mutual displacements of the 
metaphysics of the question itself to which this chapter is addressed.     
 
 In the last chapter we saw that Derrida and Foucault both disperse the empirico-
transcendental double into an anterior milieu in which it is constituted.  Furthermore, 
both think the formation of determinate relations as occurring in the between of 
determinate order and what both refer to as its 'outside.'  But what is the outside?  What is 
it to think that which exceeds any determinate or metaphysical field of relations?  How 
                                               
13  Ibid., p.311 
14  This is how Claire Colebrook defines the impasse of representational thought for Heidegger, Derrida 
and Foucault in The Ethics of Representation. 
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can such a thought be attempted?  A move made in the interest of recuperating or 
resolving thought to the outside would be anathema to both of their post-essentialist 
projects.  But there is nevertheless, deeply rooted in both of their work, a Nietzschean 
affirmation of the outside as an indefinite play or pure movement of differences of forces 
which is underivable and irresolvable to cognitive content.  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
has suggestively sought to think this radical empiricism – neither commencing from fixed 
terms nor attributed to a subject – which underlies the conceptions of force in both 
Derrida and Foucault in terms of the ontological difference.  Both Derrida and Foucault, 
she argues, "may be trying to touch the ontic with the thought that there is a 
subindividual (or random, for Derrida) space even under, or below, or before [...]  the 
'preontological Being as [Dasein's] ontically constitutive space... [where] Dasein tacitly 
understands and interprets something like Being."15  Proceeding from Spivak's formula, 
we might think this pre-ontological and pre-human 'space' in Foucault's terms as "the 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their own organization" and which Deleuze calls, in his book on Foucault, the 
"savage forces" of the outside.16  Similarly, for Derrida, it is a "systematic play of 
differences" or the "game of the world" without a transcendental signified to arrest its 
indefinite movement.17  Such a radical, ontic and pre-ontological empiricism marks a 
Nietzschean transposition of Heidegger characteristic of both thinkers; the movement or 
play of difference is anterior to its amalgamation in a Being that then forms the horizon 
for determinate relations.  If for Derrida and Foucault multiplicity is 'prior' to its 
amalgamation in a Being that then gives determinate relations, then it would undermine 
Heidegger's question of Being as the disclosure of a singular 'clearing' or locus for 
thought, since the play of difference would undermine the Heideggerean ontology which 
begins from what Rodolphe Gasché calls "a totality that, in an originary fashion, precedes 
its severance into a multiplicity."18   
 
 Yet, in a definitively Heideggerean motif, Derrida and Foucault both proceed from 
                                               
15 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "More on Power/Knowledge." from The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Donna Landry & Gerald MacLean, Eds. London: Routledge, 1996.  pp.141-
174.  Quoted on p.147.  The quotation from Heidegger is from Being and Time, p.39; the emphasis is 
Spivak's. 
16  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction.London: Penguin, 1998. [Hereafter 
referred to as HS] P.92.  See Gilles Deleuze, Foucault. London: Continuum, 2006.  Pp.120-2. 
17  Jacques Derrida, "La Différance." P.11, OG, p.221,  
18 Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror, p.182 
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the premise that any order or field of determinate relations is the effect of an anterior 
decision or event.  For Heidegger, presencing – the event of disclosing an order – is an 
event of unconcealment or a-letheia.  Heidegger's question of Being or 'question of the 
question' proceeds from the fact that phenomena must always be disclosed or 
unconcealed in order to be questioned such that, unconcealment is anterior to any 
particular question of a ground or origin.  Like Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault think 
arche or grounds as effects of a prior differentiation.  Both think within the terms of what 
in Being and Time Heidegger calls 'equi-primordiality;' that is, in terms of a multiplicity of 
origins of underivable or irreducibly original phenomena.19  Thought takes place in a 
'medium' which cannot be reduced to a single principle or condition.  Thus, as Claire 
Colebrook suggests, for all three thinkers thought has an 'other' or outside which is 
anterior to, and which gives thought.20  Heidegger's ontological difference describes the 
different modes across the history of the separation of thought and its other.  Being, 
Heidegger argues, is disclosed in the ways thought questions its world.21  Yet, Heidegger's 
Being is still a general or single 'unthought' or outside, a single medium differentiating 
from itself.22  It is thus, as I argued in chapter 1, a Nietzschean cosmology of the play of 
difference through which both Derrida and Foucault displace or exceed Heidegger's 
question of Being since both refuse to posit a single or originary medium of thought 
which thought might recover as its origin and ground to think the origin as difference.  
What is at stake in both Derrida's and Foucault's works is, at least in part, an attempt to 
relate to the pre-ordinal, to an outside marking the contingency of every order without 
committing the Heideggerean error of positing an originary mode of this relation.  Before 
pursuing the divergent formulations of a post-Heideggerean form of the 'question' in their 
work we must turn to examine more closely their mutual formulations of the outside. 
 
 
Derrida and the Thought of the Outside 
 In working through the relation between speech and writing in Saussure, the 
singular and the general in Levi-Strauss, de jure and de facto in Foucault, the empirical and 
                                               
19 Cf. Being and Time, p.170, for Foucault and equi-primordiality see Edward McGushin's Foucault's Askesis: 
An Intrduction to the Philosophical Life. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2007, p.30 and Claire Colebrook The 
Ethics of Representation, pp.167-8, ; for Derrida see Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror, p.182.   
20 Claire Colebrook, The Ethics of Representation, p.168 
21 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics. (Gregory Fried & Richard Polt Trans.) London: Yale UP, 
2000.  P.6.  
22 Colebrook, The Ethics of Representation, p.169 
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the transcendental in the metaphysics of subjective self-presence we have seen that 
deconstruction establishes the experience of an 'essential' and unmasterable relation 
between terms such that it opens thought to an aporetic and uncontrollable position 
which is neither inside nor outside a determinate structure, but rather in the undecidable 
'between' or medium of differentiation where relations are produced.  What Derrida calls 
his 'paleonymns' or 'quasi-concepts' work to inscribe undecidability 'between' two terms in 
a particular binary hierarchy and thus, displace rather than subvert or reverse the 
dominance of one term over another.  The attempted closure of the determinate inside 
from its outside is thus shown to be always already disrupted through an "eruption of the 
outside within the inside."23  The identity of a concept is always contaminated by what 
exceeds it and thus, the attempt to form an absolute limit between the inside and outside 
is undermined: "by means of the work done on one side and the other of the limit the 
field inside is modified and a transgression is produced that consequently is nowhere 
present as a fait accompli."24  Concepts and discursive totalities are always already fissured 
by contradictions and heterogeneities which philosophy must avoid in order to protect 
the unity of its concepts.  Thus, the aporetic logics which make a thinking of presence, 
ground or origin possible cannot be reduced or annulled.  They are grounded in an 
irreducible difference such that to choose one is to attempt to collapse the aporia and 
thus, deny the origin as an effect of the play of differences.25   
 
 The logic of the aporia disrupts metaphysics not by employing empiricism in its 
place.  Empiricism too is discounted since the impossibility of appropriating a totality 
results not only from human finitude but because totality is an ontological impossibility.  
Deconstruction marks a passage across and through the between of both of these choices 
(human and ontological finitude) in the same way as it does between the empirical and 
transcendental.  The passage between the presence of the concept or idea and the 
'completely other' which appears as non-presence in its withdrawal and which mediates any 
metaphysics of presence is unavoidable: "the instituted trace cannot be thought without 
thinking the retention of difference within a structure of reference where difference 
appears as such and thus, permits of variations among full terms."26  The structure of 
                                               
23 OG, p.34 
24 Positions, p.12 
25 Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror, p.136 
26  OG, p.46-7 
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language makes presence impossible through an arche-synthesis which is inescapably 
'transcendental' since it shapes the essence of our experience yet is not itself experienced 
since it is 'absent;' there is always an excess or beyond the merely empirical.27  Derrida's 
aporetic quasi-concepts undermine empiricism by calling for the inescapability of thinking 
transcendentally.  As he puts it, "the value of the transcendental arche must make its 
necessity felt before letting itself be erased."28  All of Derrida's quasi-transcendentals, his 
nicknames, function to mark the locus of this centering-de-centering movement of 
determinate structures.29   
 
 Derrida's "aporetography" makes the appearance of phenomena possible but 
makes pure presence or singularity, an originary non-violent relation impossible: "the 
disappearance of any originary presence is at once the condition of possibility and the 
condition of impossibility of truth.  At once."30  The unthinkable simultaneity of 
possibility and impossibility that Derrida calls this "at once" or aporia shows the inside of 
determinate order to be inescapably haunted by an outside or other which it cannot 
master nor make present.  The account of the aporia therefore has the effect of making 
the inside and the outside indelimitable since no delimitation can ever be complete nor 
closed from its outside.  Deconstruction, Derrida says, "always finds itself between these 
two poles."31  Neither extreme is recoverable in its purity, neither the security of a totally 
determinate inside, nor the indeterminate or outside.  This motif of the desire for and 
passage through the indeterminate or impossible extends to all of Derrida's work; the 
indeterminate or unconditionality of justice, hospitality, the gift, forgiveness, the event, 
democracy are related to their inscription in a determinate, calculative, finite and 
empirical economy:  
 
"the very least that can be said of unconditionality... is that it is independent of every 
determinate context, even of the determination of context in general.  It announces itself 
as such only in the opening of context.  Not that it is simply present (existent) elsewhere, 
outside all context; rather, it intervenes in the determination of a context from its very 
inscription, and from an injunction, a law, a responsibility that transcends this or that 
context."32   
                                               
27  OG, p.60. cf. Marion Hobson, Opening Lines. P.29 
28  OG, p.61 
29  Jacques Derrida, "Force and Signification." WD, pp. 1-35, see p.26 
30  DIS, p.166 
31  Jacques Derrida, "The Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority." Acts of Religion. (Gil  
 Anidjar Ed.) London: Routledge, 2002. Pp.228-98. [Hereafter referred to as FOL] Quoted on p.251 
32  Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc. (Trans. Samuel Weber) Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1988. Quoted on  
 p.152 
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It is thus at the limit of the inside which, rather than a total impasse, an opening to the 
other occurs and thus, this liminal realm forms the locus of the ethical and political.  As 
we will see, it is not a space of immobilization, but the space where judgment and ethical 
decision is made.   
 
 
Foucault and the Thought of the Outside 
 First thematized in a series of early essays Foucault wrote on Georges Bataille and 
Maurice Blanchot and other avant-garde writers and artists of early and mid-20th century 
France, Deleuze extends the theme of the thought of the outside to all of Foucault's 
oeuvre.33  The constitutive outside in Foucault's work, Deleuze says, does not function as a 
ground, but as what he calls "an unformed element of force."34  The relation between the 
inside of determinate order and the outside of a zone of forces is what Foucault calls a 
'non-place' since it is in constant mutation, transformation and constitution.35  For 
Foucault, as for Derrida, the inside of order is always a failed delimitation from a "void" 
which is its outside.36  Thus, all forms of interiority, positivity and identity are an 
"operation of the outside."37   To move to the outside, to think the void from which all 
orders delimit themselves is to think the 'origin' as what Deleuze calls, a fold of the 
outside,' an organization of the limit between the inside and outside.38  Such a thought, as 
Foucault describes it in his essay on Blanchot,  
  
"stands at the threshold of all positivity, not in order to grasp its foundation or justification 
but in order to repair the space of its unfolding, the void serving as its site... a thought that, 
in relation to the interiority of our philosophical reflection and the positivity of our 
knowledge, constitutes what in a phrase we might call 'the thought of the outside."39   
 
The thought of the outside, for the early Foucault, is located in the anonymity of language 
                                               
33  Deleuze's theorization of Foucault in these terms is a hypothesis which is proving increasingly  
       accurate as his lectures from the College de France reach publication.  In Security, Territory,  
      Population : Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-8 (Michel Senellart Ed., Graham Burchell Trans.)   
      London: Palgrave, 2007 [Hereafter referred to as STP])  for instance, Foucault himself refers to his  
      work in these terms and consequently, seems to justify Deleuze's interpretation. cf. STP, pp.116-120  
      wherein Foucault explicitly affirms his genealogy as a thought of the 'outside.' 
34  Deleuze, Foucault p.43 
35  Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, p.85, cf. 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,' EWII,  p.377 
36  EWII, p.152 
37  Deleuze, Foucault, p.97 
38  Ibid. 
39  Michel Foucault, "The Thought of the Outside." EWII, pp. 147-70. Quoted on p.150 
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as an exteriority to which the interiority of the subject is dispersed.  Blanchot, Foucault 
argues, posits an experience of language not grounded in subjectivity as a medium of 
thought.  Language is thought as force and as being prior to interiority or representation.  
To think language as exteriority is to see the dynamism of forces or events giving the 
literary work and thus, to oscillate between the inside of representation and its 
constitutive exteriority.40  Thought takes place within the space of rules, language and 
history but crucially, it can also think these rules themselves and thus, think its own 
limits.  Though speaking in a different context, Jean-Luc Nancy nevertheless deftly 
describes this relation to the limit: "touching the internal border amounts also to touching 
the external border."41    
 
 The avant-garde literature which captures Foucault's interest reaches the limit of 
what can be said and thus, locates the limit through a recognition of the force of 
language.42  The void of the outside cannot be recuperated, but it can be touched and 
thus, brought to relate to the inside.  While in Madness and Civilization Foucault tried to 
appropriate this space as a void absolutely beyond reason, in these works from the late 
60s, madness and death are affirmed as only silent and absent.43  The other of reason is 
no longer made to speak, but only to mark the limit of what can be said.  Residing at the 
limit, the thought of transgression expresses the presence of the absence and silence of 
madness and finitude; of an excess which cannot be mastered nor appropriated and made 
present by the philosopher or writer.   
 
 Foucault would cease to work with these writers and themes, which has led a 
number of critics to suggest that he no longer thought art could be a transgressive force; 
that he saw himself as having succumbed to aestheticism.44  Yet, while avant-garde 
literature is no longer a central thematic in Foucault's texts after the late 1960s, he would 
never depart – as Deleuze affirms – from posing the question of the outside.  After this 
                                               
40  Timothy Rayner, Foucault's Heidegger, pp.52-3, p.57 
41  Jean-Luc Nancy, The Experience of Freedom, (Trans. Bridget McDonald). Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993.  
p.48 
42  See "The Thought of the Outside."; "The Prose of Acteon,"; "A Preface to Transgression,"; all in EWII. 
43  Roy Boyne locates Foucault's essay on Bataille, "A Preface to Transgression" as the moment when    
 Foucault would cease to implicitly claim a position for his own text outside history and reason.  See  
  his  Foucault and Derrida, p.84 
44  cf. John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy. New York: Columbia UP, 1985. p.16-7, see 
also Jon Simons Foucault and the Political, (London: Routledge, 2002) whose whole argument is 
structured around what he sees as the oscillation, within and across Foucault's works, between the total 
constraint and total transgression of the limit.    
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period the experience of the limit is no longer only found in the privileged locus of 
aesthetics, but traversing all modes of relation.  While I have argued that in Madness and 
Civilization, The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault is caught 
maintaining a problematic status for his own discourse as totally outside the orders which 
it describes, in the early 1970s, in announcing an explicit Nietzschean inheritance, 
Foucault began to refuse any privileged position for his own texts.  In the genealogical 
works Foucault affirms his own texts as events of power whose status is determined, at 
least in part, by the determinate relations within which it arises and which it might 
effect.45  Roy Boyne is thus correct to note that Foucault's genealogical works mark a 
moment of rapprochement with Derrida insofar as he no longer claims to appropriate a 
realm beyond reason.  Yet, it is my claim that the manner in which the outside is related 
to the inside by Foucault's genealogy differs considerably and is in fact incommensurable 
from the means in which deconstruction effects such an experience.  Any claim for a 
rapprochement needs to be tempered insofar as the conclusion that Foucault seems to 
draw from the impossibility of total access to the outside is that it can only be experienced 
immanently, that is to say, from within and as the inside. 
 
 In 'The Order of Discourse,' an essay written in the early 1970s, Foucault 
announces a new theoretical trajectory: the principles and means for ordering discursive 
practices should be thought, in terms which Foucault already suggests in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge, in terms of a metaphor of "battle."46   The archaeological method is 
supplemented by an approach which thinks discourse as effected by a multiplicity of force 
relations traversing institutions, spaces, disciplines and epochs.  Genealogy, unlike 
archaeology, no longer questions the conditions of existence of statements but of the 
production and regulation of discourse:  
 
"in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and 
redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers 
and dangers, to cope with chance events, and to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality."47 
 
Discourse, in marking out its particular objects (e.g., sexuality, population, carceral 
                                               
45  Michel Foucault, Foucault Live: Interviews 1961-1984. (Sylvère Lotringer, Ed.) New York: Semiotext(e), 
1996.  P.213  
46  AK, p.205 
47  "The Discourse on Language." The Archaeology of Knowledge (Sheridan Smith, trans.) New York:  
 Pantheon Books, 1972, pp.231-37,  quoted on p.231.   
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subject) may be incorporeal, yet it produces actual material effects; actual possibilities and 
limits and is thus referred to as an "incorporeal materialism."48  Genealogy adds another 
dimension to archaeology since by questioning the manner technologies of power order 
discourse and thus, unlike archaeology, does not proceed in the form of a formal question 
of "the rules of formation of [a discursive formation's] concepts."49  Rather, it attends to a 
discourse's "objectives, the strategies that govern it, and the program of political action it 
proposes."50  Accordingly, genealogy makes visible the positivity of determinate relations 
produced by dispersions of power by "showing the knowledge effects produced by the 
struggles, confrontations, and battles that take place within our society, and by the tactics 
of power that are elements of this struggle."51   
 
 Foucault conceives two complimentary ways in which the exteriority of knowledge 
is formulated.  Firstly, by thinking knowledge as the effect of an anterior event which 
exceeds it, it appears as the "result of conditions that fall outside the domain of 
knowledge" since knowledge does not represent an ideal object or universe.52  Secondly, 
that knowledge always involves "relations of struggle" since behind it, he argues, "there is a 
will."53  In opposition to the logocentric disjunction of truth from power, genealogy maps 
discourse as event and outcome of struggle.  Knowledge is dispersed into what Foucault 
often calls an 'economy of power relations' which always circulate with knowledge and 
which knowledge always denies.  Truth is linked in a circular relation with the systems of 
power which produce and sustain it and to effects of power which it provokes and which 
in turn expand it.   
 
 Foucault traces the rigidity or regularity of dispersions of power through what he 
calls in the 1970s 'dispositifs' (translated as apparatus) which he would later argue, arise in 
response to specific 'problematizations.'54  The dispositif, as the formation of a complex of 
limits between a determinate inside and outside is the locus where Foucault isolates what 
Derrida calls the 'medium of differentiation.'  Like Derrida, Foucault does not think this 
                                               
48  Ibid., p.231 
49  STP, p.36 
50  STP, p.36 
51  STP, p.3 
52  EWIII, p.13 
53  EWIII, p.14, p.11 
54  Foucault began thinking the apparatus as a response to particular problems as early as 1977. cf. STP, 
p.10 
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'medium' as a single thing since power is always dispersed across a multiplicity of media.55  
The dispositif is a "thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions."56  While not 
the product of conscious design, the dispositif traces the coherence of a multiplicity of 
relations as disparate responses to a given problem; that is, through the practical 
conditions by which something becomes an object of knowledge.   
 
 Broad strategies arise from particular questions isolated by the genealogist which 
are as concrete and general as possible which Foucault describes as "problems that 
approach politics from behind and cut across societies on the diagonal."57  Accordingly, to 
the problem of how to govern a 'population' as an object of demographic knowledge a 
new liberal dispositif appears; the disciplinary dispositif appears as a response to the 
problem of ensuring the orderliness and assent of the citizen during the rise of liberal 
democracy.  The disciplinary dispositif is an ensemble of practices and discourses for 
controlling and observing human subjects in a number of institutions including schools, 
factories, prisons and hospitals without being identical to any of them.  It functions 
within and between them, traversing and linking institutional sites.  No single element 
acts as the ground or center of the dispositif, but rather, multiple elements form the 
conditions for each other.  Disciplinary technologies and productive technologies for 
instance, condition each other without functioning as causes but rather, in terms of 
mutual reinforcement.  Accordingly, Foucault argues that factory production is 
constituted in the intersections of techniques for quickly processing raw materials and the 
formation of an orderly workplace in a highly segmented and rationalized process of 
production.  The radical reform of prison or factory conditions is not the result of the 
development of humanism or a new moralism, but the contingent effect of the 
intersections of technologies and the attempt to increasingly efficiently control and order 
individuals in confined spaces.58  In this sense, the interiority of a moral subject of rights 
and freedoms is shown to be the effect of an 'outside' of multiple events.  The political 
subject is formed not through governmental representation but by disciplinary and 
                                               
55  Claire Colebrook, The Ethics of Representation, p.165 
56  PK, p.198 
57  Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader. (Paul Rabinow, Ed.) New York: Pantheon, 1984. P.376 
58   I owe this example of the factory system to Nick Crossley, The Politics of Subjectivity: Between Foucault and 
Merleau-Ponty.  Aldershot: Avebury., 1994.  P.110 
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governmental dispositifs which effect, through a multiplicity of institutional linkages, an 
individual capable of functioning normally within this new socio-economic landscape.   
 
 Discipline and Punish is exemplary of a de-subjectifying experience of the outside 
which, no longer located in the privileged locus of literature, is thought in the terms of a 
struggle and strategy against authority.  The individual and society are not fundamental 
units of analysis, but the product of a multiplicity of dispersed strategies and technologies 
which revolve around the goal of normalization and order.  That is, around networks of 
power functioning independently from individual intentions.  Since they are shown to be 
spaces of struggle which always generate modes of resistance, the outline of the 
technologies for ordering relationality traced by Foucault's genealogies mark the fragility 
and contestability of power apparatuses.  Struggles occur over the form power should take, 
who should exercise it, its limits, etc.  If there is an element of constancy in Foucault's 
accounts, it is only of a constant redistribution and redeployment.  The contingency of 
the outside against which interiority is formed appears in the 'eventalization' of order 
whereby what is taken as determinate is unveiled to its accidental, particular and 
indeterminate nature. 
 
 The radical novelty of Foucault's genealogies lie in the refusal to see limits or 
ordering as a purely negative force.  Rather, competing and colliding discourses intersect, 
interrupt, or support one another.  As Foucault explains in a discussion of Discipline and 
Punish, "[m]astery and awareness of one's body can be acquired only through the effect of 
an investment of power in the body...  But once power produces this effect, there 
inevitably emerge the responding claims and affirmations, those of one's own body 
against power...  Suddenly what made power strong becomes used to attack it."59  This 
passage, as well as other similar ones60 have led a vast number of readers of Foucault, both 
critics and defenders, to argue that a circularity permeates his work.  Habermas, Charles 
Taylor, Nancy Fraser and Michael Walzer's characterizations (one could name many more) 
of Foucault as a "theorist of confinement" and their consequent critiques of the absence 
of a positive normative formulation, a way to resist the suppression of freedom, proceed 
from a view which paints an opposition either a total determination of the social by 
                                               
59 PK, p.56.  
60 For example, "The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to 
be sex desire, but bodies and pleasures." HS, p.157.   
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power or the dream of an originary authenticity (or what Visker calls the "pre-ordinal" 
origin) of freedom.61  From this perspective, power appears as a limitation on freedom; a 
limitation moreover, which leaves no prior principles from which power can be 
condemned.62  Yet, these thinkers neglect the total re-articulation of the political which 
occurs as an operation of genealogy; and thus, they wrongly maintain an oppositional 
relation between power and resistance.   
 
 Regimes of truth, Foucault argues, form multiple ensembles of fields of possibility; 
different strategies, goals and techniques may support one another, but may also come 
into conflict.  Fields of relations are always potentially reversible – the metonym never 
becomes a metaphor – such that there is what Foucault calls a 'tactical polyvalence of 
discourses':  
 
"discourse can be both instrument and effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-
block, a point of resistance and a starting-point for an opposing strategy...  Discourse 
transmits and produces power, it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it 
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it."63   
 
Fields of power-knowledge act as unstable fields of frictions, like waves passing through 
the social which expand or collide at their intersections.  The notion of 'resistance' marks 
those moments of "counter discourse."64  Resistance is not situated totally outside of 
power, it is "never in a position of exteriority in relation to power,"65 but rather the varying 
and unstable points within networks and which marks their contingency and thus, their 
absence of ground.  The limit is thus not only a negative force since to think it as purely 
destructive is to assume that it distorts something essential and prior.  There is no 
originary presence that is then ordered, but rather, order appears from out of 
multiplicities of relations, relational orders, places and problems and their intersections.  
The whole debate around the possibility and source of resistance to power has ultimately 
                                               
61 See Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity; Charles Taylor,"Foucault on Freedom and 
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Prozorov, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty. p.26   
62 Walzer, "The Politics of Michel Foucault," p.53,61 
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64 The notion of counter-discourse is central to Foucault's account of discourses of power which displace 
the centrality of sovereignty in the 18th and 19th centuries in Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: 
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 115 
 
failed to grasp this fundamental point, since it has focused upon the search for 
'something' in Foucault's texts which would resist power, which would act as a material or 
ideological point from which power could be opposed, refused, or overthrown.  Foucault's 
readers have either located this source somewhere implicit in the text (usually located in 
the human body) or claimed that it is absent and thus, left us to our supposed fatedness 
to an indefinite and total domination.  Much of the reception of Foucault's later 
genealogies of ethics proceed along this same trajectory, analysing and evaluating 
Foucault's readings of Ancient Greek and Roman philosophical and moral practices for 
this same putative source of resistance.  As we will see in the next chapter, Foucault's turn 
to the Ancients is not made in the search for a society free from power relations, nor as 
some non-ordering or non-determining socio-political realm, but rather, as a different, 
immanent and non-normalizing relation to the outside. 
 
The thought of the outside is at the heart of both Derrida's and Foucault's work.  
Both attempt to inhabit the space of the outside and simultaneously affirm the 
impossibility of doing so.  The goal or aim of their work is not to posit some total 
transcendence or transgression to the outside, nor do they provide an alternative mode of 
ordering, but instead, enact a re-articulation of our relation to the event of ordering itself.  
Hierarchy, authority and domination all appear as contingent effects of the play of the 
indeterminate.  Significant for our analysis is how these two modes of thinking the 
outside mark a massive displacement of the way theoretical questioning has traditionally 
proceeded.  In this instance, philosophy does not proceed by either positing or attempting 
to discover some ground or event of thought but rather, by attempting to disrupt and 
circumvent the very question of ground itself.  It is to their mutual displacements of the 
question of ground that we now turn. 
 
 
The Question of the Question of Relation 
 Part of the massive significance of Nietzsche's work for philosophy, I have argued, 
is the means by which a meta-question is put to philosophy's procedures themselves.  
Unlike his predecessors, he is not engaged in seeking or affirming a ground or first 
principle which would both explain and govern relationality but rather, the conditions, 
forces and effects of positing the question of grounding itself are brought into the scope of 
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inquiry.  The genealogical recoil which turns against the will to truth itself; his 
questioning of the 'value of value' and the value of truth' stages a seismic philosophical 
event whose reverberations are not only epistemological or ontological, but ethical and 
political.  Nietzsche's genealogical recoil upon the question itself opens the horizon for 
not only his own, but the way Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault all radically undermine 
this metaphysical and ethico-political desire by disrupting the question of the ground of 
relationality itself in attempting to think the anterior non-relational locus which gives 
determinate relations – and thus the conditions which make particular questions possible.  
Nietzsche's 'will to power,' Heidegger's 'Being, Derrida's 'différance' and Foucault's 'power' 
all shift the site of questioning from the desire to ground or order relationality to the 
giving of relation itself.  Once we think the priority of relation itself ethico-political 
questioning no longer proceeds from the logic of an independent subject-being in relation 
to other independent subject-beings but from the irreducibility of the fact that our 
existence is being-with-others.  Consequently, the political can no longer be thought in 
terms of timeless, non-empirical principles, but in terms of a multiplicity of relations 
across hierarchies, spaces, temporalities and institutions which constitute political 
existence and whose analysis undermines the metaphysical desire to arrest and submit 
existence to a particular and timeless logic.  Yet, if Nietzsche and Heidegger can be said to 
radically open a new post-essentialist questioning of relation, there are, we have seen, 
fundamental moments in the works of both wherein the question of relation is 
determined.   
 
 Nietzsche opens thought to the inescapable violence of communal life yet this 
opening is always accompanied by a refusal and determination of the question of relation 
in his politics.  In viewing the institution of an order of rank as a necessary condition for 
the enhancement of humanity, Nietzsche re-enacts the Platonic gesture of philosophy’s 
legislation of the limits of the political.  He abandons the ethico-political question of 
relation through the desire to dictate the empirico-political conditions for the 
enhancement of humanity.  Nietzsche calls for a new legislation and determination (of the 
weak by the strong) in order to form a 'free' space for the question.  In short, the pathos of 
distance forms the limit of Nietzsche’s thinking of relation.  Heidegger's search for a 
'proper' determination of Being which leads him back to what he thinks as the event of 
the inception of metaphysics among the pre-Socratics is still caught, both Derrida and 
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Foucault argue, in the metaphysical move of freeing presencing from its relation to any 
particular being.  Heidegger opens the question of relation insofar as he does not proceed 
by conceiving prior entities which are then related but rather, in terms of the primordial 
unconcealment of a 'clearing' which gives relationality in the first place.  Yet, Heidegger's 
attempt to accede to the ontological is always haunted and contaminated by the ontic or 
empirical determinations from which he proceeds.   
 
 Crucially, Derrida's and Foucault's (implicit or explicit) critiques of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger do not lead them to go still further in maintaining the 'purity' of the question 
and unconditionality of questioning.  The question of what is anterior to or outside 
determinate relations, what Derrida calls 'the question of the question,' can only be 
approached from within determinate relations.  As such, all questioning is a matter of 
strategy, calculation and negotiation so that it is always already a question of politics.  We 
might say that in a sense, Derrida and Foucault accuse one another of not being strategic 
enough.  Metaphysical violence, defined as the attempt to deny or transcend the 
determinate relations wherein the question is formed, is the very violence which both 
Derrida and Foucault accuse one another in the 'cogito debate.'  The difference between 
the two thinkers is accordingly formed by the divergent strategies that each takes up in the 
approach to the outside to determinate relations.  Furthermore, it is because neither 
thinker accepts either the possibility of a pre-ordinal authenticity, nor the particular 
violence of any order that both view questioning as taking place within an 'economy' of 
violence or power which neither is willing to accept in any form as Nietzsche is.    
 
 How do their mutual strategies of the question differ from each other?  As 
Foucault's critique of Derrida in 'My Body, This Paper, This Fire' suggests, genealogy 
questions the orientation from which deconstruction begins; the specific choices that 
Derrida makes in framing the objects of deconstruction.  As a response, Foucault 
attempts to go 'behind' Derrida to show the specificity of the power-knowledge networks 
which have constituted the objects of Derrida's analysis.  In his reading of the Meditations 
Derrida does not attend, Foucault maintains, to the question of the discursive structures 
which form the conditions for the philosophical 'system' which Derrida goes on to 
deconstruct.  On the other hand, Derrida too problematizes the formation of the object 
of analysis in Foucault.  The archaeological or genealogical analysis can only proceed, 
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Derrida maintains, by first determining or totalizing the discursive and epochal structures 
which form the objects of Foucault's reading of Descartes.  Consequently, there is an 
indefinite oscillation between Derrida and Foucault, each circumscribing the other; each 
proceeding to show that the other has denied in some way the relational field from which 
his analysis commences and thus, a failure to think the outside.  In chapters four and five 
we will attend to the ethics and politics which relate to the disruption of the demand for a 
unity of question and answer which need not result in a thoroughgoing nihilism or 
impasse.  The remainder of this chapter, however, will address itself to the ways in which 
Derrida and Foucault continue the Nietzschean move of disrupting the question of 
relation and the polemic that results from the different ways they go about doing so.   
 
 
Derrida and the Question of the Question 
 Derrida thinks the conditions giving the possibility of particular questions in 
terms of a "decision" determining a particular field in terms of the thematics of presence 
we have examined above.66  The act of questioning, or what he simply calls 'the question' 
is, Derrida says in 'Violence and Metaphysics,' always already caught in a prior horizon: 
"the question is always enclosed; it never appears immediately as such, but only through 
the hermeticism of a proposition in which the answer has already begun to determine the 
question."67  The violence of this enclosure is inescapable since questioning can only 
proceed from within determinate grounds such that the response is never free from the 
partially fixed conditions in which it arises.  Rather than remain within the confines of an 
always determining question, Derrida attempts to think in terms of what in "Violence and 
Metaphysics" he calls 'the question of the question':  
 
"that fragile moment when the question is not yet determined enough for the hypocrisy of 
an answer to have already initiated itself beneath the mask of the question, and not yet 
determined enough for its voice to have been fraudulently articulated within the very 
syntax of the question."68   
 
Rather than attempt to fix the conditions of a given field or place and remain within the 
identity of the question of foundations and its response, Derrida attends to what he calls 
                                               
66  Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas." WD. 
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 Deconstruction, pp.95-7 
67  WD, p.99 
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"the question about the possibility of the question."69  His is an attempt to accede, if only 
partially, to that space anterior to every question or determination, of thinking the 
outside prior or under all determinate relation – that which precedes the question 
without belonging to it:  
 
"[t]he questioning of foundations is neither foundationalist nor antifoundationalist.  
Sometimes it questions, or exceeds the very possibility, the ultimate necessity, of questioning 
itself, of the questioning form of thought, interrogating without confidence or prejudice the 
very history of the question and of its philosophical authority.  For there is an authority – and 
so a legitimate force of the questioning form of which one might ask oneself whence it derives 
such great force in our tradition."70   
 
How does a questioning of questioning itself lead thought to touch the anteriority 
of its outside without claiming to exceed its own relational determination?  Derrida 
has approached this theme throughout his work, however, it is perhaps his texts 
engaging with Heidegger where the question of the question is most pronounced 
and also lends itself to an engagement with Foucault.71 
 
The Aporia and the Problem 
 In Aporias Derrida opposes his thematic of aporetic conceptual impasse(s) to what 
he calls 'the problem.'72  For Derrida, the establishment of a problem as the delimitation 
of a field is a thoroughgoing metaphysical move since it assumes the possibility of forming 
a closure, horizon or mastering a given field in the face of what exceeds it.  As we will see 
below, Derrida's choice of vocabulary forms not only an apparently accidental parallel 
with Foucault's own concept of 'problematization,' but is a central motif in Derrida's 
return to the polemic with Foucault following the latter's death in 'To Do Justice to 
Freud'.73  In theorizing the aporia as a disruption and as anterior to the problem, Derrida 
posits the necessity of the movement of 'nonpassage' of the aporia to all articulations of 
the question or problem.  That is, the problem is always and ineluctably constituted in 
covering over the aporia which makes it possible.  The following section will examine 
Derrida's discussion of the aporia's relation to the problem in relation to his discussion of 
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Heidegger's Being and Time as well as several later texts before letting it resound against 
Foucault's own notion of the problem. 
 
  The novelty and importance of Being and Time, Derrida argues in Aporias, arises 
from the absence of an ontic assumption of an (empirical) understanding of death in the 
text – the type of assumption for which Derrida accuses Foucault in his appropriation and 
implicit claim to understand madness.  Instead, he argues that Heidegger makes the error 
of trying to overcome the irreducibility of the empirical tout court.  Heidegger's 
'problematic' sets up what Derrida calls a new ontological "pro-ject" or "border" to 
determine the field of his analysis between a proper and improper relation to death 
theorized in terms of the finitude of Dasein.  When Heidegger famously declares in Being 
and Time that "[d]eath is the possibility of the very impossibility of Dasein,"74 death is 
made to function as the horizon, project or border between proper and improper which 
organizes Dasein's relation to the present and the past by thinking the future as the 
'possible impossibility' of existence.   
 
 Derrida pursues a deconstruction of the limit-line, border, or threshold between 
authentic and inauthentic Dasein along two distinctions which Heidegger makes.  First, 
in terms of the ontico-ontological difference since Heidegger argues that only Dasein can 
experience death "as such" and thus distinguishes the death of Dasein from the 'perishing' 
and dying of the animal.75  Second, authentic death is contrasted to inauthentic deceasing 
whereby Dasein is said to flee its finitude into Das Man where only 'one' dies since the 
singularity of existence is covered over by its contingent and empirical determinations.  
The circumscription of authentic Dasein, the decision to begin with the originary or 
proper, is the event of determination which generates all choices and hierarchies of 
Heidegger's analysis: "[t]he decision to decide from the here of this side is not simply a 
methodological decision, because it decides upon the very method: it decides that a 
method is pre-ferable, and better, than a non-method."76  Dasein's authentic Being-towards-
death thus marks the moment in which the answer already determines the field of 
Heidegger's questions.  Yet the decision which Heidegger makes is only possible because 
death is an aporia, it has no limits and is thus, undecidable.  
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 If death is the cessation of experience and the experience of the end of experience 
is impossible, then the relation to death can only be aporetic, can only be structured on 
the impossibility of "being-dead."77  Not only can Dasein not relate to death, but it 
consequently cannot appropriate 'the there' or the unity of existence.  Death, Derrida 
argues, absolutely resists possibilization or determination.  Heidegger's attempt to think the 
impossible as possible marks a simultaneous recognition of impossibility but also, a 
nostalgia for presence; a privileging of an originary gathering relation to which Derrida 
opposes the originary violence of all relationality which dis-appropriates but also forms 
the conditions for Heidegger's ontological analysis.   
 
 The logic of aporia initiates the undermining of not only Heidegger's, but every 
determinate limit.  As such, it cannot be made to appear except in the form of the "pas 
(step/not)" which means that it appears only as incalculable and undecidable, as "the line 
that terminates all determination" and as the refusal of "the pure possibility of cutting 
off."78  Derrida describes the oscillating movement of the 'pas' as made present only 
insofar as it withdraws the very possibility of the presence of any determination and in 
this sense, marks both the drawing of a border or limit which can be traversed and its 
simultaneous impossibility:  
 
"To mark and at the same time to erase these lines, which only happen by erasing 
themselves, which only succeed in erasing themselves [n'arrivent qua' s'effacer], is to trace 
them as still possible while also introducing the very principle of their impossibility."79 
 
The step/not, the (im)possibility of the determination of limits forms the conditions for 
what Derrida calls an 'absolute exposure' to the outside since it points to a locus anterior 
to any determinate form or relation.  There is 'nonpassage' since the necessary 
impermeability of any medium of thought is formed only by covering over the aporia or 
impasse.  There is no longer any border to cross or delimit a field, and thus no passage 
since there is no originary medium to pass to.  In this state of absolute undecidability, 
Derrida says, "we are exposed, absolutely without protection, without problem."80  There is 
thus, no possibility of positing pure limits; between 'awaiting oneself at death,' 'awaiting 
death and expecting that death will come,' awaiting or 'expecting another at/from death 
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at the limits of truth.'   
 
The Aporia, Of Spirit and The Other 
 One thread in Derrida's Of Spirit pursues the same trajectory as Aporias insofar as 
it seeks to disturb and undermine Heidegger's attempt to think an originary and non-
ontic unity of Being which avoids the metaphysics of presence.  Derrida steadfastly 
disrupts Heidegger's articulation of the 'question of the question' and his attempts to go 
beyond metaphysics by posing an originary proximity to the unconcealment or revealing 
of Being which makes particular questions possible; a pure question of Being prior to its 
determination by metaphysical concepts which would only allow a thinking of Being in 
the terms of presence rather than presencing.  A close reading of the complex arguments 
which Derrida raises in relation to Heidegger's attempt to exceed metaphysics in Of Spirit 
is beyond the scope of the present work.  However, if we pause over this text it is to note 
the similar form Derrida's reading of Heidegger to the one given in Aporias; an 
indeterminate thinking of Being, a questioning which proceeds without conceptual 
determination, he argues, is impossible.   
 
 In Of Spirit Derrida traces four ways in which the question of Being is determined 
in Heidegger's text.  First, Derrida argues that the privileging of the question of Being 
which dominates all of Heidegger's texts is still caught within the orbit of metaphysics 
since the priority of the question is defended through a determination of Dasein as the 
being which poses the question.81  Much as he argues in 'The Ends of Man' and Aporias, 
Derrida maintains that authentic Dasein forms a proper starting point for the question yet 
the 'power' of Dasein to question is itself never questioned so that Dasein acts as a ground 
for the possibility of the question.82  Secondly, Heidegger's claim in The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics that unlike Dasein, the 'animal is poor in world' determines Dasein 
as being human.83  Thirdly, Heidegger's critique of technology as a nihilistic forgetting of 
Being formulated in terms of "the essence of technology is nothing technological" marks 
for Derrida the attempt by Heidegger to preserve the purity of the question of Being from 
any contamination by technicity.  Finally, Heidegger's notion of epochality is traversed by 
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a teleology since it excludes that which does not fit with Heidegger's notion of 
metaphysics.  Epochality is preserved only insofar as Heidegger covers over or disregards 
elements of the tradition (Derrida's example is Heidegger's failure to address the 
singularity of Spinoza84) which exceed Heidegger's own notion of metaphysics.  In short, 
Derrida argues that throughout his oeuvre, Heidegger determines the question in advance 
by positing a prior hierarchy, order or will which forms the grounds of the question.  
Whatever is offered as exceeding all empirical or ontic determination is nevertheless 
haunted or contaminated by its ontic articulation.   
 
 Heidegger is aware that any unconcealing of Being can only be said in the 
language of presence and thus, only as a concealing of presencing.  Yet, he proceeds 
nevertheless to attempt to avoid contamination by metaphysics for his own questioning 
and thus, is caught in the dream of an originary non-violence of the question which 
would overcome the violence of determinate relationality.  For Derrida, no presence can 
ground difference, there can be no originary presence of Being to which thought might 
return.  Thus, when in 'La Différance' Derrida says that différance is "a difference more 
unthought than the difference between Being and beings," unlike Heidegger he is not 
positing a difference of a prior presence or pre-given foundation.85  Anterior to Being is 
the pure play of difference which cannot be thought or affirmed except through a 
questioning which has already been determined by its metaphysical heritage and thus, 
cannot be affirmed as such.  No transcendental or ontological claim can avoid being 
contaminated by its empirical or ontic inscription.  Heidegger's pursuit of a questioning 
which is not determined by any substance or ground thus, inescapably relies upon its 
situatedness and situating of particular determinate relational fields.   
 
Affirming The Outside Anterior to the Question 
 But in Of Spirit Derrida also locates a different moment in the later Heidegger 
wherein the priority of the question is displaced.86  Heidegger 'crosses out' or questions 
his question marks, Derrida says, in the form of thought as 'listening;' a thinking of the 
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       of metaphysics either. 
85  "La Différance." p.22 
86  Derrida refers to "Language" in Poetry, Language, Thought and "The Essence of Language" in On The Way 
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way language gives or grants relation anterior to its human usage or any anthropologism.87  
Prior to the question is the affirmation of the very fact of our being related in language; 
"[l]anguage always before any question."88  The experience of the absence of grounds for the 
human delivers Heidegger, Derrida argues, to eventually seek a recovery of Dasein's 
originary abandonment or dis-propriation – to the fact that relation is always already 
violence.  The opening to language is an opening of thought to the originary violence of 
relation from which the question proceeds; "in and from an abyssal structure of 
experience that involves a constant ex- or dis-propriation."89  The impossibility of 
exceeding the violence of determinate relations, their dis-propriating force, is always 
anterior to the question.  It is in this sense that Derrida thinks an unconditional 
command of the question of the question in terms of the call, promise, responsibility and 
affirmation.  Prior to any determinate questioning is the affirmation which proceeds from 
an exposure to the outside or aporia.  It is, as Derrida describes it, "the promise which, in 
opening every speaking, makes possible the very question and therefore precedes it 
without belonging to it: the dissymmetry of an affirmation, of a yes, before all opposition 
of yes and no."90  This prior call, promise, or responsibility which "overwhelms the 
question itself" is 'heard' in the affirmation of always beginning in determinate relations, 
but also a response which desires to think what exceeds and gives relation while 
acknowledging that it can only be thought from within those relations.  The opening to 
the indeterminate, in excess of relation, only proceeds through a prior affirmation of 
relationality itself; of the limit between the inside and the outside.  As Derrida puts it in 
The Politics of Friendship, there is an affirmation which is "more originary than the question 
and which, without saying yes to anything positive, can only affirm the possibility of the 
future by opening itself to determinability and therefore by welcoming what still remains 
indeterminate and indeterminable."91   
 
 The opening to the outside which proceeds from the affirmation of beginning 
from determinate relation effects a different mode of relationality; a different genealogical 
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relation which affirms its own violence.  Thought, in affirming its own situatedness and 
violence, not only inevitably determines what exceeds the otherness which exceeds it, but 
also forms an opening to the other; a 'promise' that the other will appear as other.  In 
Aporias, Derrida argues that the relation to death 'as such' can only appear through the 
other: "self-relation welcomes or supposes the other within its being-itself as different from 
itself," and thus, the closure of self-relation is only promised but never given.92  Dasein's 
'awaiting itself' in its being-towards-death, given its aporetic status, cannot be bounded by 
Heidegger's conception of the singularity and solitude of Dasein since Dasein's awaiting its 
determinate and proper self is undermined when opened to its aporetic structure.  Dasein, 
Derrida says, can thus only be thought to be awaiting what he simply calls 'something,' a 
completely other.  Existence cannot be appropriated and so the self can only be related to 
as an other awaiting it's singular self.  Moreover, the relation to death might be thought 
even more radically, as an "absolutely awaiting each other" since we await a relation to 
death which is impossible.93  An awaiting of 'each other' (the French 'tout autre' can mean 
both all otherness and every singular other) occurs in the impossibility of simultaneity, 
relationality appears in the form of an indefinite non-coincidence:  
 
"the waiting for something that will happen as the completely other than oneself, but of 
waiting (for each other) by awaiting oneself [s'attendre en s'attendant du même coup soi-
même], by preceding oneself as if one had a meeting with a oneself that is but does not 
know."94   
 
This albeit disorienting formula marks the "contretemps" of the aporetic structure of 
relationality and in turn structures the logic of promise and of the 'to-come.'  A waiting 
for each other that will never arrive is defined as "impossible simultaneity."95  In the 
affirmation of the 'nonpassage' of the aporia and thus, of the fact that we are in relation, 
lies the impossibility of a determination of either self or other.  The other cannot be 
determined since the other is never present.  Like Heidegger, Derrida affirms the 
'thrownness of existence within the 'Da,' that is, the anteriority of others, languages and 
traditions (one might simply say, of relations).  But unlike Heidegger, Derrida argues that 
the 'Da' can never be appropriated since it always exceeds any determinately 'human' 
experience.  Thus, the relation to death cannot be recuperated such that otherness always 
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precedes determinate Dasein.  The relation to death is always mediated by an other; there 
is "expropriation" and "inauthenticity" at the heart of existence – a radical anteriority to 
which we are called to respond.96   The experience of the aporia, of the impossibility of a 
questioning which is not always already determined and given in advance, nevertheless 
brings forth an opening; the other is always arriving, always 'to come' and it is the promise 
of the other which is the 'call' to which the deconstruction of borders, limits or problems 
strives. 
 
 Any particular response to the other is always already a general response to what 
echoing Heidegger in Of Spirit Derrida calls the promise of language, to the fact of its 
always having already addressed us and to our having responded to it; alterity precedes 
identity.  Thought finds itself positioned within a relational network which it does not 
transcend, which cannot be appropriated and from which it always already begins.  The 
experience of 'nonpassage' erects a new thinking of the border or limit between the self 
and other since it invokes the opening of the border itself and not simply the constitution 
of a particular relation to some ontic other.   Rather, the 'arrival of the other' prefigures 
every particular determination of relation: 
 
"an arrivant [who] affects the very experience of the threshold, whose possibility he thus 
brings to light before one even knows whether there has been an invitation, a call, a 
nomination, or a promise... What we would call here the arrivant, the most arrivant among all 
arrivants, the arrivant par excellence, is whatever, whoever, is arriving, does not cross a 
threshold separating two identifiable places."97   
 
The proto-arrival as event allows the event of identification, differentiation and 
reconstitution but, as an event that de-indentifies and not as an identity that synthesizes 
constituent parts.  Thus, the absolute arrival is prior to the possibility of any border, that 
is, prior to the possibility of different identities but also allows the possibility of any 
identity or border, and thus, allows the possibility of determinate relations.   
 
 The event or arrival of the other is not simply "to cross a given threshold" but 
rather, "affects the very experience of threshold."98  The aporetic is an experience of an 
absolute border whose crossing, or erasure opens the space of every positive and 
identifiable border: "[p]erhaps nothing ever comes to pass except on the line of a 
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transgression."99  The figure of absolute arrival cannot be determined, expected, or 
prepared for since it is a radical indeterminacy which allows and is prior to any 
determinate encounter of émigré, refugee or tourist.  These are definitive arrivals, arriving 
in a defined and determinate place where "the inhabitants know or think they are at 
home."100  The absolute arrivant "call[s] into question, to the point of annihilating or 
rendering indeterminate, all the distinctive signs of a prior identity."101  In the experience 
of the aporia and the affirmation of relationality, there is no longer a definitive or total 
border to be crossed, but an opening to the outside, to the contingency and 
indeterminacy of relationality itself, to the excess and contingency upon which every 
determinate relation is grounded.  
 
 
Foucault and the Problem 
 Like Derrida, Foucault too proceeds strategically; that is, by affirming that every 
question, including his own, cannot totally exceed the limit between inside and outside 
and accordingly, is always already at least in part, the particular effect of the specific order 
or apparatus which makes it possible.   And like Derrida, Foucault proceeds not by 
pursuing transcendental and a-historical answers to the questions philosophy has posed 
itself (who are we? what ought we to do?) but rather, in shifting the scope of questioning 
itself to ask after the conditions forming the possibility of particular questions themselves.  
Foucault's displacement of what he calls 'the dialectic of the question and answer' takes 
place through what, by the early 1980s, he called "problematization."102  Foucault's 
articulation of problematization is restricted to several interviews and an abbreviated 
outline in a late book, however, near the end of his career Foucault intimates that all of 
his works revolved around this notion.  Much more so than Derrida, Foucault was a 
thorough revisionist; each phase of his work, from the archaeology to ethics is folded into 
the one which follows it.  Yet it is the final articulation of his work in terms of 
'problematizations' as events of thought which involves an engagement with all three sets 
of exteriorities which made up Foucault's career: archaeology, genealogy and ethics:  
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"I tried to locate three major types of problems: the problem of truth, the problem of power, 
and the problem of individual conduct.  These three domains of experience can only be 
understood in relation to one another, not independently."103   
 
The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge in particular, address the criteria 
governing the formulation and circulation of statements and thus, the ways of 
distinguishing true and false.  Secondly, in the 1970s Foucault compliments discursive 
analysis with a power axis which represents the rules, techniques and objectives governing 
relations between human beings.  These analyses occur in the well known works of 'power-
knowledge;' Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality but also his lecture courses from 
this decade which all mark the shift whereby the production of knowledge is theorized 
together with the power relations which support and are supported by knowledge.  
Strategies, apparatuses and institutions analyzed as technologies of power, circulate and 
reinforce knowledge in attempts to determine and regulate the normal and abnormal, the 
permissible and impermissible, the natural and unnatural, etc.  Finally, the genealogies of 
the early 1980s and of The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self both published in 1984, 
analyze the modes in which values are appropriated and practiced as modes of relating to 
and governing oneself.  Foucault establishes this continuity in a late interview: 
 
"It was [throughout his career] a matter of analyzing, not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and 
their 'ideologies,' but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily 
thought – and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed.  The 
archeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms themselves; its 
genealogical dimension enabled me to analyze their formation out of the practices and the 
modifications undergone by the latter.  There was the problematization of madness and 
illness arising out of social and medical practices, and defining a certain pattern of 
'normalization'; a problematization of life, language and labor in discursive practices that 
conformed to certain 'epistemic' rules; and a problematization of crime and criminal 
behavior emerging from certain punitive practices conforming to a 'disciplinary' model."104 
 
Madness, illness, the criminal, etc., are all problematic objects which enable social 
scientific discourses and administrative practices to conceal their 'heterotopic' or 
contingent status.  These objects do not exist in themselves, but function to unify 
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multiple discourses and practices.  Without existing in themselves, they are the negative 
space which acts as the constitutive opposition to any norm.  Modern societies posit 
madness, death, delinquency and sexuality in order to constitute the world of social 
appearances.  One may confine, treat or punish the 'madman', but in doing so, one 
applies regulations and laws that constitute the conditions for a 'sane' experience of the 
social world.  For example, the experience of the body of the criminal within the panoptic 
space, dispersed across society, founded a new experience of the social and bound law to 
that order rather than in grand displays of sovereign power.  The exclusion of the 
problematic object, which has no substantial existence in itself, worked to reinforce a 
particular mode of social order.105 
 
 Through the notion of problematization, the three axes or "realms of exteriority" 
of knowledge, power and ethics are united by what Foucault simply calls 'thought:'  
 
"[b]y 'thought,' I mean what establishes, in a variety of possible forms, the play of true and 
false, and consequently constitutes the human being as a knowing subject; in other words, 
it is the basis for accepting or refusing rules, and constitutes human beings as social and 
juridical subjects; it is what establishes the relation with oneself and with others, and 
constitutes the human being as an ethical subject...  In this sense thought is understood as 
the very form of action – as action insofar as it implies the play of true and false, the 
acceptance or refusal of rules, the relation to oneself and others.  The study of forms of 
experience can thus proceed from an analysis of 'practices – discursive or not – as long as 
one qualifies that word to mean the different systems of action insofar as they are 
inhabited by thought."106 
 
As Paul Rabinow points out, this definition of thought, as constituted in 
problematizations, establishes thought as a broad domain of experience.107  
Problematizations are processes by which tripartite domains of knowledge, power 
relations and ethics are assembled in relation to particular difficulties or questions which 
demand a response.  Experience emerges from interrelations between these three axes in 
their concrete forms in institutions, disciplines, various techniques and systems of rules, 
yet no priority can be given to any one axis since, in the complexity of their interactions, 
each axis "is affected by transformations in the other two."108  "A problematization," 
Foucault says, emerges as a complex "reply to some concrete and specific aspect of the 
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world."109  By connecting disparate conditions for the emergence of particular forms of 
experience, existence is problematized, producing a historically singular event of thought.  
The conditions for particular questions are thus the result of concrete events: "the 
development of a given into a question, this transformation of a group of obstacles and 
difficulties into problems to which diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response, 
this is what constitutes the point of problematization and the specific work of thought."110  
Yet the question, in attempting to produce an answer or response disavows the contingent 
and accidental nature of its origins and therefore attempts to legitimize or derive a certain 
necessity and transcendentality from contingent events or power relations.    
 
 Problematizations are not particular representations of the world, since there is no 
prior presence which problematizations order.  Rather, problematizations give order itself.  
Thought, Foucault argues, "develops the conditions in which possible responses can be 
given; it defines the elements that will constitute what the different solutions attempt to 
respond to."111  Any transcendence, ground, or Being does not exceed or become 
represented through a given problem, since any ground is given as a result of the 
particular relations which result from a particular formation of subjective experience.112  
Problematizations, Foucault writes in The Use of Pleasure, are the different ways "through 
which being offers itself to be, necessarily thought."113  Contra Heidegger, Foucault does 
not think a selfsame Being which gives the conditions for existence and which is then 
forgotten in its metaphysical or representational determination.  Being is not prior to 
problematization; the medium of differentiation or particular forms of the relation 
between the inside and the outside are effected by the relations of forces which coagulate 
into determinate conditions through which thought questions or problematizes its 
existence.  A given 'clearing' or order of existence is the effect of the becoming of a 
multiplicity of events which coagulate into particular regularities.  We might say that like 
Derrida, the multiplicity of forces which form the conditions for a given field of thought 
are 'older than the ontological difference,' since, as Foucault argues in The Order of Things, 
Heidegger's question of Being is rooted in a particular modern mode of thinking the 
'unthought.'   
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 Foucault's genealogy of problematizations attempts to go beyond or before the 
question to "define the conditions in which human beings 'problematize' what they are, 
what they do and the world in which they live."114  The way in which these three 
"fundamental elements of experience" are related in a given power apparatus will 
determine the subject's field of possibility, or what, Foucault would quite simply call 
power relations.115  The genealogy of problematizations functions as a history of thought 
which maps these interrelations through the ways in which problems become an object of 
forms of knowledge and technologies of power.116  This work does not attempt to excavate 
a subjective interiority as ground of experience, but rather, thinks the subject as emerging 
within a historically delimited space bounded by the limits governing these axes at a given 
time.  The genealogy of problems operates as a mapping of difference since events are 
thought as singularities and in terms of their differences in and between multiplicities: 
 
"[i]t is not a matter of locating everything on one level, that of the event, but of realizing that 
there is actually a whole order of levels of different types of events, differing in amplitude, 
chronological breadth, and capacity to produce effects.  The problem is at once to 
distinguish among events, to differentiate the networks and levels to which they belong, and 
to reconstitute the lines along which they are connected and engender one another."117 
 
A history of problematizations proceeds by showing the conditions of particular 
questions as formed by concrete techniques, effects and conditions and thus, denies any 
transcendent term as a ground for understanding the particularity of events:  
 
"[f]ar from being the still incomplete and blurred image of an Idea that would, from on high 
and for all time, hold the answer, the problem lies in the idea itself, or rather, the Idea exists 
only in the form of a problem: a distinctive plurality whose obscurity is nevertheless 
insistent, and in which the question ceaselessly stirs.  What is the answer to the question?  
The problem.  How is the problem resolved?  By displacing the question.  The problem ...  is 
a dispersed multiplicity...  We must think problematically rather than question and answer 
dialectically."118 
 
The problem gives an account of the combinations of heterogeneous elements which 
have their modes of existence made visible as a product of their constitutive outside.   
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Problematization and the Aporia 
 If Foucault thinks that the metaphysics of the question can be disturbed through a 
genealogy which analyses the conditions which make the question itself possible, then 
Derrida's response could be said to argue, against Foucault, that the very possibility of 
delimiting a given problem already relies upon a transcendental move.  At stake between 
them are the forms thinking might take while both affirming its being-thrown into 
determinate relations yet thinking the conditions of that thrownness itself.  In 'Cogito 
and the History of Madness' Derrida calls what he sees as Foucault's attempt to reduce a 
universal condition of reason to a historical event a "structuralist totalitarianism."119  The 
event of determination "cannot be recounted, cannot be objectified as an event in a 
determined history" and thus inaugurates the terms of a give-and-take (discussed at length 
in chapter two) over the question of the empirical and the transcendental; over the 
possibility and/or necessity of a determinate history, which as Derrida says, in reference 
to the infamous break between them which occurred following the publication of 'My 
Body, This Paper, This Fire, "made us invisible to one another, that made us not associate 
with one another for close to ten years.”120   
 
 In 'To Do Justice to Freud', written almost ten years after Foucault's death, 
Derrida returns to these questions.  In this text however, Derrida engages closely with the 
thematic we have been addressing in this chapter; the possibility of disrupting the 
question by problematizing the conditions which make it possible.  In 'To Do Justice to 
Freud' Derrida once again identifies a reduction or determination in Foucault's Madness 
and Civilization in the construction of what he calls here, echoing his critique of 
Heidegger in Aporias, a "border."121  However, in this later essay, the thematic of the 
border is related to Foucault's oeuvre as a whole – and to the possibility of displacing the 
question – since Derrida extends the argument to question the conditions of thinking a 
'problematization' at all.122  At stake is thus the very mode in which both thinkers displace 
the question in order to think its constitutive outside. 
 
 In the later essay on Foucault Derrida 'declines' to return to the earlier debate over 
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the place of madness in the Meditations and this time argues that in Madness and 
Civilization (along with The Order of Things and The History of Sexuality) it is Freud who is 
violently determined by Foucault.  Foucault's violent and metaphysical gesture, Derrida 
argues, is "to situate Freud in a historical place that is stabilizable, identifiable, and open 
to a univocal understanding."123  Unlike Descartes, Freud recognizes the death drive as a 
hyperbolical force which operates in the ego and cannot be mastered such that for Freud, 
hyperbole cannot be excluded from thinking as Descartes wanted to do, nor can it be 
confined to an epoch, discursive formation, or given problematization as Foucault wants.  
The latter's situating of psychoanalysis into a discursive regime or an apparatus of power-
knowledge still must presume a position totally outside the hyperbolic excess of the death 
drive.  Foucault, Derrida says, "regularly attempts to objectify psychoanalysis and to 
reduce it to that of which he speaks rather than to that from out of which he speaks."124  
In order to place Freud within a given field, to see him as a violent 'figure of order' one 
must discount the transgressive and hyperbolic element in Freud's text.  Moreover, as 
Derrida points out, in Madness and Civilization Foucault himself affirms that Freud stands 
with Nietzsche as a figure who entered into a dialogue with madness prior to its 
pathologization by psychology and thus, like Nietzsche, Artaud and Holderlin, makes 
Foucault's own text possible.125   
 
 Freud thus acts as what Derrida calls a 'supplement' in Foucault's text; he is both 
excluded by being placed inside the history of the determination of madness and placed 
outside insofar as he makes a dialogue with madness possible.  Freud can thus only lie at 
the "border" of Foucault's history: 
  
"Freud, is the double figure of the door and the doorkeeper.  He stands guard and ushers 
in...That is why – and this would be the paradox of a serial law – Freud does and does not 
belong to the different series in which Foucault inscribes him.  What is outstanding, outside 
the series [hors-série], turns out to be regularly reinscribed within different series."126 
   
 
Like any totality, Foucault's delimitation of the violent determination of madness can be 
shown to be founded upon that which it excludes.  In 'To Do Justice to Freud' Derrida 
refers to this experience of nonpassage at the border of Freud, employing a 'quasi-concept' 
from Specters of Marx, as a 'hauntology,'; any objectification is perpetually haunted by the 
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hyperbolic:  
 
"the whole criteriology and symptomatology that can give assurance to a historical 
knowledge governing a figure, an episteme, an age, an epoch, a paradigm, once all these 
determinations are found to be in effect threatened by a perpetual haunting.  For in 
principle, all these determinations are for the historian either presences or absences, as 
such, they exclude haunting."127   
 
Much like the argument in 'Cogito and the History of Madness,' here Derrida 
suggests that Foucault has failed to ask 'the question of the question' of the relation 
between the inside and outside (here marked by the figure of Freud), which makes 
his analysis possible.  As such, rather than do "justice," Foucault has committed a 
determinate violence against Freud. 
 
 Given the resonance of this later text with the deconstruction opened in 'Cogito 
and the History of Madness,' 'To Do Justice to Freud' may not be of great importance for 
our own analysis since, as we argued in chapter two, Foucault came to reject many of the 
assumptions grounding Madness and Civilization and quite radically altered his own 
methodology, especially after The Archaeology of Knowledge.  However, in the later text, 
Derrida extends his argument to encompass all of Foucault's work.  A 'problem' he 
argues, can only appear through the promise of the presence of knowledge of a given 
field.  Yet, since presence is always already divided and deferred, any problem, is only 
constituted in the covering over of an aporia: 
 
"The self-identity of its age, or of any age, appears as divided, and thus, problematic, 
problematizable... as the age of madness or an age of psychoanalysis -as well as, in fact, all the 
historical or archeological categories that promise us the determinable stability of a 
configurable whole."128 
 
In other words, it is Foucault who delimits or closes the inside from the outside, who 
denies the instability and impossibility of all limits, who violently 'decides' the contours 
and context of his history before presuming to undermine it in genealogy.  The possibility 
of any genealogy of problematizations cannot proceed except by violently and 
teleologically determining its objects and thus, by covering over the aporia or hyperbolic 
excess which is the condition for Foucault's history.    Derrida makes a similar argument 
in Rogues, arguing that the determination of context or field in Foucault's works is an 
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"infrastructure of technoscientific discovery" and thus,  
 
"[w]henever a telos or teleology comes to orient, order and make possible a historicity, it 
annuls that historicity by the same token and neutralizes unforeseeable and incalculable 
irruption, the singular and exceptional alterity of what [ce qui] comes, that without which, or 
the one without whom, nothing happens or arrives."129    
 
It is Foucault who, Derrida argues, enacts the closure of the outside in attempting to form 
an interior horizon as the field for his histories of problematizations.  In Aporias, Derrida 
traces the etymology of the word 'problem' to its Greek origins as a reference to 
'projection' or 'protection.'  The ancient meaning of the term, he suggests, echoes the 
constitution of a problem as the ordering or delimitation of a domain or field.  The 
constitution of problems in disciplinary, ontological, or territorial terms Derrida says, 
refers to the constitution of a border, identity, or, in short, a closure.130  The setting up of 
a problem or limit, he argues, is always already threatened; it is always already marked by 
the "experience of nonpassage" of the aporia which denotes the impossibility of any total 
or non-negotiable border.  The aporia is that milieu where, Derrida argues, "it would no 
longer be possible to constitute a problem, a project, or a projection."131   
 
 For Derrida, Foucault's text is not genealogical enough, since it denies the 
determinations of relation that occur within it.  It cannot maintain the question as a 
question and so, it is up to deconstruction to conduct "the problematization of 
problematization."132  The aporia is not merely prior to decision or problematization, it is 
also an excess over any decision and thus, prevents the possibility of mastery by a given 
decision.  Foucault's problematization then, could only be constituted in a violent 
reduction of this anterior medium.133  Deconstruction would thus be anterior to and less 
violent than the genealogy of problematizations since this experience of a non-totalizable 
excess or outside which exceeds any determination or problematization marks the failure 
of its attempted closure.  Yet, if Derrida's deconstruction of Foucault is correct, it cannot 
be so when considered within the scope of the terms of Foucault's own articulation.  That 
is to say, the polemical difference between Derrida and Foucault might be irresolvable not 
because of a fundamental ontological contention but rather, as arising from their shared 
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affirmation of the relational determinateness of questioning and the consequent necessity 
for questioning to proceed strategically.  Since neither thinker attempts to sustain an 
absolute justification for their discourse, we might wonder if we can say that each account 
is ultimately justifiable only in terms of the point from which their analysis sets out.  The 
debate between them, as a question of the violence of their respective analyses, moves 
from two distinct points of 'evaluation' internal to both discourses such that each seems 
to be caught in an indefinite circularity.  The accusation of violence emerges from two 
distinct strategic points of departure. 
 
 The debate and polemic between Derrida and Foucault might be unavoidable 
since, in an ironic logic, both affirm the situatedness of their thought in determinate 
relations and thus, posit no absolute justification for their analyses.  As Derrida put it in 
Of Grammatology, it is "impossible to justify a point of departure absolutely," and thus, he 
goes on, deconstruction always proceeds from a particular point, it always begins "in a text 
where we already believe ourselves to be."134  To work strategically for Derrida is to sustain 
what he calls a "radically empiricist" point of departure, one which is neither absolute, 
nor purely empirical but which proceeds along or through a 'minimal' consensus in the 
interpretation of given phenomena or texts.135  Deconstruction's mode of proceeding has 
come under criticism, most notably from David Wood and Peter Dews (albeit in different 
inflections) for this strategic mode of questioning.  Inherent to this first step of 
deconstruction they argue, is a sustenance or nostalgia for metaphysics or logocentrism by 
which Derrida first constructs a metaphysical whole prior to its deconstruction.136  This 
type of argument mirrors Foucault's own attack in 'My Body, This Paper, This Fire' on 
what he sees as Derrida's preservation of the sovereignty and privileged status of 
philosophy in deconstruction's positing of essentialism in metaphysics and the history of 
metaphysics.137  Yet, Foucault, as we will see, makes a similar 'strategic' affirmation about 
the truth status of his genealogies.   
 
 This negotiation with the veracity of their analyses in relation to dominant 
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paradigms of truth is not a temporary problem, a minor (or major) mistake which can be 
overcome, it is the condition and fate of all 'strategic' and genealogical thought that 
refuses to adopt a model of substantive truth absolutely.  The debate and difference 
between Derrida and Foucault, while it may revolve around certain formal interpretative 
differences (e.g., the historical status of Descartes' Meditations), more fundamentally, the 
dispute centers on the status of the transcendental and its ethical import.  While the 
divergence between Derrida and Foucault may be articulated in terms of formal questions 
of interpretation (and consequent accusations of teleology), the fundamental distinction 
and the stakes of the difference lie at the intersection(s) of philosophy, ethics and politics.  
The 'error' of which each thinker is accused resides at the locus where relationality is 
determined.  As such, while the 'debate' revolves around given interpretations of the 
status of Descartes or Freud, the critical element of the debate is nevertheless the 
accusation of committing violence or a determination and it is an ethical and political 
one.  The stakes of the debate and the difference between Derrida and Foucault lie over 
how the violence of relationality is to be negotiated, how a relational or genealogical 
thought is to be affirmed and thus, is ultimately a question of 'strategy' of the question; of 
a strategy of a lesser violence in relational existence.  At stake are two 'economies of 
violence' and thus, the irreducibility and centrality of the ethico-political question of 
relation.  It is here, at the question of strategy, that the distinction Agamben draws 
between a thought of transcendence and a thought of immanence might be operative. 
 
 Foucault perhaps most clearly explains the immanence of the conditions of 
thought to thought itself through his conception of 'life' which is elaborated in the essay 
he penned as an introduction to Georges Canguilhem's The Normal and the Pathological.138  
Foucault understands life itself as a continuous process of concept formation and, of 
human life in particular, as being always within a "conceptually structured environment," 
a milieu that is "mobile, on an undefined territory."139  In appropriating Canguilhem's 
formulation of knowledge in terms of the conceptual structuring of an environment 
Foucault conceives the subject's relation to its environment(s) as defined by complex 
"interactions," and not as having constituted it or been constituted by it.140  Concepts lie 
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at the centre of that complex relation between the subject and its context.  And it is not 
just humans but all living beings for which life is formed in this way.  As Foucault puts it, 
the concept, “is one of the modes of that information which every living being takes from 
its environment and by which conversely it structures its environment... Forming concepts 
is a way of living and not a way of killing life.”141  To form the conditions for responding 
to conceptual problems is thus a mode of negotiating our environment; it is to form 
specific possibilities within a complex and unstable environment.  Thought does not 
reflect a prior world, but is an active event in itself.  Thus, conceptual systems or grounds 
are not reducible to a single element (a subject, or an object, or Being); because any 
ground is itself the effect of a regularity which then affects meaning, subjectivity and 
particular decisions.142  The conditions of thought are immanent to and inseparable from 
the empirical event of thought itself.  Accordingly, thought is always a response and never 
a solution since it forms the very conditions for its response to a problem and can never 
resolve itself to, or in Derridean terms, appropriate those immanent conditions which 
produce it. 
 In the essay on Canguilhem, life itself is conceived as a series of modes of being 
within an immanent conceptual network that is always susceptible to "error," for the 
processes of adequation that define the forming of concepts "give way to a chance 
occurrence that before becoming a disease, a deficiency or a monstrosity, is something 
like a disturbance in the informative system, something like a 'mistake.'"143  One must 
grant, Foucault goes on, that if concepts are the mode in which we cope with the 
inherent contingency of life, then "error is the root of what produces human thought and 
history."144  If norms are by their very nature contingent, never in the 'right' place, truth 
will always consist in a calendar of errors.  Thought will always be grounded in 
discontinuity since it is grounded in its own singular limits which are never transcendent 
from it.  It is susceptibility which acts as the instigation for a problematization, thought is 
problematic since it is constantly giving way to those "chance occurrences" which reveal a 
mistake in the conceptual system.  If to err (i.e., to think) is to deviate from the norm, 
then contingency becomes the ground of order itself and the source of a becoming other 
or ‘thinking otherwise’ as a way of living, an exit from the norm which constitutes it. 
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This formulation of life suggests an analogy between such a thinking of the 
concept and the aporetic logic of (im)possibility which lies at the heart of Derrida's 
thought.  Both thinkers affirm the contingency and ultimately the failure of all concepts 
to attain a transcendent truth and the consequent violence which all concepts do to 
things; the concept is always in error.  Neither thinks that relations can be indefinitely 
determined since all grounds are effected by the play of differences of an ultimately 
irrecuperable outside and both seek to open up this irreducible contingency, to destabilize 
fixed limits.  Yet, the implications which both thinkers draw from this non-
foundationalist state of affairs are radically different and perhaps irreconcilable.  Derrida 
tirelessly persists with the 'quasi-transcendental' question of the impossibility of the 
concept as a means of disturbing all attempts to govern relationality and accordingly 
affirms the responsibility which beginning from determinate relations entails.  Foucault, 
on the other hand, concludes that, if a transcendental truth is not attainable and thus, all 
interpretation or concept forming is an "infinite task" with no telos which violently 
"upset[s], shatter[s] with the blow of a hammer" then thought might perhaps affirm itself 
as such; that is, as difference and as an event of power.145  As Foucault puts it, "knowledge 
is always a certain strategic relation in which man is placed... that's why it would be 
completely contradictory to imagine a knowledge that was not by nature partial, oblique, 
and perspectival...  Knowledge simplifies, passes over differences, lumps things together, 
without any justification in regard to truth."146  If thought cannot exceed its own 
determinate conditions than this means it can only proceed in terms of an analysis of the 
immanent relational and conceptual milieu in which it finds itself.  The impossibility of 
transcendence signals for Foucault the possibility of proceeding without posing 
transcendental questions of justification, of the Idea or of Truth.  Instead, thought might 
affirm itself as a determinate and determining event rather than 'mourn' the impossibility 
of the indeterminate.147  It might be in this sense that Agamben refers to the essay on 
Canguilhem when he distinguishes Foucault and Deleuze as thinkers of immanence from 
Derrida and Levinas as thinkers of transcendence.148  For being in error, Foucault says 
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there, is a way of living: "with man, life has led to a living being that is never completely in 
the right place, a living being who is fated to 'err' and to be 'wrong.'"149   
 
 Foucault consequently accorded no special status for his own genealogical texts.  
And it is with his notion of the concept as error in mind that we should understand his 
labeling of all of his works as 'fictions':  
 
"I am quite aware that I have never written anything but fictions.  I'm not saying for all that 
that this is outside truth.  It seems to me the possibility exists to make fiction work in 
truth, to induce effects of truth with a discourse of fiction, and to make it so that the 
discourse of truth creates, 'fabricates' something that does not yet exist, therefore, 
'fictionalizes.'  One 'fictionalizes' history starting from a political reality that makes it true, 
one 'fictionalizes' a political outlook that does not yet exist starting from an historical 
truth."150 
  
Any delimitation of a problem, apparatus or discourse begins from within what Foucault 
calls a given (and needless to say, contingent) "game of truth" and to one extent or 
another it works from within its conditions.151  Thus, the work "does need to be true in 
terms of academic, historically verifiable truth;" it must accord with certain functions and 
demands of the particular discourse of truth in which it is inserted.152  This mode of 
truth, as demonstrable, verifiable, empirical and acquired through an act of cognition is 
what, in the lectures from 1974 Foucault thinks as a mode of truth which denies its 
inescapable relation to power.153  This is a mode of truth which we saw, Foucault argues, 
comes to full form with Descartes Meditations whereby truth is acquired in an adequation 
of the subject to the object.154  Truth, in this sense, is tied to particular rules or laws 
which determine a correct method for attaining truth.155  It is in terms of this Cartesian 
mode of truth which Derrida will deconstruct Foucault's text, by showing that any 
empirical designation of a problem, any claim to a verifiable truth, will always be 
determined, determining and violent. "All pathbreaking,” Derrida says in reference to 
Foucault, “opens the way only at a certain price, that is, by bolting shut other passages, by 
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ligaturing, stitching up, or compressing, indeed repressing, at least provisionally other 
veins."156 
 
 But it is another mode of truth which I think Foucault seeks to formulate: a truth 
which simply affirms itself as an event of power.  Genealogy should be judged, Foucault 
argues, not in terms of its capacity to prove demonstrable truths, but in terms of its 
'effectiveness,' insofar as it’s "fictions become true."157  As an event of power, the 
effectiveness of any work lies with its capacity to affect and alter determinate relations by 
relating them to their outside.  Foucault clearly illustrates this point in an interview in a 
discussion of Discipline and Punish: 
 
"The book makes use of true documents, but in such a way that through them it is possible 
not only to arrive at an establishment of truth but also experience something that permits a 
change, a transformation of the relationship we have with ourselves and with the world 
where, up to then, we had seen ourselves as being without problems – in short, a 
transformation of the relationship we have with our knowledge.  So this game of truth and 
fiction – or if you prefer, of verification and fabrication – will bring to light something which 
connects us, sometimes in a completely unconscious way, with our modernity, while at the 
same time causing it to appear as changed.  The experience through which we grasp the 
intelligibility of certain mechanisms (for example imprisonment, punishment, and so on) 
and the way we are enabled to detach ourselves from them by perceiving them differently. 
will be, at best, one and the same thing"158 
 
The attempt to exceed the realm of verification and coherence is not the nihilistic cry of 
'everything is permissible' since, as Foucault argues, the work arises from within, and 
cannot totally escape the demands of the 'game of truth' which forms its conditions.159  
Yet, in opening to the exteriority and contingency of the institutions and apparatuses 
which have formed a given field of knowledge a different mode of truth appears.  
Genealogy, in the identification of points of constitution and therefore, possible points of 
fracture or possibility, “disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments 
what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent 
with itself.”160  The telos of the work is thus not to demonstrate truth, but to be 
"effective;" to “deprive the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature.”161  Its very 
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effectiveness arises with its ability to introduce discontinuity “into our very being.”162  It is 
the introduction of discontinuity itself which opens the sphere of possibility.  The 
introduction of new possibilities for what might be thought and done, of a new mode of 
relating to the limits that form the self; limits as relations to the self, to knowledge, and to 
others.  In inducing particular effects, new experiences of the carceral institution for 
example, the work invokes new relations to truth and to others and as such, 'becomes 
true' since it enters into and transforms, particular economies of power relations, opening 
them to the ‘outside’ which has made them possible.163           
 
 Like Derrida, Foucault thus affirms the violent consequences, the necessary 
determinations, which any historical analysis will provoke.  Yet for Foucault, if knowledge 
is inherently violent and determining of relations, if all knowledge is 'error' and 'fiction,' 
then questioning need not proceed in terms of grounds, foundations, justification nor 
Truth.  All of these concepts are given over to the sedimentations of fields of forces which 
Foucault comes to call 'problematizations,' in which they are constituted.  Derrida's 
deconstruction, in both 'Cogito and the History of Madness' and 'To Do Justice to Freud' 
question the constitution of given problematizations themselves; their elaboration, he 
argues, focusing on Descartes and then Freud, will always be inextricably tied to a violent 
effacement of the aporia and consequently, violent determinations which are not 
acknowledged by Foucault.  As a result, we are caught in an infinite regress between the 
problem and the aporia, each purporting to have outlined the conditions in which the 
other might appear.  Foucault's genealogies appear to be constituted upon a violent 
reduction of the aporias which make them possible since they assume the possibility of 
the presence of a given field of knowledge while Derrida's work on the experience of the 
aporetic is formed within particular 'games of truth' and thus maintains the sovereignty of 
traditional, transcendental philosophical questions.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 If neither Derrida's nor Foucault's thought is to fall prey to the accusations made 
by Visker, Fraser, or Habermas of a thoroughgoing nihilism wherein all ordering, all 
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determination is both equal and unavoidable, then a satisfactory articulation of an ethical 
orientation will prove crucial to their work.  In the next chapter we will explore the 
intersections of ethics and politics in Derrida and Foucault to think the way the ethics of 
each is informed by a thought of the outside and the way an ethics of relationality guides 
political thought in their oeuvres.  Can a questioning which proceeds by a thought of the 
aporia or the problem orient thought without simultaneously falling prey to the 
archipolitical desire to posit itself as transcendent authority?  What kind of ethical 
orientation emerges from such a thought?  Finally, how do we think the ethico-political 
once we concede the incommensurability of the accounts of ethics proposed by Derrida 
and Foucault?  It is to these questions we now turn.
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Chapter 4: Two (Incommensurable?) Economies of 
Violence: Ethics in Derrida and Foucault 
 
 
Introduction 
 In a recent book Slavoj Zizek succinctly presents the rationale for looking beyond 
the empirical and apparent when thinking about violence.1  What Zizek calls “objective” 
or empirical violence is made visible and identifiable against the implicit "background of a 
non-violent zero level" which we associate with our everyday existence.2  In other words, 
violence appears as the suspension of the natural and generally peaceful state of things.  
However, by thinking violence in these terms, Zizek maintains we implicitly obscure and 
veil the systemic violence of our own existence.3  That is to say, in reducing violence to a 
(relatively) rare eruptive event, we conceal the fact that our existence as social and 
linguistic beings is always already irreducibly violent; that violence is the condition of all 
meaning and all relation.  Zizek goes on to tie this insight to Heideggerean ontology: the 
disclosure of a world or of particular epochs of Being always denotes particular 
determinations of both our being-in-the-world and our being-with-others.4  For Zizek, 
Heidegger's fundamental insight is that all social or political existence – all relationality – 
is constituted in an irreducibly violent reduction and determination of what 'is.'  
Moreover, as Zizek notes, Heidegger also is aware that the violence of relation is not 
“merely ontological” and thus, should not be reduced to a purely philosophical problem.5  
Any particular world disclosure, while violent as such, will involve specific relations of 
authority and domination.  Consequently, the irreducibly ontic violence of any particular 
field of relations is not only an ontological problem, but an ethico-political one as well.   
 
 Zizek's account of the irreducibility of violence is prescient here.  It is in refusing 
to view violence as limited to an irruptive and purely empirical event that we open the 
possibility of thinking the more pervasive violence of the moral-metaphysical grounds that 
have sought to determine the modes by which we exist with others.  As Nietzsche's 
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genealogy and Heidegger's history of Being have shown most of all, moral and 
metaphysical categories are irreducibly violent; either as the product of political struggles 
themselves (Nietzsche) or particular historical determinations of Being (Heidegger).   In 
restricting violence to the empirical, we veil the limits and hierarchies of particular socio-
political structures.  As we have seen, both Derrida and Foucault critically appropriate in 
different ways these Nietzschean and Heideggerean themes.  From Heidegger, Derrida 
and Foucault inherit the notion of 'determination.'  For Heidegger, any ground or arkhe is 
effected by an anterior relation to Being which is subsequently determined or reduced by 
thought and thus, concealed.  However, if both take up Heidegger's notion of the violent 
and reductive nature of metaphysics, they nevertheless reject the recovery of origin or 
essence which permeates Heidegger's work.  For Derrida, Heidegger's desire for a 'proper,' 
non-reductive, non-metaphysical and non-subjective thinking of Being is itself haunted or 
contaminated by its own irreducibly reductive gestures.  Similarly, for Foucault Heidegger 
is caught in the modern epistemic move of seeking to recover an origin which would 
ground or condition knowledge.  Read through either Derrida or Foucault, Heidegger's 
recovery of the 'proper' origin of thinking thus appears as one more (yet perhaps the most 
radical) attempt to avoid or overcome the irreducible violence of existence.  Against 
Heidegger's attempt to recover the 'proper' Derrida and Foucault insist on the Nietzschean 
theme of the violence of all origins and thus, refuse the possibility of recovery.  
Accordingly, each posits a mode of thinking strategically via the aporia or the problem in 
order to attempt to displace the question of origin or ground altogether. 
 
 The crucial question with which we closed the previous chapter and which will be 
our focus in this chapter arises here.  Once we insist on the irreducibility of violence and 
refuse, as I have shown Derrida and Foucault to, either the possibility of appropriating a 
spontaneous primordiality or the possibility of a non-violent order, are we left unable to 
discern violence at all?  In other words, if no ground is posited from which particular 
orders can be evaluated then both Derrida and Foucault are seemingly left without the 
means by which the irreducibility of a violent social existence can be negotiated.  Their 
work would be, as one thinker has put it, nothing more than the “sabotaging of a reigning 
epoch's agenda.”6  By thinking a violence more pervasive than the empirical and which 
cannot be transcended they risk no longer being able to recognize violence at all.  If non-
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violence can never be present are we reduced to a vacuous inability to think and act 
ethically and politically? 
 
 This chapter constructs a negative response to this question.  Both Derrida and 
Foucault provide a way out of this apparent paradox by positing an 'economy of violence' 
which functions something like a compass allowing them to orient and negotiate the 
irreducibility of violence.  Both thinkers postulate a principle of evaluation which allows 
them to discern a better and a worse and yet does not form a transcendental ground 
beyond all determinate relations (insofar as a 'principle' here is not thought as a law but as 
an 'orientation').  Moreover, I will argue that the ethical orientations both propose are 
characterized by a Nietzschean affirmation of the irreducibility of violence, one which 
receives its motivational force from what, for both is a ‘desire’ for the other or outside.  
That is, a desire to relate the violence of determination to the otherness and 
indeterminacy which exceeds it.  Finally, despite these similarities the question of the 
incommensurability of the two strategies employed by these thinkers reappears here – in 
the question of the ethics of otherness.  For while they attempt congruous ethico-political 
moves they do so in terms of the two radically different strategies outlined in the previous 
two chapters in terms of immanence and quasi-transcendence.  From an encounter 
between these two disparate strategies of conceiving the finite, determinate and violent 
nature of thought and its accordant ethics a violence appears in excess of their very 
accounts of violence.  Insofar as each strategy excludes and circumscribes the other, it thus 
cannot account for nor recognize the very force of the other's account.   
 
 
Derrida:  An Ethics of the Same and the Other 
 One possible path into the complex terrain of the ethics of deconstruction 
proceeds from Derrida's critique of empiricism discussed at length in chapter 2.  As we 
have seen, in several essays collected in Writing and Difference, in Of Grammatology and 
elsewhere, Derrida claims there to be a historicism inherent to the structuralist theories of 
Levi-Strauss and the early Foucault.  The latter are accused of illegitimately collapsing 
originary violence, constitutive of all determinate relations, into an empirical and 
secondary violence in order to recover the possibility of a non-violent presence of the 
other.  In "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida's first major essay on Emmanuel Levinas 
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he implies that his friend and contemporary succumbs to a similar error.  Levinas, 
Derrida argues, seeks to transcend originary violence by making it a merely empirical 
event.  As such, Derrida's reading of Levinas proceeds on the same basis as those of Levi-
Strauss and Foucault, that is, on the affirmation of the impossibility of transcending 
violence.  Yet, it is in the deconstruction of Levinas' ethics of alterity in particular that, 
among his early works, Derrida perhaps most explicitly develops his own understanding 
of the relation between (in Levinas' words) the Same and the Other and ultimately, begins 
to formulate what we might call his own 'ethics' of relationality.7   
 
 In this section I will begin by briefly outlining Derrida's early engagement with 
Levinas in order to suggest that an 'ethics' of deconstruction emerges from the particular 
way in which, contra Levinas, Derrida asserts the irreducibility of violence in the relation 
to the other.  I will then go on to argue that many of Derrida's critics, who to differing 
degrees accept this reading, nevertheless err in limiting the scope of deconstructive ethics.  
Not only does Derrida affirm the irreducibility of violence and calculation for ethics, he 
also provides a notion of 'lesser violence' which acts as an 'orientation' by which an 
economy of violence can be negotiated.  This 'orientation,' I will argue, is defined by a 
'desire' for the other or outside which permeates all of Derrida's work. 
 
Derrida, Levinas, The Same, and the Other 
 Levinas' theoretical apparatus is centered on the attempt to displace the cogito as 
the centre or ground of all relationality in modernity by inscribing an absolute otherness 
within it.  Accordingly, he seeks to inscribe the totalizing force of identity, or what he 
simply calls the Same, with a notion of infinity which, essentially inappropriable, 
undermines the totalizing movement of consciousness' appropriation of the object.8  For 
Levinas ethics revolves around the pursuit of a concept of infinite responsibility for the 
other formed in an attempt to totally exceed the identity of the Same.9  Whenever the 
other is not addressed or related to as absolutely other it is reduced to an element of the 
Same, and thus, violently appropriated.10  Hence, Derrida says that for Levinas "coherence 
                                               
7  The argument that the 'ethics' of deconstruction arise through an engagement with Levinas is well 
    known.  See for instance Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP,  
    1999.  Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit, London: Routledge, 1992. 
8  WD, p.122, p.142 
9  Marion Hobson, Opening Lines. P.36 
10  Hent de Vries,Religion and Violence : Philosphical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida. Baltimonre : Johns  
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in ontology," – the absolute coherence of the logos with itself – is "violence itself."11  
Levinas' ethics is said to be grounded in the claim that the other cannot and should not 
be reduced to a determinate economy or context, that "the concept (material of language) 
which is always given to the other, cannot encompass the other, cannot include the other."12   
 
 While Levinas associates violence with the finitude and determination by the 
concept, he holds out the possibility of non-violence embodied in a pure logos which 
would incorporate the absolutely other as other.13  He attempts to guarantee otherness or 
alterity through a formulation of 'positive infinity' which would be "beyond Being."14  An 
otherness which would always be absolutely more than, or in excess of the Same, and 
therefore self-sufficient and in-appropriable.  Such a notion of otherness, absolutely 
beyond relation, or as Levinas puts it echoing Blanchot's formula, a "relation without 
relation," would ensure respect for the other insofar as it would keep it from being 
determined and reduced.15   
 
 While the ascription of an ethics to deconstruction is commonly conceived 
through the proximity of Derrida's work to Levinas' notion of alterity there is a risk in 
collapsing Derrida into Levinas.  Overstating the proximity threatens to efface the 
absolute irreducibility of violence and its ethical implications in Derrida’s work.  Simon 
Critchley's influential The Ethics of Deconstruction is exemplary of this error.  Despite 
generally providing an accurate and provocative reading of Derrida, Critchley goes too far 
towards reducing deconstruction to Levinas' ethics of alterity.  In conceiving 
deconstruction as a "philosophy of hesitation" Critchley sees it as a mode of opening 
thought to an ethics of infinite responsibility to the other, that is, to an unconditionality 
and undecidability which both transgresses the empirical and determinate and cannot be 
effaced.16  Accordingly, he maintains that for Derrida there is an irreducible gap between 
the ontological and the ontic, the same and the other and so, between ethics and politics.  
                                                                                                                                          
Hopkins, 2002.  P.124 
11  WD, p.403, n.2 
12  WD, p.117 
13  Hent de Vries, Religion and Violence. P. 134 and “Violence and Testimony.” Violence, Identity, and Self-
Determination. (Hent de Vries & Samuel Weber, Eds.) Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997.  P.23 
14  Hobson, Opening Lines. P.44 
15  Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. (Alphonso Lingis, Trans.)  
       Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991. P.80. See also Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation. (Susan Hanson,   
       Trans.) Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1993. 
16  Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction.  p.42 and passim.  
  
149 
It follows for Critchley that deconstruction fails to theorize an engagement with the 
empirical (and thus the political) since his very account of ethics is based on the 
Levinasian notion of the failure of finite empirical existence to live up to the absolute 
ethical demand to respond to the other.17   
 
 Critchley's view that Derrida fails to close the gap deconstruction forms between 
the empirical and transcendental insufficiently stresses the extent to which the latter’s 
account of relationality is formulated in opposition to Levinas.18  The relation to the 
other in Derrida's work, unlike in Levinas, begins and ends in violence.  All three of 
Derrida's texts engaging with Levinas proceed from the principle that determinate 
relations cannot be totally exceeded and thus, violence cannot be restricted to a particular 
concept or determination.19  In suggesting there is an irreducible gap between the 
transcendental and empirical or unconditional and determinate, Critchley too quickly 
effaces the ineluctable contamination of the purely ethical relation as the basis of a 
deconstructive ethics.  It is to a closer reading of Derrida's deconstruction of Levinas in 
'Violence and Metaphysics' to which we now turn. 
 
 If Levinas seeks an exteriority beyond the discourse of philosophy in the form of a 
pure difference of pure difference then Derrida, much as he does in relation to Heidegger, 
insists on the inescapable thrownness and attendant finitude of thought.  We find 
ourselves always already caught in fields of determinate relations and thus, we are called 
to negotiate rather than transcend violence if we are to avoid what Derrida calls the 
"worst" violence of the disavowal of violence.20  Responsibility, is necessarily indissociable 
from irresponsibility.  As Derrida puts it, it is necessary "to state infinity's excess over 
totality in the language of totality [...] it is necessary to state the other in the language of 
the Same [...] it is necessary to think true exteriority as non-exteriority."21  The other can 
                                               
17  Ibid.  P.200, 236. 
18  One should note here that Critchley's privileging of the place of Levinas in deconstruction rather   
reductively revolves around the following brief sentence from Derrida's Altérités (Paris: Osiris, 1986).: 
"faced with a thought like that of Levinas, I never have an objection." Quoted in The Ethics of 
Deconstruction, p.10; See also Alex Thompson, Deconstruction and Democracy: Derrida's Politics of Friendship. 
London: Continuum, 2005. Pp.1223, 126-8 and Morag Patrick Derrida, Responsibility and Politics (pp.91-
125) for a more extensive critique of Critchley's hermeneutic strategy.  
19  These texts are "Violence and Metaphysics" WD, pp.97-192;  Adieu: to Emmanuel Levinas. (Pascale Anne-
Brault and Michael Naas, Trans.), Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999; (with Pierre-Jean Labarierre) “At this 
Very Moment In This Work Here I am.” Psyche: Inventions of the Other. Pp.143-90 
20   WD, p.146, 162, 191 
21  WD, p.140 
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only appear within a given and particular context which is in turn destructive of its 
singularity.22  A relation to the other is always violent and moreover, all denunciations of 
violence are violent: "[t]here is no phrase which is indeterminate, that is, which does not 
pass through the violence of the concept [...] The very elocution of nonviolent 
metaphysics is its first disavowal."23  Absolute difference or 'positive infinity' can only be 
thought from within a series of finite attempts to think difference and thus would not 
escape its own inscription as a possibility within finitude, language and the world.24   
 
In short, Derrida displaces Levinas' ethical relation to the other by the originary 
and uncircumventable excess and co-implication of totality and infinity or inside and 
outside, that makes transcendence both possible and impossible.25  Originary violence is 
the irreducible condition of relation since "the other cannot be absolutely exterior [or 
"cannot be, or be anything" Derrida adds in a footnote to this sentence] to the same 
without ceasing to be other."26  If an ethics emerges from the deconstruction of Levinas, it 
does so through the claim that the latter elides the full import of the impossibility of 
understanding and relating to absolute otherness.  This impossibility is not only an 
empirical condition but a transcendental one.27  The same or inside is, Derrida argues, 
the "only possible point of departure" for any relation to the other.28  Consequently, 
violence is the condition of all relationality and all ethics; violence is what Derrida calls in 
Of Grammatology the "nonethical opening of ethics."29  "One never escapes," Derrida says, 
"this economy of war."30    
 
 In affirming the necessity and inescapability of violence Derrida appears to assert 
what we might call a genealogical ethics, characterized by the refusal to veil or conceal the 
violence of all points of departure against Levinas' ethics of alterity.  Insofar as Derrida's 
work is permeated by an invocation to produce what he calls an "experience" of the 
irreducibility of the aporia (and thus of violence), we can, I believe, describe it as an amor 
                                               
22  WD, p.142 
23  WD, p.185 
24  WD, p.146 
25  WD, p.146 
26  WD, p.158 and p.404, n.45 
27  Marion Hobson, Opening Lines. P.37 
28  WD, p.156 
29  OG, p.140 
30  WD, p.185 
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fati.31  That is, if there is something like an ethics in deconstruction it is situated in the 
between, as an opening and avowal of and by thought to the originary violence from 
which any particular ethical acts proceed.  As we saw in chapter 3, deconstruction 
proceeds from our abandonment to determinate relations to an exposure and affirmation 
of the outside or other, "an affirmation, of a yes, before all opposition of yes and no."32  
The call to our responsibility to the other is 'heard' in the affirmation of always beginning 
within determinate relations, but also as a response which desires to think what exceeds 
and gives relation.  An opening to the other, in excess of finitude and the conditional, 
only proceeds through an experience and affirmation of relationality itself: of the 
'between' the inside and outside, same and other. 
 
 Crucial here is that in affirming the irreducibility and necessity of its own 
violence, deconstruction constitutes a different order of violence to that of metaphysics: 
this is a violence that recoils upon itself.  This formulation of the relation to the other, in 
affirming its own situatedness and violence, not only inevitably determines or reduces the 
singularity of the other, but also forms an opening to the other.  If contra Critchley we 
sustain an understanding of Derrida's work not as a "refusal" of determinate tactics, 
strategies and calculations, since deconstruction is irreducibly finite and strategic, we must 
nevertheless ask how an 'economy of violence' can be negotiated?33  If the possibility of 
moral or normative principles is disavowed, are we caught in a vacant nihilism without 
orientation, affirming only our own finitude?  It is to these questions that we now turn. 
 
The Universalisation of Violence 
 Critchley's account reflects a common critique of deconstruction.  Insofar as it 
forms an affirmation of the incompleteness of identity, the argument goes, deconstruction 
is inherently insufficient as an articulation of political relations.  In this vein, William 
Connolly for instance, argues that deconstruction is limited to provoking an experience of 
contingency.  While this experience is a necessary element of a post-essentialist 
conception of the ethico-political, Connolly nevertheless maintains that it is merely a 
                                               
31 Derrida often refers to deconstruction as an "experience" of the aporia or undecidability.  See for  
instance AP, p.33; "Eating Well." Who Comes after the Subject?  P.107  
32  Of Spirit, p.94 
33  See Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, P.200 
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negative critique which fails to produce positive theoretical alternatives.34  Further 
determinate and positive political articulations are necessary if our thinking of 
relationality is to exceed a merely reactive and critical status.  Similarly, albeit in a radically 
different ontological register, Alain Badiou sees the Levinasian-Derridean inspired 
account of ethics as at best, banal and insufficient.  "Infinite alterity is quite simply what 
there is," Badiou argues in his Ethics.35  Difference or alterity, Badiou says, characterizes 
every relation and so, offers no particular insight or basis for an ethics or a politics.36  
Analogously, Ernesto Laclau argues that the attempt to attribute an ethics of responsibility 
to the other as constitutive of, or constituted by deconstruction cannot be valid.  As he 
puts it, 
  
"[t]he illegitimate transition is to think that from the impossibility of a presence closed in 
itself [i.e., originary violence], from an 'ontological' condition in which the openness to the 
event, to the heterogeneous, to the radically other is constitutive, some kind of ethical 
injunction to be responsible and to keep oneself open to the heterogeneity of the other 
necessarily follows."37   
 
If the impossibility of closure revealed by deconstruction, Laclau argues, is to be 
constitutive of experience, it must always be prior to any ethical injunction.38   
Deconstruction is just 'what happens.'  In a sense Laclau is correct, no ethical necessity 
follows from the logic of aporia or double-bind and moreover, the postulation of a 
determinate ethical principle would amount to submitting thought to a transcendental 
principle.39   
 
 Despite their very apparent differences all of these thinkers understand Derrida in 
terms of the irreducibility of a gap between the unconditional and conditional described 
by Critchley.40  For instance, while Laclau's 'structuralist' reading of unconditionality lies 
in stark contrast to Critchley's Levinasian reading, whereby what the former views as an 
                                               
34  William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization.  Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1995.  P.36 
35  Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. (Peter Hallward, Trans.)  London: Verso,  
2001.   P.25.  While Badiou's discussion centers around Levinas, Peter Hallward suggests that Badiou's  
critique of post-structuralist ethics clearly extends to Derrida.  See Hallward's "Introduction" Badiou's  
Ethics. Pp.xxi-xxvii.  
36  Ibid.  p.27.  We return to Badiou’s critique in further detail in chapter 6. 
37  Ernesto Laclau, Emancipations. London: Verso, 2007. P.77 
38  Ibid. 
39  Ernesto Laclau, "Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony." Deconstruction and Pragmatism. Pp.47-68. P.53 
40  We could also add Slavoj Zizek to this list since he relies on Critchley's understanding of  
       deconstruction.  See "Melancholy and the Act." Critical Inquiry. Vol.26, No.4 (Summer 2000) Pp.657- 
  81. 
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ethical relation the latter sees as a structural condition, both nevertheless begin from the 
postulation of an absolute gap between the unconditional and particular decisions in 
deconstruction.41  All of these thinkers see deconstruction, to one extent or another, as 
limited to a description of the conditions from which determinate actions are effected and 
moreover, all see this description as insufficient for an ethico-political praxis.  Crucially, if 
these thinkers are partly correct to note the absence of determinate, or what Connolly 
calls 'positive' theoretical alternatives or demands beyond the affirmation of openness or 
contingency in deconstruction, this does not mean that Derrida leaves us to blindly 
negotiate our being-thrown into determinate relations.  Rather, I will argue that 
deconstruction does provide (or simply is) what we might call an ethical orientation or 
compass to orient our negotiations within economies of violence.   
 
 In 'Violence and Metaphysics' Derrida defines this orientation as the desire for 
"the lesser violence in an economy of violence."42  What would choosing the 'lesser 
violence' entail?  It is the choice to hear the genealogical imperative defined by the refusal 
to disavow the fact that all relationality – all relation to otherness – is constituted in 
violence: "the avowal of violence, is the least possible violence, the only way to repress the 
worst violence."43  In this sense, I claim that the ethics which impels deconstruction is 
defined by an imperative to undermine the will to truth's denial of originary violence – 
amor fati.  So while Laclau insists that it is contradictory to posit an ethical command 
transcendent to deconstruction, it is not an injunction beyond all violence which Derrida 
elicits, but rather, the affirmation of what 'is': the irreducibility of the dis-propriating force 
of différance, aporia, double-bind, etc.  Much as we will see is the case for Foucault as 
well, there is no categorical difference between the description of what happens and an 
'ethics' grounded in its affirmation.  A genealogical 'ethics' is defined by this indissociability 
between fate and injunction, ought and is.  For while the opening of the same to the 
other, or the inside to the outside is inescapable, it is nevertheless ceaselessly violently 
denied and concealed. 
                                               
41  The reference to Laclau's 'structuralist' deconstruction is from Aletta Norval, "Hegemony After  
 Deconstruction: The Consequence of Undecidability." Journal of Political Ideologies. Vol.9, No.2, (2004). 
Pp.139-57.  For the debate over the status of ethics in Laclau's theory of hegemony see Simon Critchley, 
"Ethics, Politics and Radical Democracy: The History of a Disagreement." and Ernesto Laclau "Ethics, 
Politics and Radical Democracy: A Response to Simon Critchley." Both in Culture  Machine. Vol 4. 
(2002). (http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk) (Accessed 10/01/2008). 
42  WD, p.146 
43  WD, p.162 
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 How do we recognize a 'worse' violence?  How does what Derrida calls a "violence 
against violence" provide an orientation by which we can navigate the relational?44  
Derrida argues that it is a "desire for the other" which deconstruction elicits and that acts 
as an "injunction" or an “unconditional appeal.”45  As he once put it in an interview, 
“deconstruction is a positive response to an alterity which necessarily calls, summons or 
motivates it.”46  This 'injunction' does not amount to a normative principle, yet it is the 
desire for the other or outside which nevertheless elicits responsibility and has, what 
Derrida elsewhere calls "motivational force."47  In this sense, deconstruction is also always 
a response and a responsibility since there are always already others before the self to 
which we are called to respond and to whom we have always already begun to respond in 
the form of what Derrida calls a "nonpositive affirmation."48   Accordingly, it is not 
possible to ascribe an ethics to deconstruction or an ethics of deconstruction insofar as 
what I am calling ethics is the way violence, the structural condition of all relations, 
is/should be negotiated.  Thus, to describe ethics as the 'desire for the other' or outside 
which acts as a compass to orient that negotiation is to conceive ethics as only guided by 
the refusal to disavow or conceal what 'is;' that the closure or determination of the 
relation to the other is impossible.   
 
The Messianic as Ethical 'Orientation' 
 Given the way ethical themes arise in Derrida's work, 'ethics' cannot refer to the 
search for a normative ground or principle upon which action should be based.  This 
becomes increasingly prevalent in his work from the 1980s and 1990s in the formulation 
of a 'desire for the other;’ an impossible horizon nevertheless structures our negotiations 
within the possible.  The general structure of this experience is often referred to by 
Derrida in terms of the (im)possibility of an event or messianic promise which, in always 
receding from finite experience, is said to be always futural and thus, 'to-come.'  Take for 
instance one of his earliest account of the logic of the futural event or 'to-come' in the 
                                               
44  WD, p.146 
45  RO, p.53; "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism." p. 83; Limited Inc., p.152 
46  Jacques Derrida, “Deconstruction and the Other: An Interview with Derrida.” Dialogues with  
Contemporary Thinkers. (Richard Kearney, Ed.) Manchester: Manchester UP, 1994.  P.118 
47 RO, p.XIV.  See also Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever. p.126 
48 WD, p.335, n.15.  Or as Derrida puts in another text: "The affirmation of the future to come: this is  
not a positive thesis.  It is nothing other than affirmation itself, the 'yes' insofar as it is the condition of 
all promises and of all hope, of all awaiting, of all performativity, of all opening toward the future, 
whatever it may be." Archive Fever, p.68 
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deconstruction of the concept of invention.49  Invention, Derrida argues in this text, 
"begins by being susceptible to repetition, exploitation, reinscription."50  The status of an 
invention or event qua event is only recognized by its re-insertion into a system or 
economy of conventions.  At the origin of every invention or event rests the violence of 
the inscription of the singular into the general since without such an insertion or 
inscription we would not be able to recognize or confer any status to the event at all.  In 
other words, the concept of event implies an inaugural instance which only receives its 
status in a system through which it can be recognized; excess always requires its insertion 
into an economy.51  All events thus have an aporetic and promissory structure; they 
cannot be determined in advance since they can only occur in the suspension of any 
determinate law and yet to have occurred they must be recuperated by a programme or 
laws and thus, are always susceptible to repetition and reinscription.52  In short, we can 
never be sure if the event occurred since the horizon through which it must pass in order 
to appear can never be made present.53   
 
 Thus, the event as Derrida describes it marks the irreducibility of the arrival of the 
other which can only occur via a passage through and disturbance of the same.54  The 
other cannot be incorporated in any de facto relation since it always exceeds any 
determinate relation, border or horizon.  Originary disjointure, repetition and the 
constant retroactivity of presence, means that a final justification or identification of the 
event and its consequent recognition is constantly deferred to an open future which never 
arrives as such.  The other is always 'to come' since the event of the other marks both the 
impossibility of closure of a horizon and the impossibility of anything coming to presence 
                                               
49 Jacques Derrida, "Psyche: Inventions of the Other.” Inventions of the Other. [Hereafter referred to as  
PSY].  Richard Beardsworth points to this essay as marking the beginning of a shift in Derrida's work 
towards the question of the event, the opening to the new, and a futural logic of otherness.  cf. "The 
Future of Critical Philosophy and World Politics." Derrida: Negotiating the Legacy. Pp.45-65.  See p.56 and 
also the 'Conclusion' to Derrida and the Political.  Geoffrey Bennington rejects Beardsworth's formulation 
of two distinct trajectories in Derrida’s oeuvre distinguished by a concern in the earlier work with an 
absolute past and the question of originary technicity and with an absolute future in the later work as a 
false and positivist dichotomy.  See Bennington's Interrupting Derrida. Pp.174-9. 
50  PSY, p.16 
51  One of Derrida's privileged exemplars of this logic is following poem by Francois Ponge titled "Fable":  
 "with the word with begins then this text, of which the first line says the truth." (Francois Ponge,  
 Proêmes. Paris: Gallimard, 1948 quoted in PSY, p.8.)  The phrase is contained in the first word of  
 the poem: 'with.'  However, only in its repetition does sense appear.  Repetition confirms that what is    
 new can appear, but this necessary repetition simultaneously destabilizes, undermines and 
contaminates the new.  On Derrida's reading of Ponge see also Marion Hobson, Opening Lines, p.184. 
52  PSY, p.16 
53  PSY, p.54 
54  PSY, p.11 
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on that horizon.   
 The argument being put forward here is that Derrida's account of the arrival of 
the other orients finite thought since, if our negotiation of the determinate is propelled 
by a desire or response to the other, then this response can only be performed by opening 
the determinate and closed to the other who is 'to-come.'  Furthermore, this 'ethics' which 
Derrida often describes in terms of 'hospitality' or 'welcoming' signals what we suggested is 
the collapse of description and affirmation, necessity and obligation.55  The 'promise' that 
the other is always to come forms a mode of relation between same and other which in 
Aporias is described as "impossible simultaneity;" a figure of arrival which, in arriving or 
appearing is no longer totally other.56   
 
 In Specters of Marx and elsewhere, Derrida famously thinks the futural logic of the 
event of opening the same to the other in terms of what he calls "the messianic without 
messianism."57   Derrida's use of the concept of messianicity functions to affirm a thinking 
of the event which is always-to-come, necessarily having no determinable or determinate 
content.  In thinking messianicity in this way, Derrida is able to put forward a mode of 
affirming the absolute contingency of the future-to-come.  The messianic appears in the 
opening of a horizon or border which it affirms can never be closed.58  As one theorist 
describes it, "[a]t issue is the move from a promise of the future that insists on the 'what' 
of the future, to the atheological, 'dry' promise that there is a future, before all else."59  
Messianicity functions as an affirmation of the refusal or impossibility of closing 
determinate horizons and yet, by emerging only from out of determinate relations, it 
marks what Bennington describes as an "infinitisation, which takes place each time 
finitely."60  Between the determinate and indeterminate, between necessity and 
injunction, the messianic is described by Derrida as simply "an 'it is necessary' for the 
future."61  Yet, if the irreducible messianic promise of the arrival of the other marks a 
desire for a non-violent relationality, violence is in fact irreducible and thus, the desire for 
                                               
55 See for instance Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality. Pp.147-9; "Hostipitality." Angelaki. Vol.5, No.3, (2000) 
p.14;  "A Word of Welcome." Adieu: To Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999. 
56  AP, p.65 
57  Jacques Derrida, Spectre of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International.  
London:  Routledge, 1994. [Hereafter referred to as SoM], p.59 
58  SoM, p.73 
59  Matthias Fritsch, The Promise of Memory.  P.60 
60  Geoffrey Bennington, Interrupting Derrida. P.16 
61  SoM, p.73 
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the other calls for calculation, strategy and convention.62  An ethics of negotiating an 
economy of violence requires choosing among injunctions and thus, of unjustifiable 
exclusions and determinations of the other.  It is to the question of the 'traversal' and 
oscillation between the unconditional and the finite, the other and the same to which we 
will now turn by briefly examining Derrida's accounts of responsibility and justice.  
 
Ethics and the Necessity of Violence 
 The conception of ethics as inescapably violent and thus sacrificial of the other is 
perhaps most explicit in Derrida's account of the Abrahamic sacrifice in The Gift of 
Death.63  In the third chapter of this text mainly addressed to Jan Patocka's ethics and his 
relation to Heidegger, Derrida opens a discussion of Abraham's response to God's 
demand to kill his son Isaac.  Abraham, in responding to the unconditional call or voice 
of the absolute other (which in this case is called God) who commands the sacrifice of his 
son, suspends the authority of the law ('though shall not kill').  As such, Abraham 
sacrifices the law for the other in the name of absolute responsibility and thus assumes 
the risks of the undecidable (the 'madness' or aporia of a decision between responding to 
the call of the other and the sacrifice of the particular other – Isaac) in the name of 
responsibility, that is, he assumes the risks of the undecidable and his commitment to a 
concrete decision.64  Thus, Abraham figures the aporia of every decision and every ethics 
such that he is both "the most responsible and the most irresponsible of men, absolutely 
irresponsible because he is absolutely responsible."65   
 
 Within an economy of violence, every genuine decision involves the sacrifice of 
the ethical, that is, the sacrifice of the other to the same.66  Every decision takes place, 
Derrida argues, by ignoring, excluding and in short, by sacrificing others:  
 
"I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another 
without sacrificing the other other, the other others.  Every other (one) is every (bit) other 
[tout autre est tout autre], everyone else is completely or wholly other."67   
                                               
62  See “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism.” p.83 
63  Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death (David Wills, Trans.) Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1995. [Hereafter 
referred to as GoD] 
64  Note the parallels in this account of the decision with that given in WD.  In both cases the absolute  
 contingency of the decision is only concealed and stabilized by positing an absolute guarantor which, in 
both cases, is figured by God.   
65  GoD, 72 
66  Hent de Vries, Religion and Violence.  P.159 
67  GoD, p.68 
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Any decision, any sacrifice of one for (an) other is absolutely unjustifiable and violent 
insofar as we think the ethical, as Derrida does, in Levinas' sense of a non-violent relation 
to the singularity of the other.  For there to be responsibility as such, it must be infinite, 
yet since we always find ourselves in finite and determinate relations with others, duty and 
responsibility are ultimately impossible.68  Even feeding one's cat, Derrida suggests, 
represents the sacrifice of all other cats in the world whom one does not feed.  Infinite 
responsibility to the singularity of the other therefore forms an impossible horizon which 
structures the demands of finite and thus unjustifiable decisions.69  Consequently, guilt 
and violence are inherent to responsibility since no response can ever accede to its 
unconditional form.  The unconditional cannot therefore be an ideal form against which 
acts are measured nor a telos towards which actions aim as Critchley for instance, seems 
to suggest.  To think unconditionality in this way is in fact to either make it totally 
conditional (and thus, to invoke a closure) or to attempt to maintain its transcendent 
status as Levinas does.  The unconditional cannot be made present but therefore, this 
implies that our acts are never satisfactory, that change and further action are both 
necessary and possible.  Contestation and negotiation find no resolution. 
 
 Derrida's account of the universalisation of violence and the consequent 
impossibility of fulfilling our absolute responsibility to the other corresponds to the broad 
genealogical thematic developed throughout this thesis insofar as the promise that "there 
is a future" is constituted from within the finite and yet, affirms its own violent status.70  
Nevertheless, if no decision transcends violence this does not mean that ethical decisions 
cannot be differentiated or that, as instances of failed responsibility or duty, they remain 
indistinguishable from one another.  There is always the possibility, as Hent de Vries 
argues, of the worst and the best.71  The suspension of a normative ground which in turn 
makes ethical decisions possible means that no decision can be guaranteed nor stabilized.  
Yet crucially, it is the desire for absolute responsibility to the singularity of the other and 
thus, for 'lesser violence' which prevents the condition of undecidability from licensing 
anything.  Thus, Laclau is partially correct to argue that from deconstruction no state of 
affairs necessarily follows since the impossibility of closure is a structural condition of all 
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experience.72  Yet he reiterates the error of conceiving the relation between the 
unconditional and the determinate as irreducible gap in arguing that, given the 
contingency which deconstruction brings to bear on the ethical, no outcome can be 
considered better or worse than another.73  Laclau's argument occludes that 
deconstruction, insofar as it results from (and is) an injunction and desire for the other, 
thus contests and undermines ethical decisions which claim a metaphysical ground or 
dogmatic truth since they veil their contingent and violent status.  Duty and necessity 
become indistinguishable here; closure is structurally impossible and yet, the possibility of 
openness 'ought' not to be prevented.  In denying the violence of our actions and 
concepts we deny what 'is,' the arrival of otherness.  Thus, an 'ethical' orientation appears 
in deconstruction in terms of a logic of the sacrifice of the other taking place in the 
between of the finite and the infinite or unconditional.     
 
 In the first part of 'The Force of Law,' prior to a close reading of Walter 
Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence' essay, Derrida rather schematically outlines the aporia 
of justice which, he argues, adhere to the "experience of aporia" as such.74  At stake in this 
account of justice and its relation to finite law is the ethical articulation of the negotiation 
of an economy of violence viewed as an oscillation between the inside and outside, of the 
(in)determinate nature of all relationality and, in Levinas' terms, between the same and 
the other.  Justice, says Derrida, is "infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to 
symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotopic."75  Law, as finite and conditional, is a 
"stabilizable and calculable apparatus, a system of regulated and coded prescriptions."76  
Accordingly, law is the sphere where the negotiation of determinate relations and thus, 
finite calculation is necessary.  "The law," says Derrida, "applies equally to all," and yet, 
"[e]ach case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique 
interpretation which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely."77  As 
such, the justice of every single legal decision is by definition impossible since, while law 
forms determinate horizons in the form of legal decisions, unconditional justice exceeds 
every horizon.   
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 There is a necessity of a traversal and oscillation between two poles; from the 
injunction or command of the unconditional to calculation in the finite.  In a by now 
familiar conceptual terrain, Derrida insists on the necessity and irreducibility of an 
experience of justice as impossible, since this experience of failure and inadequacy of any 
empirical law in relation to justice nevertheless allows or opens a space for a 
transformation of the empirical in the name of justice.78  As Derrida puts it, "infinite 
justice commands calculation."79  The 'ethical' takes place within the finite, but as its 
"infinitisation."80  Justice cannot transcend its inscription in the law since justice requires 
a decision.81  Yet justice, by being inscribed in a determinate law, marks a sacrifice of the 
singularity of the other to "a system of regulated and coded inscriptions" and thus, to a 
secondary violence.82  Justice, in order to be possible commands violence, strategy and 
tactics.  Insofar as justice cannot be made present in any particular decision, it remains 
always 'to-come.'83  Justice cannot be maintained as unconditional or transcendental since 
any empirical practice involves the construction of determinate "horizons" – both 
theoretical and practical.84  Our responsibility to the other 'is' violence and is realized 
violently; not only must a relation to the other qua other be violent, but the desire or 
opening to the other demands decision and thus, violence.85  
 
 In summary, if deconstruction assumes no transcendental position and is thus 
irreducibly violent and reductive, it nonetheless inhabits and figures a different order of 
violence.  It figures a violence that not only reduces or determines, but simultaneously 
opens to, rather than closing off, the other or outside.  In 'Violence and Metaphysics' 
Derrida refers to this other violence of deconstruction as a "violence against violence" and 
in Rogues goes further, to label it a "weak force" and a "force without power."86  But it is 
perhaps in "The Force of Law" that Derrida most clearly distinguishes two modes of 
violence through his reading of Walter Benjamin.  On the one hand, a mystical or 
messianic force of non-representational, excessive, hyperbolic force which undermines 
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every identity.  A violence without limits or determination which thus always marks the 
opening of horizons.  On the other hand, the 'mythical' violence of foundations grounded 
in the veiling of its own contingency, in the denial that "its ultimate foundation is 
unfounded."87  If Derrida's 'ethical' move is to affirm the messianic force which 
undermines identity, closure and determination which is mystical violence (and which 
mythical violence occludes), there is nevertheless a second affirmation; of the 
irreducibility of transcending mythical violence as such.  This notion of an irreducibility 
of violence, of two orders of violence, simultaneously distinguished yet inseparable – of 
opening and closing to the outside and motivated by a 'desire' for the outside – forms a 
key point of dialogue and difference with Foucault.  Before entering the agon of this 
dialogue it is to an account of Foucault's genealogical ethics to which we now turn. 
 
 
Foucault, the Same and the Other 
 In an otherwise perceptive account of the analogies between Derrida and 
Foucault, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak inadvertently signals a profound distinction 
between the two thinkers when she turns to the question of violence.  As Spivak admits, 
"I cannot find anywhere in Foucault the thought of a founding violence."88  Spivak is in 
fact correct to assume that absent from Foucault's oeuvre is an account of originary and 
secondary violence in Derrida's terms.  But by phrasing the question in this way she 
reveals the bias of a Derridean theoretical framework in her reading of Foucault.  Unlike 
Derrida, for Foucault there is no category distinction between an originary or messianic 
force of différance and the secondary violence of founding or legislating.  Between the 
irreducibility of power relations and the disjunction of knowledge from power formed by 
the will to truth there does not lie an absolute horizon which is then shown by the 
theorist to be always-already transgressed or fissured.  There is only an immanent plane of 
different organisations of relations between forces out of which transcendence is 
produced.  In this sense, if transcendence, the disjunction of truth from power, forms a 
different form or order of violence it is insofar as it forms a particular (historical) mode in 
which relations between forces are organised; one wherein the irreducibility of violence is 
disavowed. 
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 To search for, or decry the lack of an interrogation of 'founding violence' is to 
ascribe a (quasi)transcendental questioning to Foucault's work, when at the core of the 
latter's strategy is the attempt to think in terms of immanence.  However, if this is the 
case, how then is the irreducible economy of violence to be thought and negotiated?  Can 
Foucault too provide a legitimate notion of 'better or worse'?  In order to respond to this 
question we will begin by delineating the 'economy of violence' which can be found in 
Foucault's genealogical works and which places him in a dialogue with Derrida over the 
question of violence.  We will then turn to Foucault's genealogy of ethics in order to 
demonstrate that, like Derrida, Foucault also has a notion of 'better' and 'worse' by which 
power relations can be negotiated, which is also motivated by a 'desire for the other' or the 
outside.   
 
Foucault's Economy of Violence 
 In affirming the inherent contingency of power relations Foucault implicitly 
provides an analytic whereby power can be distinguished from domination.  This 
distinction is most clearly expressed in the late essay 'The Subject and Power.'89  Here 
Foucault draws a nominal distinction between 'violence' and 'power': "a relationship of 
violence acts upon the body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys, or it 
closes of all possibilities."90  Since power is positive it forms subjective possibilities and 
capacities while violence, a purely negative force, closes them off.  For example, when 
Foucault says that "a system of constraints becomes truly intolerable when the individuals 
who are affected by it don't have the means of modifying it" or "[w]here the determining 
conditions saturate the whole there is no relation of power," he differentiates power 
relations as strategic relations in a field of possibilities from domination as the ossification 
of a given order or more ominously, as the violent attempt to eliminate possibility 
altogether.91  Foucault's analyses thus always move within these poles: of limits as limiting 
and limits as constituting possibility.92  Limits both regulate thought and action and make 
it possible.  The analyses of power/knowledge hover in these grey regions between 
possibility and limits.  On the one hand, a power which forms possibilities while, on the 
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other hand, a power that denotes a contraction of the limits of the possible.  This 
'economy' provides in some sense a diagnostic tool to evaluate particular 
power/knowledge regimes.   
 
 A number of theorists have suggested that a radical agonistic politics arises from 
Foucault's economy of power relations which would be grounded in what William 
Connolly has described as the constant pursuit to "find space for the other to live and 
speak," or as Leslie Paul Thiele puts it: "it is the enhancement of struggle – not its mere 
production or exacerbation – [that] must form the criterion of political judgment."93  
These theorists suggest the emergence of an ethico-political project which would be 
grounded in the maintenance of a political sphere which contests any claims to necessity 
in order to engender certain conditions of freedom in relation to the regimes in which 
our subjectivity is constituted by what Connolly calls an "agonopluralistic ethic."94   Yet 
these articulations of a Foucaultian political ethics are limited insofar as they do not 
pursue a series of crucial questions which emerge when Foucault’s genealogy is brought 
into dialogue with deconstructionist ethics.  That is to say, from where would such a 
political ethics derive what Derrida calls 'motivational force'?95   
 
A crucial distinction between Derrida's quasi-transcendental ethics of the other 
and Foucault's own genealogy of ethics opens up with this question.  In stark contrast to 
Derrida, it is the absence of a constitutive responsibility or relation to the other which has 
been perhaps the most common critique of Foucault's ethics.96  Judith Butler, for 
instance, argues that Foucault generally occludes the fact that his own questions are 
motivated by a "desire to recognize another or be recognized by one."97  It is in the desire 
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to confer or receive recognition from the other which Butler, in a decidedly Hegelian 
logic, argues that the conditions determining relationality come into question.98    Thus, 
without an account of the desire for recognition the argument follows, Foucault is unable 
to address the constitutive ethical force of his own genealogies.  More notoriously, in her 
paradigm-forming essay 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak criticizes 
Deleuze and Foucault for what she sees as their abandonment of the question of the 
domination of the 'subaltern' or third-world subject, characteristic of the Western 
intellectual.  In their refusal of ascribing to the intellectual the role of representing the 
interests of the oppressed subject and concordant desire to 'let the other speak,' Deleuze 
and Foucault, she claims, valorize the oppressed subject.  Both are caught in what is for 
Spivak the dangerous and violent invention of an oppressed subject who can know and 
speak its conditions.99  Consequently, she argues that the anti-representational role which 
Deleuze and Foucault ascribe to the intellectual in an interview they held together fails to 
situate the dominant Western intellectual in relation to the third-world subject and thus, 
neglects to address its economic and social exploitation.100  Since they do not question 
their relation to the radical heterogeneity of the 'subaltern' subject it follows for Spivak 
that Deleuze and Foucault maintain an essentialist notion of the pure presence of a 
subject capable of representing itself.101  Spivak famously favorably contrasts Derrida's 
deconstruction of Eurocentrism as an opening of the Western, first-world 'same' to the 
third-world oppressed other to what she sees as Deleuze and Foucault's implicit occlusion 
and reduction of the heterogeneity of the exploited subject. 
 
 Butler's and Spivak's critiques of Foucault are legitimate to a limited extent, for 
there is no explicit interrogation in his work, the ethics above all, of the possibility of 
knowledge or recognition of the other.  However, their legitimacy resides in conceiving 
the relation between same and other (quasi)transcendentally; a move which, as we have 
seen, Foucault's own notion of immanence places in question.  'Can the subaltern speak?' 
or 'can I receive recognition from the other?' are transcendental questions which 
                                               
98  Ibid.  See also Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France.  New York: Columbia  
 UP, 1999. 
99  Gayatri Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" P.273-4 
100  The interview to which Spivak refers is "Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation Between Michel  
   Foucault and Gilles Deleuze." Language, Counter-Memory and Practice. (Donald F. Bouchard, Ed.)   
   Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977. Pp.-205-17  
101  Ibid.  p.276 
  
165 
Foucault's ontology of power relations attempts to displace.102  For Foucault, posing the 
question of otherness in these terms reduces the medium of differentiation away from 
discursive and positive differences to transcendental philosophical questions.  How then 
would a Foucaultian 'ontology of immanence' which ostensibly occludes the question of 
the other find 'motivational force?'  What type of account can an approach which refuses 
the 'question of the other' offer of the relation between same and other?  Is there a 
fundamental absence of the question of otherness in Foucault's account of ethics?  It is in 
now turning to Foucault’s late works on the genealogy of ethics that I seek to respond to 
these questions. 
 
Care of the Self and Knowledge of the Self 
 Just as Foucault's genealogies of modern power-knowledge apparatuses work to 
displace and undermine the universal status of political concepts such as sovereignty to 
reveal the micro-powers through which social order is formed, the genealogy of ethics 
displaces morality as a quasi-juridical system of laws and prescriptions blinded by the 
juridical question of 'what ought I to do?'  Foucault shows that anterior to this 
articulation of the moral question lie a multiplicity of different historical 
problematizations to which ethical practices respond.  The traditional juridical 
articulation of ethics obstructs the fact that while given sets of moral rules or codes 
remain relatively stable across time and space, ethical practices are highly volatile, unstable 
and specific.  A historical analysis of codes inevitably repeatedly returns to the same series 
of obligations and so, Foucault argues, "only shows the poverty and monotony of 
interdictions."103  Differentiation emerges not upon the terrain of a history of moral 
obligations, but upon a history of moral conduct, or what Foucault calls 'subjectivation.'  
Foucault's focus on ethical practices thus displaces the transcendental question of 'can the 
other speak?' or 'can I be recognized by the other?' by the analysis of the techniques by 
which we become subjects of our own actions.104  In turn, there emerges, as we will see 
below, an economy of violence or power in his work. 
 
 What is the specificity Foucault finds in Ancient ethics?  How might they suggest a 
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'lesser violence' which might function as a point of orientation in an economy of violence?   
The answer to these questions only emerges once we bring Ancient ethics into dialogue 
with the contemporary forms of power and domination described by Foucault.  His 
genealogies of the power/knowledge apparatuses of disciplinary and bio-power delineate 
the way in which the increase of subjective capacities and creativity is developed through 
the intensification of power relations.105  This form of control, originating with Christian 
ethics of self-renouncement and developing up to contemporary neo-liberalism, is 
characterized by a quasi-juridical mode of subjectivation whereby the demand for constant 
self-examination and self-transformation operates in relation to the demands of the law.  
This structure not only persists, but as Foucault’s genealogies of discipline and bio-power 
show, is intensified once the religious context disappears.  Therefore, the genealogy of 
ethics is vital to Foucault’s project since it formulates a distinction between moralities 
grounded in a rigid systematicity and Greek and Roman ethical practices which function 
in terms of dynamic relations between the subject, his actions and pleasures and moral 
rules.106  The genealogy of Ancient ethics not only form one example of the contingent 
problematizations around which thought and action revolve, but uncover an ethics which 
problematizes the self's capacity to direct or master itself.   
 
 This fundamental distinction between juridical and active ethics is ultimately 
defined by Foucault as two broad modes of conceiving the subject's relation to truth.  In 
his 1982 lectures at the Collège de France and elsewhere this dichotomy is formulated in 
terms of the Athenian distinction between 'care of the self' and 'knowledge of the self.'  
Here the distinction lies between an ethics of transcendence which has dominated 
Western thought from Christianity to modernity and an earlier notion of ethics grounded 
in the necessity of a subjective self-transformation.107  These two ethical trajectories make 
up what in the 1984 course Foucault will describe as two modes of ‘ethical 
differentiation’: a metaphysical experience of the world which seeks access to a ‘true’ 
transcendent other world (“autre monde”) in contrast to a historico-critical experience of 
life which seeks to transform both the world and the self in name of truth (“monde 
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autre”).108      
  
Care of the self (epimeleia heautou in Greek and cara sui in Latin) had, Foucault 
argues, held in Greece and Rome a precedence over the knowledge of oneself (gnothi 
seauton).  A transformative care of the self had been a precondition for philosophical 
access to truth.  Thus, for the Greeks and Romans there could be no truth without a 
“conversion”of oneself since, as Foucault puts it, "for the subject to have the right access 
to the truth, he must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become to some extent and 
up to a certain point, other than himself."109  For the Ancients, access to truth is 
inseparable from askesis.  The role of knowledge is limited to assisting the subject to form 
his ethical being and is thus secondary to the care the subject takes in relation to itself.  
The Greeks and Romans problematized ethics as a relation to the excess of bodily 
pleasures and forces, logos was only instrumental to the ultimate goal of self-mastery or 
self-conversion.  Ethical practices were not grounded upon a universal subject of 
knowledge capable of objective knowledge of, and obedience to a law and therefore, the 
subject of knowledge is itself never an object of knowledge.110  Rather, the question of the 
subject always appears as a question of its relations to the world and to its ethical 
substance.111  As such, the Ancients established a circular conception of truth: "to have 
access to the truth is to have access to being itself, access which is such that the being to 
which one has access will, at the same time and as an after-effect, be the agent of 
transformation of the one who has access to it."112   
 
 The priority of care over knowledge which begins with the Greeks and continues 
up to early Christianity undergoes a gradual separation from its relation to spirituality and 
philosophy.  Christian ethical practices appropriate the notion of the care of the self yet in 
this later problematization, the subject emerges as a detached and universal subject of 
knowledge.  Interiority becomes for Christianity an object of knowledge in terms of a 
question of nature and origin.  Man begins to interpret the forces giving birth to his 
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thoughts; he begins differentiating experiences as originating either from God or Satan.113  
This practice of mining the interiority of the subject by an examination of consciousness 
through a technology of confession eventually develops into a care of the self by the other 
in terms of disciplinary and bio-power.114  In effect, the problematization of the relation to 
oneself is transformed into a problematization of the formation and disciplining of the 
other.   
 
 Foucault returns to Descartes' Meditations for the first time since the debate with 
Derrida to define the text as the decisive moment of this historical transformation 
between care and knowledge.  As a 'meditation' the text demands an askesis or 
transformation so that the subject is capable to access truth and yet is simultaneously 
defined by a non-spiritual form of subjectivity.  The subject with the 'right' to truth is 
identified through the exclusion of the care of the self since only a correct method is 
required to attain knowledge or truth.115  Accordingly, Descartes forms a definitive 
juncture between ancient and modern since he produces a relation between the subject 
and truth without the necessity of a prior conversion.  After Descartes truth is no longer 
thought in terms of power, contest, deliverance or conversion but in terms of adequation 
between idea and object.116  Kant's status for Foucault is in this sense that of a supplement 
to or elaboration of the Cartesian determination of the subject.  With Kant the question 
of the subject shifts from the Cartesian guarantee of truth in God to an analysis of man's 
faculties of representation.117  The place of Descartes and Kant is thus crucial to 
Foucault's analysis since they mark a decisive turning point in the de-spiritualisation of 
the subject's relation to truth.  A relation between ethics and knowledge emerges with 
them which finally effaces the Ancient experience defined by immanence and so not 
sustained by transcendental principles but through what Paul Rabinow calls a "continual 
self-bricolage" whereby subjectivity is not tied to a norm or law.118  Ethics for the Ancients 
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was an order of life immanent to, and not external to life.119   
 
 The distinction Foucault draws between ethics based in care and knowledge of the 
self returns us to the question of the incommensurable difference between Derrida and 
Foucault which formed the terms of their engagement in the 'cogito debate.'  As we saw 
above, ethics for Derrida revolves around the contamination and irreducibility of 
unconditional or transcendental demands and their impossibility or failure in their 
empirical or finite inscription.  The 'medium' of differentiation', the relation between the 
same and the other occurs for Derrida at the level of the irreducibility of the 
transcendental demand of and for the other.  The implicit contrast with Foucault's ethics 
almost precisely parallels Foucault's explicit critique of Derrida in 'My Body, This Paper, 
This Fire.'  That is, for Foucault, thinking the ethical involves looking to the multiplicity 
of discourses and practices which qualify particular forms of ethical subject in particular 
historical times and places.  From the Foucaultian perspective, Derrida reduces ethics to 
the quasi-juridical question of the possibility of a universal or unconditional law and thus, 
conceals the 'true' medium of differentiation: the historical practices by which the subject 
identifies with a particular morality.  Differentiation occurs as the manifestation of 
differing modes of power's relation to truth.  On the other hand, from the deconstructive 
perspective, Foucault appears to occlude the very founding question of ethics: of 
responsibility and recognition of the other. 
 
 Before turning more closely to the question of the incommensurability of 
Derrida's and Foucault's ethics, one crucial question regarding Foucault's genealogy of 
ancient ethics remains; can his genealogy of ethics suggest a way in which power relations 
can be negotiated?  How, in comparison to Derrida's ethics can it offer an orientation or 
principle of evaluation from within the irreducibility of violence?  Given Foucault's refusal 
of transcendental questions, unlike Derrida, this orientation will not arise against the 
relief of an impossible horizon of non-violence.  Rather, the 'better' and the 'worse' are 
contrasted by relating regimes to the genealogical question of their particular capacity to 
affirm the indissociability between knowledge and power.  The capacity or incapacity to 
affirm the positivity of knowledge and power does not limit our ethical 'compass' to 
existential questions or affirmations.  Rather, it brings into perspective material 
                                               
119  Frederic Gros, “Course Context.” HH, p.532 
  
170 
dominations and thus, lies at the core of the distinction we set at the outset: between 
power and domination.  This distinction is brought into stark relief in the history of the 
shift from the centrality of care to knowledge traced by Foucault. 
  
Foucault argues that while the ancient notion of care of the self is grounded in a 
relation to truth in terms of askesis or ethos, the philosophical prioritisation of knowledge 
of the self reverses the relation: in modernity truth demands that the subject become 
other.  This reversal of the primacy between care and truth embodied in the cogito would 
have a massive effect on the nature of modern relationality.  Once subjectivation is 
sustained by transcendental principles rather than local and effective truths, subjectivity 
becomes tied to a prior norm, rule or law.  Consequently, the function of care shifts from 
a relation which one forms with oneself to a relation to a given institution or individual.  
In this sense, in modernity power "begins to take care of its subjects."120  Government is 
legitimated by its capacity to care for others.121  Care becomes associated with 
normalization; morality is conflated with philosophical anthropology so that one must 
relate experience and choices to a given problematic object (sexuality, madness, 
criminality, entrepreneur) to which an expert has better access than the self so that 
thought and action are governed by their relation to what is considered 'normal.'122  Any 
dissonance from the norm is thought to be the result of ignorance, moral weakness, 
biological defect or perversion and calls for further 'care.'  Norms function as principles 
for differentiating, evaluating and recognizing individuals and thus, increased subjective 
capacities are no longer tied to a practice of freedom, the formation of a relation to the 
outside, but rather, an intensification of power relations.123  In modern power 
apparatuses, the relation between inside and outside is mediated by the other and by a 
subjugation to universalising demands.   
 
This contrast between the primacy of care and knowledge illuminates the link 
between Foucault's earlier and later genealogies.  The genealogies of disciplinary and bio-
power reveal the relation to oneself in modernity to be wholly integrated into moral and 
political systems.  The poles of a 'better or worse' violence emerge on the basis of a care of 
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the self or care by the other which in turn lie in two divergent conceptions of truth as 
either effective or as transcendent.  It is therefore, in terms of something like a 'desire' for 
the outside which might describe Foucault's privileging of the ancients since for them, 
this determination of the relation between inside and outside is absent. 
  
Ethics as Counter-Discourse 
 Foucault's most explicit and extensive production of a genealogy of ethics which 
could function as a counter-discourse to contemporary forms of normalizing power is to 
be found in his last two books; The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self.  Underlying the 
structure of both of these books is the construct of a four-part grid through which Greek, 
Hellenistic and Roman ethical practices are analyzed.  In taking up this grid we can 
further distinguish or mark the singularity of ancient ethics in contrast to modern power 
and in particular, on the way the Ancients problematized what we call 'sexuality' in the 
formation of an ethical subject.124  As such, by constructing an explicit contrast of the 
relation to the self in Ancient Greece and Rome with the early Christian and modern 
confessional experiences of the self, as we will see below, a clear evaluative analytic of 
negotiating power relations emerges, that is, of a formulation of better or worse 
violence.125  Two broad modes of subjective experience are defined here through the 
ethical experience of 'sexuality' and it is to a closer analysis of their differences to which 
we now turn.    
 
 First, the substance of ethics or the material of moral conduct in the confessional 
apparatus described in The History of Sexuality is formed when subjective interiority is 
posited as an object of knowledge which is used to explain or regulate actions.  Similarly, 
for the early Christians, the body is imbued with a sense of corruption and sin.126  Yet 
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such a conception is nonexistent in Ancient thought.127  Absent in Greek and Roman 
thought was any objectification of a prior interiority to be overcome or discovered.  Both 
Greek and Roman ethics were grounded in an ontology of strength whose concern was 
the avoidance of excess.128  Ethics revolved around questions of the use or excessive force 
of, pleasures and their attendant dangers and necessary modifications.   
 
 Secondly, for the early Christians the ethical 'mode of subjection' – the way a 
relation to obligation or moral rules through which one recognizes oneself as a moral 
subject is established – consisted quite simply in a submission to universal law.129  
Analogously, in modern bio-power one's relation to a norm determines one's place in a 
table or hierarchy via medical, legal and psychological discourses and technologies.  By 
contrast, for the Ancients subjection was governed by need (itself governed by 
moderation), time (governed by circumstance, often in relation to a calendar or age) and 
status (governed by one’s position in relation to others).  There was no “table of 
forbidden” acts and instead, practices were guided by a question of the aesthetics of 
existence or what Foucault sometimes calls an ‘art of living.’130   
 
 Third, in early Christianity the form of ‘ethical elaboration’ – the technology or 
ascetics through which the subject is transformed – is defined by what Foucault calls 
"decipherment of the soul and a purificatory hermeneutics of desires."131  The modern 
confessional apparatus inherits Christian hermeneutics of interiority whereby ascetics 
consists primarily of confession and either penance (for Christians) or therapy (for 
moderns).  Both Christian and modern secular ethics are grounded in the demand that 
the subject speak the truth of him or herself to the other and to have this truth re-
interpreted and situated in relation to a law or norm.  As such, ethical practices are 
grounded in self-renunciation and decipherment.  For the Greeks the use of knowledge 
was guided by a reasoned measuring and control of the self in relation to one's conduct in 
order to find a centre of moderation or balance in relation to one's pleasures.132  This 
conduct is characterized by Foucault as a "domination" over the self.133  The Hellenists 
                                               
127  UP, p.11 
128  UP, p.4 
129  UP, p.27, CS, p.239 
130  Timothy O’Leary. Foucault and the Art of Ethics. London: Continuum, 2006. P.42, UP, p.106  
131  CS, p.239 
132  UP, p.86 
133  UP, p.68, 69 
  
173 
and Romans differed from the Ancient Greeks insofar as they were increasingly 
concerned with the dangers involved with the excess of pleasures and thus, placed a 
greater emphasis on asceticism; that is, on practices of abstinence and self-scrutiny and 
accordingly, an increased importance on self-knowledge and the practices of self-
examination.134  Concomitantly, they held a greater angst and attention to the relation 
between sexual act and body, an increased valorisation of the marriage bond as a universal 
form of mutuality, and an increased sense that the love of boys was problematic.135   
 
 Finally, the telos of ethical practice in early Christianity is characterized by the 
desire for self-renunciation.136  The telos of the later confessional apparatus is the 
production of a 'normal' and productive citizen which does not disturb order and who is 
produced through an emancipation of one's 'true' self.  Conversely, despite their 
differences, there is a central continuity running through Ancient Greece and Rome 
insofar as they shared an agonistic conception of the relation to the self grounded in a 
notion of an art of living that did not necessarily draw a distinction between aesthetic and 
ethical criteria.  The Greeks sought a 'mastery of the self;' a freedom in relation to the 
pleasures which would be defined by a capacity for moderation.137  Mastery of the self was 
a condition for the mastery of others such that the capacity to care for oneself was a 
precondition of political life.138  For the Hellenists and Romans the end of ethics was a 
"conversion of the self."139  They sought to produce a form of self-control which was no 
longer the Greek model of a triumph over pleasures but a juridical mode of self-control 
whereby the self would become an object of pleasure.140  Consequently, they increasingly 
regarded the body and soul with suspicion and thus, accorded an increased polarisation 
between the love of boys and marriage.   
 
 Given the contrast between Ancient, Christian and modern ethics constructed 
here, it should be apparent that the significance of Ancient ethics for Foucault does not 
lie in what number of his critics perceive to be a celebration of highly individualistic 
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modes of practicing freedom.141  Liberal critics of Foucault often argue that if power is 
omnipresent, then resistance to power cannot be preserved in Foucault's account.142  
Foucault's error in the eyes of his critics lies in failing to provide a foundation or space for 
resistance or a ground for the critique of power.  Accordingly, the turn to ethics in 
Foucault's late work is viewed as an implicit admission of the absence of a concept of 
agency in the genealogy of power/knowledge while the ethics is also dismissed as a hyper-
astheticizing displacement of normativity.143  Foucault's ethics are said to be caught in a 
relativism which can offer no perspective from which any order can be judged or resisted 
since they are grounded in the attempt to recover a heroic and rare vanguardist mode of 
self-transformation.144  These interpretations all relate the genealogy of ethics to what is 
assumed to be a normative status or ground for Greek and Roman ethics in relation to 
Foucault's oeuvre.  This of course, is the very move that Foucault, in attempting to 
displace transcendental grounds by proceeding immanently, seeks to avoid.  In now 
turning in further detail to the ‘principle of evaluation’ which results from such a refusal 
of normativity I seek to show the way in which these critics are misguided. 
 
Ethics and Immanence 
 Rather than assigning a transcendental or normative status to ancient ethics, 
Foucault's genealogy of ethics functions as a counter-discourse which reveals the 
possibility of a different limit between inside and outside, a relation to excess wherein 
practices are not submitted to universalising rules – a "morality with no claim to 
universality" as Paul Veyne has put it.145  The ancients did not possess a 'hermeneutics of 
desire' which asks what actions mean, but rather an immanent ethical discourse which 
focuses upon what it does and what its effects are.  Truth had not been separated from 
power, but rather, was seen to be 'effective.'  The Greeks and Romans did not posit a 
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subjective interiority which could then be codified and used to explain and regulate 
actions.  Instead, actions were given value and related to other practices.  Without first 
positing a general, universal and transcendent good, there were only local, positive and 
specific valuations.  'Norms' in this sense were immanent to practices since the stylistic 
criteria upon which they were based excluded the necessity of universal moral law 
grounded in the supposed ethical substance of the subject.   
 
 Conceiving ethics at the level of practices as the Ancients did, affirmed for 
Foucault a potential which he had attempted to think throughout his oeuvre: a folding of 
the outside not subjected to transcendence, representation or universal structures and 
thus, not governed by an authority.146  The Ancients affirmed for Foucault a pole of lesser 
violence in power relations since they marked the possibility of a relation to the outside 
which does not rely on the modern notion of a subject which "separates itself from what it 
is not and takes responsibility for itself" which Foucault had begun to attempt to displace 
in The Order of Things.147  The Greek and Roman fold is not subjected to transcendence 
since it is not governed by a conception of the outside which thought re-presents and 
organizes. 
 
Foucault's Ethics, The Same and the Other 
 Therefore, much as Derrida does, Foucault's genealogy of ethics reveal a 
conception of  'lesser violence' which functions to orient thought within an economy of 
power relations while disabusing it of the possibility of a normative ground.  While ethics, 
as Foucault conceives it, does not provide the genealogist with a position beyond the 
perspectival logic that may seem to confine thought to relativism, it does provide a means 
by which power relations can be negotiated.  Moreover, like Derrida, the force of this 
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orientation arises from a 'desire for the outside' in Foucault's work insofar as the recovery 
of Ancient ethical practices signals the possibility of a relation to the outside or otherness 
which would not be subjected either to submission to a logic of representation nor the 
truth of an authority but remain immanent to singular and particular values and goals.  
Ethics would be grounded not in the desire to have access to truth but rather, would 
function to transform the self and the world.148  In this sense, Ancient ethics affirm the 
positivity of power and its indissociable relation to truth.  Furthermore, this Ancient 
problematization reveals the possibility of a refusal of the will to truth's domination and 
determination of the formation of the limit between inside and outside and the logic of 
identity which attends it and which is constituted and supported through carceral and 
bio-political institutions.   
 
 A further striking parallel with Derrida arises here.  For Foucault's contrasting of 
the will to truth inherent to modern disciplinary and bio-power with the Ancients' 
affirmation of the positivity of power blurs the traditional distinction between 'is' and 
'ought'.  No system of ethics, not even that of the Greeks which Foucault implicitly favors, 
is given a transcendent status; their rules do not hold a juridical force over Foucault's 
oeuvre.  On the other hand, ancient ethics are positively affirmed by Foucault since they 
are not governed by the metaphysical denial of the indissociability of power and truth.  
The distinction between description and affirmation collapses here in the articulation of 
a genealogical ethics of amor fati.  The histories which Foucault describes are affirmed as 
opening thought to the play of forces yet it is the Greeks and Romans in particular which 
present the possibility of a social order revolving around this affirmation of positivity.  
Thus an immanent series emerges here: the strategy of immanence which circumvents 
metaphysical questions by attempting to think in terms of the problems through which 
they arise in turn affirms a particular problematization of ethics itself defined by 
immanence insofar as it does not seek to base its truths in some transcendent good. 
 
 Yet, a further question of the status or place of the other persists in Foucault's 
particular construction of a genealogical ethics which is both a refusal of transcendence 
and forms a particular orientation to negotiate the immanent field of power relations.  
Moreover, the question appears against the background of Derrida's ethics.  For while 
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Derrida refuses the possibility of a transcendent ground or position of non-violence, he 
nevertheless suggests that an 'economy of lesser violence' is only possible against the 
background of an (im)possible horizon or messianic promise of non-violence.  As Derrida 
puts it,  
"a certain force and violence is irreducible, but none the less this violence can only be 
practiced and can only appear as such on the basis of a non-violence, a vulnerability, an 
exposition.  I do not believe in non-violence as a descriptive and determinable experience, 
but rather as an irreducible promise and of the relation to the other as essentially non-
instrumental."149   
 
An ethics of lesser violence is thus possible Derrida argues, on the basis of an irreducible 
promise and desire for, a relation to the other qua other, a relation without 
determination.  In contrast, Foucault's articulation of ethics as a relation or work upon 
the self seems to disqualify, as Butler and Spivak suggest, any constitutive questions of 
moral responsibility for the other.  Around the question of responsibility or recognition 
of the other arises the common critique leveled against Foucault: that he reverses the 
centre of ethics.   
 
 Accordingly, Foucault appears to move in direct opposition to the heteronomy at 
the centre of Derrida's ethics.  Moreover, Foucault notoriously seems to support this view 
in a late interview; "care for others" he says, "should not be put before care of oneself.  
The care of the self is ethically prior in that the relationship with oneself is ontologically 
prior."150  On the one hand, Foucault's rationale in making such an affirmation is quite 
clear.  The ethics of a practice of freedom which forms a particular relation to the outside 
denotes what he sometimes calls a 'mastery' or 'discipline' of the self which is, as we saw, 
in contrast to a domination of the self by the other.  Nevertheless, if the analytic of an 
ethics grounded in the relation one has to oneself is expanded to an analytic of relations 
to others, it will necessarily inhere to the agonistic logic of power relations.  To expand or 
share the space of freedom with others is by definition to enter into a relation constituted 
by power and thus a strategic relation always constituted in advance.  In this sense a 
methodological continuity runs between the genealogies of power/knowledge and of 
ethics.   
 
 For instance, like disciplinary practices, technologies of the self too are techniques 
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which the subject operates upon itself.  Dietary and sexual practices, physical exercises, 
letter writing and oral disclosures of the self all consisted in Antiquity as forms of tekhne 
or work which individuals would carry out upon themselves with the aim of becoming a 
particular type of subject.  Ethics, the process of working upon the self is, one could 
claim, analogous to the process of domination described in Discipline and Punish – a 
domination exerted upon the self analogous to the process of dressage Foucault uses to 
describe the disciplining of the docile body in his history of the carceral apparatus.151  In 
this sense, to expand ethical practice beyond the subject’s relation to himself is to 
constitute a relationship that is not ethical, but rather one characterized by domination; 
by a control and conditioning of the other.  Disciplinary techniques, when performed by 
the self upon the self according to a loosely defined moral code, constitute a sphere of 
agency.  When such techniques are exercised by a subject over others, they constitute a 
relation of power; the contraction of possibility.  It is assumingly for this reason that 
Foucault argues that the relation of government or care of the self “defines the relation of 
power over the self independently of any statutory correlation and any exercise of power 
over others.”   
 
 As we suggested above, the absence of a constitutive status for the desire for 
responsibility or recognition has left many of Foucault's readers arguing that what his 
work lacks is an account of ethical alterity which would give it motivational force.  From 
the Derridean perspective there is a fundamental metaphysical error in Foucault's 
genealogy of ethics since it appears to be grounded in the autonomy of the subject.  As 
such, Foucault's 'subject' appears as an attempt to suture or draw a closure around an 
aestheticized subjective identity in order to oppose it to what Foucault sees as a 
domination by the other which characterizes modern relationality.  In questioning the 
status of the other in Foucault's oeuvre, Spivak, Butler et. al., regardless of their relation 
to a deconstructionist paradigm, nevertheless put to Foucault a typically deconstructionist 
question.  For from the deconstructive perspective (though not exclusively) there is an 
absence of questioning and confrontation of the conditions for a relation to the other as 
other in Foucault's genealogy.  The de jure opening of the inside or the same to an 
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unmasterable excess or otherness is neither questioned nor accounted for and thus 
implies, as Spivak argues, that a determination and closure of and to the other is inherent 
to Foucault's work.  In other words, that ironically, what Foucault's genealogy of ethics 
lacks is an ethics; a conception of recognition and responsibility to otherness.    
 
 Still, these critiques of Foucault are legitimate only insofar as we privilege a quasi-
transcendental account of originary violence (as for instance, Spivak does) and 
accordingly, veil the immanent account that arises in Foucault's genealogy.  One 
particular strategy of thinking the 'medium of differentiation' necessarily excludes the 
other.  Therefore, what these critiques obscure is that at stake here are two competing 
'grander narratives' and the ethics of amor fati which arise from them.  The appearance of 
otherness in Foucault's work occurs in a way which is radically incommensurable to 
Derrida's.  For from Foucault's strategy of immanence, otherness is not conceived as an 
"oppositional" difference which lies outside the horizons of the same.152  From the 
Foucaultian perspective, Derrida’s project always begins from the twin and opposed poles 
of same and other.  That is, for deconstruction the arrival of the other 'takes place' 
between two conflicting elements; the empirical and transcendental, general and singular, 
same and other, law and justice which deconstruction can then go on to show cannot be 
indefinitely united nor separated.  Ethics always begins for Derrida in the recognition that 
no universal or unconditional ethical concepts can be located beyond their particular and 
determinate articulations.  In contrast, Foucault attempts to leave absolutely no space for 
a transcendental horizon defining the border between the same and the other.153  In 
Foucault's account, the conditions of any relation are, as we have seen, in constant 
transformation and immanent to their elements.  Accordingly, Foucault does not locate 
otherness as transcendent to or in excess of the empirical since for him singularity and 
otherness always already defines the present.154  In his book on Foucault, Deleuze aptly 
refers to Nietzsche's dictum of "the iron hand of necessity throwing the dice of chance" to 
describe the way in which power relations ceaselessly produce difference from out of 
positive, but never stable sets of varying relations between discourses, rules, practices, 
institutions, spaces and bodies.155  Otherness appears in the constant play of differences 
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between chance [the outside] and necessity [the determinate inside].156 
 
 Therefore, Foucault's account of otherness is distinguished by the fact that he does 
not proceed by attempting to determine the formal structure of a given concept, but 
rather, to determine its place in a particular field of relations and the transformations it 
undergoes.  He therefore posits no (im)possible movement of transcendence but rather, 
an irreducible instability in the play of difference is accounted for by the system of forces 
itself.  The event or arrival of otherness is not thought in terms of (quasi)transcendence 
but is instead theorized as immanent to the system in which it appears.  No radical 
interruption is theorized nor is one necessary since Foucault's genealogy shows the ways in 
which any system or field is in constant mutation and reconfiguration.  Otherness 
appears from within a system; the same is always already other.  As Pierre Macherey puts 
it, 
 
 “[i]t is as though the subject were the same of the other – the being, on the contrary, 
dialectically, the other of the same – that is, this ‘identity’ without substance, which has no 
other thickness, no other materiality, than that of a difference or a limit.”157 
 
Otherness appears at the inside of the outside (at the limit of the inside – much like for 
Derrida).  Yet for Foucault, Macherey continues, this limit is not,  
 
“between two independent orders, for example, between a world of exteriority, where there is 
the other, and a world of interiority where there is only the same.  But it is a question of that 
limit which, in every order, in every normed system, reveals a margin (a certain possibility of 
refolding) in it and not outside it.”158 
 
 Foucault thinks a different relation to the other than the one commonly conceived in 
contemporary theory; his is an alterity without any mediation or opposition.   
 
 
The Same and Other Between Derrida and Foucault 
 We are now at a point at which we might return to our fundamental question 
which first emerged in our discussion of the 'cogito debate': how can we think the 
difference between Derrida and Foucault?  In the discussion of Derrida's 'Cogito and the 
History of Madness' and Foucault's 'My Body, This Paper, This Fire' in chapter 2, I 
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suggested that these two thinkers posit two incommensurable 'media of differentiation' 
from which they attempt to think difference and the violence of relationality.  This 
fundamental difference has re-emerged in various ways throughout our analysis.  From 
the disruption of the empirico-transcendental double to the thought of the outside, the 
dislocation of the question of ground, and finally to the ethical question of the relation 
between same and other, what has continuously reappeared throughout this thesis is that 
the respective ways in which each of these two thinkers conceive this medium (or more 
aptly; media) in terms of a 'formal structure of transcendence' or immanence, is 
necessarily exclusive of the other.  As such, in this section I want to argue that this 
apparently inescapable exclusion points to a realm of relationality and violence which 
emerges between them and yet which cannot be reduced to either thinker's account of 
relational violence.  By approaching the question of the incommensurability of Derrida 
and Foucault's accounts what appears is an ethico-political violence which exceeds both of 
their accounts and thus, points to the very violence of attempting to think an ethics of an 
'economy of violence.'  An excess emerges between Derrida and Foucault that by 
definition eludes their own accounts.  This excessive and irreducible violence marks the 
limit and the conditions of forming a mode of questioning and an ethics which affirms its 
own situatedness, particularity or finitude and thus proceeds strategically. 
 
 If we employ the theoretical strategies of either Derrida or Foucault to account for 
the difference between them, then given their incommensurable accounts, the other 
always appears to lack an account of the 'true' medium of differentiation.  Since their 
ethics are both grounded in an affirmation of what 'is,' yet both such onto-political 
accounts proceed in terms of two distinct trajectories, the other's work appears as a violent 
reduction and determination of otherness or excess.  In other words, if we select either 
the strategy of the 'aporia' or of the 'problem' as a starting point, the other necessarily 
appears to have failed to affirm the 'true' medium of differentiation.  Each thinker 
implicitly or explicitly argues that they have accounted for the play of differences which is 
anterior to and constituted the medium through which the other's work proceeds and 
which he therefore also reduces.  Thus, for Derrida, Foucault's play of force relations is 
constituted via the quasi-transcendental aporetic conditions of all thought and conversely, 
the concepts which Derrida deconstructs are for Foucault always already the effects of 
particular discursive systems.  The charge of ethical failure, explicit in the cogito debate, is 
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generated by the strategic decision to negotiate finitude in one of two ways and thus, the 
decision for a particular narrative is the anterior condition to the charge of ethical failure.  
Both polemical strategies proceed by circumscribing the other within a general onto-
political narrative which is anterior to the failure itself. 
 
 Accordingly, we cannot overcome the incommensurability of Derrida and 
Foucault in terms of a rapprochement by which we could identify common points that a 
dialogue between them might be construed.  Reading the similarities and differences 
between Derrida and Foucault cannot be restricted to a question of slowly spiraling into a 
hermeneutic circle, constantly ironing out conceptual differences or locating points of 
convergence.  To remain solely with this possibility is revoked at the outset since each 
thinker posits an incommensurable ‘grander narrative’ which acts as a methodological strategy 
which circumscribes the 'meaning' of the other's text.  It was these two strategies which we 
described in chapter 3 under the names of aporia and problem.  It cannot be a question 
of a circular hermeneutic exercise here, though if one were to insist on keeping with this 
Heideggerean formulation one could only do so by conceiving two separate circles 
between which we may only leap and wherein from the perspective of each, the other 
appears to be in error.  It is in this sense that the Nietzschean formulation of 
perspectivism might be more apt in describing the polemic.  For it is a case of two 
accounts of what 'is' and which recoil back upon their own authority which are at stake 
here.  It is not therefore a question of dialogue between Derrida and Foucault, but a 
question of dispute.  Theory enters an agon from which it cannot exit and that neither 
thinker can circumscribe since the terrain of the polemic emerges only in their competing 
articulations.  There is only a silence between these two strategies.   Moreover, it is a 
silence or gap which amounts to a violence which cannot be accounted for by either 
Derrida or Foucault's 'economy of violence' without reductively circumscribing the one or 
the other.  Thus, it reflects the very nature of originary or inescapable violence: without 
positing a transcendent position for the theorist, their radical empiricism(s) can only 
think relational violence from a particular and situated position; a particularity or 
situatedness which their own work can never totally account for, but is in a sense blind to.  
In extending the violence of relationality to Derrida and Foucault's accounts of the 
relation between inside and outside we ascribe a more radical particularity to their very 
accounts of particularity.   
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  Consequently, if we reduce the account of the relation between Derrida and 
Foucault to a deconstructionist strategy Foucault, as we have seen, appears to have failed 
to question the (im)possible conditions which make his analysis possible.  Furthermore, 
we might argue as Spivak and Butler do that the absence of a constitutive question of 
otherness in Foucault's work discloses the absence of a motivational force to his genealogy 
and thus, points to the anteriority of the question of alterity prior to the positing of a 
problematization.  In other words, there is an occlusion of the ethical question in 
Foucault's work.  More generously, we might argue that the relation between Derrida and 
Foucault denotes a paradigmatic example of the impossibility of appropriating the other 
to the same.  That Foucault's other strategy of thinking the 'between' must appear to have 
failed from the perspective of Derrida since no account of the other can escape a passage 
via the same.  In other words, that Derrida could not possibly give an account of 
Foucault's work without reducing it to his own in some way.  While potentially attractive, 
this meta-explanation is still caught in reducing the relation between Derrida and 
Foucault to a decidedly Derridean description.  Before such an account has already 
begun, it is constituted in the 'decision' that deconstruction can circumscribe both 
genealogy and itself and as such, simply consists in a deconstructive description of both 
Derrida and Foucault's works.  
 
 Analogously, this reduction can be reversed by depicting the relation between 
Derrida and Foucault in Foucaultian terms.  From this position as we saw in chapter 2, 
Derrida appears to elide the medium where difference occurs and thus, he disavows his 
own position within a particular power/knowledge apparatus.159  In privileging 
transcendental philosophical questions (how can I be responsible for the other? how can I 
forgive? etc.) Derrida effaces the very particular fields of ethical technologies which 
construct subjects able to ask and understand these questions.  In seeing all discourses 
through the horizon of philosophical questions, Derrida is thus blind to the singularity or 
particularity of his own discourse.  On the other hand, a more generous Foucaultian 
understanding of deconstruction might argue, as Edward McGushin does, that 
deconstruction in itself qualifies as a mode of 'care of the self.'  Deconstruction would 
constitute a form of ethical askesis insofar as it would consist in the subject's self-
transformation in order to attain truth rather than a prior truth which determines the 
                                               
159  EWII, p.412 
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subject; deconstruction would consist in the establishment of a relation to oneself.  As 
McGushin puts it, "[t]he subject who goes through the experience of a deconstruction 
attains a new self-determination in terms of responsibility."160  Much as a 'generous' 
Derridean reading of Foucault inescapably reduces the latter's genealogy to 
deconstruction, viewing deconstruction as a 'care of the self' as McGushin does posits 
Foucault's account of ethics in terms of 'problems' as privileged and anterior to 
deconstruction.  Deconstruction can only be read or understood in a favourable light 
once it is reduced to being one mode of care of the self and not as a ‘grander narrative’ of 
'what happens.' 
 
 In short, once violence is universalized and thus the possibility of a transcendental 
position for thought is eliminated, thought affirms its own empirical and particular point 
of departure (this is one of the tenets of Nietzsche's perspectivism).  It thus also affirms an 
excess, a play of difference which it cannot master and yet, will inevitably reduce.  Derrida 
and Foucault both make this move in two different ways and thus, while both refuse the 
totalising effect of assuming a transcendental position, their very accounts of the 
impossibility of totalization or universality seem to have a totalizing effect insofar as each 
excludes and reduces the other's strategy.  The seemingly inescapable reduction which 
their genealogical strategies seem to elicit against one another points to an excess which 
exceeds both of their accounts of excess; an otherness beyond their accounts of the 
relation between same and other.   
 
Conclusion 
If we affirm the irreducible particular violence of each of these grander narratives 
how do we articulate philosophy's relation to politics?  That is to say, if we situate 
deconstruction and genealogy as I have upon a polemical terrain which always exceeds 
their competing formulations of it, how then are we to conceive the status of their critical 
engagements with archipolitical attempts to master and govern this terrain?  Do these two 
competing ethics of alterity carry a decidedly political import?  It is to these questions that 
we now turn.  
                                               
160  Edward McGushin, "Foucault and the Problem of the Subject." P.633.  Such a reading of Derrida  
         has also more recently been proposed by Antonio Calcagno, “Foucault and Derrida: The Question  
         of Empowering and Disempowering the Author.” Human Studies. No.32, Vol.1. 2009.   
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 Chapter 5: THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS 
 
 
Introduction 
 One implication of the affirmation of the contingency of any relational or 
political order inherent to post-foundational thought is the shift it effects upon the 
perceived role of philosophy in relation to politics.  If, as I first suggested in discussing 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, the political denotes the contingent and violent character of all 
determinate relations, then the very denial inscribed in the tradition of political 
philosophy of the impossibility of a final foundation amounts to a 'depoliticization.'  The 
philosophical tradition, possessed by a will to truth which has dominated the history of 
the West has been constituted by a denial, disavowal or in Bonnie Honig's terms, 
'displacement' of the political for which, as Honig puts it, 
 
"success lies in the elimination from a regime of dissonance, resistance, conflict or 
struggle… [Politics is confined] (conceptually and territorially) to the juridical, 
administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, building 
consensus, maintaining agreements, or consolidating communities and identities."1   
 
Faced with the displacement of the contingency of the political, the common task of post-
foundational political thought is thus to politicize – to undermine and rupture the 
authority or hierarchy by which any given determinate order is legitimated and organised.   
 
 The formulation and critique of ‘archipolitics’ around which post-foundational 
political thought converges carries fundamental implications.  This shared diagnosis of 
philosophy's traditionally repressive dominance and determination of politics implies the 
need for a re-articulation of its status in relation to dominant logics or systems.  Not 
oriented by the task of legitimating a particular order, post-foundational thought assumes 
a different role: to politicize, that is to say, to return both concepts and the empirical 
institutions which they legitimize to the politico-polemical locus of their emergence.  
Theory assumes the task (though not reducible to theory) of the rupture of the social 
bond, of the indetermination of relation and thus, of the exposure and undermining of the 
violence which results from the artificiality of every social order.   
  
It is within the scope of this articulation of the role of theory that we can once 
                                               
1  Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993., P.2 
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again pick up the dialogue between Derrida and Foucault.  For it is precisely the 'desire 
for the outside' by which I have defined their ethics which points to a theoretical impetus 
to undermine or exceed any given order.  It was argued in the previous chapter that 
Derrida and Foucault renounce the possibility of totally exceeding the violence of the 
ordinal but they nevertheless articulate two competing ethics of 'lesser violence' from out 
of the irreducible economy of the determinate.  Yet in a more explicitly political 
inscription of these themes, that is, in moving from the question of their ethico-political 
'orientations' to the nature of its political effects a different series of questions emerges.  
Once the outlines of an ethico-political orientation is established, the focus of inquiry 
shifts to its effectiveness upon a political terrain.  How are determinate relations 
politicized?  That is, how do we describe the capacity to effect transformations upon the 
field of social relations?  Is there a disparity in the determinate politics we might derive 
from Derrida and Foucault?  How is the incommensurability between Derrida and 
Foucault reflected when our focus shifts to the determinate political effects of 
deconstruction and genealogy?  It is around an engagement with these questions that this 
chapter turns.  I will begin by examining Derrida’s and Foucault’s divergent engagements 
with archipolitics before proposing that both thinkers pursue a displacement of 
archipolitics through a conception of democracy.  
 
 
Derrida, Foucault and Archipolitics 
 The concept of sovereignty – the de jure determination of the political – is a 
central target for both Derrida’s and Foucault's pursuits of the disruption of the 
archipolitical.  Sovereignty, a foundational programme for the justification of power, 
represents the claim to a right to power whose grounds reason would discover.  Both 
thinkers pursue an engagement with this concept across a number of works and come to 
critique its continued centrality to political thought today.  For both it seems, sovereignty 
remains a privileged locus of an archipolitical or foundationalist philosophical 
programme.  As such, the aim of both of their accounts is to politicize and thus 
undermine sovereignty's determining logic.  In engaging with the question of sovereignty 
their mutually exclusive methodological strategies of the aporia and the problem are 
explicitly inscribed upon a political terrain.  Accordingly, the analysis of the question of 
sovereignty allows the inherently political nature of the incommensurability already 
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articulated in my analysis of the cogito debate begin to emerge more clearly.  I argued 
there that their two accounts of the event of determination in Descartes implicitly points 
to a broader relational account and second, that their incommensurability (which I 
argued was apparent from the terms of the debate) points to a radical politicization of 
politico-ontological accounts of relationality itself.  Let us turn firstly to Derrida’s 
engagement with the question of sovereignty before contrasting his position with 
Foucault’s. 
 
Derrida's Deconstruction of Archipolitics 
 One of Derrida's earliest attacks on archipolitics is to be found, albeit implicitly, in 
his essay 'Plato's Pharmacy.'  Here, our focus should turn to the distinction made by 
Socrates between speech and writing as forms of good and bad representations of truth 
conditioned by their proximity to the eidos.  While speech is conceived in terms of 
aletheia, the unveiling of truth in its self-presence to itself, writing is described by Socrates 
as a support for memory and thus, as lethe or concealment.  Writing, Derrida claims, as an 
external support or supplement to memory is thus for Socrates a form of "prosthesis."2  
Plato's decision to suppress writing is thus claimed to reflect the metaphysical desire – what 
in Rogues is called the “sovereignty drive” – to banish the external and empirical from 
meaning and value in order to posit a realm of pure presence or absolute origin which 
would govern it.3    
  
 Yet if the political implications of Derrida's early work were only implicit in this 
and other early texts, they become unequivocal in much of his later work.  Like Arendt, 
Rancière and Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, in Rogues Derrida looks to The Republic as 
privileged locus of sovereignty's appearance as a figure of philosophy's desire to dominate 
the political.  In granting 'absolute sovereignty' to the eidos of a 'Good' beyond Being Plato 
inaugurates the structure of the archaeo-teleological politics which have defined the West 
until today.4  The idea is construed as both absolutely other, unconditional condition of 
knowledge and as that which gives power to knowledge; that which gives knowledge the 
                                               
2  Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy." Dissemination. (Barbara Johnson, Trans.) Continuum: London,  
    2004.  Pp.67- 186.  See p.111, 113.  On the political implications of 'Plato's Pharmacy' see Catherine  
    Zuckert, Postmodern Platos:Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Strauss, Derrida. London: U of Chicago P,  
    1996. Pp.201-225 
3  Ibid.  P.104, 113, 162 
4  RO, p.139 
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right to govern.  Plato does not limit philosophy to attempting to think the absolutely 
unconditional but also inscribes it with the "mastering authority of architectonics" and 
thus inaugurates the metaphysical desire for the mastery and determination of the 
empirical.5   
 
 In this attempted violent reduction by or on behalf of the unconditional, 
deconstruction shows sovereignty to be permeated by an aporetic logic which Derrida 
comes to call, appropriating a term from immunology, 'autoimmunity.'6  If immunity 
refers to a system's attempt to protect itself, to be pure or self-identical then autoimmunity 
refers to an error where the antibodies created to defend an immune system attack a 
body's own cells.  Autoimmunity is, Derrida says, that  
 
"strange illogical logic by which a living being can spontaneously destroy, in an autonomous 
fashion, the very thing within it that it is supposed to protect against the other, to immunize 
it against the aggressive intrusion of the other."7    
 
The production of a sovereign identity generates its own autoimmune process in striving 
for purity.  "Nothing," Derrida says, is left "unscathed in the most autonomous living 
present without a risk of autoimmunity."8  Sovereignty is, Derrida argues, a privileged 
figure of autonomy insofar as it is an autos which gives itself its own nomos and thus, is 
"the power that gives itself its own law, its force of law, its self-representation."9  Yet (and 
this will form the crucial point of engagement with Foucault) as soon as sovereignty 
extends itself or its empire in space or attempts to maintain itself across time, it 
"autoimmunizes itself."10  As soon as sovereignty tries to protect or justify itself, it opens to 
the unmasterable excess of law and of language:  
"[t]o confer sense or meaning on sovereignty, to justify it, to find a reason for it, is already to 
compromise its deciding exceptionality, to subject it to rules, to a code of law, to some 
general law, to concepts.  It is thus to divide it, to subject it to partitioning, to participation, 
to being shared."11  
 
                                               
5  RO, p.143 
6  As far as I am aware, this notion first appears in the essay "Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources  
    of 'Religion' at the Limits of Reason Alone." Acts of Religion (Gil Anidjar, Ed.) London: Routledge,  
    2002.  Pp.40-101   Derrida also employs it extensively in "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides  
    - A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida." in Philosophy in a Time ofTerror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas  
    and Jacques Derrida. (Giovanna Borradori, Ed.) London: U of Chicago Press, 2003.  Pp. 85-136. and in  
    RO. 
7  RO, p.123 
8  Jacques Derrida, "Faith and Knowledge." p.82 
9  RO, p.11 
10  RO, p.109 
11  RO, p.101 
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The sovereign's establishment of even a single law already opens it to critique in the name 
of that law.  Pure sovereignty could only remain pure and undivided in pure silence and 
lawlessness and so in a total absence of sovereignty.  To extend sovereignty to the 
empiricity of time and space is to subject it to the logic of autoimmunity and thus, to 
open it to its other. 
 
 A brief essay on the status of the U.S. Declaration of Independence as the ground 
or foundation of the U.S. state is exemplary of Derrida's revelation of the autoimmune 
logic inherent to all sovereign founding.12  Here an aporia emerges between the 
Declaration's 'performative' and 'constative' status; between the event of its coming into 
being and the object which is brought into being.13  The moment of institution, the event 
of the declaration of 'we the people' who assert themselves as independent and sovereign 
must exist as a people prior to the event of the declaration itself.  "The signature," Derrida 
says, "invents the signer."14  In other words, the aporia of the Declaration lies between its 
juridical or transcendental status and its de facto existence in space and time insofar as the 
existence of the people (the 'to be') and the declaration that forms the people (the 'ought 
to be') cannot be simultaneous and yet, must occur at the same time for the declaration to 
function.15  The event of determination, of bringing something into being simultaneously 
implies that 'something' must exist anterior to the act of its determination.16  The people 
are thus never present, autonomous, nor self-identical and thus, can only remain 'to 
come': "[a]nother subjectivity is still coming to sign, in order to guarantee it, this 
production of signature."17  The event of the signature of the Declaration always 
presupposes its repetitions which are indefinitely still to come.   
  
In Specters of Marx this spatio-temporal logic is referred to as the "disjointure" at 
the heart of every founding event.18  The final justification of any founding act is 
                                               
12  Jacques Derrida, "Declarations of Independence." Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971- 
      2001. (Elizabeth Rottenberg, Ed.). (Tom Keenan & Tom Pepper, Trans.) Pp.46-54.  [Hereafter  
      referred to as 'DI']. 
13  DI, p.49 
14  DI, p.49 
15  DI, p51-2 
16  On this point, see Noah Horwitz, "Derrida and the Aporia of the Political, Or the Theologico- 
      Political Dimension of Deconstruction." Research in Phenomenology.  Vol.32, (2002). Pp.156-176.   
      P.160 
17  DI, p.50 
18  As he puts it there, a "disjointure in the very presence of the present, this sort of non- 
      contemporaneity with itself." SoM, p.25 
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constantly deferred to an open future which never arrives as such.  Every foundation or 
constitution of sovereignty cannot but be violent since there is no anterior law to justify 
it.19  Thus, the Declaration plays out the aporia of all sovereignty and autonomy – the 
paradox of something creating itself – since it demonstrates that the sovereign power must 
"presuppose itself in order to performatively enact itself."20  Founding violence can only 
take place through an indefinite repetition and consequent in relation to the non-
sovereignty and otherness that exceeds it.21  As Derrida puts it, "[i]n signing, the people 
say – and do what they do, by they do so by differing or deferring themselves through the 
intervention of their representation, whose representativity is fully legitimated only by the 
signature."22 
 
Derrida and the Limits of Politicization 
 Deconstruction thus politicizes the legitimacy of authority, of any claim to 
sovereignty insofar as it returns the archipolitical displacement of politics to the originary 
violence from which it emerges.  It is in this sense that we should understand Derrida's 
claims in Specters of Marx and "Marx and Sons" that deconstruction is inherently a 
"repoliticization."23  Repoliticization, he argues, consists in the "question of putting into 
question again," and accordingly, of returning the determining event to its contingent and 
aporetic status.24  However, there is another decisive element to the deconstructive 
engagement with archipolitics. If for Derrida a refusal to disavow originary polemos or 
violence is, as I argue in chapter 4, the condition for an other, (in)determinate and 'less 
violent' mode of relationality, he nevertheless insists in a number of texts that 
depoliticization is irreducible.  As he puts it, "a repoliticization always involves a relative 
depoliticization, an awareness that an old concept of the political has, in itself, been 
depoliticized or depoliticizing."25  Every politicization, insofar as it proceeds from a 
determinate and situated time-space, will be subject to a "law of finitude of decision and 
                                               
19  Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political.  p.99 
20  Noah Horwitz, "Derrida and the Aporia of the Political." p.161 
21  RO, p.123 
22  DI, p.50.  One should note that Derrida goes on to argue, much as he does in ‘Cogito and the  
      History of Madness’, that it is only in grounding the authority of the Declaration in the  
      (impossible) absolute power of God that the aporetic logic of its foundation can be stabilized. See  
       DI, p.52 
23  SoM,p.87 and Jacques Derrida, "Marx and Sons", p.221 
24  SoM, p.87 
25  Jacques Derrida, "Marx and Sons." p.223 
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responsibility for finite existences."26  The deconstructions of the accounts of 
politicization of Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt's own critiques of the archipolitical to 
which I now turn attest to what Derrida sees as the danger and violence inherent to any 
refusal to admit the irreducibility of politicization and so, of finitude and the 
irreducibility of relationality itself. 
 
 In 'Force of Law' Derrida reads Walter Benjamin's essay 'Critique of Violence' as a 
discourse which, like Heidegger's and Schmitt's, falls prey to the myth of a fall or decline 
from an ideal origin.27  While never explicit, it seems that for Derrida, these three 
thinkers have in common an account of history as decline and thus, all see the necessity 
of a radical and total repoliticization.  They all view "destruction" as a "condition of an 
authentic tradition and memory;" there is no limit to the emancipatory rupturing of the 
social bond in their work.28  Yet, in positing an originary authenticity or politicization 
Derrida contends they potentially license any means by which to re-invoke an originary 
being-with others and so are complicit with the 'worst' violence.29  It is in revealing the 
contingency and instability of Benjamin's theoretical schema that Derrida returns the text 
to its inherently finite and depoliticizing moments and accordingly, undermines the 
possibility of an absolute politicization.  Benjamin, Derrida argues, "never gives up trying 
to contain in a pair of concepts and to bring back down to distinction the very thing that 
incessantly exceeds them and overflows them."30  Ultimately, like Foucault, Benjamin is 
accused of reducing the violence of determination to a determinate history when, as we 
have seen, for Derrida violence is a condition of history.   
 
 One of Derrida's points of reference is the constitutive distinction in Benjamin's 
'Critique of Violence' between 'mythic' founding violence and a 'divine' violence which 
"annihilates" the foundation discussed in chapter 4.  Law is violent for Benjamin since it 
is an authoritative founding.  Thus, what Benjamin is attempting to think through divine 
violence is a society without law or, as Derrida puts it, "an order of non-violence that 
                                               
26  SoM, p.87 
27  Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence." Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings.  
      (Peter Demetz, Ed.; Trans. by Edmund Jephcott). New York: Schocken, 1986.  Pp.277-300; FoL,  
       p.259 
28  FoL, p.261 
29  FoL, p.261, Derrida even draws an implicit link between Benjamin's discourse and the Nazi final  
      solution. 
30  FoL, p.279 
 192 
 
subtracts from the law."31  Divine violence, the "violence of God" is not a violence of 
foundation but of the destruction and annihilation of boundaries.32  For Derrida the 
absolute politicization of a revolutionary divine violence – the total indeterminacy of a 
society without law –  which grounds Benjamin's account of mythical violence as 'decay' 
and 'loss' of a pure origin of (divine) violence marks it as "arche-teleological" and "arche-
eschatological."33  Benjamin thus effaces the finitude and the non-originary status of any 
origin and so he risks advocating the worst violence which would be legitimated by its 
capacity to institute the purity of the origin.34  Benjamin's account of divine violence is 
haunted, Derrida says, by "the theme of radical destruction, extermination, total 
annihilation, beginning with the annihilation of the law and right, if not of justice."35  
The depoliticizing moment which Benjamin wants to overcome altogether is 
uncircumventable, the revolutionary and politicizing event can never be present.  But 
therefore, it is also found in every moment, in every act of foundation or institution: 
"[p]oliticization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be 
total."36  The revolutionary and politicizing moment cannot be identified in a lost origin 
or future horizon, but rather, every determination or founding moment insofar as it is 
subject to the logic of aporia or autoimmunity is always potentially politicizing. 
 
 Echoing 'Force of Law,' in Politics of Friendship Derrida engages Carl Schmitt's 
account of the political in order to undermine the determinate borders which underlie 
the latter's account of politicization.  Schmitt defines the 'phenomenon of the political' as 
the event of the sovereign decision over the identification of the friend and enemy.37  Like 
Heidegger and Benjamin, Schmitt's recovery of a properly political sphere not grounded 
in religious or economic phenomena occurs through his schema of the founding event of 
the political.  Schmitt's account relies on the sovereign's positing of the "presence" or the 
"real possibility" of war between the friend and the enemy.38  Yet in opposition to Schmitt, 
Derrida argues that the ‘properly’ political decision over the enemy can never be totally 
sovereign nor immune: "the purity of the polemos or the enemy, whereby Schmitt would 
                                               
31  FoL, p.265; see also p.284, 286. 
32  FoL, p.287 
33  FoL, p.281 
34  FoL, p.281 
35  FoL, p.258 
36  FoL, p.257 
37  Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. (George Schwab, Trans.) London: U of Chicago Press,  
       2007. P.35 
38  PoF, Pp.145-5 
 193 
 
define the political, remains unattainable... no politics has ever been adequate to its 
concept."39   Any attempt to define the political will always be exceeded by originary 
polemos since positing such a definition is itself a political act and thus, inherently partial 
and unstable.  If Schmitt's definition of the political is grounded upon a notion of war as 
a 'real possibility' then, Derrida argues, this means it is caught between being 'both/and' 
potential or actual.  That is, as 'real' war is made 'present'; the decision over the enemy has 
already been made.  Yet as a 'possibility' war remains a telos; an always possible event 
which cannot be made without an empirical determination of war itself by the sovereign.40  
Thus, if the friend-enemy distinction defines the political it in fact requires an anterior 
decision over whether the 'real possibility' (of war) is present or not.41  The source or 
grounds of the decision is the aporetic notion of the 'real possibility' or "undecidable 
eventuality" of war.42  Moreover, if for Schmitt war is the transcendental condition of 
politics because it is 'always present' then war functions as the ultimate criterion of 
politicization.43  In thinking depoliticization as empirical erasure or effacement of the 
irreducible possibility of the presence of war Schmitt echoes Benjamin and Heidegger in 
falling prey to a nostalgic discourse driven by a teleological desire for the recovery of a lost 
violent origin.  As it does for Benjamin, war or violence here attains a status of legitimacy 
in itself insofar as it is authorized in the name of an absolute repoliticization.   
 
 Contra Benjamin and Schmitt, Derrida affirms the consequences and stakes of 
the irreducibility of (de)politicization, then deconstruction will be both politicizing and 
depoliticizing.  Yet my claim is that deconstruction is nonetheless depoliticizing in a way 
which Derrida does not and perhaps cannot acknowledge.  For if, against Schmitt, 
Derrida argues that originary violence or polemos is anterior to and a condition of any 
particular determination of the political, there is still an anterior determination of 
originary violence or of what 'is' which is finite and partial, insofar as it is couched within 
a 'grander' narrative that excludes other accounts of originary violence.  By comparing the 
Derridean account with Foucault's undermining of the archipolitical logic of sovereignty 
what emerges is a polemos over polemos itself.  Indeed, the 'cogito debate' points to an 
account of the difference between them in these terms since it suggests each views the 
                                               
39  PoF, p.114 
40  PoF, p.145-5 
41  PoF, p.127 
42  PoF, p.128 
43  PoF, p.128, 126.  I owe this point to Alex Thompson, Deconstruction and Democracy. p.158 
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other as having effaced the 'true' locus of originary violence and of the 'medium' where 
the decision or determination occurs.  It is with this incommensurability in mind that we 
now turn to Foucault's genealogy of discipline as an alternate counter-history to the one 
dominated by the question of sovereignty. 
 
Foucault's Problematization of Archipolitics 
 Space precludes an extensive analysis of the critique of the juridical model of 
power which extends throughout Foucault’s genealogical phase, his lectures and book on 
biopolitical governmentality in particular.  Rather than provide a brief overview of these 
works, I take here as an example a more detailed analysis of Discipline and Punish.  The 
latter book describes a broad historical transmutation of the status of sovereignty which 
occurs from the classical to the modern age.  In the classical age Foucault argues, power 
operates through mechanisms of ordering and the exclusion of the disorderly.44  Power 
relations were structured around the premise of the visibility of sovereign power which 
would reflect the might and glory of the ruler.45  With the rise of the disciplinary 
apparatus in the modern age the question of punishment is transformed.  No longer does 
it revolve around strategies of exclusion but rather, around the way order could be 
produced from disorder, its aim the formation of a productive and 'free' citizen and 
individual.46  Thus, discipline is distinct from sovereignty insofar as it distributes power as 
widely as possible across society by a juridical rationality which punishes and controls 
deviance.  Moreover, Foucault argues that political theory has almost totally effaced this 
massive disciplinary apparatus which appeared in modernity.  Discipline, he argues, is not 
to be located at the level of the juridical or sovereign foundation of power but rather in 
what he calls a rationality, which consists in "discourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions."47  If a 'medium' of determination is to be 
observed, it is what in terms of what Foucault famously calls a "micro-physics" of power.48  
A closer engagement with Foucault’s displacement of sovereignty, to which we now turn, 
allows us to differentiate his account more clearly from Derrida’s. 
                                               
44  The emergence of the asylum discussed in Madness and Civilization is archetypal of this form of  
       power. 
45  Edward McGushin, Foucault's Askesis. P.267 
46  DP, p.211 
47  PK, p.194. See also DP, p.215 
48  DP, p.214 
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 The telos of the disciplinary apparatus described in Discipline and Punish is the 
production of a normal and 'docile' body.49  A particular conduct produced through 
regimens of training positions the individual in relation to a given norm allowing the 
identification of an abnormal element which further training aims to overcome.  The 
"differentiation" which defines discipline is not of the act's relation to the law, but of the 
body's relation to the norm.50  The relation between the body and power in discipline 
exceeds the sovereign decision of inclusion and exclusion, upon which Derrida focuses in 
his reading of Schmitt, insofar as it settles upon the desire to produce the visibility of the 
body to the gaze of normalizing power.  Moreover, discipline's focus on the body translates 
to a broader focus on the social body.  "The phenomenon of the social body," Foucault 
says, "is the effect not of a consensus but of the materiality of power operating on the very 
body of individuals."51  The recognition of oneself and one's place in society is formed 
through an interiorization of the relation between the observers or trainers and the 
observed.  Individuals, trained to function as a cog in a machine, begin to experience 
themselves as such.  Anterior to the modern question of the free subject and the 
legitimacy of power constituted in a contractual relation are the practices for disciplining 
the body.  It is discipline, as anterior locus of 'differentiation' of the individual and 
response to the problematisation of social order, which forms the conditions for a 
modern juridical power which traditional philosophical questions of 'legitimacy' and 
obligation have continuously effaced.52   
 
 The divergence from Schmitt or Derrida not to mention much of contemporary 
political thought is sharp here.53  The conditions for a de jure determination of social 
order do not lie in the exceptional event or aporetic and autoimmune logic of any 
sovereign claim to ground and order a particular field of social relations, but rather, in the 
practices which seek to form an individual who inhabits the juridical order with as little 
                                               
49  DP, p.25 
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51  PK, p.54 
52  DP, p.169; 
53   Foucault’s theorization of the immanence of power relations places him squarely in opposition to    
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interference, resistance and heterogeneity as possible.  At stake is the location of the event 
of determination through either a strategy defined by (quasi)transcendence or by 
immanence.  We saw that for Derrida the constitution of sovereignty is destabilized 
through its circulation in the empiricity of time and space.  Since at least Of Grammatology 
and especially the essay 'Ousia and Gramme,' Derrida has sought to show that the 
possibility of conceiving a present origin or foundation lies in the disavowal of the aporia 
between time and space or presence and absence.  Much as he does in 'Declarations of 
Independence' for instance, in this earlier essay he claims that the metaphysics of presence 
is made possible by a linear conception of time which allows successive 'nows' to be 
conceived as simultaneous in space.  Successive 'nows' are (im)possibly present: "[t]he 
impossibility of coexistence can be posited only on the basis of a certain coexistence, of a 
certain simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous."54  The ramifications of this account of the 
aporia of space-time traverse Derrida's work.  Presence, he repeatedly shows, is posited 
only in the effacement of the aporia which makes it possible insofar as time (succession) 
and space (simultaneity) are its mutually exclusive conditions.55  Sovereignty, as event of 
foundation and self-identity, can never be present; it is always differed and deferred from 
itself insofar as it extends itself in time and through space.   
 
 Conversely, in Foucault's genealogical work the question of space and time is not 
conceived in terms of the impossibility of presence but rather, space and time are among a 
multiplicity of immanent conditions of determination.  Disciplinary space is organised 
with the objective of making the body visible; of isolating, observing and controlling 
detainees, soldiers and students.56  It is in terms of this objective that the division of 
institutional space isolates and circulates bodies through segments which make them 
visible and insert their elements into particular fields of knowledge.  The disciplinary 
technique of 'rank' organises the grid of functional spaces so that the movements of 
bodies can be managed in their passage through different rankings or hierarchies.  The 
individual becomes intelligible in his or her progress from one stage to another and 
accordingly, his or her identification is facilitated by the place he or she occupies in the 
segmented structure.  One assumes the role of the space to which one is appointed and 
accordingly, the individual emerges through the functional demands places on him or 
                                               
54  Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Gramme.” Margins of Philosophy. P.55 
55  Ibid., p.65;  
56  DP, p.141-3 
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her.  Time, Foucault argues, is the operator of discipline.  Discipline organises time into 
delineated parallel or successive segments; a serialization of time through order, level and 
task.57  Discipline is the control and organisation of time: "[t]he disciplines, which analyze 
space, break up and rearrange activities, must also be understood as a machinery for 
adding up and capitalising on time."58  Movement is subdivided and programmed 
through the minutest possible number of segments into a regulated repetition and thus, 
"a collective and obligatory rhythm."59  Foucault delineates the 'time-table' as the primary 
temporal disciplinary technique.  It allows the breaking down and ordering of each action 
of the body at each time of the day.  The time-table is an instrument which allows the 
extraction "from time, ever more available moments and, from each moment, ever more 
useful resources."60  In short, normalisation operates through particular organisations of 
time-space through which the object of power – the human body – becomes "no longer 
the mobile or immobile mass, but a geometry of divisible segments."61 
 
 Unlike Derrida's account of the aporia of space-time and its apparently devastating 
implications for any attempt to found or determine social relations, in Foucault's 
genealogy time and space are immanent to disciplinary practices.  Space and time are 
both conditions and conditioned; they form positive conditions, immanent to their 
elements insofar as they make up modulating series of sites and modes of difference.  
Discipline enters the body into a particular time and space, itself organised according to 
particular objectives of control and training.  The carceral organisation of time and space 
produces the 'presence' of the body as object of both knowledge and of disciplinary 
power.62  The disruption of the founding or sovereign moment is thus not located in an 
engagement with the impossibility of its presence, autonomy or ipseity.  Rather, it is 
premised on the notion that a juridical or contractual order is itself conditioned by the 
production of the presence of a normalized and objectified body in and by time and 
space.63  For Foucault, the determination of relations cannot be reduced to the inherent 
instability of the extension of sovereignty or the founding event across space and through 
time.  To question only the foundations and origins of power is, he argues, to depoliticize 
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62  Keith Robinson, Michel Foucault and the Freedom of Thought. p.173 
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it.64  It is in this sense that Foucault famously claims that by remaining within the 
framework of this mode of analysis, "we still have not cut off the king's head."65  It is only 
by locating the event in practices which parallel, if not condition the juridical that we can 
understand, Foucault argues, the production of order.66 
 
Sovereignty cannot be, Foucault argues in Discipline and Punish, the principle of 
intelligibility of social power.67  Determination is to be located in a broad strategy or what 
Foucault calls the "assembly of a multiplicity."68  In other words, a rationality and regime 
of practices localized in time and history which respond to a problematization of social 
order.  As such, the singularity of the event of determination traced by Foucault operates 
in a way which must be seen as radically different from and incommensurable to 
Derrida's.  The analysis proceeds in two ways.  First, through the systems of power which 
consist of regulating, ordering, grading, examining, classifying and training.  These in 
turn are linked to the production of true discourses "which serve to found, justify and 
provide reasons and principles for these ways of doing things."69  The constitutive outside 
– the conditions of determination – emerges through a mapping of the event as a 'general 
technology of power.'70  Knowledge, in other words, is dispersed into power relations 
through which it circulates yet which it effaces.  Juridical discourse is thus mapped as an 
event and outcome of struggle.   
 
Derrida's Sovereignty vs. Foucault's Discipline 
 The stakes of Derrida and Foucault's competing politicizations of archipolitics 
should thus be clear: the medium in which differentiation, or the event of determination, 
occurs.  Two strategies emerge for undermining the domination of archipolitics by 
                                               
64  DP, p.92-7 
65  DP, p.89 
66  Spatial limitations dictate that an analysis of Foucault's 1976-79 lecture courses and The History of  
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68  DP, p.92-3 
69  Michel Foucault, The Foucault Effect. P.79 
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opening it to the originary violence which it effaces.  On the one hand, the impossible 
possibility of any concept or act of sovereignty and on the other, the fields of 
governmental practices which form the consensus conditional of sovereign power.  I have 
discussed at length the claim made by Foucault in 'My Body, This Paper, This Fire' and 
reflected in his genealogy of modern power relations which suggests that the Cartesian 
gesture is inherent in Derrida's account of politicization.  As such, much as in his reading 
of Descartes, I claim that from the Foucaultian perspective Derrida appears to impose a 
meaning upon sovereignty in terms of status as a purely trans-historical question.  In this 
sense the deconstruction of sovereignty is depoliticizing insofar as Derrida commits a 
violent exclusion in his interpretation of the aporia of sovereignty by locating it within the 
scope of 'transcendental philosophical questions.'  It is possible to reconstruct a parallel 
argument from Foucault's later works.  Derrida's account of sovereignty, to echo the early 
Foucault, "goes directly to the calling into question of the 'totality of beingness.'"71  
Derrida continues to maintain the sovereignty of sovereignty insofar as the transcendental-
philosophical understanding of political foundations effaces the broader disciplinary or 
biopolitical 'field of transformations' through which the determination of social order 
occurs.  
 
 What is the Derridean response to this Foucaultian critique?  In chapter 3 we saw 
that in 'To Do Justice to Freud' Derrida returns to the polemic with Foucault and 
explicitly extends the claim he first made in 'Cogito and the History of Madness': that 
Foucault violently effaces the aporetic conditions of his own discourse and thus, violently 
determines the objects of his analyses.  In other words, the Foucaultian displacement of 
the de jure or foundational moment would itself qualify as a foundational move.  Like any 
totality, Foucault's displacement of sovereignty can be shown to be founded upon that 
which it excludes: "the evil slips in" as Derrida says in 'Plato's Pharmacy.72  The claim to 
have displaced the question of sovereignty itself relies on a sovereign and archaeo-
teleological determination of the presence of sovereignty itself within history.  It is the 
implicit identification and circumscription of the event (inherent to all Foucault's 
genealogies) which in Rogues Derrida argues disavows the unconditionality or otherness 
which makes it possible:  
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"[a] calculable event, one that falls, like a case, like the object of some knowledge, under the 
generality of a law, norm, determinative judgment, or technoscience, and thus of a power-
knowledge and knowledge-power, is at least in this measure an event.  Without the absolute 
singularity of the incalculable and exceptional, no thing and no one, nothing other and thus 
nothing arrives or happens.... as other as the absolute exception or singularity of an alterity 
that is not reappropriable by the ipseity of a sovereign power and a calculable knowledge."73   
 
 
While in 'Cogito and the History of Madness' Derrida argues that Foucault attempts to 
transcend the language of Western reason, in Rogues he seems to suggest that Foucault 
attempts to totally exceed archipolitics itself.  Much as in his earlier critique, wherein he 
argues that the opposition between reason and madness cannot be exterior to language 
and thus can only be articulated in the language of reason, so sovereignty, Derrida 
appears to claim here, cannot be displaced except through an implicitly sovereign claim to 
transcend the "sovereignty drive."  We cannot totally exceed the will to foundation except 
through a sovereign and founding move which inevitably repeats it insofar as it seeks to 
master and order that which it exceeds.  Thus, if I characterized the implicit Foucaultian 
critique of Derrida as maintaining the 'sovereignty of sovereignty,' Derrida seems to accuse 
Foucault of attempting a sovereign determination and transcendence of sovereignty itself.   
 
 Recall that in 'Cogito and the History of Madness' Derrida argues that in Madness 
and Civilization reason and its other are located by Foucault within history.  Thus, 
Foucault is guilty of a de jure determination of history whereby the presence of madness is 
made to appear.  Similarly, in the genealogy of government, Foucault again implicitly 
appears to inhabit this apparent Archimedean position.  The location of sovereignty as 
event within the empiricity of history presupposes the transcendental determination of 
history itself.  Moreover, Derrida claims that the place of decision in Descartes occurs 
elsewhere than where Foucault locates it.  The Cartesian exclusion of madness is not a 
particular event but the condition of the constitution of all language, reason and history.  
The exclusion cannot be contained within a determinate history since it is a condition of 
history itself.  Concordantly, sovereignty for Derrida cannot be displaced or sufficiently 
politicized by a historical account of the emergence of a biopolitical technology of 
government since autoimmunity would have to be the very condition of Foucault's history 
of biopower.  Anterior to its supposed disruption in history by a logic of biopower, 
sovereignty is made (im)possible for Derrida by the autoimmune logic which conditions 
it.   
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The Question of Emancipation and Revolution 
 But what then are the implications of these two divergent strategies for politicizing 
the archipolitical?  Insofar as the Derridean and Foucaultian politicizations of sovereignty 
form two modes by which dominant political logics are challenged and undermined and 
insofar as they disturb the given and redefine the possible, can they be said to be 
emancipatory?  Moreover, what would it mean to speak of theory as emancipatory in 
these terms?  Certainly, both refuse the traditional conception of emancipation as the 
promise to overcome an ideological distortion of a determined social objectivity through a 
positivist account of man's 'true humanity' or what Ernesto Laclau describes as the 
transparency of an “absolute coincidence of human essence with itself.”74  Both Derrida 
and Foucault refuse what they view as the eschatological discourse of revolution grounded 
in the desire to 're-appropriate' or ‘actualize' a positive conception of a true human 
essence.75  Both Derrida and Foucault thus, as is well known, seek a different notion of 
emancipation, one not subsumed to the promise of a determined mode of relationality to 
be founded or rediscovered in some determinate future but rather suggesting the ever-
present possibility of resistance and change and of a less oppressive order.  But both also 
hold that the determining violence of ordering is irreducible and thus, that a total and 
revolutionary overcoming of this violence is impossible.  For both thinkers, revolution, 
rather than having a liberating effect, functions to determine the relational by inscribing 
it within the circularity of a teleology which acts as a self-authorizing and violent 
determination.  Both problematize the distinction between a wholly exceptional 
revolutionary event and more localized and modest reformism. 
 
Derrida and Emancipation 
 It is in this vein that, much as Foucault had already claimed thirty years earlier in 
The Order of Things, Derrida argues that the truth of Marx's discourse is caught in a 
circular logic which depends on a promised futural realization of a scientific prognosis.  
The 11th of the Theses on Feuerbach amounts to a call by Marx for a future in which his 
theoretical programme will be realized and as such, his discourse is not to be judged in 
accordance with its scientific value but rather by its power of producing emancipatory 
change.  Yet the call to revolutionary action is made in the name of a determined 
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communism or what Derrida describes as "the real presence of the specter" and the 
insertion of a teleology into his history which accompanies it.76  It is in this sense that 
Derrida refers to Marx's history in the particularly cumbersome terms of an "onto-theo-
archeo-teleology" which insofar as it determines the future "cancels historicity" itself.77  In 
attributing a status of necessity to the overcoming of capitalist appropriations and 
distortions of the ideals of emancipation Marx invokes a future that would 
simultaneously undo futurity as such.  Thus, for example, the Communist Manifesto is, 
Derrida argues, marked by a logic of 'incarnation;' whereby a privileged agent of history 
becomes identical to itself in a determinate future.78 
 
 Derrida's ethico-political move in relation to Marx is to detach the latter's account 
of history from a fixed narrative of emancipation.  If communism is the 'specter' haunting 
Europe as the famous first line of the text claims, then its determination by Marx 
amounts to a desire for the "end of the spectral."79  The desire for a future present wherein 
the specter will become present to itself signals a desire for the "end of the political as 
such."80  In the face of the violent and reductive maneuvers which he views operating in 
Marx’s texts Derrida's politicization, oriented by a 'desire' for the other, operates a 'dis-
jointure’ on Marx's historical narrative between capitalism, communism and Marx's 
critique.81  Mirroring the move he makes in 'The Force of Law' Derrida displaces Marx's 
future present communism with the 'messianic' promise 'that there is a future.'82  Against 
Marx’s emancipatory eschatology he posits an "interminable, infinite... critique" which 
refuses to disavow the outside which makes it possible.83 
 
 Yet insofar as Derrida reveals the precariousness of the Marx’s account of 
emancipation what remains for politics?  Given the Derridean account of relationality 
there can be no privileged site or form of politics yet, this does not mean that the 
possibility of politics is withdrawn either.  Rather, politics occurs in the inescapable 
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process of (de)politicization; each politicization opens any determinate politics to the 
otherness which exceeds it and which it has violently reduced.  Still, politicization cannot 
in itself become the object of a politics or movement since we are always situated within 
determinate relations and so finite decisions are irreducible.  Alex Thompson has deftly 
described the aporetic logic which defines the Derridean account of the political:  
 
"[t]here can be no politics of the moment of politicization, since it has no content, nothing 
that can be acted upon – it is the suspension of all decision... Any political decision, any 
political event must be an experience of depoliticization by definition; it sets a rule... 
Politicization cannot be the object of a political demand; what complicates this structure is 
that every political demand, while depoliticizing, will attest to a possible repoliticization."84   
  
Thus, total depoliticization as it occurs in Plato’s or Marx’s text is impossible since it is 
always being undone and politicized by the aporias which it cannot master.  
Deconstruction opens these determinations to the otherness which they violently exclude.  
On the other hand, total politicization, which Benjamin and Schmitt attempt to think, 
cannot be appropriated.  Any particular politicization emerges from the finitude of 
determinate relations and thus, in contrast to Heidegger, Benjamin and Schmitt, will 
always involve a decision and thus determine in its turn.  Every politicization must 
negotiate the determinate and thus, cannot be made present.   
 
 Accordingly, as Alexander Duttman put it to Derrida in a late interview, 
deconstruction, insofar as it affirms the determinate as inescapable, amounts to a 
reformism since "each decision calls for another one" and thus, inaugurates an 
interminable process of reform after reform...  However, given that no determination or 
decision is ever total or originary, every depoliticization is inescapably open to the 
possibility of another repoliticization and in this sense, deconstruction appears to describe 
a "permanent revolution."85  In this sense, deconstruction is equally 'both/and' reformist 
and revolutionary insofar as the account of the (in)determinate between which it proffers 
cannot be reduced to either term.  No determinate politics can perfectly correspond to 
the absolute contingency of a politicization since no politics can escape finitude and thus, 
violence.  Nor can the political be reduced to any particular form or field since every 
determination is potentially politicized. 
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Foucault and Emancipation 
 Unlike Derrida, Foucault's relation to revolutionary thought, and to Marx in 
particular, has been a constant if under-theorized element throughout his oeuvre.  In the 
early essay 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx' Foucault argues Marx produces a mode of 
interpretation which is a constant and indefinite undermining of the 'signs' of capitalist 
economy.  Yet he maintains that while Marx introduces a thought of "the violence, the 
incompleteness, the infinity of interpretations", given his emphasis upon an eschatology 
and ideology Marx "enthrone[s] the terror of the index or to suspect language."86  Building 
on this argument, in The Order of Things Marx's discourse is said to be caught in the 
humanist 'double.'  Marx produces a discourse which guarantees its validity through the 
postulation of an eschatology which grounds it.87  Foucault argues, much as Derrida does, 
that we must draw a sharp break between Marx’s work as interminable critique on the 
one hand, and its teleological strains on the other.  Accordingly, it is in the spirit of 
interminable and militant critique that Foucault explicitly privileges Marx's journalistic 
texts such as 'The 18th Brumaire' and 'The Civil War in France.'88  These texts, much like 
Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment?’, form what Foucault would come to call 'histories of the 
present' which, without producing or being grounded in totalizing claims, study the 
conditions which form the present as singular events.89  He contrasts the analysis of the 
present from what he sees as Marxism's assumption of a "totalizing historical position" on 
the one hand and from attempts to ground the authority of Marx’s work in a scientific 
discourse on the other.90 
 
 Foucault’s 1976 lecture course Society Must Be Defended further extends the critique 
of eschatology in Marx.  Here, he argues that discourses around race war prevalent in the 
16th and 17th centuries furnished Marx with the model of class war.91  Class war, he 
argues, originates from early nationalist notions of the presence of a war in society 
between two irreducible groups whose inequality is masked by the equality of law and 
right.  Marx’s socialism risks universalizing an authentic subject of freedom and an 
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accordant emancipatory praxis, and in doing so is always in danger as Warren Montag 
suggests, of reverting to the primitive state of an openly racist politics from which it 
arises.92  Like Laclau or Rancière, Foucault argues that Marx’s privileging of and 
"obsession" with class as emancipatory agent effaces the multiple possibilities of struggle 
and forms struggle takes by reducing it to a pre-determined concept and agent.  If struggle 
is not to be reduced it cannot be located and defined in advance.  The theoretical 
preoccupation with determining the agent of emancipation is displaced by Foucault with 
a question of the locus of already existing and potential spaces for struggle.   Foucault does 
not set out to found resistance or struggle since his analyses show it to be always already 
occurring and so the task becomes to trace its manifestations.  To determine a subject of 
struggle and resistance in advance is to efface the multiplicity of places and forms which 
struggle takes.   
 
 In refusing to conceive power as negative force, Foucault also refuses the whole 
thematics of revolution prevalent in Marx at times and central to modern political 
thought as a whole.  Foucault argues that we must overcome the notion that revolution 
guarantees that the struggle which it produces and describes or its discourse cannot be re-
captured, colonised or recuperated by a dominant logic.  Any discourses of resistance, 
Foucault says, "no sooner accredited and put into circulation, than they run the risk of re-
codification, re-colonisation."93  In assuming the totalizing perspective which 
revolutionary discourse demands, the revolution is seen as a disappointment when it 
either fails to occur or provide the utopia it promises, leads only to resignation.  Like 
Derrida, Foucault’s refusal to adopt a revolutionary discourse reflects in definitively 
political terms the refusal of what in chapter 3 we called a 'pre-ordinal authenticity' – 
access to an outside beyond all forces of determination and domination.  In other words, 
for both thinkers revolution presumes access to a position beyond all determinate 
relations; either through the promise of a non-violent future regime or the reference to, as 
Foucault puts it, "a nature or human foundation which, as a result of a certain number of 
historical, social or economic processes, found itself concealed, alienated or imprisoned in 
and by some mechanism of repression."94  Foucault does not seek to disregard all 
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emancipatory movements; an anti-colonial liberation for instance, is indeed liberating.95  
The risk involved for Foucault (as for Laclau and Rancière, for instance), is rather that 
such a movement should be seen as totally liberating.  The danger of revolutionary 
discourses is that they should assume that "man will be reconciled with himself."96  
Foucault dismisses what calls he 'bourgeois' accounts and uses of history which posit a 
"great continuity" beneath revolutionary upheavals thus asserting the illegitimacy of 
revolutionary breaks from an underlying historical unity.97  Moreover, revolutionary 
discourses too are said to efface the locus of struggle, revolt and discontinuity.  The 
concept of revolution reduces resistance or revolt to power as a property or sovereignty of 
a given social group or class.   
 
 Foucault locates an emancipatory operator around the complimentary notions of 
revolt and resistance.  Revolts, Foucault claims, interrupt the continuity of history; they 
emerge from 'outside' history and escape it.98  By reading revolts as 'revolutions' we tame 
them by including them within the rationality of a history.99  Revolution, Foucault says, is 
"a giant effort to domesticate revolts within a rational and controllable history."100  The 
discourse of revolution has become a standard for evaluating and even "disqualifying" 
revolts.101  For Foucault, the question of the difference between revolt and revolution is a 
question of what I have argued is the difference between immanence and transcendence.  
Reading revolt, resistance or struggle in terms of the discourse of revolution, that is, as a 
singular and total or radical transformation places a burden upon it to effect a 
transcendence of power relations; on the promise (and ultimate failure) of what in his 
1984 lectures Foucault says is an 'other world' [autre monde] which would justify it.102  
Revolutionary discourse effaces the locus where transformations are, have been, and can 
occur.  It effaces the actual and possible becoming other immanent to power relations.  
Events are multiple, discontinuous and are not grounded by any great continuity.103   
 
There is neither an essential nature to be liberated nor a global or single 
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programme which a revolution would transform.  Resistance is contingent, local and has 
no privileged locus or agent, it is simply always already occurring: "people revolt: that is a 
fact."104  Every power relation, every actual or potential hegemonic relation is politicized.  
Thus, no revolt is necessarily legitimate or illegitimate, liberating or limiting, since every 
revolt necessarily risks its own re-articulation in terms of a dominant logic: "[m]y point is 
not that everything is bad.  But that everything is dangerous... and that we are always in a 
position of beginning again."105   Since no revolt can totally exceed determinate power 
relations, every act calls for further resistance.  Like Derrida, Foucault assumes a position 
between a total politicization and depoliticization; neither a revolutionary transcendence 
of determinate relations to a pre-ordinal authenticity nor a total depoliticization which 
would be defined by the total reification of power relations.  Both, in other words, assume 
an account of the event which views the conditions of possibility of transformations as 
ineradicable – both total determination or absolute indetermination are foreclosed as 
possibilities.   
 
 Indeed, Derrida and Foucault both theorize a relation between philosophy and 
politics which precludes the possibility of a deduction of political praxis from 
philosophical analyses.  No determinate task follows from the politicization(s) effected by 
deconstruction or genealogy.  This locus 'between' the contingent and the determinate 
therefore is also the locus of politicization of philosophy or political ontology itself.  It is a 
space that cannot be resolved, closed or violently effaced, yet it is nevertheless inscribed 
with a particular political, if nevertheless minimal and ‘weak,’ telos by Derrida and 
Foucault.  For it is a locus that only democracy, for both thinkers, can mark or represent.    
  
  
In their late works both Derrida and Foucault come to think a form of democracy 
opposed to, and which undoes the will to truth.  Democracy is a privileged political form 
for both thinkers insofar as they each view it as opposed to the 'sovereignty drive:' the 
disjunction between truth and power which in one form or another has sought to 
displace the political.  In this sense, democracy is the genealogical political form par 
excellence.  But what makes democracy 'radical'?  How does it suggest the possibility of 
transgressing the hold of the will to truth?  What implications does thinking Derrida’s 
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and Foucault's ethico-political orientations in terms of a radically democratic horizon 
have for an articulation of the locus of their polemic?  It is to these questions to which we 
now turn. 
 
 
Radical Democracy 
 An early and influential account of radical democracy emerges from Claude 
Lefort's Democracy and Political Theory.  Democracy, Lefort maintains, is a particular 'mise-
en-forme' or founding social principle, one wherein the political is detached from other 
references and becomes an autonomous activity unto itself; in democracy "power is an 
empty place" as he famously puts it.106  Freed from any positive content, power in modern 
democracy becomes the object of a contest.107  Lefort's account of radical democracy has 
not been without its critics (Foucault among them), yet his affirmation of the 
irreducibility of the polemical echoes the fundamental claim of theorists of 'radical 
democracy' and also distinguishes it from liberal and communitarian forms.  Thus, 
theorists such as Laclau and Mouffe, William Connolly and Rancière to name but a few, 
all affirm an essentially contentious and polemical notion of the democratic.  Democracy 
does not produce a rational consensus for these thinkers; contestation lies on an 
ontological level; irreducible competing accounts of the social and the political are at 
stake in democratic contest.108  Radical democrats thus affirm the incommensurability of 
competing political claims rather than seek their reconciliation within a broader rational 
discursive horizon or foundational equality.  Accordingly, procedural and deliberative 
forms are rejected on the grounds that they hold implicit foundational assertions.  Both 
Dahl and Habermas for instance, assume the possibility of the neutrality of democratic 
institutions and of reasoned and rational debate which will inform the determination and 
administration of proper policies while radical democracy wholly rejects this 
perspective.109  Democracy is taken to be open-ended so that struggle is not limited to the 
site of the state, democratic institutions must themselves remain open to contestation if a 
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prevailing regime is to be qualified as democratic.  Democracy by definition cannot be 
founded or limited, it accepts the absence of an ultimate ground.  As Nancy succinctly 
puts it in a recent essay, "[t]here is no 'demarchy:' the people do not make principle."110   
  
Similarly, both Derrida and Foucault theorize democracy as a 'force of weakness.'  
For as genealogical thinkers they refuse the possibility of transcending the play of 
differences between forces or originary violence and simultaneously affirm the finite, 
violent and determinate nature of all thought.  Through the strategies of the aporia or the 
problem their thought thus recoils upon itself, affirming its own violence and its own 
contingency.  Accordingly, democracy is the political form which figures these genealogical 
logics since, for both thinkers, democracy is characterized by an absence of ground, its 
form or structure does not exceed the horizons of contingency which its' principle implies.  
Democracy is marked by weakness and fragility (both in ontological and historical terms) 
since in principle it affirms its own contingency, affirms itself as violent and determining 
and thus always risks displacement.  Let us now turn to these two parallel competing 
accounts of democracy as aporetic and as problematic. 
 
Derrida's Democracy To Come 
 The notion of 'democracy to come' which becomes increasingly prevalent in 
Derrida's late work might be said to form the ethico-political horizon of deconstruction in 
general.  This is an admittedly intrepid claim insofar as it is problematic to assert anything 
finally determinate and non-contingent about deconstruction at all without effacing the 
very contingency which this work shows to be ineradicable.  That said, if we have affirmed 
that Derrida's work, like Foucault's, opens up a space between politicizations and 
particular politics, it is 'democracy to come’ which, more than any other name, stands for 
this (im)possible place.   
 
 What does it mean to say democracy is 'to come'?  As the term suggests democracy 
is always futural, on a horizon which never arrives.  But this does not entail a utopian 
future arrival of democracy since democracy cannot be made present.  Democracy has an 
irreducibly messianic or promissory structure and thus, cannot be determined in advance 
or made present.  For democracy to be as such would mean that unconditional justice, 
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equality or freedom (or any other concepts we associate with democracy) would be made 
conditional.  Yet, as we have seen, the recuperation of unconditionality by a de facto 
programme or law will, by definition, violently exclude or determine and call for further 
democratisation in its turn.  Accordingly, democracy is always promised and undermined, 
constantly deferred to an open future which never arrives.   
 
 So far the impossibility of reducing democracy to a determinate presence only 
affirms that it resembles the aporetic structure of all concepts as Derrida describes them.  
To affirm the privileged status which democracy holds for deconstruction requires a 
second move.  Democracy is distinct from all of Derrida's other 'non-synonymous' 
signifiers of the aporetic because it is an autoimmune concept whose critique – of a lack 
of equality or freedom – is always made in the name of democracy.  Self-critique and 
openness to otherness and to a future that comes is, unlike other terms, intrinsic to 
democracy.  Democracy, in Derrida's terms, is a "force of weakness" insofar as inscribed 
within it is the self-deconstruction or autoimmune force of opening to otherness.  
Democracy, in this sense, recoils upon the will to truth since it posits no originary ground 
or transcendent truth which governs it.  The very structure or determination of 
democracy is inherently open to democratic decision.  Democracy invites contestation, is 
always open to further democratization. 
 
 Democracy is therefore distinct since it implies a form of relationality which 
demands, more than others, an open interpretation.  As Derrida puts it, "[o]f all the 
names grouped a bit too quickly under the category of 'political regimes'... the inherited 
concept of democracy is the only one that welcomes the possibility of being contested."111  
Democracy, by definition, explicitly figures its autoimmune logic insofar as it assumes the 
possibility of self-critique in its own being.  At the core of democracy is what Gasché says 
is a notion of the "self-contestation of the autos."112  Unlike other concepts, democracy is 
defined by the fact that it is not governed by a will to truth.  The process of determining 
who, what and how to govern, and not its particular outcomes is the movement which 
democracy names, a process which in turn, itself remains in question.  It is the absence of 
a foundation which defines democracy: “[t]he absence of a proper form, of an eidos, of an 
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appropriate paradigm... that is what makes democracy unpresentable in existence."113  In 
short, democracy to come openly inheres and figures the autoimmune logic which is the 
condition of all political regimes and all relationality.  Unlike other political forms, the 
autoimmunity opening to the other is an explicit condition for democracy, the more 
autoimmune a regime becomes, the more it opens to otherness the more democratic it is. 
 
 Derrida traces a number of explicit democratic aporias that suggest that, unlike 
other forms of political regime, democracy in its avowed autoimmunity is the 'least 
violent' form of regime.  First, as Derrida puts it, "the alternative to democracy can always 
be required as a democratic alternation."114  A suspension of democracy, against for 
example an anti-democratic party, is a means of both protecting democracy and also the 
"suicide" of democracy.115  In situations such as the suspension of elections in Algeria in 
1992, in order to prevent an expected victory by an avowedly anti-democratic religious 
party, democracy can only protect itself "by limiting and threatening itself."116  Moreover, 
democracy is necessarily a 'cracy' or kratos.117  Insofar as any democracy is bound by a 
territory or defined by a particular population it will exercise some sovereign power, rule 
through the force of some laws and thus, exclude in its turn.  Democracy is unthinkable 
without some ipseity yet every sovereignty is anti-democratic, putting some limits on 
democracy.118  However, in democracy in particular the identity of the sovereign is never 
stable, insofar as the people rule no sovereignty can be final.   
 
 Furthermore, in order to be democratic any notion of equality will have to be 
unconditional, that is, equality will have to assume a state "where every other is equally 
altogether other."119  Yet in order to function democracy must calculate; citizens from non-
citizens or an elected majority from a minority.120  Thus, the "law of number" necessary for 
any determination or measure of equality cannot do justice to either equality as such nor 
to the singularity of every counted other.121  The reduction to number which any 
democratic equality requires will necessarily be violent and reductive of the equality of all 
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and the singularity of every one.  The order of calculability, to which democratic equality 
is always reduced, must therefore negotiate with what is beyond calculation.  In brief, all 
of these paradoxes point to the explicitly and inherently aporetic nature of democracy 
which allow it to function as the 'least worst' political form for Derrida, one which figures 
the nature of relationality as all of his work describes it. 
 
Foucault and Democratic Parrhesia 
 Unlike the close attention given to democracy in Derrida’s work, the concept has 
had little discussion by Foucault’s interpreters.  While thinkers such as William Connolly 
have long insisted on the presence of a democratic ethos in Foucault's work, such an ethos 
could only be implicit given the near total absence of any discussion of democracy in his 
work.122  With the recent publication of his final two lecture courses at the Collège de 
France this is no longer the case.  The account of democratic parrhesia or truth-speaking 
in the 1984 course titled Courage de la Vérité in particular, points to, I will argue, 
democracy’s status as the ethico-political horizon of genealogy as a whole.  The underlying 
condition for democracy is that which all Foucault's work since at least the early 1970s 
show has been lost throughout the history of the West: a notion of truth inseparable from 
power.   
 
 Foucault argues that there are at least two central elements to understanding 
democracy's status for the Ancient Greeks.  First, that democracy has a particular political 
form.123  Greek democracy is defined by two central formal or juridical principles: the 
guarantee of equal participation in the exercise of power (isonomia) and the equal right for 
all to speak before the assembly (isegoria).124  Theorizations of democracy, primarily 
restricted to this de jure level of analysis, have effaced the defining feature of Greek 
democracy: the particular problematization of the political which Greek "experience" or 
"practice" provoke.125  This second element – the particular experiential or problematic 
structure of democracy – defined by a game of democratic power, procedures and 
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techniques for the exercise of this power and the ethos of individuals within this game – is 
not only central to understanding democracy as a political system but is also effaced by 
the majority of post-foundational formulations of democracy.  While Foucault refers to 
Lefort’s account, one could also add Derrida as well as Laclau and Mouffe to a list of 
thinkers who efface the singularity of democracy as a political experience and event.126   
 
 The political experience of Greek democracy is characterized by the Greek practice 
of truth-speaking called parrhesia.127  Parrhesia was central to early Greek political 
experience since it formed a “modality of truth-speaking" which is “alethurgique.” That is, 
parrhesia refers to a manifestation of truth and not an epistemological mode of truth 
linked to method, a truth grounded in the opacity of prophetic truth-speaking nor the 
technical knowledge of a teacher.128  As a mode of speaking, parrhesia is defined by three 
key elements.  First, it signifies a coincidence or identity of bios or subject and his logos or 
discourse which enunciates a truth.  In parrhesia the subject is the enunciator of a truth 
and not an object of truth.  Second, parrhesia is characterized by risk and courage.129  In 
speaking the truth the subject risks angering or hurting the interlocutor; truth should be 
revealed in its totality, no matter the consequences.130  It is thus “truth, in the risk of 
violence.”131  Thirdly, conditional for parrhesia is the acceptance of the 'game' of truth by 
the recipient of truth speaking; there must be a "pact" between the speaker and the 
other.132    The requirement of courage extends to the interlocutor insofar as he must be 
willing to listen to the truth no matter how hurtful or infuriating it may be.   
 
 In Courage de la Vérité Foucault develops extensive readings of Euripides Ion and 
Thucidydes account of Pericles’ Funeral Oration in particular, in order to show that 
parrhesia forms the primary condition of agonal democracy in 5th and 6th century 
Greece.  While the constitutional guarantee of equality was of course necessary, much 
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more importantly democracy consisted in the parrhesiatic act of speaking a truth in the 
Assembly to which one is committed in order to guide the polis.133  Parrhesiatic democracy 
formed the condition for an "ethical differentiation" through which the true interests of 
the city were determined.134  The 'best' for the city was able to emerge insofar as 
'differentiation' was recognized not on the basis of an objective truth or norm but through 
an agonal contest insofar as truth was recognized on the basis of its power to inspire, 
command and contest.  As Foucault puts it, “[t]he discourse of truth introduces a 
difference… only some can speak the truth.”135  An effective democratic polity was 
grounded in the courage, frankness and directness among citizens to speak and the 
willingness among the Assembly to listen and recognize those that spoke the truth.  The 
condition for agonal democracy was thus the constitution of a space for “a logos which will 
exercise its power and its influence.”136  In short, democracy was possible insofar as truth 
or knowledge was not opposed to power.   
 
 Both Foucault’s 1983 and 1984 lecture courses trace the events whereby, near the 
end of the fifth century B.C., democracy in Athens comes into crisis.  The possibility of 
speaking the truth and of the truth emerging from the agon come into question.  The 
problematization of democracy, Foucault argues, shifts from the themes of its mythical 
and heroic origins exemplified by Ion and Pericles Funeral Oration so that democratic 
parrhesia itself becomes a problem and object of angst.  The production of 'ethical 
differentiation' which lay at the core of democracy begins to be viewed as its “weakness” 
and its “fragility.”  The ethical differentiation constituted by parrhesia and at the core of 
agonal democracy necessarily institutes informal inequality and difference into the formal 
democratic condition of equality.  For democracy to produce truth, Foucault maintains, a 
resulting inequality between speakers is necessary.  On the other hand, truth is always 
threatened by democracy insofar as all are able to speak such that nothing guarantees that 
the ‘best’ will emerge through its practice.  The strength of democracy is a force of 
weakness:  
“no democracy without true discourse, since without true discourse it will perish; but 
the death of true discourse, the possibility of the death of true discourse, the possibility 
of the reduction to silence of true discourse is inscribed within democracy.  No true 
discourse without democracy, but true discourse introduces differences within 
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democracy.  No democracy without true discourse, but democracy is a threat to the very 
existence of true discourse.”137 
 
 
Beginning in the 5th century B.C. critiques of democracy proliferate, democracy 
ceases to be seen as a privileged locus of truth-speaking.138  Plato is exemplary of the view 
that democracy forms a danger to the city insofar as its condition of equality leads not to 
the emergence, but to the effacement of the possibility of ‘ethical differentiation’ and 
thus, of the appearance of truth.  Because it permits all to speak democracy cannot 
guarantee that the 'best' will emerge and thus, is problematized on the grounds that it may 
impede the possibility of ethical differentiation.  What the argument implies is that there 
is a ‘fragility’ inherent to democracy insofar as it does not and cannot 'found' or guarantee 
truth.139  For the critics of democracy democratic truth-speaking is open to the threat of 
rhetoric and flattery; modes of speaking where logos and bios are disjoined and 
additionally, the Assembly offers no guarantee that others will listen and will not suppress 
the truth.140 
 
 What implications should we draw from Foucault's account of the fall of 
democracy?  The portrayal of democracy in his last lecture courses as a political regime 
wherein truth is not disjoined from power should be viewed as central to understanding 
both Foucault's opus and the political ethics which arise from it.  Democracy is the form 
of political regime which excludes the demand to obey commanded by the power of a 
transcendent or scientific truth characteristic of all subsequent Western political forms.  
Democratic parrhesia is a 'less violent' mode of relationality.  Yet it is this very 'lesser 
violence' which also marks democracy as inherently weak.  In the absence of a foundation 
which would guarantee the emergence of a particular truth in advance, democracy is 
traversed by an intrinsic 'fragility' as its inescapable condition.  This fragility, if the regime 
is to remain democratic cannot be transcended since democratic polity by definition is 
not to determine or found truth in advance.  Moreover, Foucault shows metaphysics to 
emerge as a desire and attempt to master and overcome the fragility of democratic truth.  
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The Platonic invention of a truth beyond being emerges  as a response to what Plato saw 
as the emergence of a lack of harmony among Athenian citizens between their bios and 
their logos and the consequent incapacity of speaking or recognizing true discourse in the 
democratic polis.141  The Socratic confrontation of the citizen displaces the demos to 
become the medium through which true discourse might care for the polis by 
commanding the interlocutor to bring their bios in harmony with their logos.142  The 
Platonic response to the fragility of parrhesiatic truth in the demos displaces the Assembly 
as locus of truth and relocates it to the philosophical question of essence. 
 
 Thus, the Alcibiades is typical insofar as the question of the unity of the relation 
between the subject and truth is relocated from the demos to Socrates' confrontation with 
a single citizen whereby truth does not emerge through a contest but in a rupture with the 
sensible world.  The parrhesiatic question of the power of truth, of the relation between 
the logos and the bios is displaced by a question of the 'soul' as the object which gives 
access to truth.143  Viewed as an "ontological reality distinct from the body" the 
metaphysics of the soul founds, through theoretical contemplation, an originary relation 
between the soul and a transcendent truth.144  From the Alcibiades Western thought 
inherits a discourse of transcendence, spread by Christianity and developed by 
metaphysics and biopower, postulating a relation to truth via a 'monde autre' and a 
demand for obedience (to God, his representatives, or later, a secular scientific authority) 
in order to access truth.   
 
 For Foucault, democracy's fragility or weakness results from the fact that it is 
organised around an experience of truth not grounded in a metaphysical essence which 
transcends its appearance.  Democracy, in other words, is a regime in which truth is not 
dis-joined from power.  Relations to others are not subjected to or governed by context-
independent rules or normative criteria, and thus, are free from the demand for order 
and obedience which has dominated relationality in the history of the West.  Democracy 
is a regime wherein truth emerges in agonal struggle and as such arguably forms the 
                                               
141  FS, pp.100-1 
142  FS, p.97, 100; CV, p.69, 79, 102. 
143  CV, pp.116-7 
144  CV, p.117; Frederic Gros, "Situation du Cours." CV, pp.313-328.  See p.321; Foucault argues that the  
   tradition of immanent critique is also founded by Plato in the Laches which does not question the  
   essence of truth but how one should 'care' for oneself in order to access truth.   
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ethico-political horizon of all of Foucault's interventions insofar as his genealogies target 
the postulation of a normalizing truth and its demand to obey.  Insofar as nothing 
external to democratic practices ensures that a truth will emerge, nothing external to it 
can function as its guarantor or ground.  Democracy for Foucault, is thus inherently 
problematic and, as his genealogy of parrhesia shows, it is only in the Platonic and then 
Christian postulation of a metaphysical essence that democracy and the inherently agonal 
nature of the political is displaced. 
 
 
Democracy, Incommensurability, Polemics 
 Is there any particular significance to their competing accounts of democracy as 
opposed to the epistemological, ontological and ethical discrepancies and disagreements 
between them?  Initially, it would appear that, aside from what I have claimed is its 
significance as an ethico-political horizon in their work, the comparison of Derrida and 
Foucault on the question of democracy does not contribute to our ability to think 
through the difference between these two thinkers.  In this sense, as I claimed above, the 
implicit debate over the nature of democracy reflects a more fundamental divergence over 
the decision between immanence and (quasi)transcendence insofar as democracy is 
conceived in terms of either the aporia or the problem.  However, to limit one’s analysis 
of the implications of their competing notions of democracy to these terms is to neglect a 
further essential insight both for our understanding of the polemics between Derrida and 
Foucault and more broadly, for the terms it suggests for thinking post-foundational 
accounts of the political.   
 
 I have shown that Derrida and Foucault explicitly in the cogito debate and 
implicitly throughout their work see one another as having failed to think the 'true' locus 
of differentiation and determination and thus, circumscribe one another within the limits 
of metaphysics in a way analogous to Heidegger's insertion of Nietzsche within the 
confines of metaphysics.  Both Derrida and Foucault draw the conclusion that the other’s 
failure is signaled by his accession to a transcendent metaphysical stance in excess of all 
relation.  But I have argued that the equality in this twofold circumscription points to the 
relational character of their thought.  That is to say, each theorist’s critique of the other is 
in total conformity with their broader ‘ontological’ view such that it is confirmed only 
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from within the ‘perspective’ of Derrida's deconstruction or Foucault’s genealogy – each is 
able to restrict the work of the other within the confines of the metaphysical.  To the 
extent that their accounts are self-affirmingly finite and situated there is no position 
beyond the relational which they both seek to express from which the polemic between 
them can be decided.  Yet this also means that their incommensurability points to a 
broader polemical/political space which cannot be described as such since it only emerges 
between them, confirmed only in the equality of their incommensurability, a polemical 
space that can only be inferred but never described in itself.   
 
 What are the implications of this notion of the polemical for thinking a post-
foundational understanding of the political and a radical democracy?  Theorists of radical 
democracy, I argued, share the notion that democracy is truly democratic insofar as the 
form and structure of democracy itself is in question.  They all share the view that 
democracy must be open not only to differing perspectives and opinions but must admit 
that irreducible ‘ontological’ accounts of the very nature of the ethical and political are at 
stake.  The fundamental terms of democratic contest cannot be determined in advance if 
democracy is to be sustained.  Yet these thinkers describe the nature of this irreducible 
contestability in competing and often incommensurable terms.  For instance, Mouffe’s 
Schmittian conception of agonism, Rancière's notion of the emergence of the claim to 
equality from the ‘part that has no part,’ Nancy’s re-inscription of mitsein or most of all, 
Derrida’s and Foucault’s formulations of the democratic as figuring the aporia or 
problem form competing  accounts of essential contestability.  The polemics between 
Derrida and Foucault are exemplary for us since they stage the paradox of post-
foundational thought: they both affirm a radically democratic political form yet reduce it 
to their own onto-ethico-political ‘perspective.’  The democratic contest in which their 
own philosophy might be situated is thus potentially disavowed and the locus of the 
polemic is limited to one or another perspective upon it.  This move is in a sense 
irreducible for two reasons.  First, as Derrida and Foucault both affirm, there is no extra-
relational position from which the ‘medium’ of relationality may be appropriated and 
secondly, it follows that every ‘perspective’ will be irreducibly finite and violent.  
Consequently, the incommensurability between Derrida and Foucault begins to suggest 
that we must expand our understanding of the political to admit that no single onto-
political account or 'grander' narrative can in itself be said to finally describe the nature of 
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relationality, even if as it is in Derrida and Foucault, an affirmation of originary violence 
and finitude is built into that account.    
 
 The polemics in excess of either the Derridean or Foucaultian onto-political 
perspective points to an indefinitely broad democratic field, irreducible to its 
determination by any 'grander' narrative while simultaneously pointing to the 
politicization of the philosophical itself.  That is to say, once we affirm this more radical 
relational field, irreducible to its accounting by any particular narrative no matter the 
lengths to which it affirms its own finitude or situatedness, is always conditioned by the 
polemico-political move of producing a 'grander' narrative to begin with.  Here, radical 
democracy signals not only one or another account of the irreducibility of political 
contestability, but the very contestability of these accounts themselves.  Thus, the 
possibility of the polemical is always anterior to particular polemics themselves.  
Philosophy is politicized, but also democratized.  This is not to reduce the philosophical 
to the exchange of opinions but to a form of agonism in excess of any account of agonism 
and thus, guarantees the continued possibility of agonistics. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 These claims for the irreducibility of democracy and agonism as potentially 
forming the locus of philosophical polemics should not be seen to bring my own 
argument into affinity with the liberalism of a thinker like Richard Rorty.  Indeed, Rorty 
may affirm the priority of democracy to philosophy but any similarities end there.  Rorty 
famously claims that the affirmation of contingency that proceeds from Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault; the ‘postmodern’ decentering of subjectivity which 
grants a certain freedom and autonomy is, he argues, “pretty much useless when it comes 
to politics.”145  As such, the work of Derrida and Foucault is always reduced by Rorty to a 
practice of self-creation restricted to the private sphere.146  This is because, Rorty argues, 
these philosophers and philosophy in general, has little if anything to say to his liberal 
conception of politics as the pragmatic pursuit of justice.  Yet it is not difficult to see that 
Rorty’s is the formulation of an extremely vague and broad liberal ideology in which his 
                                               
145  Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989.  P.83, 65 
146  Ibid., p.120.  See also Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers 2. Cambridge: Cambridge  
        UP, 1991. 
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liberal “ironists” are circumscribed.  The point is that Rorty disavows that his liberalism, 
and the positing of a public/private divide which follows from it, are themselves 
contingent and open to contestation.  Derrida and Foucault cannot be so easily reduced 
to a liberal practice of self-creation, liberalism is not immune to critique and 
circumscription.  Yet if Rorty’s attempt to ‘neutralize’ the polemical nature of the political 
(to use Schmitt’s terms) is relatively clearly contestable, there is nevertheless a more 
substantial challenge to Derrida and Foucault which emerges in recent political thought 
and is grounded in the claim that both thinkers fail to pose a serious challenge to 
contemporary liberalism and capitalism.  It is this debate that we now seek to examine. 
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Chapter 6:  Derrida, Foucault and  
the Politics of Universalism 
 
Introduction 
 Can the schema of philosophy's relation to politics derived from the question of 
relation in Derrida and Foucault be extended beyond the specificity of their 'onto-
political' accounts?  Is there a limit or paradox internal to Derrida and Foucault which 
allows us to construct a 'perspectival' schematic but marks the work of these two thinkers 
as deficient?  Or, to articulate these questions in a political register, might their strategies 
of politicization, of the ascription of the irreducibility of an economy of violence as 
'founding' their parallel yet distinct ethico-political strategies be sufficiently emancipatory?  
Might a politics of indetermining or un-bonding the relational exhaust the political 
possibilities of a thought affirming its own relational status?  This chapter will pursue 
these questions by first discussing the increasingly prominent calls for the necessity of a 
formulation of universality if a truly emancipator politics is to emerge in late capitalism.  
It will then go on to discuss Derrida’s and Foucault’s own theoretical engagements with 
contemporary capitalism and liberalism before entering their work into a dialogue with 
the political ontology of Alain Badiou, perhaps the most influential and powerful critic of 
post-Heideggerean thought and proponent of a politics of universalism. 
 
 
The Return of Universality 
 Wendy Brown and Diana Coole are both exemplary of a theoretical disposition 
which claims that there are intrinsic limits to the effectiveness of post-foundational 
political thought and to deconstruction and genealogy in particular.  Without denying the 
significance, influence and potency of Derrida's or Foucault's work, Brown and Coole 
both ultimately question the political effectiveness of ethico-political strategies which 
result or at the very least, take their bearings from their work.  For Brown the key insight 
to be derived from 'postmodern' theory is the potentially liberating effect of the 
affirmation that everything is at least potentially politicized insofar as it points to the 
  
222 
artificiality of every ordering and hierarchy in some way.1  Yet this radically politicizing 
perspective, both Brown and Coole claim, is inherently limited because it fails to think 
the “collective” nature of politics.  That is, post-foundational accounts suppress a second 
key element of the political which Brown defines as “negotiating the powers and values of 
enduring collectivities.”2    Or as Coole puts it, 
 
“philosophies that begin with heterogeneity and flux [...] are inimical to the subsequent 
derivation of a politics[...] precisely because the political is the domain of collective life, it 
necessarily engenders, and indeed requires, shared practices, habits, norms, languages, 
no matter how diverse its participants.”3   
 
Not limited to Brown nor Coole, a number of thinkers who seek to re-articulate the status 
of universality itself in politics draw inherent limits to the Derridean and Foucaultian 
strategies of politicization.  For it is generally through a re-articulation of the status of 
universality that the apparent inability to construct a collectivist politics in Derrida and 
Foucault appears as a particularly debilitating element of their work.4  Thus, lying at the 
core of recent discussions of the inherent limits of deconstruction and genealogy is the 
perceived necessity of a broader conception of universality as an emancipatory category of 
collective action.   
 
 Whilst it is overly simplistic and reductive to suggest that a Marxist-influenced 
theory focuses on collective struggle while a Nietzschean one looks to individual efforts to 
realize the Ubermensch, nonetheless, this apparent need for a universalizing emancipatory 
discourse is itself centered upon a particular understanding of late capitalism's status as 
the dominant political logic in the world today.  For example, while affirming the post-
foundational claim that every universal must by definition itself be contingent and 
particular, Étienne Balibar has argued that 'our' situation today is nevertheless defined by 
what he calls “real universality.”5  For Balibar, 'real universality' is not a utopia or telos 
which philosophy or politics seeks but rather, our 'actual condition' defined by, in his 
words, the “actual interdependency between the various units” and the processes which 
                                               
1 Wendy Brown, Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005. P.76 
2  Ibid. 
3  Diana Coole, Negativity and Politics: Dionysus and Dialectics from Kant to Poststructuralism. London: 
    Routlede, 2000. P.9 
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5  Étienne Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene. London: Verso, 2002. P.147 
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involve them.6  Balibar is offering a unique description of what is usually referred to as 
globalisation; the concrete material processes which increasingly merge all elements of 
social life throughout all corners of the world.  As it stands, Balibar claims, “the 'limits' or 
'extremities of the world' have now been reached by various modes of exploration, or the 
expansion of dominant, unified technologies and institutions have incorporated 'all parts 
of the world.’”7   
  
 Balibar's account of the universalising processes at the core of late capitalism 
should however, not be understood as a re-articulation of by now well-worn truths about 
globalization.  There is an element to his account which sets it apart insofar as he claims 
that our contemporary 'real universality' is defined by what he calls a 'generalization of 
minority status.'8  Balibar argues that the notion of a hegemonic centre from which, or by 
which one is excluded is imagined, there is no more 'centre' to these processes but rather 
an indefinite “multiplication of centres.”9  Accordingly, a politics based on the perception 
of wrongs committed by a hegemonic 'centre' against particular groups or individuals 
through which emancipatory claims are often articulated today and which (rightly or 
wrongly) are generally thought to be inspired by Derrida and/or Foucault among others, 
appear in Wendy Brown's words, as “generic claims of particularism endemic to the 
universality of political culture.”10  The affirmation of particularity or difference in itself 
thus merely certifies the differential and differentiating power of late capitalism such that 
the ethico-political imperative against the totalizing force of dominant logics merely 
reflects its own situation; difference itself functions as a form of arche-logic.  One finds 
parallels to Balibar's account of 'real universality' in the work of a number of his 
contemporaries.  Thus, Rancière argues that the assumption of a plurality of differences 
or differential identities has become a contemporary form of universality.11    Similarly, 
Alain Badiou, upon whom we will focus below, claims that 'difference' is inconsequential, 
difference is simply what there is and thus, implies that difference in itself cannot 
function as the ground of an emancipatory politics.  An ethics of difference or otherness, 
Badiou argues, leaves one caught “oscillating between the abstract universal of capital and 
                                               
6  Ibid. 
7   Ibid. 
8   Ibid. 
9   Ibid., P.150 
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localized persecutions” without challenging the ‘false universality’ of capitalism itself.12   
 
 For all of these thinkers, the problem with a politics grounded in claims of 
difference is that it does not present a serious challenge to the 'real universality' of late 
capitalism but rather, confirms its dominance.  In claiming recognition or legitimacy for a 
particular group (e.g., women, gays, ethnic or cultural groups, etc.) one is caught, as 
Rancière puts it, between either the “submission to the universal as formulated by those 
who dominate” or the “confinement within an identitarian perspective in those instances 
where the functioning of the universal is interrupted.”13  The initially progressive critique 
of universals, ‘grand narratives’ and their hegemonic subordination of cultural, social and 
sexual differences also risks its reduction to a set of self-righteous groups claiming the 
objectivity of an identity.  Accordingly, difference itself becomes fixed as a position; one's 
place in the system does not change yet one acquires the status of victim or minority.14  
One might thus say that a politics of difference is only effected from within the foreclosure 
of the universalising effects of contemporary liberal capitalism or, as Wendy Brown puts 
it, the claim to difference or singularity is “partly dependent on the demise of a critique of 
capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values.”15  The demands of minority 
or particular identities are easily addressed by the capitalist system and thus, do not put 
that system itself in question.16   
 
 From this perspective, an 'onto-political' strategy is required that would be in 
excess of the affirmations of differentiation which might be said to characterise genealogy 
and deconstruction insofar as their theorizing of the political is restricted to localized 
strategies of politicization.  What is required is a politics which operates at the level of 
universality that can rival that of capital itself and thus, to ensure that the struggle against 
capital occurs on a plane other than that of capital.17  Or as Balibar formulates the 
question: “[h]ow can we universalize resistance without reinforcing the exclusive identity and 
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otherness which the system already produces and instrumentalizes?”18   
 
 If the hypotheses developed around the problem of incommensurability thus far 
in this thesis are to be extended beyond Derrida and Foucault, an articulation of the 
limits of the effectiveness of collective and universalist emancipatory strategies should also 
be subject to the modulations inherent to post-foundational polemics.  That is to say, if 
Derrida and Foucault are both to be circumscribed within a logic of 'real universality' then 
it should be possible to locate, as the condition for this circumscription, a divergent 
articulation of the medium of differentiation to either the aporia or the problem.  The 
condition for their circumscription is assumingly the production of a different 'grander' 
narrative within which deconstruction and genealogy can then be located.  Alain Badiou's 
political ontology of the event is a particularly adept example19 of such a circumscription 
since his work has been perhaps the most potent and influential post-foundational 
philosophy in recent years.  At the core of his work lies precisely the attempt to articulate, 
in contrast to Derrida and Foucault, an ethics and politics of universalism which would 
conceive the possibility of effecting a radical transformation of the current situation.  At 
stake between Derrida, Foucault and Badiou is thus the articulation of a terrain upon 
which an effective resistance to liberalism can be effected.  Before bringing the insights of 
Badiou's political ontology to bear on Derrida's and Foucault's work, I will briefly describe 
the potential terms in which an opposition to liberalism is constituted by deconstruction 
and genealogy.   
 
 
Derrida, Foucault and Liberalism 
Derrida and Liberalism 
 To my knowledge Derrida's most rigorous and extensive engagement with the logic 
of contemporary liberalism occurs in the discussion of Francis Fukuyama's The End of 
History and The Last Man in Specters of Marx.20  The target of Derrida's reading is the 
triumphalist discourse of neo-liberal capitalism which followed the collapse of the Soviet 
Union that permeates Fukuyama's book.  Derrida claims that Fukuyama's discourse 
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reflects a "new world order" grounded upon a celebratory 'death' of Marx and Marxism 
which signals, he argues, an "unprecedented form of hegemony."21  Fukuyama is 
archetypal of the celebration of the apparently unchallenged arrival of the telos of liberal 
capitalism, that is, the conditioned emergence of the "ideal orientation" of global 
humanity to the telos of liberal democracy.22  Once Marxism had apparently died as a 
political force in 1989, Fukuyama argues that the arrival of a worldwide liberal democracy 
is an inevitable eventuality.  Any particular failures or inadequacies to have arrived at this 
end already are merely 'empirical' and contingent and do not reflect or affect the ideal 
movement of liberal democracy.23  For Fukuyama, any failure in the realization of liberal 
democracy across the globe is only a de facto or empirical one and does not affect the de 
jure truth of liberalism.24   
 
 Derrida inserts his deconstruction of the hegemonic discourse of neo-liberalism in 
the space between Fukuyama's 'arche-teleological' affirmation of the unstoppable universal 
ideal of liberalism and the merely contingent 'failures' to have emerged in its totality 
already.  Not unlike Carl Schmitt's critique of liberalism's 'neutralization' of the 
conflictual nature of the political, Derrida argues Fukuyama is able to posit the principle 
of liberalism and its universality only through a brutal and violent effacement of the war, 
totalitarianism, conflict and suffering which have always, and continue to, accompany any 
liberal discourse.25  It is in other words "evil in general" which Fukuyama and those like 
him, disavow.26  Accordingly, in opposition to the teleology of Fukuyama's liberal 
idealism, Derrida calls upon what he names the 'ten plagues' which mark the most severe 
failures and tragedies of this liberal new world order: unemployment, homelessness, 
economic war between states, the contradictions of the free market and its control of 
international law; the destruction of states via foreign debt; the arms industry; nuclear 
proliferation; inter-ethnic wars; the mafia and drug cartels; the domination of 
international law by a small number of nuclear states.27  These plagues are not mere 
contingent and ephemeral events which the spread of liberalism will overcome.  They 
cannot be reduced to Fukuyama's "idealist" logic, but rather, are correlative with liberalism 
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24  SoM, p.64 
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itself.28  As Derrida caustically puts it,  
 
"at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal 
democracy that finally realized itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, 
inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings 
in the history of the earth and of humanity."29 
 
 
 In several shorter essays mirroring the terms of the critique of Fukuyama Derrida 
has deconstructed the hegemonic logic and claim to universality and neutrality of 
globalization, or what he calls mondialisation.  Derrida insists on this other name, best 
translated as 'world-wideization' because he argues that the process is far broader than 
mere territorial changes which globalization implicitly indicates.  Globalizing 
'teletechnologies' create a unity or world not only through territorial expansion but rather, 
through the expansion of markets, technologies, values, popular culture, etc.  Much like 
his deconstruction of Fukuyama's neo-liberal discourse, Derrida targets the contradictions 
which he argues are inherent to globalization.  On the one hand, the name refers to the 
process of opening and increasing inter-connectivity of borders, markets, and so on.  On 
the other hand, it brings with it increasing inequalities within this new global space.30  
Discourses around globalization generally disavow that the openings and connections the 
process conditions are not equally beneficial to all if in fact it is beneficial to some at all.31  
Globalization is, in effect, not very global at all.  Accordingly, globalization he argues, is a 
'pharmakon,' it is both "for better and for worse."32  Inherent to its concept is both the 
chance of increased democracy but also, increasing inequality.  Globalization is an 
inherently violent and particularising process defined by a narrow 'Christianization', a 
Eurocentrism and a marketization of the world, yet for globalization to succeed or 
proceed, it must maintain a certain universalising or unconditional element.33  A 
globalizing process cannot maintain its identity across time and space without a certain 
openness to, and malleability in the face of particularities and differences of culture, 
language, geography, etc.  Thus, it is on the basis of this inescapable unconditionality or 
autoimmunity of hegemony and homogeneity that globalization can be challenged.34   
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 These readings of the spread of liberal capitalism open a disjointure between 
liberalism's ideals and empirical reality.  They show that the universality to which 
liberalism lays claim is a chimera, it is always accompanied by the spread of inequality and 
empirical violence.  However, we should not proceed too quickly to suggest that Derrida's 
'resistance' to liberalism remains caught within the confines of liberal concepts, reduced 
to the demand for more liberal equality, freedom and justice and so risk an extension of 
the state, of juridical power, of capitalism, etc.  The binary trap of de jure and de facto 
liberalism is exceeded, Derrida suggests, insofar as it is questioned through the 
“inspiration” of a certain “Marxist spirit.”35  It is the refusal to disavow the militant and 
interminable critique which Marxism has produced which would put the ideal of 
liberalism in question by exceeding its economy altogether.   
 
Yet, this is precisely the type of claim which draws the ire of his critics since in 
Specters of Marx, where this ‘Marxist spirit’ is derived, Derrida primarily seeks to question 
the possibility of Marx’s determination of the 'actual material conditions' of existence in 
the name of the irreducibility of the spectral or 'hauntological' which incessantly disrupts 
the terms within which Marx defines the material and the living.36  Marx’s critique is itself 
shown to be subject to the vagaries of the aporetic such that a number of theorists have 
wondered what, if anything, is left of Marxist theory and praxis once it has undergone 
Derrida’s intervention?37  From Fukuyama to Marx to globalization and beyond Derrida 
presents an indefinite series of depoliticizations and repoliticizations.  Neither universalist 
nor reducible to their particularity, neither reformist nor revolutionary, they point to a 
critique which is necessarily infinite and a political terrain determinable only as the locus 
upon which these oscillations between the determinate and indeterminate play out 
endlessly.  It is the irresolution of the aporia itself which, for Derrida, promises the 
interminability of critique and politicization.  
 
Foucault on Liberalism 
 Perhaps the starkest contrast between Derrida and Foucault, but also between 
Foucault and most post-foundational political thought is drawn in the latter's 1979 lecture 
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course on neo-liberal governmentality.  The novelty of his analysis emerges from the 
refusal to view liberalism as Schmittians such as Chantal Mouffe have as a juridical 
'neutralization' of the political.  Liberalism is politicized by Foucault not insofar as it 
forms a hegemonic effacement of its own particularist status nor its telos of consensus, 
but insofar as it is perceived as a broad governmental rationality or programme whose 
conditions of possibility lie in the production of a new object of government loosely 
assembled by a particular notion of the 'market.'  Liberalism is not, from Foucault's 
perspective, a doctrine which theorizes the natural freedom of the individual, it is a 
governmental rationality which involves a multiplicity of interventions for the promotion 
of a specific form of life and social order.  
 
 The Birth of Biopolitics traces a series of crucial epistemological transformations in 
19th and especially 20th century liberal discourse which Foucault argues mark the 
emergence of a new form of biopolitical government.  Classical liberalism appears, 
Foucault argues, as a critique of biopolitical police governmentality's ability to govern the 
market and market relations for maximum economic development.38  Liberals posit the 
state's perceived lack of knowledge, its incapacity to master the complexity of market 
forces as an internal limit to government: government should not prevail over individuals' 
freedom to produce and exchange and should be measured by "the regulative ideal of 
personal autonomy."39  The constitution of the market as object of knowledge enabled the 
state to extend the range of activities over which it could be said to hold true knowledge 
and to anchor criteria for this truth in the nation's economic vitality.  The constitution of 
the market, like madness or sexuality, allowed the formation of an "apparatus [dispositif] of 
knowledge-power that effectively marks out in reality that which does not exist and 
legitimately submits it to the division between truth and false."40  Governmental 
effectiveness and legitimacy was reflected in the level of understanding of what was 
perceived as the independent forces of life and respect for the autonomous development 
of the market.41 
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Foucault locates a central shift from Classical liberalism in two primary moments 
in which hegemonic neo-liberal discourse proceeds in the twentieth century.  First, early 
20th century Ordo liberalism re-defines capitalist rationality by developing an anti-natural 
logic of the market.42  The market for ordo-liberalism was not a natural reality with its 
own laws as classical liberals believed.  Pure competition was neither natural nor real but 
rather, the telos and justification for political intervention and for government.  Markets, 
in short, required state intervention to function.43  Foucault argues that Ordo-liberalism's 
anti-natural conception of the market fulfilled a strategic function of marking a strict 
dichotomy between the economic base and the legal-political superstructures as untenable 
since the non-natural market is a field of intervention.  Politically, this meant that anti-
naturalism allowed for the formation of a logic of 'saving' capitalism.  If capitalism does 
not exist in itself but is a historically singular form one had to construct a capitalist 
polity.44  Social intervention would be employed in order to anchor and universalize the 
entrepreneurial and competitive social form.  In the latter half of the 20th century, the 
'Chicago school' theorists radicalized Ordo-liberal premises.  The logic of the anti-natural 
market was extended to all social spheres such that the distinction between the economic 
and the social was effaced; the social is redefined as economic.  As a result government 
itself was conceived as a form of enterprise whose task was to universalize competition 
and increasingly extend market systems of action.45  No longer considered as only one 
sphere among others, economics increasingly defines all social behavior and relations.46   
 
 This underlying conception of anti-naturalism meant that unlike classical 
liberalism, the neo-liberal conception of social agents is not grounded in a universal 
account of human nature, but rather, in an artificially created behaviour.  The ground of 
political legitimacy is not conceived as a natural freedom, but rather a produced artificial 
freedom of entrepreneurial and competitive behavior.  Conceived in terms of a 
multiplicity of governmental practices or interventions, liberalism is thus not grounded in 
the promotion of a minimal state or a theoretical postulation of a 'neutral' terrain but by a 
multiplication and intensification of state intervention whose goal is to form 
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'enterprising' agents who will inhabit this terrain.47  Neo-liberalism is not defined by the 
loss of authority of the state, instead it transfers state responsibilities to 'rational' 
individuals through the logic of giving life an entrepreneurial form.  A behavioralistically 
manipulated being is linked to a correlative governmentality whose role is to alter the 
social environment in the interest of the ascendancy of rational choice as mode of 
behaviour.48  As Nicolas Rose argues, the 'expert' functions as a hinge between the 
individual and liberal governmental power in a way which requires almost no direct 
repression or intervention on existence.  The liberal ethical demand to govern oneself 
allows power to bring individual conduct in line with broad liberal political and statistical 
objectives.49  These techniques parallel and develop the confessional model; teachers, 
doctors, job counselors and market researchers among others, armed with the authority of 
scientific knowledge, manage and form individual life as enterprise to ensure the 
proliferation of liberal objectives of productivity, competitiveness, consumption and 
innovation.50   Increased productivity and efficiency are no longer primarily governed by 
disciplinary techniques but managed through an engagement with the desire for self-
fulfillment insofar as the objectives of the organisation or increases in consumption are 
continually aligned with the desires of the self.       
 
The Critique of Liberalism and Incommensurability 
 In question between these two accounts of liberalism is not only a 'theoretical' 
account which would identify the way in which liberal capitalism seeks to constitute a 
neutral and universal space of the political, the stakes are much higher.  The response to 
the question of politicization, of how to politicize – through the strategy of the aporia or 
the problem – points to the locus or terrain upon which the contemporary hegemony of 
neo-liberalism can be resisted.  For Derrida, that locus appears in the 'disjointure' between 
liberalism's ideals and empirical reality; a disjointure which itself points to the 
irreducibility of the aporetic and so, the indefinite possibility of critique.  For Foucault, 
the conditions for the liberal determination of relation and thus revolt against them 
should be located elsewhere.  The constitution of liberal 'neutrality' is conditioned by the 
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formation of an 'entrepreneurial' subject who relates to herself and to others in the terms 
of a governmental rationality of biopower and who thus aligns herself with the objectives 
of this particular mode of eliciting social order.  As such, it is a different relation to the 
self – one freed from the demand to attach the self to an exterior norm – which 
Foucault's genealogy of liberalism calls for. 
 
 The Foucaultian 'desire' for the other gives a radically different orientation in the 
face of the hegemony of liberal capitalism to Derrida's.  The violence of liberalism occurs 
at the level of practices; a knowledge of the market, disjoined from its own relation to 
power is constituted as the object by which a relation to oneself is governed by a 
biopolitical truth.  The possibility of disrupting this determination must thus target not 
the impossible possibility of its conditions, but the immanent possibilities of becoming 
other in the disconnection of the becoming of the self from the "intensification of power 
relations."51  It is perhaps in this sense that it is the lectures on liberal biopolitics that 
form the hinge between Foucault's genealogies of power-knowledge and the later works on 
ethics.  For the structuring of possibility by liberalism occurs for Foucault in the 
intersection between one's relation to oneself and to the authority and power of the norm 
of homo oeconomicus.  As such, it is upon the terrain of the invention of non-normalizing 
relations to the self upon which the possibility of exceeding liberal capitalism lies.  
 
Circumscribing Derrida and Foucault in Capitalism 
 If Derrida's and Foucault's engagements with contemporary liberalism locate the 
terrain of its de-stabilization or resistance in terms of the ethico-political logics of a 'desire 
for the outside' described in chapter 4, an articulation of the limited effectiveness of these 
strategies would have to call for their circumscription within an articulation of the nature 
of the real universality of late capitalism.  It is through this understanding of capital as 
contemporary medium (or media) through which differences are produced that both 
Derrida and Foucault, though in different ways, may be said to fail to think the 'real' 
nature of this medium, the terrain upon which it is to be resisted and accordingly, 
theorize an insufficient provocation in relation to it.  From the perspective of the 
differentiating force of 'real universality' the ethics of alterity articulated by Levinas and 
radicalized by Derrida appears as a “modesty” and “moderation” on behalf of 
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philosophy.52  That is, deconstruction appears to dispense with emancipatory possibilities 
altogether for a reflection upon the irreducibility of its own violence and hubris.53  The 
ethical 'recoil' of deconstruction and genealogy appears as an inherently 'melancholy' 
thought, a “resigned” or “cynical” stance defined by the announcement of the failure of 
one's claim concurrent with its production.54  Derrida's ethics of the aporia seems to 
abandon democratic solidarity to a preoccupation with absolute dissymmetry.  Both 
Rancière and Badiou for example, argue that politically, the affirmation of dissymmetry in 
relation to the other is reflected by the logics of humanitarian intervention insofar as they 
are derived from a constitution of the other as victim and thus, restrict the other's 
appearance to his/her inequality and radical passivity.55   
 
 The account of the limits of the emancipatory force of Foucault's work through 
the perspective of 'real universality,' much like the circumscription and critique of 
Derrida, lies in the question of Foucault's ability to posit a terrain in excess of dominant 
political logics today.  For example, Balibar argues that in positing the immanence of 
resistance to power Foucault fails to think the “transformation of the world” which would 
condition the possibility for an ethics of the care of the self.56  In positing the absence of 
any gap between conditions and the conditioned Foucault, like Derrida, is caught in an 
interminable ethical pessimism which limits the possibilities for political transformation.57  
In other words, the refusal to posit any form of essential distance between the subject of 
resistance and the conditions which it resists leave Foucault incapable of conceiving an 
emancipation which would subvert the system which generates it.58  Analogously, for 
Badiou this deficiency in Foucault is a direct result of his failure and refusal to think what 
the former calls the “genericity” of a given time (discussed below).59  Foucault's emphasis 
on the particular and local targets upon which power is exercised leaves him without any 
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effective means to found the universal 'truths' which found any genuinely emancipatory 
politics.60 
 
 Recall that we examined critiques of this form against Derrida and Foucault in 
chapter 4 and claimed that they were based on a mis-reading of these authors.  It was 
argued that the notions of an inherent 'hesitancy' in Derrida's work and the lack of a 
source of resistance in Foucault were grounded in a misapprehension of the conditions of 
their respective 'grander' narratives, of the terms of which their ethics' of amor fati were 
articulated.  Thus, if the potency of these ethico-political strategies are once again being 
reconsidered here it is because they appear in a totally different light in terms of the 
theorization of the 'real universality' of late capitalism.  In other words, the critiques of 
the lack of emancipatory strategies in Derrida and Foucault gain their force from within 
an other circumscriptive horizon.  A horizon which on the one hand, views capitalism as 
a single dominant force of the organisation of human collective existence and which 
conditions every element of social, political, cultural, intellectual and emotional life and, 
on the other hand, views the deconstructive or genealogical critique of totalization and its 
affirmation of difference as itself, at least in part, not lying in excess of this universality.  
From the horizon of 'real' universality the politicizations effected by deconstruction and 
genealogy are ultimately insufficient since they fail to address what is the apparently 'real' 
horizon within which they are constituted and as such one may perhaps go so far as to 
claim, as Slavoj Zizek does, that the effects of their ethico-political strategies are no 
different than the 'essentialisms' which they target.61  
 
 Zizek and Alain Badiou both claim that the affirmation of contingency merely 
reflects, rather than challenges capitalism since the latter as a system thrives upon the 
breakdown of traditional relations and capitalises upon new identities.  In other words, it 
is capital itself which conditions contingency.  Thus, the nihilistic destabilizing of 
foundations first described by Nietzsche and Heidegger is not to be located in the internal 
logic of philosophy or metaphysics.  Rather, for both Zizek and Badiou contingency is 
produced by the “metanarrative” of capital which in turn forms the “historic medium of 
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ontology.”62  Anterior to the philosophical articulation of contingency is its constitution 
in the rupturing force of capitalism itself: “[c]apital is the general dissolvent of sacralizing 
representations which postulate the existence of intrinsic and essential relations (between 
man and nature, men, groups and the Polis, mortal and eternal life, etc.).”63  From this 
perspective real universality forms the unavowed conditions for both deconstruction and 
genealogy.  If, as I suggested in chapter 4, we could defend Derrida or Foucault by 
pointing to the misinterpretations and reductions of their work by Zizek, Badiou, et. al. 
this would be to miss the essential point here.  Rather, I will seek to show below that this 
third circumscription too fits the model of polemics and the politicization of philosophy 
by which I have argued all post-foundational thought is characterised.  The complexity, 
differences and debates among the group of thinkers discussed above precludes the 
possibility of a detailed analysis of all of their work.  Instead we will take Alain Badiou's 
recent work as perhaps the most rigorous and influential example of the way in which the 
proponents of 'real' universality fit our model of the relational nature of political thought.   
 
 
Alain Badiou's Political Ontology 
 Badiou claims that his philosophy begins with the question first posed by 
Heidegger.  Like the latter he attempts to overcome the question of 'beingness' to think 
Being in itself.64  Both Heidegger and Badiou critique the metaphysical subordination of 
Being to a principle defining all beings or what Badiou, in his own characteristically 
mathematically derived discourse calls simply, the 'one.'65  Moreover, like Derrida and 
Foucault, Badiou's ontology is oriented towards thinking an outside anterior to any 
determinate relational field; all three thinkers are defined by the effort to orient thought 
via an inaccessible experience of the indeterminate.  Yet Badiou seeks to interrupt the 
relation between Being and 'beingness' or the 'one' in a way incommensurate to 
Heideggerian 'Abbau', deconstruction or genealogy.   
 
 Badiou's answer to the ontological question of Being qua Being is to assert that 
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Being is 'pure multiplicity' which, he argues, can be said only by mathematics.  Only 
mathematics speaks ontological truths and thus, articulates what can be presented of pure 
Being.66  Crucial here is the distinction he draws between multiplicity and the 'one.'  The 
one, he claims, “is not,” Being can be reduced to neither unity nor identity and cannot be 
defined.  All unifying principles fail to express Being since, as pure multiplicity, it is 
“without-oneness.”67  As Badiou puts it, “if the one is not, it follows that the multiple's 
immanent alterity gives rise to a process of limitless self-differentiation.”68  This 
distinction, fundamental to Badiou's ontology proceeds from his claim that if Being is to 
be conceived as pure indeterminacy, inconsistency or multiplicity ontology cannot 
proceed in terms of any attempt to define or represent Being.  Any determinate 'one' can 
only be the result of an operation of 'counting' pure multiples: “[t]he counting of one is 
no more than the system of conditions through which the multiple lets itself be 
recognised as multiple.”69  Yet since 'pure inconsistency' or without-oneness cannot be 
presented in itself it can accordingly only be affirmed by an axiomatic decision, one which 
is borne out by the presentation of what 'is' as pure multiplicity to us.70  No limit or 
constitutive condition of the multiple can be posited since to do so is once again to 
elevate the sovereign position of some 'one.'71   
 
 In affirming the primacy of the axioms of mathematical set theory Badiou posits a 
radically different mode of thinking the indeterminate to the thinkers we have discussed 
at any length thus far in this thesis; Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault.  For 
Badiou only a purely axiomatic thought makes it possible to think multiplicity without 
thinking it as an object or referent which would then be defined, experienced, 
represented or ordered.72  It is mathematical set theory for Badiou which prescribes the 
steps whereby any identity or one is determined as the result of an operation of 'counting' 
upon a multiplicity.73  According to the axioms of set theory any situation can be posited 
as an infinite set, that is, as a ‘generic’ multiplicity determined by some counting 
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operation.74  Moreover, set theory submits that the number of possible subsets always 
exceeds the number of elements of any set.  In an infinite set the excess of subsets would 
thus be immeasurable.  Since Badiou asserts that every human situation is an infinite set, 
accordingly, in all human situations there is an immeasurable excess of parts over the 
whole.  The upshot is thus that any human situation can only appear through the 
suppression of an immanent anarchic multiplicity, and as such, what 'is' cannot be 
articulated either in terms of a founding principle or an originary finitude.75    
 
 The central axiom of Badiou's ontology therefore states that every situation is 
founded upon pure inconsistent multiplicity, or what he calls a 'void' or 'empty set.'76  
Since any given presentation of a multiple implies the absolutely unpresentable, “void” is 
the proper name of Being.77  Since any unity of elements is imposed by a count the void 
must be what precedes it.  Any presentation or counting thus necessarily forces the void 
back into its nothingness, indeed, pure multiplicity or inconsistency can only be inferred 
or deduced  through the claim that any counting or determination constitutes an 
operation so that 'something' is prior to the count which the latter always excludes.78  The 
count in other words, is only retrospectively apprehended as an operation.79   
 
 If from the perspective of a given count or what Badiou calls 'situation' the void 
appears as nothing since it cannot be counted, it is not simply non-Being since it is at the 
same time the stuff of which determinate or consistent presentations are made.  The void 
is thus that which is not subject to counting or rather, that which can only be counted as 
'nothing' rather than something and is in this sense 'void' for the situation.80  The void is 
thus, in Badiou's words, inconsistent multiplicity “according to a situation,” it is that in the 
situation which presents nothing (in the set of numbers 1,2,3,4.... 0 is void since it is 
foundational for the set, yet cannot be counted as a 'one').81  For while every situation has 
its way of counting its members the void is what only appears as unauthorized, 
unqualified and un-counted and thus, what makes up the Being of a situation.   
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 Any situation is structured by a particular count or criteria of 'belonging' and 
'inclusion' such that counting results in a sort of meta-structure which Badiou calls the 
'state of the situation' and which in turn, designates the situation as 'one.'  Moreover, 
there is a constitutive distinction between presentation and representation in relation to 
the state.  Presentation refers to the fact that each unit is presented or counted in the 
same way.  Presentation is therefore always egalitarian since ontology has absolutely 
nothing to say about empirical processes of counting, insofar as it belongs to a set each 
element counts as one.82  Yet the state organizes the anarchic multiplicity of subsets into a 
coherent 'representation' which is a function of classifying or ordering the situation.  
Representation supplements presentation insofar as it makes the inclusion of its elements 
discernible.  Significantly, an element can be presented without being represented.  That 
is, it can belong to the situation without being included in its state such that it lies on 'the 
edge of the void,' at the limit of pure generic or indeterminate multiplicity and thus, 
without being included in the state of the situation since the state is nothing but 
resistance to or prohibition of the presentation of the void, of generic multiplicity and it 
is in this sense that Badiou defines the state as an always violent inclusion whose effect is 
“the disjunction between presentation and representation.”83  For example, a family of 
undocumented migrants within France might be counted as a 'family' and belong to the 
situation of the French state yet they are not included in it; that is, they are presented, but 
as non-citizens are not represented in the situation of social life in France.84  Their 
existence within the French situation is foreign to the very logic of that situation. 
 
 It is in terms of the disjunction between presentation and representation that 
Badiou's ontology is defined as subtractive and through which we will locate his political 
orientation since the aim of subtractive ontology is to describe the conditions that will 
allow one to move beyond the state of representation to a situation of pure presentation.85  
Any counting as measure, calculation or ordering establishes categories of existence so 
that counting is therefore never totally distinct from its terms and as such always presumes 
the presentation of pure multiplicity.  For if, as I claimed above, every 'one' is the result of 
an operation of the count it follows that what 'is' counted is not one, 'something' precedes 
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every count or order.  As with Derrida and Foucault, it is the inference of the artificiality 
of every hierarchy or ordering of relations which for Badiou affirms the irreducibility of 
contingency and thus, structures the possibility of an 'emancipatory' indetermination or 
rupturing of the determination of relations.  Furthermore, much as in Derrida and 
Foucault it is a particular understanding of 'the event' which lies at the core of Badiou's 
ethico-political orientation. 
 
 Strictly speaking the event is not an ontological category in Badiou's work since its 
status is extra-ontological.  Yet it is through his concept of the event as truth-procedure 
that we can perhaps most clearly distinguish Badiou from Derrida and Foucault and the 
implications of his thought for an account of the relational.  Badiou defines the event of 
truth as a break with knowledge and with all established criteria, as he puts it, “truth 
makes a hole in knowledge.”86  Truth is subtracted from the ordering of particular 
situations and so emptied of content and as such is affirmed as open to all and thus, as 
universal.  The archetype of a truth-event is to be found in Badiou's reading of St.Paul.  
The event of truth which struck St.Paul on the road to Damascus, that of Resurrection, 
suspended all rituals and laws while founding as the sole truth-procedure necessary to be a 
Christian, open to all without reservation, was the public and militant avowal of that 
faith: “[t]he One is only insofar as it is for all: such is the maxim of universality when it 
has its roots in the event.”87  Unlike the other Apostles, Paul's concern was not with the 
re-foundation of the Jewish community and its laws, Paul's truth was indifferent to the 
state of the situation and by definition, totally inclusive.   
 
 As Balibar points out, Badiou's notion of the event marks it out as a radically 
different historicization of truth to both Derrida’s and Foucault’s.88  From Badiou's 
perspective Derrida's de-stabilization of idealities in their dissemination in time and space 
subsumes the question of truth to a hermeneutical-theological question of meaning while 
Foucault's prioritization of truth's material effects brackets the question of truth 
altogether.  Common to both is the absence in their thought of what Badiou's ontology 
claims is the generic and universal nature of any truth and thus, a failure to think the 
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event as such.  In question is accordingly the identification of differing loci of the event, a 
discrepancy which carries over to ethics and politics to, in Badiou's case, constitute an 
altogether distinct and universalist terrain upon which dominant logics are resisted. 
 
 But how then does the event, wholly in excess of the situation, occur?  It is here 
that some element in excess of belonging to the situation or at the 'edge of the void' 
(discussed above) holds a crucial function.89  An element in excess of belonging to the 
situation provides in its indetermination an “evental site” insofar as it is a sheer 
singularity from which an event can emerge (consider '0' in the number series 1,2,3,4 
which cannot itself count as a number or the undocumented family member who counts 
as a member of the family, but in himself remains “un-presented” within the situation).90  
An element that goes un-counted by the state of the situation is by definition singular and 
totally self-defining (since it is not counted by the situation) and therefore acts as a 
potential catalyst for change and transformation of the way a situation organises its 
elements since the situation cannot be maintained as it is while 'counting' this element.91   
For undocumented workers, a total reformulation of the logic of the state is required – a 
transformation of the legal, economic and socio-political fabric – if their existence as 
members of the situation is to be recognized.  
  
 Since the event fails to “connect” to the state of the situation, the state cannot 
recognize it, the event, in Badiou's words, “surges up as such beyond every count.”92  
There can be no knowledge of the event since its very nature is to interrupt the order of 
knowledge so that not unlike its status for Derrida, the event is “undecidable” and 
“supernumerary” from the perspective of the situation.93  In short, the event forges a 
caesura in the state since it produces a perspective of which the situation can have no 
knowledge and points to the void or inconsistency out of which the situation emerges.  
The event is simply that moment when the ordering, hierarchy and rules through which 
things appear in the situation are suspended and Being is exposed as what it is, as pure 
multiplicity and anterior to every determinate relation.  It allows all elements in the 
situation to count as the same and thus, allows equality to serve as the rule of 
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representation insofar as it is grounded in pure multiplicity.   
 
 Because the event always implies a rupture with the situation, it therefore 
connotes two further key elements; that any truth event requires the intervention of a 
subject and that the event is always divided into two.  First, the event calls for a subject 
who asserts and verifies, by examining or 'investigating' one by one the connection of the 
infinite number of in-situation multiples to the event, the existence of the supernumerary 
in the situation.  The subject is a local operator of the production of truth and so does 
not precede the event but rather, the event is what makes a process of subjectivation 
possible.94  Accordingly, the subject's interpretative intervention declares or decides if an 
event is presented in a situation by 'forcing' a name out of an un-presented element of the 
site.  The event, in other words, demands naming from the subject (e.g., Christ's 
Resurrection, the French or October revolution) since only through a subjective 
intervention on behalf of truth can an event be circulated and named.  For example, an 
analysis of the history of France between 1789-94 can account for all the terms which 
belong to this historical situation (the guillotines, the massacres, English spies, etc.) but 
this presentation of the revolution acquires an identity through an “axial term” (in this 
case Saint-Just's declaration that the 'revolution is frozen’).95  The event is thus signified by 
a singular point (a declaration or act) which functions as a pivotal moment (the Road to 
Damascus for the early Christians or Saint-Just's declaration for the French Revolution).  
An event is never affirmed by all within the situation and it is thus the militant work of 
the subjects for whom it appears to decide its undecidability so that a truth appears to all 
in the situation.  In Badiou's words, the subject “generate[s] veridical statements that were 
previously undecidable.”96   
 
 It is in terms of the concept of intervention that Badiou's crucial ethical operator 
of 'fidelity' emerges.97  Ethics is defined by the general principle of faithfully continuing a 
truth-process, to preserve the rupture with a situation which the event signifies and is 
characterised by Badiou through the ethical imperative of “keep going!” or “never forget 
what you have encountered.”98  Fidelity sets forth the command not to subsume the event 
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to the law of a situation but rather, to maintain its singularity and transform one's own 
life through its terms.  Moreover, insofar as the event exceeds a situation and demands an 
intervention, if it is to be maintained qua event it must divide into two.99  Since the event 
is indiscernible in the situation and only guaranteed by an intervention there must thus 
be a division between those who do and do not affirm it.100  There is always an essential 
division between the state's counting and a revolutionary event since the event is always 
illegal for a state which cannot account for it.101   
 
Badiou’s Emancipatory Political Ontology 
 What relevance does this ontology hold for the terms of the debate over the status 
of the universal in the resistance to dominant logics or systems?  Like Derrida, Foucault 
and all post-foundational thought, Badiou's ontology indicates a re-articulation of 
philosophy's relation to politics.  Much as for his two predecessors, ontology does not 
serve to generate philosophical or scientific principles which seek to explain or determine 
the political, philosophy is actively engaged in politics.  For Badiou, politics (like the three 
other “generic procedures” of love, art and science) forms philosophy's 'conditions.'102  
Philosophy does not produce truths but rather, truths condition philosophy, that is, 
philosophy “seizes truths” such that its role is to think the events that orient it.103   
 
 For Badiou, politics is defined by its collective and universal nature.  Unlike 
mathematics or love whose subject may be finite (for Badiou love is between two people), 
the subject of politics is by definition universal and infinite.104  Thus, the condition for an 
emancipatory politics is that its truths be collective and universal, that is to say, addressed 
and open to all who proceed from the event.105  An 'unqualified equality' is the only 
criterion of politics: “equality is politics, such that a contrario, any in-egalitarian statement, 
whatever it be, is anti-political.”106   To the extent that politics for Badiou is intrinsically 
collective and universal, it is thus opposed to the finitude at the core of the 'weakness' of 
the Derridean and Foucaultian ethico-political orientations.  Indeed, its universal 
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character denotes that there is no intrinsic limit to collective politics, it is by definition 
infinite since politics presents the infinite of every situation.107  Activity is therefore 
qualified as political only insofar as it seeks a total transformation of the situation in, as 
Peter Hallward puts it, “the interest of the universal interest.”108  Any activity restricted by 
a principle narrower than an absolutely infinite, universal and collective demand for 
equality is simply not politics but only a negotiation of determinate relations in situo, a 
“mixture of power and opinions.”109   
 
 Badiou calls the axiomatic prescription of equality 'justice.'110  Philosophy subtracts 
the axiom of pure equality from within social processes and thus, amounts to a practice 
which calls for a justice open to all.111  The axiomatic character of Badiou's politics of 
equality follows directly from his ontology since politics is that activity whereby pure 
belonging or presentation is abstracted from all representations.112  Politics is grounded in 
the ontological principle that all elements which belong to a situation are presented in the 
same way.  Insofar as equality is subtractive, its criteria cannot be defined by any positive 
content nor prescribe its terrain or terms, it is only defined by the 'negative' moment of 
rupturing, of the undermining of determinate relations, that is, of moving from 
consistency to inconsistency.113  As such, political truth is always a “trial and trouble” and 
accordingly, also a “rupture and disorder.”114    Rather than stabilizing or legitimizing social 
relations, it presents only their moments of inconsistency.  No matter how open a 
situation might be to accommodating particular claims or terms, there are for Badiou 
moments of transformation so extreme that the situation will cease to be the same 
situation it was prior to them.  The French, Russian or Cultural revolutions did not occur 
through a reformist democratic openness to differences but through radical disruptions of 
the logic by which members of those states were represented.115   
  
 In distinction to Heidegger's dike and the Derridean and Foucaultian accounts of 
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the founding-unfounding of relation which proceed from it, Badiou's notion of justice 
seeks absolutely no “foundation of social bond.”116  Unlike Heidegger, Derrida and 
Foucault who all insist upon the de-politicization that always accompanies every rupture 
of the social bond, justice for Badiou involves only “attempts to seize the egalitarian axiom 
in a veritable political sequence.”117  In other words, while none of these thinkers seek to 
legitimize any particular foundation, they all in some sense see the founding or 
determining moment as irreducible.  This irreducibility in turn sets the terms for the 
affirmation of finitude which by contrast, Badiou’s axiomatic universalism totally rejects.   
 
 
Intersections Between Badiou, Derrida and Foucault 
 There are nevertheless a number of intersections between Badiou's and Derrida 
and Foucault's ethico-political strategies.  First, the fundamental point of convergence 
between them lies with the aim of thinking the relational in itself, that is, the pure 
plurality of human existence.  Once every order or hierarchy is conceived as artificial, 
philosophy's relation to the political is theorized as the attempt to think being-with in 
itself and is not involved in the proposition of principles to legitimize and determine the 
good order.  Political thought is restricted to positing the anteriority of an excess of all 
determinate relations and of theorizing the nature of the event of its reduction or 
determination (as disavowal of the aporia, the coagulation of power relations or the 
count).  In relating every determinate order back to the contingency of its origins theory 
has a liberating effect, for if no particular order is natural or necessary none can claim 
legitimacy.  Moreover, if every order is the result of a determination then philosophy in 
turn must affirm its own status as departing from particular political conditions, the 
anteriority of the indeterminate is only ever thought from within the determinate and to 
fail to affirm this relational point of departure is to return philosophy to its sovereign 
position governing the empirical. 
 
 But crucially, for Badiou, politics does not involve the affirmation of differences 
which escape any determination and thus, place dominant logics in question as it seems 
to for Derrida and Foucault.  Difference for Badiou is not an emancipatory operator since 
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the accommodation of differences does not pose a radical challenge to the state.  Claims 
for recognition and legitimacy by particular communities or identities remain congenial 
to the logic of liberal capitalism insofar as they rely upon a decision of the state to supply 
their recognition and are thus inserted within its logic.  On the other hand, truths 
eliminate differences and testify to the latter's insignificance since truth points to the 
infinity of the collective.  Truth is, Badiou says, “indifferent to differences.”118  It is the 
collective, axiomatic and universal nature of truth and of politics which marks the 
ultimate discrepancy of Badiou from Derrida and Foucault as well as most post-
foundational political thought.   
 
 Everything here hinges upon the terms in which the conditions of the event are 
articulated and the accordant terrain upon which its effects might be located.  From the 
perspective of Badiou's subtractive ontology, both Derrida and Foucault err insofar as they 
trace the de-stabilization of a dominant order in such a way that it is forever relegated to 
'real universality's' margins.  In the indefinite unveiling of the aporetic or problematic 
status of any universal, Derrida and Foucault both renounce the possibility of ever 
constructing a politics in Badiou's sense, a universal and axiomatic claim to equality.  A 
political ethics oriented by a 'desire for the other,' in what Badiou would see as the self-
limiting of its articulation to particular and marginal sites of determination, fails to 
produce any account of politics which might productively subvert the logics within which 
it is articulated.   
 
 For Badiou deconstruction constitutes a rigorous thought of the indeterminate or 
in his words, “inexistent,” yet in refusing to stray from what he describes is for Derrida the 
“impossibility of the inscription of the inexistent” he thus restricts the transformative potential 
of the event.119  For while both Badiou and Derrida orient their notions of the event 
around something which totally exceeds the situation, the latter confines its appearance 
to a 'trace' of the ineffable while Badiou situates the transformative potential of the event 
in the evental site and thus, from within the situation (yet in excess of the count of the 
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situation).120  As such, Badiou seeks to overcome the indefinite oscillation between same 
and other, inside and outside in terms of which deconstruction operates.  So while for 
Derrida determinately deciding the truth of the event is ultimately impossible, it is 
precisely this apparent ethico-political impasse generated by deconstruction which Badiou 
moves to overcome by justifying every commitment in terms of its universal and infinite 
nature.121  Yet, if for Badiou Derrida attempts to point to the indeterminate as 
indeterminate in thinking its withdrawal from every presence, Foucault's error seems to be 
the failure to think the event at all.  Since change is always located within and between 
given fields of power-knowledge by Foucault, what is missing from his account is that 
which totally exceeds the field itself, that is, the event of truth.122  Since Foucault always 
locates what he calls the event as occurring within power relations, his analyses forever 
remain at the level of systems of knowledge within the situation while we know that for 
Badiou, truth is wholly in excess of knowledge.  Accordingly, the political implication of 
Derrida's and Foucault's failures to think the event in Badiou's terms is that the possibility 
of a collective and absolutely universalist politics subtracted from differentiation is totally 
foreclosed.  In short, what seems to be lacking in both thinkers is the possibility of 
accounting for the conditions for a radical transformation of the determinate. 
 
 Yet, if I am suggesting that Badiou implicitly and occasionally, explicitly 
circumscribes the genealogical politics which, in distinct forms, emerges from Derrida's 
and Foucault's work to enunciate their situatedness within the logic of the situation it 
should nevertheless be possible to suggest the reverse.  The central focus of such a 
circumscription would have to revolve around the key terms of Badiou's ontology, that is, 
the theorization of the relation between Being and the event.  An enduring criticism of 
Badiou's work since Being and Event is the apparent elitism and heroism upon which his 
notion of the event relies.123    Why, for instance, are some moments (St. Paul, the French 
or Russian revolutions) named as events and not others?  We know that for a moment to 
be an event for Badiou it must be universal and that politically this means that it must 
concern all as posited by the axiom of equality.  But, as John Mullarkey points out, the 
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question thus lies with how this universal 'all' is to be determined, how the infinite count 
in itself to be decided: “how is equality to be fleshed out – in welfare, in rights, or just in 
counting?”124   
 
 In posing this sort of question are we not entering once again the terrain of 
deconstruction?  That is, of the aporetic oscillation produced in the relation between the 
universal and the singular in its articulation as a political process.  For example, if the 
truth-event is to include all without limit we are driven towards irreducible aporias of an 
infinite count: should a city welcome its enemies, should I give to the poor until I am 
poor?  Or alternately, as Mullarkey argues, if we restrict, as Badiou does, the political 
process to some (apparently arbitrary) qualifier – which in Badiou's case is the limitation 
of universal emancipation to humans and for instance, not animals, plants or even robots 
do we not unjustifiably restrict in some way the universality of the universal?125  As Laclau 
has argued, Badiou’s formalist universalism may be operative at the purely mathematical 
level, but at the level of social analysis it cannot be maintained.126  No universal can 
transcend its singular and particular inscriptions and thus, no universal can be emptied of 
all content.  It is far from clear that Badiou's political ontology escapes the complexity, 
vagaries and aporias of the indefinite differential movements of idealities in time and 
space theorized by Derrida once universality is implemented as a political prescription 
and process. 
 
 This line of questioning also points us towards a possible Foucaultian 
circumscription of Badiou whose contours have been pointed to by Peter Hallward.  For 
Badiou's equation of politics exclusively with universal and collective militant criteria 
forecloses political engagement with potentially progressive yet ultimately perhaps merely 
reformist 'social work' (Hallward's examples include poverty reduction, welfare, 
education).  Maybe more importantly, Badiou's political ontology threatens to veil what 
for Foucault are the local sites, procedures and rationalities which make up the 'micro-
physics' of power and which, in their coagulations or sedimentations, make up a 
dominant political logic.127  For Foucault, it is because mechanisms of power do not 
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emanate from a single site or centre that they cannot be resisted in terms of a single logic.  
Reference to a single term of 'state' effaces both the multiplicity and complexity of power-
knowledge and restricts the irreducible resistance which accompanies, in differing 
intensities, every application of power. 
 
 As we have seen, both Derrida and Foucault problematize the logics of 
revolutionary politicizations in ways which appear inimical to Badiou's political ontology 
of the event.  For Derrida the possibility of politicization is irreducible yet since any 
particular politicization will necessarily be finite it will always entail a relative 
depoliticization which, in turn, opens the possibility of further politicization.  In 
Foucault's genealogy, struggle is simply always possible, everything can be politicized and it 
is precisely in the attempt to produce a rationality for, or the conditions of, revolt that we 
tame and reduce it.  Derrida and Foucault both view difference as irreducible so that the 
event or the emergence of the new cannot ultimately be closed.  It is thus in some sense 
the aim of their work to liberate the power of this contingency where it has been 
disavowed or determined by philosophy, ethics and politics.  Determinate relations are in 
this sense only contingently determinate since there is an absolute irreducibility of the 
event from the conditioned.  In locating transformative possibilities as emerging within 
determinate relations both thus preclude the need for an account of the wholly 
exceptional, non-relational and heroic character of the event in Badiou's terms.        
 
 
Conclusion 
 Does this mean we can place Badiou within the logics of perspectivism by which 
I've defined post-foundational onto-political accounts?  Is Badiou's ontology and his 
universalist politics amenable to the schema of polemics through which I have framed a 
dialogue between Derrida and Foucault?  The defense of such a claim would require an 
extensive engagement with Badiou's opus and with his recently translated Logic of Worlds 
in which some of the questions we have posed to Badiou are further addressed.  This 
work exceeds the scope of this thesis yet I think we can nevertheless begin to suggest, as I 
have done above, the terms upon which such an operation would proceed.  Moreover, 
Badiou's work is in a sense an even more coherently circular 'grander' narrative than 
either Derrida's or Foucault's.  Badiou's account of ontology as mathematics, as pure 
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multiplicity elaborated by set theory affirms his own starting point within the terms of his 
ontology.  That is, he affirms that the maths of set theory itself is born of an event and 
sustained by fidelity (Badiou's among others).128  Badiou's preference for multiplicity is an 
explicitly ethical event and has the status of an axiomatic “decision.”129  Yet, to suggest 
that Badiou thus affirms the relational situatedness of his account would be to overstate 
the point.  For the axioms of set theory through which his ontology emerges testify not to 
the finitude of the accounts origins but rather to the infinite and limitless nature of 
multiplicity.   
 
 Moreover, Badiou’s work certainly poses a challenge to the polemico-perspectivist 
account of incommensurable political ontologies developed in this thesis.  His critiques of 
Nietzsche’s will to power as an attempt to think the ineffable and of his ‘reduction’ of his 
truths to his own enunciative position evidence the difficulties of thinking Badiou’s 
ontology in the same terms as Derrida’s or Foucault’s.130  Yet Badiou’s is an oeuvre which 
is still being developed and re-articulated.  His recently published Logics of Worlds begins to 
address some of the questions we have raised here over the difficulties his account faces in 
thinking within the situation and it is perhaps in looking to work he is currently 
producing that we may seek to further think his relation to the work of Derrida and 
Foucault. 
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Conclusion:  
Perspectivism in Excess of Derrida and Foucault 
 
'In every philosophy there comes a point at which 
 the 'conviction' of the philosopher enters on stage.' 
Friedrich Nietzsche1 
 
The Question of Perspectivism, Again  
We conclude by returning to the fundamental paradox articulated in the 
introduction to this thesis: ‘how are we to think the differences and divergences between 
political ontologies which provide an account of the nature of the relational while 
simultaneously affirming the finite and political status of that very account?’  This thesis 
has not sought a resolution to this apparent dilemma, nor is it certain that one is or 
should be found.  Indeed, rather than resolve the paradox, the aim of this thesis has been 
to question and explore the conditions and implications that issue from it.  As the 
introduction to this thesis suggests, post-foundationalism signals the essential 
contestability of political concepts yet my claim has been that this also implies the 
contestability of conceptions of the political and in turn, a shift is required in the way we 
think the relation between philosophy and politics.  It is here that an account of the 
political through the question of relationality becomes indispensable.  For if any concept 
of the political is contingent, the affirmation of this contingency should also involve a 
reversal of the relation between philosophy and political ontology.  Philosophical 
discourse itself must be situated within the post-Heideggerean depiction of the 
(dis)ordering movements of political determination if it is to accord with the post-
foundational thesis.  Once the autonomy of philosophy's enterprise of providing and 
justifying foundations for relational existence is disturbed by the affirmation that this 
gesture is pre-eminently violent and political, then the priority of the philosophical over 
the political can no longer be maintained.  The 'political', as event of determination, can 
no longer be reduced to any particular sphere or institutions, and moreover, every 
philosophy must be affirmed as emerging from a given determination of the political. 
 
 The full implications of this account of political ontology only emerge insofar as 
we think it from out of the question of relation – something which political thought has 
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generally failed to do.  The claim underlying this thesis has been that through an analysis 
of the question of relationality it becomes apparent that any account of the event of 
determination itself proceeds from out of its situatedness within the determinate.  There 
is an irreducible opacity inherent to every political ontology.  While politics can no longer 
lay claim to secure grounds, the gesture of rethinking the ontological cannot be separated 
or abstracted from the determinate conditions into which it is 'thrown.'  Insofar as it does 
so it will necessarily be partial, oblique and contingent.  It is by placing the formulation of 
this inherent partiality and contingency of political thought at the core of the analysis 
that this thesis has demonstrated that a polemic can be traced between Derrida and 
Foucault in terms of their accounts of (de)politicization, the polemic between them is 
shown to result from their pursuit of two parallel yet radically incommensurable 
philosophico-strategic accounts of de- and re-politicization.  Throughout, it has been by 
foregrounding the question of relation that the analysis of Derrida’s and Foucault’s 
‘grander’ narratives has proceeded without effacing the fact that philosophy is in itself 
political, that is, inextricably tied to determinate relations.  That is to say, any account of 
the relational itself begins from out of particular and determinate (social, linguistic, 
economic, sexual, political, etc.) relations.  Accordingly, any descriptions of the nature of 
the political as a contingent field of relations and the concordant determinations or 
reductions of this contingency are themselves affected by and have effects upon that field.  
Any absolute autonomy philosophy might hold in relation to the political is irrevocably 
undermined.     
 
 In positing that the dialogue between Derrida and Foucault occurs over the 
question of the 'medium' or terrain wherein relations are contingently determined a 
number of questions emerge that cut across their works.  First, epistemic questions about 
the possibility of a knowledge that can conceive this 'medium' while simultaneously 
avowing its own situatedness.  Accordingly, chapter 2 had sought to show both that the 
polemic between Derrida and Foucault is irreducible, but also that they pursue analogous 
philosophical orientations, in turn often resulting in parallel themes in their analyses.  
Second, it was through ontological questions about the being of thought, its relation to its 
outside and relationality's own emergence or generativity that Chapter 3 examined the 
simultaneous convergence and divergence between Derrida and Foucault through the 
scope of their methodological principles (the mode by which their questioning proceeds 
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in negotiating its own finitude and contingency).  Third, the question of the possibility of 
providing an orientation for a self-affirmingly situated thought was pursued in chapter 4 
through an engagement with the question of ethics (the way by which their philosophies 
admit their own inherently violent or reductive nature yet nevertheless seek to formulate a 
‘lesser’ violence).  Finally, the question of the possibility of a situated and finite thought 
that might nevertheless maintain an emancipatory orientation was pursued in the 
engagement with politics in chapter 5 (Derrida and Foucault’s re-articulations of 
philosophy’s relation to the political, of the notion of emancipation and of democracy).   
 
It is thus in tracing the polemic between Derrida and Foucault as two ways of 
thinking the relational that I have sought to demonstrate that there exists a politicized or 
polemical space that exceeds their accounts and which appears only negatively – inferred 
in the moments where their divergence points to the fundamentally incommensurable 
nature of their work.  It is the self-affirmingly particular and situated origins of their 
thought that points to the fact that something of the relational by definition always 
exceeds their responses to the above questions (since any response to the question is 
always accompanied by an irreducible opacity). 
 
In addition, in chapter 6 I sought to suggest that this form of polemic is not 
restricted to Derrida and Foucault, but might also be extended to more recent post-
foundational thinkers such as Alain Badiou, who have sought to overturn the theme of 
finitude as it emerges in Heideggerean and post-Heideggerean thought.  While Badiou 
may provide one of the most powerful critiques of Derrida and Foucault, his ontology too 
may be susceptible to a circumscriptive critique through either a Derridean or Foucaultian 
perspective and thus, to the vagaries of polemics of the relational described in this thesis.  
That is to say, one may locate moments of incommensurability between Badiou, Derrida 
and Foucault which in turn, produce a recoil in Badiou’s text onto its own situatedness in 
a relational field which ultimately, it cannot account for.  What is more, this 
incommensurability – between Derrida, Foucault and perhaps Badiou – itself points to a 
broader account of the relational.  For if there are inherent limits to every political 
ontology, and no particular ontology may claim a final interpretation of those limits 
(since this interpretation is always liable to be circumscribed by another one), then we can 
infer that there is an absolute excess of the relational anterior and irreducible to any 
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‘grander narrative’ which seeks to describe it.  In other words, there is by definition 
something of the relational which inherently resists or withdraws from its inscription by 
any particular political ontology.  As a result, if there is already broad agreement among 
post-foundational thinkers of the polemical nature of all political concepts, then the point 
of debate should be transformed from the traditional question of the grounds of 
legitimacy to competing (and possibly incommensurable) accounts of the polemical, to 
the violence and determination of relationality itself.   
 
 
Formulating Polemics 
 There are certainly resonances between the formulation of philosophical polemics 
developed in this thesis with other recent accounts of the polemical and of 
incommensurability, Jean-Francois Lyotard’s and Jacques Rancière’s in particular.  It is 
important to briefly review them here in order to underline the particular questions that 
my own account of polemics raises for political thought.  Perhaps most well known and 
influential of these is the conception of incommensurability in the work of Lyotard. 
Lyotard's claim in The Postmodern Condition that any narrative can be shown to fail to meet 
its own criteria enacts the shift discussed in my Introduction, from a question of 
foundations to an examination of their conditions and effects.  Since there is no ultimate 
foundation, Lyotard argues, agonism is irreducible.  In the works following this text, 
Lyotard continues to seek to develop what he describes there as “a theory of games which 
accept agonistics as a founding principle.”2  In Just Gaming, written several years later, 
Lyotard supplements his notion of agonism with a conception of “incommensurability.”  
Located in the intersections between ‘ language games’ (a term Lyotard appropriates from 
Wittgenstein denoting systems wherein meaning is produced), incommensurability 
follows from Lyotard's claim that the absence of any criteria of judgment over competing 
language games implies that such judgments can only be existential choices, resonates 
with my own argument for the impossibility of finally deciding between ‘grander’ 
narratives.3  In The Differend, the titular term replaces the notion of 'incommensurability' 
developed in Just Gaming.  Differends, Lyotard argues, occur between incommensurable 
language games, in his words, they represent “a case of a conflict between (at least) two 
                                               
2  Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. P.16 
3  See Jean-Francois Lyotard & Jean-Loup Thebaud, Just Gaming. (Wlad Godzich, Trans.)  
    Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1985.  P.16 
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parties that cannot be equitably resolved for a lack of a rule of judgment applicable to 
both arguments.”4  There are only, he claims, differends or “abysses” between 
perspectives.5  Here, Lyotard's formulation of the differend accords with my own claims 
for the ultimate irreducibility of polemics. Agonism is irreducible and irresolvable since 
the means of establishing a common 'reality' between perspectives or theories is itself an 
agonal question or object of agonism.  
 
 Rancière explicitly distinguishes his own formulation of polemics from Lyotard's 
conception of the differend.  Rancière argues that the differend is restricted to naming the 
conflict inherent to the “structure of community,” that is, it names a merely legalistic or 
'police' problem.6  Accordingly, to Lyotard's differend Rancière opposes his own 
formulation of polemics as 'disagreement' or 'dissensus' which he describes as  
 
“a determined kind of speech situation: one in which one of the interlocutors at once 
understands and does not understand what the other is saying... It is the conflict between 
one who says white and another who says white but does not understand the same thing 
by it or does not understand that the other is saying the same thing in the name of 
whiteness.”7   
 
How does this notion of incommensurability as 'disagreement' differ from Lyotard's?  
Rancière locates the divergence in political terms.  For Lyotard politics is located in every 
(inherently violent) decision over the linking of language games or 'phrases' while ethics 
would involve “bearing witness” to and avowing inherent incommensurability.8  While 
Rancière agrees that conflict occurs at the intersection of two heterogeneous logics, 
crucially, he diverges from Lyotard in claiming there is a fundamental equality underlying 
any disagreement.  Disagreement, which amounts to politics itself, is always between the 
'police' and the fundamental equality which any hierarchy or order presumes.  That is, 
because any order or hierarchy presumes and requires a basic shared understanding of 
orders and rules it must implicitly presume the fundamental equality which it explicitly 
denies.9  So while for Lyotard a differend is always violently decided and reduced by what 
he calls a “wrong,” for Rancière a “wrong” refers to the distortion by any order of the 
                                               
4  Jean-Francois Lyotard. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute.  (George van den Abbeele, Trans.)  
     Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
5  Ibid., p.150 
6  Jacques Rancière, Disagreement. P.18.  For Rancière 'police' refers to all dominant social logics. 
7  Ibid., P.X 
8  Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend, sections 22-3. 
9  Jacques Rancière, Disagreement, p.16 
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equality anterior to and conditional of any inequality.10  Polemics thus occur at the 
intersection of “equality and its absence together.”11   
 
Much like the formulation of philosophical polemics developed in this thesis, 
both Lyotard and Rancière think the political as a process whereby the foundations (or 
lack thereof) of social order are in dispute such that there are no criteria by which the 
dispute can be settled.  Both seek to theorize polemics in terms of incommensurability, 
that is, without a referent, standard or criteria outside of or not subject to polemics.  
Moreover, much as it is formulated in this thesis, both claim that philosophy or 'theory' 
does not attain an autonomy or Archimedean position beyond the polemical.  Yet the 
very difference between Lyotard and Rancière itself points to the more all-encompassing 
and irreducible description of the polemical developed in this thesis.  For there is 
nevertheless an irreducible incommensurability that takes place between Lyotard's 
fundamental notion of the heterogeneity of language games or phrases and Rancière's 
own axiomatic affirmation of a fundamental equality.12   
 
Accordingly, while Rancière assents to Lyotard’s notion that all ‘translation’ marks 
a violent betrayal of the incommensurable, he argues that Lyotard’s formulation of this 
violence functions as an alibi for inaction.  That is, Lyotard’s ‘wrong’ functions as yet 
another ‘ethics of alterity’ (discussed in chapters 5 and 6) which produces an “experience 
of impotence” whereby “any process of emancipation is perceived as the disastrous 
attempt to deny the disaster that enslaves the mind to otherness.”13  As such, if we are to 
follow Lyotard the only possibility we are left with is an avowal of our finitude in speaking 
the unnameable.14  Politics, if it is to be emancipatory, must proceed from a principle of 
equality that contests the constituted differences maintained by the police.  Yet conversely, 
one might claim in defense of Lyotard that heterogeneity precedes any conception of 
equality.  Thus, the fundamental equality that for Rancière is anterior to and conditional 
of disagreement itself might be said to presuppose that a cultural or social differend has 
                                               
10  Ibid., p.39 
11  Ibid., p.89 
12  The axiomatic status of universal equality in Rancière's work brings him close to Badiou,  
       something the latter acknowledges, though not uncritically.  See Badiou’s Metapolitics, pp.107-23.    
13  Jacques Rancière, “The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics.” Unpublished manuscript  
      written in response to papers presented at Fidelity to the Disagreement conference, Goldsmiths  
       College, London, 17 September 2003.   
14  Ibid. 
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already been effaced.15  A certain heterogeneity (cultural, linguistic, etc.), as Lyotard 
formulates it, would always be prior to any equality.   
 
Accordingly, from these seemingly irreducible oscillations between their 
competing accounts of the polemical, it seems that between Lyotard and Rancière there 
emerges two incommensurable circumscriptions, their divergence constituted by the 
incommensurability of the sources of polemics that they posit.  From this admittedly 
extremely brief analysis of these two influential notions of polemics and 
incommensurability it follows that, in their intersections and accordant mutual 
circumscriptions, it is an irreducible polemics itself and not heterogeneity in Lyotard’s 
sense nor equality in Rancière’s that emerges as anterior condition.  Any attempt to 
define or ‘ground’ the polemical – no matter how minimally both thinkers seek to do so – 
is always itself a polemical move.   
 
These claims should not be understood to imply that all philosophy is thus 
relativized, but rather, it is politicized.  Here, Nietzsche’s doctrine of perspectivism becomes 
prescient.  Recall that in chapter 1 I argued that Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not 
undermine his ‘grander narrative’ of will to power, indeed, it is totally in accord with it.  
There is no will to power ‘in-itself’ but only it’s transitory and partial expressions in 
particular perspectives.  However, this does not entail a vicious circularity between 
Nietzsche’s affirmation of the irreducibility of the situatedness of his account and the 
‘universalizing’ objectives of will to power as ontology.  Instead, will to power as a ‘grander 
narrative’ is evaluated on the grounds of its capacity to account for and circumscribe within 
its terms, other competing accounts (by metaphysics, positivism, etc.).  Indeed, Nietzsche 
already understood that once philosophy lost its metaphysical pretensions, it could 
thereafter only be perspectival.  That any ‘grander narrative’ or ‘weak ontology’ it were to 
produce would necessarily have to recoil back upon the site of its enunciation.  Nietzsche 
had therefore already partially discerned the means by which post-foundational thought 
would proceed.  That is, as I have claimed, in terms of polemics in which one seeks to 
account for the conditions of the interlocutor’s account.  Philosophy is thus politicized 
insofar as it becomes an agonism between onto-political perspectives competing over the 
power to circumscribe the other within their grander narratives.  
                                               
15  This claim is developed by Jean-Louis Déotte in “The Differences Between Rancière’s Mésentente 
(Political Disagreement) and Lyotard’s Différend.” SubStance. Vol.33, No.1 (2004).  Pp.77-90 
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 Yet because the articulation of relationality, polemics and incommensurability in 
this thesis rarely exceeds the scope of the encounter between Derrida and Foucault (with 
the exception of the relatively brief discussion of Badiou’s political ontology in chapter 6) 
its scope is admittedly partial and inconclusive.  In other words, the claim that these 
formulations extend beyond the particularity of the two philosophical oeuvres examined 
here can only be a hypothetical one; a premise from which future research might proceed.  
If the formulation of agonism that emerges in this thesis is to be maintained then it must 
be sought in a broader depiction of the topos and the intersections between the multiple 
and varying articulations of the relational operative in philosophy and political today.  In 
this regard, a number of thinkers might brought into such a discussion.  For instance, 
Gilles Deleuze, Giorgio Agamben, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Rancière all proceed from 
basic principles analogous to those of Derrida and Foucault.  All of these thinkers situate 
their thought in relation to localized and finite conditions and relations, all affirm the 
inherent contingency of any order and all seek to avow the artificiality and violence of any 
ordering or hierarchy – both conceptual and political.  Yet to proceed from these general 
claims to a confirmation of the extension of our formulation of agonism and 
perspectivism would require an analysis of the terrain or media upon which the ultimate 
incommensurabilities between these thinkers might be said to emerge, the points at 
which their ‘grander’ narratives might be said to make them deaf to one another.  This is 
both to affirm the particularity and finitude of this thesis as well as an appeal for further 
engagement with the multitude of questions it begs.   
 
 A final and significant question remains here over the relation of philosophy and 
politics.  How are we to conceive ‘theory’s’ relation to the political once we affirm the 
situated and agonal nature of all theory as we have done here?  Once philosophy is 
politicized to the extent it is in this thesis how is the proper territory (if there is one) of 
philosophy to be mapped out?  The aim of this thesis has not been to offer definitive 
answers to these questions but rather, to begin to relocate the nature of our questions 
regarding philosophy’s relation to politics.  That is to say, it is this politicization of 
philosophy – conceived through the question of relation in the work of Derrida and 
Foucault – that this thesis has sought to trace.  The way in which these broader questions 
might now be addressed remains the object of further work. 
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